 Welcome to George H. Smith's Excursions into Libertarian Thought, a production of libertarianism.org and the Cato Institute. Skepticism In 1562, the French printer Henri Etienne published the first Latin edition of Outlines of Pyranism, written circa 200 by the Greek physician Sextus Empiricus. Etienne explained that the work by Sextus had taught him that we cannot rely on reason, a fallible and unreliable instrument in matters of religion because it will only pave the way for atheism. Seven years later, another publisher of Sextus, the French Catholic, Gentian Hervé, also maintained that the arguments of Pyronic skepticism, as summarized by Sextus, could be used to defend Christianity. Pyronic skepticism is named after Pyrrho of Elis, circa 315 to 275 BCE, an obscure figure who has portrayed in secondary accounts as a complete doubter, especially in ethical matters. Rather than endure the mental anguish that comes from seeking certain knowledge, Pyrrho is said to have suspended judgment, thereby attaining the mental state known to Greek philosophers as Adaraxia, or what today we would call contentment or peace of mind. Pyrrho's ideas were put into systematic form by Anasitamus, circa 100 to 40 BCE, and it was Anasitamus and his followers who first embraced the label skeptic from skeptikos, meaning thoughtful or doubter. Pyronic skepticism should be distinguished from another type of skepticism that also originated in ancient Greece. Known as academic skepticism, this school derived its name from Plato's Academy and was inspired by a remark attributed to Socrates. All I know is that I know nothing. As formulated by Archessolis, circa 315 to 241 BCE, and Carnades, circa 213 to 129 BCE, academic skepticism maintained that we can attain various degrees of probability, but never certainty in our quest for knowledge. This position was based on the standard Greek distinction between knowledge, epistome, and opinion, doxa. In this scheme, if our proposition might be false, then it cannot be certain and is therefore mere opinion, not knowledge. Since both our senses and our reason are unreliable to some degree, we can never lay claim to absolute truth or real knowledge, and since nothing can be known with certainty, we must rely instead on opinions that vary in their degrees of probability. Pyronic skeptics criticized academic skepticism as dogmatic. The academics were not true skeptics because they claimed to know with certainty that certainty is impossible, a claim that is self-contradictory and therefore self-refuting. The Pyranists, in contrast, did not claim that knowledge is impossible. Rather, they suspended judgment on all such theoretical questions, thereby avoiding the mental discomfort generated by taxing one's brain with insoluble problems. For the Pyranists, skepticism was a mental attitude and a way of life, not merely an abstract philosophical doctrine. They refused to judge or to criticize the laws and customs of their society, resolving instead to accept things as they appear to be, without committing themselves to any unorthodox position. In that way, they hoped to attain the mental tranquility of Adaraxia. Of these two schools of skepticism, it was Pyronic skepticism that was destined to exert the most influence on the course of Western philosophy, perhaps because no major writings of the academics survived the ravages of time. What we know of academic arguments was transmitted through much later secondary accounts, such as those of Cicero and Augustine. The Pyranists were more fortunate, owing to the summary written by Sextus Empiricus, outlines of Pyranism. Manuscript copies of that work began to circulate during the Italian Renaissance and were eventually disseminated throughout Europe. Pyronic skepticism, as summarized by Sextus, created a sensation, some called it a crisis, among European intellectuals. Some philosophers, such as Michel de Montaigne, embraced it enthusiastically, whereas others, such as Rene Descartes, attempted with equal enthusiasm to refute it. But the influence of Sextus Empiricus was so tremendous that by the end of the 17th century, the Divine Sextus was widely hailed as the father of modern philosophy. Pyranism would remain a serious topic of discussion in Enlightenment philosophy, as we see in the writings of David Hume. The writings of Sextus Empiricus were used mainly by French Catholics to defend a position known as Fideism, which is essentially an effort to vindicate faith at the expense of reason. By stripping reason of its cognitive efficacy, Fideus appealed to faith as the sole and ultimate source of certainty. If we look to reason instead, we will sink into a more ass of uncertainty where no belief can claim superiority over any other. Fideism was a popular method of argument among French Catholics for three-quarters of a century, one that was commonly aimed at Calvinists. Pyronic skepticism also proved useful among theologians, both Catholic and Protestant, against free thinkers who sought to discredit Christian doctrines in the name of reason. By demonstrating the impotence of reason, Pyranism teaches us intellectual humility and prepares us to receive the doctrines of Christ through faith. As noted above, Pyronic skepticism, unlike academic skepticism, did not deny outright the possibility of certain knowledge. Pyranists