 And we're not living up to them. It tends to inspire the worst behavior on the part of other countries. We can talk later about the Iran nuclear issue. I think it was an historic mistake for President Trump to walk away from that agreement. I admire the efforts of our European partners and others to try to preserve it. My guess is that the Iranian regime will try to wait out the Trump administration. But that's not a really sure bet in the sense that you can have inadvertent collisions. You look at the landscape in Syria right now, which is tangled and crowded and contested. As it becomes clear that the economic benefits that the Iranian regime oversold to its people in the first place are not going to be forthcoming, the temptation, especially for the supreme leader in Iran, to walk away from the agreement himself, I think, begins to grow over time. North Korea issue is a particular challenge. So I've always thought it was a good thing for the United States of North Korea to talk directly to one another, including at the highest level. President Trump got some criticism before the Singapore summit last year for doing that without a lot of advanced preparation. But I couldn't argue that the record of US North Korea nuclear diplomacy was so pristine before that it was worth a try. I think the danger has not been, or the risk has not been talking to one another at the highest level. It's been talking past one another and having, to this date, at least, a fairly fundamental difference in how you define the nuclearization as well. So that's a longer subject as well. And then, Uncle also mentioned that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty comes up for a very important review conference in 2020, with not only the Iran and North Korea challenges hanging out there, but a lot of differences amongst the signatories to that treaty. And finally, the third phenomenon that I mentioned is the increasing entanglement of non-nuclear technologies and their advance with nuclear technologies. Cyber is one example. The danger that cyber tools could pose to nuclear command and control, for example. The rapid advances in advanced conventional technologies as well, which are making old concepts of nuclear deterrence much more complicated. And then advances in missile defense technology and President Trump has talked recently about a pretty significant expansion, the biggest expansion in US missile defense technology and expenditure since the Reagan administration. And that tends, in an absence of serious conversations about strategic stability with either the Russians or the Chinese, that tends to reinforce their temptation to invest even more actively in offensive nuclear weapons technology as a way to deal with disadvantages in missile defense as well. So any one of those three phenomenon would be really complicated to deal with. When you have them intersecting as they're becoming clear in 2019, that poses a huge test for statesmanship. We ought to be having the kind of serious conversations about strategic stability between the United States and Russia, that even in the worst of the Cold War we managed to have, we ought to have those same conversations between the United States and China right now. And so far we haven't managed to begin those conversations either. So there's a huge challenge, as I said, for statesmanship out there, and that's a quality that's in pretty short supply, I think, right now, especially coming from the government that I used to work for. Thank you very much. I just wanted to come in here because I wanted to touch on what you started to mention. And that is what I think is also the internal political climate in the United States. It's very toxic right now between the US and Russia. And that's not only because of INF, but it's also because of the invasion of Ukraine, the Crimea, and so forth. So I really wonder, there's no support that I can see for any initiative that would be taken to be more, let's say, reaching out to Russia to say, let us solve these problems. And let me mention one example, which I think is very interesting, because the ABM Treaty, at one point, was also under threat. Let's put it that way, because the Russian Soviets at the time had actually put a radar in Siberia, if I remember correctly, that existed for a number of years. And the US did not walk away from the ABM Treaty. They basically negotiated. They basically addressed the issue and said, we need to do something about it. And actually, that was dismantled at some time, so then it went on. And that is really the way to go. And what I find interesting is that when you have this spiral of upgrading your military that has already started, that's only going to intensify now with an abrogation of the INF. And I have pretty well a feeling it's absolutely going to happen. I think, Bill, you agree with that. And so if that happens, that means that we have a military expenditure spiral that is going on higher and higher and higher. And that, to my mind, is really something that we're here to address in a way. What is the new global architecture? Do we really want to live with that? So then the question comes, what can anyone do to actually abrogate that? And my question to the United States is also, is there the willingness to actually engage in a long, drawn-out process, be it bilateral or be it multilateral, to actually have negotiations, to actually come to an agreement that finds also a two-thirds Senate approval? Because I think that is very much a problem right now that where is the architecture politically to sustain such a process in the United States? Yeah. I mean, the only thing I'd add is that it is true. There's a toxic atmosphere in Washington now about Russian, US-Russian relations. I do think it's fair to say that it has a lot to do with toxic behavior on the part of Putin's Russia in recent years, too. And on the INF Treaty, I think it was a clear Russian violation of the treaty that sort of sparked the debate in the US. But I agree with your broad point, Angela. I think this is one of those moments when, despite the profound differences between the United States and Russia, and we're going to be continuing from the point of view of American policy to manage an adversarial relationship with Russia for some time to come. But as we learned during the Cold War, and