 Okay. Well, if you don't like what Plato has to say, if you're not willing to commit to these platonic forms, which are utterly mysterious, that's fine. You don't have to accept what Plato has to say. I mean, Plato was a wrestler and Plato, the name Plato means broad shoulder, but that doesn't mean Plato's gonna appear and strong arm you into accepting the forms, right? So, but if you're gonna reject Plato's conception of the form, then you're rejecting, I mean, maybe you're rejecting truth altogether, right? In which case you're back to Gorgias. Well, if you're gonna say there's at least some kind of truth or at least some kind of universals or some kind of meanings like this sort of thing, you know, because truth itself is not a particular object, right? So I say it is true that 2 plus 2 equals 4, but I'm not pointing you to an object that's 2 plus 2 equals 4. If we're going to say that there's some kind of forms of some kind, right, there we're going to reject at least one of the four characteristics that Plato's provided. You're either going to say that forms are not known through reason, that forms are not objective knowledge, that forms are not universals, or that forms are not eternal. Well, let's see what happens when we try any one of these. Okay, well, let's say we reject the first kid, you know, the first way, the first characteristic of Plato's conception form, that they're known through reason. I mean, he probably rejects Plato's notion of it. And frankly, any other notion of reason is probably going to be equally mysterious, right? We don't have a good grasp on how we rationalize or, you know, through reason come to know truths, right? We, you know, we say people do it and we point to examples, but it's not like we know what's going on in the head. Well, but what's the alternative if we give up on reason what we know forms through perception? Well, if we know forms through perception, then somehow they're seen. Well, that's not right, because you can't see the number two, you can only see a numeral two. You can't see truth, you can only reason to truth, or judge that something is true, or interpret that something is true. So if forms are known through something other than reason, what's your candidate perception? You'll have to explain how you can see form, which is like saying you have to explain how you can see the unseen. And I'm not talking metaphorically in some mystical way. I mean, literally unseen, unseeable, invisible. Maybe you say that it's through emotion, but that's not right, right? I mean, motion is really opposed to reason. So if it's not going to be reason, then perception, in which case you're not committed to, you know, seeing the unseen, talk about a rocky start. Well, let's try the next one. If we're rejecting Plato's characteristic form that it's objective knowledge of which knows the thing, the form itself. Well, okay, so if that's what we're doing, rejecting objective knowledge, it sure seems like we're right back to subjective truth. All right, we're right back to at best, protagonist, that all truth is subjective, is just whatever you say it is. But we've seen the problems of that and results in contradictions results in a lot of nonsense. And, you know, you get to say such things like, ah, to me, that's a dog. Yes, sir, that's a dog. That's, you know, the best difficult. It's either that or, I don't know, try to explain how subjective, subjective knowledge somehow equates to what's happening out there or translates to what's happening out there. How is it that, you know, even at best, if we get inter-subjective agreement, right, we all point to that and say that's a tree. At best, you know, we have some kind of claim that, well, we all think it's a tree, right. But, you know, even that may not work because I don't have objective knowledge of other people. You know, I got subjective impressions or whatever, subjective sensations, which I interpret as a person. But it's not as if my mind grasps that other people are doing. So that, you know, even inter-subjective agreement has some deep, deep problems. So, you know, if we reject objectivity, objective truth, frankly any kind, then we have to say that, you know, when there were probably active antagonists or we have to explain how subjective knowledge somehow connects to the, you know, outside world. All right. So, suppose you want to reject Plato's characteristic that forms our universals. I mean, first of all, I'm wondering why you want abstract things of just particulars and only particulars, right? There'll be no universals at all. So, there'd be the, you know, particular tree and then the form of that particular tree, then there's a second particular tree and the form of that particular tree. That would be extraordinarily weird at best. But, you know, despite all that, right, you now have to explain, if you say that, you now have to explain what we even mean by tree. If there's no universals, right, there's nothing that all these things have in common. There's just that thing, that thing, that thing, that thing, that thing, that thing. There's not like there are kind at all. So, if you give up on universals, you give up pretty much on all abstraction. I'd be impressed if you could figure out a way to say that there's no universals and yet there's abstraction. I mean, you know, goodbye such things as truth. Truth is really an abstraction. Numbers, yeah, that's an abstraction. There's no particular number two. There's no physical concrete thing that is number two. So, if you give up on universals, you've got to explain how you, you know, even have such things as truth, any abstraction whatsoever. And if you're going to utter sentences, wow, do you need abstraction? Well, last one, eternal. If you say that, if you reject Plato's notion that forms are eternal, then you're claiming that they are temporary, meaning they have a beginning, they have an end. Now, let's ignore the problem about whether temporary things also must be physical. I mean, according to modern physics, right, anything temporary, anything temporal is also physical. So, let's leave that. If I'm understanding butterflies this correctly, I think I am. Let's ignore that problem for at least existing within spacetime. Anyway, so, if we say that forms are not eternal, right, we're saying they come in and out of existence with the particular object. So, the first particular object that starts to exist of that kind, that's when the form begins. And when the last one goes out of existence, that's when the form ends. Now, if you're going to do this, okay, right, that's your choice. But you now have to explain how we have form of things that no longer exist. And we talk about this all the time. We got no problem talking about forms of particular things that don't exist. Dinosaurs. Dinosaurs don't exist anymore, but we talk about their form. We say, oh, well, we got fossils. Okay, well, that's the fossil. That's a form fossil. And we even say the form of what? And fossilized dinosaur bone. Okay, but it's more than that, right? We think there's an animal that was using that bone and grew that bone, that sort of thing. And we talk about these things a lot. The dodo bird. The dodo bird. It's also another animal that no particular dodo bird exists. But we think the form does. We talk about extinct species, contemporary extinct species. Well, and we think we know this really well, right, because they were around long enough for us to look at them. But so the rhino, right, rhinoceros is probably on its way out, probably going to end in terms of particular rhinos. Or it's one of the rhinos. I think it's white nose rhinos, something like that. Well, if the last particular, last of those animals die, well, there's no longer any form. Hmm. Let's forget the problem about, I don't know, how, how is the number two a particular thing? When did it come into existence? When does it go out of existence? Let's leave that alone. Much less negative numbers. Because there is, if there's no two, there's definitely no negative two, right? Yeah, you have all kinds of problems answering the question of how a form exists without a particular thing. And, you know, maybe a backtrack. I say, well, you know, once it existed, now it, you know, then we have the form and now the form continues to exist, even though the extinct animals are gone. I mean, I guess you could try that, but why, it's what's called an ad hoc solution, right? It's just like, well, you're just kind of stipulating there's a fix. I mean, I guess you can try that, I suppose. But now you have to explain why the forms even begin to exist for particular things when they don't exist and dependent of them to begin with. I mean, this is Plato's point. The reason why forms are eternal is because they're independent of these particular things. And if you say that they're not, I mean, okay, but why would they begin to exist even with the particular things?