 today we are going to discus about the concept of meaning and how this meaning is related with the notion of mind. That is the central topic that I will be discussing today. Now, since we have been discussing about Uschern and his contemporaries, like Forder Jomsky and many others, who have also In washimes newspaper der Sunshine magazineук you desire to study Mary's theory or philosophy of language and the passion of the mind. In this Jamescases newspaper they show the theory of chart and call it Savile – month of earthениемand meaning of their minds. According to Sir it is the ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ  oremic irm Planning By Mind Sex is not cr 두 is is a kind of a primodial concept Languages evolved, historicality has evolved And as we all know that social is presupposing the evolutionary biology Socials biological naturalism presupposes two scientific theories సిషి సికావటటాలి బ్సాలి పటాలాచ౪ న౦వర్య్అ హిదాటిపాగు సివివికికూ. to explain the nature of meaning so in that context language is a secondary phenomenon it has evolved along with it has evolved up to the evolution of many intents to complex mental states so mental states are linguistic in nature but mental states are not necessarily now if languages evolved in the process then the mind is primary evolved and then you have language so what is mind as we have discussed earlier mind is nothing but the concatenation of certain intentsional states now these intentsional states have contained so the structure of intentsional states if you remember correctly has a content and this content is linguistic in nature so the content is linguistic because the intentsional states represent things in the world or the objects in the world or the state of affairs in the world so this aboutness aboutness that is embedded in the world in the structure of an intentsional state that every intentsional state is directed towards the world now this directedness involves a content which is linguistic this content being linguistic can also be called the semantic content so there are mental states mental states have a structure say for example when i have the desire say for example the desire to have something desire of something so or desire is about something now this aboutness shows intentsionality so intentsionality is one of the evolves or one of the features which has basically related to life it is intrinsically related to life now this intrinsic relationship does not presuppose that it has the semantic content so language does not come along with intentsionality it is intentsionality or the intentsional attitude of human mind talks about the meaning talks about the semantic content that is part of the intentsional state so today we are mostly interested to talk about what is meaning what is representation and how meaning is part of the mind and meaning is also related to the mind world relationship so when we talk about the intentsional relationship between the mind and the world we also need to see how language plays a kind of a medium a connecting principle between the mind and the world I said connecting principle in the sense that the semantic element of intentsional states are fundamental for the semantic content is fundamental to the mind and the world meaning or to the expression and also to the intentsional states so in that sense we need to find out how language or meaning is placed when we talk about this world mind relationship so therefore the title of my lecture today is about language representation and meaning meaning is primarily representational so the representational theory of meaning has a long history it starts from pregue philosophy of sense and a reference so in that sense we need to find out the meaning of the meaning of the meaning and the meaning of the meaning or early Wittgenstein's notion of picture theory of meaning so Searle in intentionality very clearly says that I am talking about intentionality I am talking about philosophy of language in continuation with the fregion Wittgenstein in analytic tradition Searle talks about intentionality and meaning referring to the fregion Wittgenstein in analytic tradition h if that is后 the case h is very strongly advocated by Frega and Wittgenstein. When Wittgenstein says, language is the picture of reality. It is through language and language alone we can represent the world. Language has the potential to represent the world, so the structure of language must be taken into account. the world is there a structure or what kind of representation it is? If somebody asks this kind of questions, what kind of representation it is, then the notion of the structure of representation becomes important. So, meaning is basically representational, meaning is related to words or sentences or expressions, meaning is related to thoughts. Now, the representational structure in which meaning is stated is something very important for all of us to understand, if we are interested in understanding the structure of representation or the structure of representation. Now, understanding the meaning is broadly speaking about understanding the language. So, when we talk about meaning, we cannot talk about meaning if we do not talk about language, the linguistic life that every individual human beings live. So, language is an important concept to speak about, to explain how meaning is possible. So, language is meaning belong to the same logical space as do logic and logical form. So, language is an important concept to speak about, to explain how meaning is possible. This I am pointing out, referring to the representational theory of language advocated by Erlie Wittgenstein. When Wittgenstein says, the language represents the world, the propositions are the pictures of the world, he thinks that propositions has some kind of grammatical structure or logical structure, logical form of the propositions. And the state of affairs that it, that the propositions represents also has some kind of a structure and that is logical in nature and both language and the world share logical form. Hence, this