I'm not trying to compare these two eras, but even with profound differences between us, it's essential to engage with one another on wider issues of strategic stability, especially because, as I said, those issues are only getting more complicated and more tangled with the revolution in technology. Thank you. It's quite an intimidating picture that, on the one hand, you have the nuclear challenges becoming more complicated, and on the other hand, the diplomatic process is becoming more difficult to wield towards a disarmament or control. Before we go out to questions, I just wanted to ask for a brief comment on how you think we avoid crises, either in the case of short-term country-specific issues like the ones we mentioned, or where will the new actors or moves come from to get those other countries involved in the process to keep moving things in a safer direction, even when some of the key members are reluctant to engage? Angela, would you like to first? You know, we both have mentioned already the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the crucible that's coming up. First of all, this year was the last preparatory committee meeting in April-May, and then the next threshold, which is the 50th anniversary of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. No one wants to abrogate that treaty. Everyone wants that to continue. But we already got a rift between member states. And when I was at the UN, I saw that very, very clearly. And it has only intensified since. And that is because the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons. And that has about half of the ratification needed to come into force. And the attitude of the P5, the five-recognized nuclear powers in the NPT, has been extremely dismissive, with, I hate to say it, but with the United States being the most abusive, in a way, for those supporters, towards those supporters of the TP and WS, as it is called, of the Nuclear Ban Treaty. And it makes it very difficult to continue in this, because there is an obligation by the P5 to also, I don't even want to talk about, negotiate in good sense to disarmament measures, but on the other hand, to keep the stability and to keep the NPT in place. And that makes it very, very difficult. Because how can you actually argue in favor of the NPT if you see actions, like even the nuclear posture review that the US issued last year, which expands the rationale for using a nuclear weapon, which I think was taken very much by surprise to other member states. And I think it is time that other member states come into it here, whether it's the P5, and again, that includes Russia as well. But I think there is a role where a certain statesmanship, as you mentioned, needs to be brought into play, because it cannot be left up to only the US or only the US and Russia. There is a responsibility to be held by other countries. And again, I mentioned NATO, for example. NATO has been very quiet on this issue. They've agreed with the concerns that have been raised by the US. But they have not really to my public knowledge, in any case. I mean, maybe there are considerations inside internally that I'm not privy to. But on the other hand, there is a responsibility by other member states to play a key role and to nudge and to urge and to make this cart go out of the morass that it currently is in, because there has to be some statesmanship that is being shown. And I must say that so far, I have seen that missing. There is nothing that is coming out of the NPT process in terms of the review conferences that is other than static. It goes according to a certain formula, and it doesn't develop properly. I mean, it does not become dynamic. It does not become cooperative. It goes according to certain schemes. And I hate to say it, but I'm afraid that that's also going to happen in the next conference, which is happening in three months' time. We've certainly picked an uplifting subject for all of you to ruin your digestion after lunch. No, I mean, I would just say three things. And it's against the backdrop of the reality that I don't expect any great triumphs in nuclear diplomacy over the next few years. I think what we can do, all of us, is try to manage what is an increasingly fragile situation. I think there are three things that would be significant steps in the right direction. In US-Russia terms, it would be to agree on a simple extension of New START for another five years, I think, and to begin a conversation about strategic stability that helps draw together all of those fragile issues that I mentioned before. On North Korea, my hope would be that out of the next summit between President Trump and Kim Jong-un and hopefully serious negotiations, which would unfold beyond that, you begin to make some progress toward freezing and rolling back North Korea's nuclear missile program. I don't personally think there's any realistic chance that North Korea is going to agree to the total complete verifiable denuclearization that remains the formal position of the United States. But it would be no small thing to be able to freeze and roll back that program and apply intrusive verification measures. That would be a significant step forward. Now, ironically, that leads me to my third point because that would look eerily similar to the initial interim agreement that we made with Iran, which froze and rolled back their nuclear program at the end of 2013. On Iran, my hope would be that the JCPOA, the Comprehensive Agreement, manages to hold together over the next couple of years. And that might then create an opportunity for the United States to reconsider its approach to that issue. Thank you very much to you both. With that, I'd like to open it out to the audience. There's a question in the front here to start with. So if you'd like to mention, introduce yourself briefly, and then put your question. I'm a chairman of the Asian Group, a South Korean company, and also chairman of the World Energy Council. And to my knowledge, I was surprised to find that the Russian economy is smaller than South Korea in terms of JCPOA. It's not the superpowering past that is small. And China, the technology, not the advanced, but they have huge nuclear capacity. And North Korea, its economy is just beyond collapse. So in each country, each country is not threat to, in a way, the global