 Okay, thanks everybody for coming, actually I'm planning to turn not the whole conference but at least the conference theme a little bit from head to feet. So I'm also focusing like on development policy and climate change rather than on climate change and development policy. And that obviously is inspired by the Arab awakening, which really brings a lot of change to the whole region. But still I'm trying to point to the linkages between Arab awakening, development policy, more specifically I'm going to focus on food security and then also bring the climate change into the picture. Let me give you a brief overview and instead of bullet points I decided why not put a couple of pictures there. So there's still a big question of why the Arab awakening happened, what are the consequences and so on and there are a lot of theories out there. And I'm just going to focus on two of our recent studies at IFPRI. One is looking at data issues, whether or not you know the whole rather optimistic picture that has been shown in terms of rapid economic growth and so on is actually also reflected in the data and if so how is that possible. Then we're going to look at the broader kind of picture in terms of conflict. There's a lot of uprisings ranging from protests to war. So we're going to look to the history with cross-country regressions and to see how the Arab awakening food security and potentially high food prices then related also to climate change may have impacted that. Then we're going to look at climate change. We have done three country case studies in Tunisia, Syria and Yemen just reporting a few of those results using CGE models and then I would also like to present you some of our future plans. To most people the Arab awakening came as a big surprise. Nobody really expected what was going on. Official numbers looked good so there was not a real indication of an uprising coming. The thing that we did first is let's take a look, revisit a lot of the numbers that are out there and if you look at official poverty rates for example you will see a rather optimistic picture poverty in the region is relatively low. Even more so if you look at Gini coefficients from the World Development Indicators or from any government website you will also see well everything is fine. I mean Egypt if you trust the numbers is a more equal society than Switzerland with a Gini coefficient of 0.2 or something. So you know even from that you start to kind of question some of the numbers. But more specifically we compare two things to get a grasp of how pro-poor was growth in the past. To your left you see a graph that shows on the x-axis the number of poor people on the y-axis you see per capita income. The upper line shows you the world trend and obviously you see the higher per capita income the more poverty goes down that's to be expected. However if you look at the Arab world which is the black line down there you will see that actually growth has been more pro-poor in the Arab world than in the rest of the world. If you go to anybody familiar with the region would say there must be something wrong here and we also did some cross-country regressions to show that this cannot possibly be the case. Now to show perhaps a more realistic picture we also look at alternative development indicators and in that case we focus on child malnutrition in terms of stunting why it captures multiple dimension plus it's available for all the countries from demographic and health surveys. Now if you believe child stunting is a good proxy for poverty then you will also come to the conclusion well maybe growth was not all that pro-poor after all because you see on that right hand graph there the relationship is exactly the other way around. So growth in the rest of the world was better for improving nutrition than in the Arab world. So there's a lot of doubt on the data front. In addition you know we all like researchers look at different data sources so there's another great data source especially when it comes to coverage and recent data which is the Gallup world poll. So what we did now starting from 2005 ranging until 2011 we use the question from the Gallup world poll and as you know that's a perception based survey it's conducted twice every year in all the countries in the world representative on the national level. So one of the questions they are asking is how satisfied are you with your standard of living another question is did you at any point in time over the last year have enough food to eat. So you could think of the first question as a welfare indication the second one as a food security kind of indication. Now if you plot both of them and this is just the standard of living question you will see on the x-axis again it's the percentage of dissatisfied people then on the y-axis again per capita income then the size of the bubble tells you something about the number of dissatisfied people and the color tells you something about the change over time. Now first of all you see that as expected with growing income the percentage of dissatisfied people goes kind of down but still if you look at the colors you see a lot of orange and red even on the right hand side and so in many of those countries with with riots and revolution Egypt, Yemen and so on you could have actually told by the data that there is something going on in terms of the people being unhappy. Now we are not saying that economics is all that played a role of course if we look at the Tahir Square pictures there's a lot about dignity justice and so on but I think we are safe to say that economics also played a role. Now coming to food security intuitively it's clear that food security high food prices play a role but what we did again to bring some empirical evidence to the to the table we looked at data from 1960 to 2010 and we run a cross-country regression in terms of conflict event in the whole region and then the major determining factors. Now Collier and Hoofler and others find that in the global sample economic growth and income play a big role in terms of determining conflict and we just wanted to see if the same holds true for the Arab world and coming back to our previous argument that economic growth didn't trickle down to the poor and the people and we were just curious to see how that plays out. Now without going into much detail about this paper of my colleague Maistat and you see the link for all the details there it emerges that food security really played a major role in causing conflict over the last 