representation is possible. So, when we talk about logical space, the existence of facts in the logical space, meaning belong to logical facts. So, meaning is a semantic fact existing in the logical space as logic exists in the logical space. Or has a logical form. So, language and meaning belong to the same logical space. Now, let us talk about the nature of representation. There are two kinds of representations. The representational theory of meaning advocated by Erlie Wittgenstein or Erlie Wittgensteinians gives importance to language. Whereas, Searle, Fodor and many others talk about mental representation. According to them, mind is an representational entity. The intentional ability, the intentional feature of mind is a mental representation. It helps in explicating the representational structure between mind and the world. Intentionality helps in explicating the intentional structure that is embedded in the expression and the expression representing the world. So, there are mental representations. Intentional states have content and this content, which I said semantic content, are related to or to the mental representation of the world. Referring to the objects or a state of affairs in the world. So, there are mental representations and there are linguistic representations. Linguistic representation will talk about the logical grammatical structure, which is formally analyzable. Whereas, the mental representation would talk about, mainly, will talk about the functional computational characteristics of the mind, the ability to be represented in the formal computational machine. Now, when we talk about mental representation, say for example, in the case of Fodor, who is arguing for a representational theory of mind, he will talk about the functional computational characteristics of the mind, the ability to be represented in the formal computational machine. Now, when we talk about mental representation, say for example, in the case of Fodor, who is arguing for a representational theory of mind, would suggest that representational states are primary and they are there in a kind of a modular system, where mind is quite analogous to a machine. Now, the function of representational states is therefore computational in nature, in the sense that these representational states are syntactic, they are not primarily characterized by the semantic content. The semantic content can be explained by the syntactical structure of representational states, that is, a kind of a Fodorian and a kind of a Fodorian analysis of the representational states and how does a representational theory of mind talk about the semantic content or explains the semantic content. Now, this explanation that Fodor provides is in a sense tries to understand the nature of the semantic content from the perspective of a computational theory of mind, where the syntax is primary and the semantics is secondary, because it is through syntax the semantic content is the semantic content. The semantic content of representational states are explained. Fodor also talks about the causal capacity, the power of representational states or the power of the representational system that makes representation possible, but the Serlian theses of representation is slightly different, it is different in this sense that Serl gives primacy to intentionality and intentionality is very different. It helps in explaining meaning, it helps in explaining the structure of mental states and this intentionality is intrinsically related with consciousness and it cannot be duplicated by any model of, it cannot be duplicated by any physical system. So, Serl argues against the computational representational theory of mind, particularly when Serl argues it out in the context of his Chinese room argument that how does human mind understands the reality and how does a computer, a machine, a physical system fails to understand the reality. It fails because it does not have a semantic ability, it fails because machine is not primarily run by consciousness which is intentional in nature. Serl's argument is that the machine is not primarily an intentional in nature. Serl's argument is that the machine is not primarily an intentional in nature. Serl's argument is intentional like any other human conscious beings or any other biological beings. Hence the intentional activities of the machine and the intentional activities of human beings as a linguistic being are two different kinds of intentional activities. The intentional activities of a machine is purely syntactical whereas the intentional activities of the human beings are semantic in nature, because the concept of meaning is associated with understanding experience, whereas when we talk about concept of meaning, then the intentional activities of a machine is purely syntactical whereas the intentional activities of the human beings are semantic in nature. Because the concept of meaning is associated with understanding, experience whereas when we talk about concept of meaning, then the intentional activities of the human beings are semantic in nature. We do not necessarily speak in that language, that is the language of experience and understanding whereas in the Serl's theoretical framework one finds that there is a space to talk about experience, there is a space to talk about understanding. So, human linguistic activities are essentially governed by the semantic aspect or the semantic feature of language whereas the linguistic activities in the mental aspect are essentially governed by the semantic aspect or the semantic feature of language whereas the linguistic activities in the machine, the computational function of the machine is essentially governed by the syntax or certain syntactic principles of language. So, that is the broad distinction between the two theoretical frameworks that talk about mental representations. So, today we will try to understand that what is this intentional ability and how does human mind represent things, but before that let us briefly talk about linguistic representation. Now, there