politics. But one of the concerns is that I'm wondering why America is, instead of dividing and rule, it is trying to unite Russia and China and Korea all together with Iran to create huge, formidable, formidable, in a way, anything. And aligned then against the United States, why is it doing that way? What is the geopolitical strategy of the United States? Why is the United States moving? It seems to be not very in a way, not so strategic at all. Or whether there is any strategy, that's my concern. Thank you. Bill, would you like to talk a little bit? No, I mean, I think it's a fair question. I think if you take a step back and look at the international landscape today, the United States is no longer the singular dominant player that we were just after the Cold War. We're still, I would argue, I don't mean this as a statement of American arrogance, the preeminent player. But it's more important than ever for us to work with our allies, to build coalitions at countries, whether you're dealing with nuclear issues or you're dealing with Chinese trade and investment practices, it helps to have company and build coalitions of countries and leaderships that share a lot of our concerns as well. And instead, I think, in the current administration, what we've seen is a very strong preference for a kind of muscular unilateralism, which is disdainful of alliances and coalition building and the sorts of things you were suggesting. So it's a very fair question. I'm glad you have any thoughts on it. I think that what we have seen is that the United States was always very predictable in terms of its policy. And that goes back to the alliance, backing alliances, continuing the alliances, and also looking for partners while being a preeminent player. And what we have now in the last two years is basically a rupture in the continuity of the politics. So there has been a new start. There's been a rule by chaos, if you so want. There's been an abrogation of international agreements. And I will say, in the case of North Korea, it has touched something, meaning it has moved something. Whether that's positive or not, I'm hoping. I'm always being a longtime UN person. I always see the glasses half full rather than half empty, so I'm hoping it's going in that direction. But on the other hand, there are other actions that I think have been highly disruptive. And that was, for example, and I agree with Bill about pulling out of the JCPOA, which is extremely destabilizing, and we haven't seen the end of that. But on the other hand, this is what the situation is. So we have to now see how can we actually deal with that in the terms of the geopolitical situation and what can others do to actually help this along? And what I think that what everyone is looking to now, it's much more for focus on where am I in this universe and where are my allies? And South Korea, of course, being a neighbor to North Korea, being in the whole Northeast Asia realm is very much affected by all of this. And that is something that we all need to take into account. But you need to also take into account in your country as well as the neighboring countries in terms of, how can we actually input in this and move it into another situation? Let me mention something, and that is in support of what Bill said. And that is also that it's not only nuclear. The new technologies, the conventional new technologies, cyber, artificial intelligence, drones, you name it, lethal autonomous weapon systems, this all comes into it. And that is part of the strategic balance that we need to look at now. We can no longer look at only nuclear. That is like nuclear 2.0 rather than 4.0. And that is also not being properly addressed. I have dealt a lot with lethal autonomous weapon systems. And let me tell you, I started this whole dialogue when I was in the UN. And the difficulty is, is that even at the time when everyone was saying, well, we don't really deal with this, right now there is a distinct effort by a number of countries, including the US, including Russia, including Israel, including the UK, to push back against the ban on lethal autonomous weapon system. So that is something that needs to be addressed in the global strategic context of nuclear, but also disarmament and arms control. And there's another question, sir. Hi, it's Mark Landler with The New York Times. Bill, you were talking earlier about how almost nobody believes that North Korea is going to give up its nuclear arsenal, but it remains US policy that they should in a complete and verifiable and irreversible way. Is there any argument at all for the US over time shifting to a deterrent strategy toward in effect acknowledging the reality of that? Or will that just be a terrible mistake? No, I mean, I think that may prove inevitable over time. But I think right now, I mean, I don't take issue with the fact that that's still the formal position of the United States. The question is, can you try to take advantage of this moment to make practical step-by-step progress, even if you think that that ultimate outcome is quite unlikely? And I think that's actually possible to do. But I do think it's important then to engage systematically with one another. That's the kind of thing that's rarely done when two leaders meet with one another, especially when one of them, I think, is kind of untethered in the details of the issues as well. So I don't take issue so much with the formal end state position of the United States. The question is, how realistic are you about making progress in that direction, even if that proves ultimately elusive? In which case then, just as you suggested, you're in a better position to deter because you've managed, hopefully, to apply intrusive verification measures as a degree of transparency. You've walked back the program in some of its most threatening forms. You've built some confidence with our allies in the area as well. So I don't think the situation is hopeless at all, but a lot of it's going to depend on how realistic I think we are. With that, thank you very much to both of you for helping us. I certainly learned an awful lot. And if the first step to this is raised awareness, and I think hopefully we've done a little of that today, thank you to our audience. Thank you, Bill Burns, Angela Cain, for this issue briefing. Thank you. Thank you very much.