50 years in the Arab world. Now again this data doesn't include data set from the Arab Awakening itself but it's just another indication looking forward for a successful transition avoiding conflict it seems to be critical for policymakers to address the food security issue and by the way we tested an indicator of food security more at the national macro level and more as on the household level and they both are highly significant but talking about food security and you know slowly but surely I'm getting to the climate change but really I think all of these three things are interrelated and it's important to capture them all. So this is our food security framework not only for Arab countries but in general and I don't want you to like look at the whole thing or I don't run you through the whole graph but it's just important to notice that we put a lot of emphasis on the macro level or national level of food security and the micro level. In terms of macro level and if we think indicators and quantitative analysis we're using an indicator that is a ratio of the total food imports to total exports plus remittances because as you may know in the region still especially older people think food security in terms of self-sufficiency and here we make a strong statement that food security and self-sufficiency have very little to do with each other as expressed in that indicator as well. In fact all the Arab countries are net food importers and agriculture potential in most countries is rather limited. So some of our major messages in terms of food security is rather than only looking at agriculture and trying to increase productivity we need to look at that in a much more broader sense and that has to include trade that has to obviously include economic growth that has to include especially on the micro level also things like health education and nutrition at the same time. Now what we have done is we mapped out those indicators on the macro and micro level and so here you obviously see that most of the oil exporting countries like Libya and the Gulf countries but also others like Iran since they have high revenues from exports there shouldn't be any big issue in terms of being able to import food. However there's also a micro dimension to food insecurity and here again we use that indicator that I was talking about child malnutrition and you can see the colors are pretty different between countries that have a macro issue that means being able to import food slash produce food at the same time and the nutritional situation of households and specifically children which obviously has a lot of policy implications. So broadly speaking if the country has a macro issue then obviously you need very different policies and investment than countries with a micro issue of things and just brief a comment on the methodology. We use a global sample of countries and then we divide all the countries in quintiles both for the macro and micro indicator and we rank them from low to extremely alarming on a global sample that's important to note. Okay so now coming to climate change and we had this in the previous session just very briefly I mean there are you could think of biofiscal impact and you could think of economic effects. So biofiscal is more frequent droughts and floods sea level rise and then yields that come from changes in temperature and yields and so on and then economic impacts could be on the budget could be changing prices etc. So now what we have done and we have discussed this before in the session rather than only looking at the local let me run you through this rather than only looking using a CGE model to assess the impacts within the country we also say okay food security plays a very important role in Arab countries there most of them are net food importing countries so surely what happens in the rest of the world should to some extent impact those countries as well through higher food prices and so not only do we use like national level CGE models for those three countries that I mentioned before but we also use price changes global food price changes as projected by IFPRI's impact model to shock the country CGE models in terms of changes in prices and so let me just give you a brief overview so this is kind of the underlying data for the impact model as well as for the crop modeling just a few examples so we use generally speaking due to GCMs one is MIROC and the other CSI and this is just an example of pretty consistently in most cases in most crops not all of them but most of them yields go down and this is kind of the story that that we are expecting that that's on the local level now if you look at the global level these are the projected price changes for maize, rice and wheat what you see here is the blue is basically the expected price increase for maize, rice and wheat respectively even without climate change that's due to you know population growth changing dietary patterns and so on and then depending on which GCM you're using your price effects on the global level goes up and reaches up to 100% 55-54 respectively for for those crops between 2010 and 2050 so now and you can see all the details in the paper but the general story is okay so both the local effect and the global effect have a have a strong impact and depending on the net food importing position of the country and the net food producing position of households or consuming position of households the impact varies but the general story is there is a strong impact on households over time but they vary between countries both in terms of size and also in terms of which group you are looking at and here we are disaggregating between farm non-farm and urban households and so interestingly enough and in the case of Turkey I guess we'll see that specifically so in some circumstances if global food prices go up and the local impacts will be rather small a farmer may actually gain even though his yields may go down a bit but from the global food prices going up that there may actually be much less impact than there would be if we only look at the local effects so sorry just the key messages so there's an urgent need to improve the data and that's not new but this is the message that we are carrying then economics played a role in the Arab awakening that's pretty clear and also food security will have to play an important role for successful and peaceful transition and finally the key point if we think climate change taking global development into account really matters thank you very much