is a need to talk about linguistic representation because Serl is also talking about linguistic representation. He talks about mental representation and he also talks about the linguistic representation. The structure of intentional states and the structure of an expression are isomorphic and the common thing to these two structures is the semantic content. So, the content of thought and the content of an expression or the content of a mental states and intentional mental states like the desire that I talk about is same as the content of the expression of the desire. So, there is a kind of a common structure Serl talks about. When you talk about the mental states and intentional mental states like the desire that I talk about is same as the content of the expression of the desire. So, the content of the expression of the desire. So, there is a kind of a common structure Serl talks about. When you talk about p, say for example, p is a mental state, then say s, s is a sentence the expression of this intentional mental states. The content of p and the content of this sentence, the expression of the p are same. They are not two different things. So, that is something comes. So, the content of p and the content of p are the same. So, Serl talks about linguistic representation and Serl also talks about mental representations and they have same logical structure. When we talk about meaning, we necessarily talks about linguistic representation. That is only when we talk about the representational theory of mind advocated by say early Woodgenstein, when it talks about the picture theory of mind. But then later in the case of Serl, you will find that Serl is saying this that philosophy of language is a branch of philosophy of action and that he clearly states in the speech acts. When he talks about speech act theory, the speech act is a performative act speaking a language or expressing a organism in a chain, in which he says there is a feeling of a psychological situation. communism that is clear in the speech retra、、.. speaking is an a kind of peculiar емся If you say something to someone to say to something for uhh No, it is an intentional action. For example, when I order something please bring me a glass of water when I order something shut the door So this is an order D the door. So, this kind of analysis shows that it is not necessarily a kind of a mechanical action performed by human individuals or the human beings. Rather, it is a kind of a mechanical action performed by the human individuals or the human beings. Rather, it is a kind of a mechanical action performed by the human individuals or the human beings. Rather, it is connected with mind. Now, this connection, as I said earlier, is a kind of an intentional connection. Connection that is when established through the semantic content and intentionality is basically a kind of a semantic connection. Connection that is when established through the semantic content and intentionality is basically a kind of a semantic property of the mind. Now, when I say this, how does Searle show this connection? Such is when I am passing this order, I am also expecting that somebody would come and close the door. So, my intention has two components. One, I am intending to perform this and I performed and it also has an expectation or a desire behind it. The desire is somebody would come and the desire gets satisfied when somebody comes and close the door. Now, these intentional activities are so complex. When you talk about satisfaction, we cannot exempt this case that I am not experiencing it. I feel happy when somebody comes and close the door because that is what I intended or if I pass or if I make a request thinking that my order will not work, but if I make a request, it would work. I would succeed in making that event possible. Then I say please close the door and I also expect in this case that my hearer would respond to my request and if the hearer following my request closes the door, then I feel happy. So, Searle says that the condition of satisfaction is an important criterion to show that linguistic activities are related to certain mental activities because it is generating the kind of a satisfaction which is experiential in nature and when I say therefore saying and meaning go together, I am saying it and I must mean that what I am saying. So, there is some kind of a logical connection Searle tries to draw when Searle talks about speech act and its relationship with the mind. It is not just the kind of commonality that we talk about when we talk about the semantic content, content flowing from the intentional mental states to the world. So, the kind of direction Searle talks about the direction of speech that the language represents the world. So, this is a kind of a intentional speech or Searle calls it the direction of speech. It is a kind of a direction of speech that language, mind to the world direction of speech, language and mind. I am putting them together for our benefit to explain. In the case of speech act theory, it was language to the world. In the case of speech act theory, when you take a particular statement into account, you will find that a promise is directed towards the world or an order is directed towards the world or there is a kind of a fitness between the statement and the world. When I am thinking about making a statement, that prior intention, intention before performing an action or intention before performing speech has many sub intentional states. So, my expectation or a desire is part of that prior intention that is to say that when I am making a request, I also have this desire in my mind that my request would succeed. So, in that case, Searle says that there is an experiential component attached to it, a component which is attached to understanding. So, how can the computational model which talks about mental representation would ignore this fact that meaning is also connected to mind. Now, there are philosophers who talk about meaning exist in the mind, but Searle is not making that kind of claim. Searle in fact