argued instead that to affirm that certainty is unattainable is to take an inherently uncertain position. With examining a philosophic belief, the Pyranists marshaled a battery of arguments for both sides, pro and con, in an effort to show that reason cannot justify one belief more than another. Given this dialectical standoff, the Pyranists argued that we should disengage ourselves from useless philosophic controversies. Only in this way can we attain peace of mind. Pyronic skepticism was inherently conservative, which explains much of its appeal to those Catholics who were attempting to defend the authority of their church against Protestant criticisms. According to the Pyranists, rather than engaging in feudal speculations about philosophic truth, which could be used to criticize the religious and political status quo, we should resolve to accept things as they appear to be without attempting to judge them. That means we should passively submit to the laws, customs, and traditional beliefs of our society, rather than challenging them with philosophic principles that cannot themselves be justified. This conservative bias is what made Pyranism so useful to Catholics during the Counter-Reformation. Pyronic arguments, when directed against free thinkers and unbelievers, could be and were used by Catholics and Protestants alike as a means of showing the superiority of faith over reason. But in the internecine battle between Catholics and Protestants, the conservative implications of Pyranism proved to be of greater utility to the former. Protestants, after all, were the innovators, the radicals who had rejected the traditional authority of the church, root and branch. And though Protestants did not seek to replace that authority with reason, they did appeal to personal judgment in biblical matters as the ultimate rule of faith. The Catholic Pyranists predicted that dire consequences would result from this religious individualism. The Protestants, in counseling people to rely on their own judgment in religious matters rather than on the authority of the church, had embarked on a dangerous path. The feeble and unreliable judgments of individuals would result in diverse and conflicting religious beliefs and end in atheism. Montaigne, the major proponent of Catholic Pyranism, put it this way. The mass of ordinary people lack the faculty of judging things as they are, letting themselves be carried away by chance appearances. Once you have put into their hands the full hardiness of despising and criticizing opinions which they used to hold in the highest awe, such as those which concerned their salvation. And once you have thrown into the balance of doubt and uncertainty any articles of their religion, they soon cast all the rest of their beliefs into similar uncertainty. They had no more authority for them, no more foundation than for those you have just undermined. And so, as though it were the yoke of a tyrant, they shake off all those other concepts which had been impressed upon them by the authority of law and the awesomeness of ancient custom. They then take it upon themselves to accept nothing on which they have not pronounced their own approval, subjecting it to their individual ascent. Montaigne applied Pyronic skepticism to the great theological question of his day. What is the proper rule of faith? By what criterion should we assess religious claims and accept one scriptural interpretation over others? In this area, as in others, according to Montaigne, reason cannot bring us to definitive conclusions. And if reason cannot discern the rule of faith, then relying on reason in this sphere will land us in such doubt that it will be fatal to Christian belief. The only alternative is to accept tradition, that is, to submit to the authority of the Catholic Church. Montaigne is one of the most ambiguous figures in modern thought. Was he a sincere defender of the Catholic faith? Or was his fedeism merely a smokescreen for disbelief? That question, debated for centuries, has become a cottage industry for philosophers and historians of the Counter-Reformation. On the one hand, for example, the Montaigne scholar M.A. Screech presents Montaigne as a sincere Catholic who should be taken at his word. On the other hand, Richard Popkin, while conceding that Montaigne and other fedeists seemed capable of both a religious and non-religious interpretation, hazards the opinion that, at best, Montaigne was probably mildly religious. His attitude appears to be more that of indifference or unexcited acceptance, without any serious religious experience or involvement. Whatever Montaigne's own views may have been, his writings, especially an apology for Raymond Seabond, the longest section in his essays, provided a mine of information and arguments for later generations of free thinkers. Who, as Screech put it, pillaged the apology for anti-Christian arguments. Pyranism was clearly a double-edged sword that could be used either to defend Christianity or to attack it. This point was not lost on Catholic authorities who, in 1697, place Montaigne's essays on the index of prohibited books. This has been Excursions into Libertarian Thought, a production of Libertarianism.org and the Cato Institute. To learn more about Libertarian philosophy and history, visit www.libertarianism.org.