argues against this very thesis that meaning is not there in the mind. Searle is not an internalist in this sense. I will talk about it in my later classes, how Searle is not an internalist, he is an externalist. So, therefore, he would say that whenever we perform linguistic activities and talk about objectivity or talk about truth, etc., we need to have different presuppositions in mind, but we cannot ignore this fact that expressions or sayings or the use of words or speech act in particular is not connected to mind. So, when we discuss about the notion of mental representation, one must keep this in mind that the Fodorian theorization of mental representation tries to talk about the computational perspective through which the representational states explains the semantic content and when we speak about the Searleian notion of mental representation, we must see how the linguistic representations are linked to consciousness. In other words, they are linked to experience and understanding, feeling, etc., etc. In that sense, we can revise this statement that the birth of meaning is the birth of linguistic representation. So, there is a kind of a moment in which the linguistic representation is taking a shape, taking a form and for Searle, the linguistic representation takes a form through the intentional feature of the mind. If we suspend the intentional attitude that Searle is talking about saying that it is it is a irreducible feature, then probably we can think along with the Wittgenstein and the Wittgenstein who says now this is how language functions or this is how the thought represents the realities. Now, if we take the intentional attitude of the mind, the mind that articulates linguistic expressions, we will be able to explain the concept of meaning. Representation in this sense shows how does language speak about the world. Now, the being about the world for Searle, it is a kind of a pre-linguistic concept because Searle is presupposing this fact that intentionality is the one of the first evolutionary phenomena. Human minds are primarily intentional and then Searle talks about language. So, in that order of evolution, intentionality comes first. So, there is a kind of a pre-linguistic concept which makes this aboutness possible, makes this directedness possible. And if you look at the Wittgensteinian thinking, then language is autonomous, language is considered as a kind of an autonomous principle. So, where language speaks about itself. Now, one can very well critique Searle's position when Searle talks about the nature of intentional content or the nature of the semantic content. Can Searle tell us that this is when the semantic content is formed and can we really separate the intentional state and the semantic content. So, the mind criticism would be that intentionality is basically a kind of a linguistic feature. And language and mind are intrinsically related. So, there I would be adhering to Wittgensteinian presuppositions thinking that language is a kind of a linguistic feature. So, I would be adhering to Wittgensteinian presuppositions thinking that language is a kind of a linguistic feature. Language is something very important to talk about meaning and I will also not ignore this fact that human mind experiences things, human mind understands things and this understanding, experiencing, etc. are all linguistic or semantic activities. So, in that sense one can read Searle more critically or the Searlean perspective of linguistic representation more critically and the Fodorian understanding of mental representation more critically. So, when we talk about meaning world relationship, we talk about how language is connected to the world. They are built into each other. So, there is a kind of a structural isomorphism between language and the world. As I have mentioned that representation has been theorized particularly the Searlean notion of representation has been theorized keeping fragrance Wittgenstein's notion of meaning where these philosophers talk about the logical relationship between language and the world. But one can also bring in the later Wittgensteinian notion of meaning where language and the world are connected to the world. Language is basically a means of communication. So, what is important in the later Wittgenstein is that communication rather than representation. Searle's theorization of meaning includes the linguistic representation and the mental representation where Searle says that there is a communicative intention and there is a representational intention. The intention to speak, the intention to perform is presupposing effect that there is a representational intention involved in this. But think of a situation where I am not just representing things, but I am representing it to someone meaning thereby I am trying to communicate my ideas, my thoughts, my mental states, my desires, my beliefs to someone. So, when Searle says that there are two aspects to representation, communication and mere representation. So, the communicative intention is important. So, we need to find out this fact whether Searle is accommodating the two Wittgensteinian perspectives, the early Wittgensteinian perspective. Where he says, thoughts are representational, propositions represents a person. So, we need to find out this fact whether Searle is accommodating the two Wittgensteinian perspectives, the early Wittgensteinian perspective where he says, thoughts are representational, propositions represents the reality or the picture of reality, thoughts are better picture of reality and thereby the whole representational model which talks about the picture theory of meaning refers to the notion of mental and the later Wittgensteinian model where meaning is theorized referring to the language, language game and form of life. If one finds the communicative intention plays an important role in explicating meaning. So, there are two models, we need to see here keeping all this thing in mind, how does Searle advocate the theory of meaning would explain it in the next class. Thank you.