 Hello, my name is Sook Jong Lee, the President of East Asia Institute, and I'd like to thank you CSIS and Victor To arrange this meeting again. Actually last November we had we held this kind of conference and When we are preparing this second conference We were wondering, you know, if the agreement has settled by the time we have this conference What would be our agenda? So we thought well then you know we say and what's the implication of missed opportunity or whatever But thanks to the two-year extension we can continue our conversation But I'm at the same time these two years of extension Will definitely put us more burden to both parties of USA and South Korea because it doesn't guarantee Any any good lizard. We just earning time, but we don't know you know whether this Two more years will produce Any different consequence at all. So I hope we can Bring up some issues Naturally this session three is Related to session one session one we talked about the current status and now in this session Or we are going to talk about the future of a US rock nuclear corporations and we have three speakers and two discussants Because I usually Don't like to read the long buyers. So I usually just name and and there's a state Affiliation we have a professor Iman Song of Christ. He's a very well-known Scientist who has been addressing this topic and the second speaker will be a chime brown of CISAC Stanford University and our third speaker will be Edward Bramford Professor at Stanford University again the same CISAC and we have a two discussants Of course, we don't need the introduction of a Sharon Squasani and also Toby Dalton of a Carnegie Endowment International piece without photo. Do you let me invite Professor Iman Song I Think you have many slides, but your time is only 20 minutes, please So I'm supposed to talk about Cooperation between US and ROK in terms of nuclear industry and related developments Start out with this slide showing that energy is important in human development human development index and the energy consumption as direct correlation 90% of the humans do not have enough supply of energy according to the projection from today until Year 2050 if we just use the 80% human development index as a minimum Acceptable you need to double the energy from today's supply capacity Who's gonna do that? We have coal oil gas solar wind nuclear Today here a lot about global warming and greenhouse gases Well, nuclear still provides benefit So there is continued demand for nuclear power even in the United States the emission of nuclear I mean the green house gas reduction is Contributed a lot by nuclear power industry And in terms of using different sources of energy the grid management requires different type of sources for baseload intermediate Picking and in terms of the future energy system. This is a slide prepared by futuristic energy thinkers Basically, you have the very IT industry driven human society with a lot of electricity consumption Electric vehicle electricity and then all the electric IT based technologies So renewable energy and perhaps marriage with small module vectors will be the dominant Working horse for the future development. So now nuclear power Present the promise of abundant supply of energy. That's what happened when countries like South Korea or France Without having much natural resources Try to develop their energy infrastructure Presents the opportunity for modern high-level Technology development, which is sort of appealing to many of the developing countries and Inspiration for rapid industrial economics scientific and technological development something that again developing world wants to grab grass Presents an opportunity for reducing greenhouse gas emission and it is an important ingredient for IT based future energy system development This is let's not click global future energy development I mean actually the nuclear energy demand after Fukushima accident many people doubt or question Is there still demand for nuclear power after this horrible accident? And that's the latest projection by IAEA last summer So it may be at we are standing at 369 gigawatt electric and maybe in 2030 may see 70 more or maybe even doubling the current capacity based on IAEA projections in terms of who's wanting nuclear power basically we see everywhere Mostly coming from North East Asia and then Europe or Eastern Europe Then we have demands coming from Latin America or even Southeast Asia and etc This is slide from Steve and Scott's paper on Existing and expirations nuclear power states basically you have states with nuclear power Existing nuclear power states and then as powering nuclear power states Bottom line is you have a lot of states who wants to own nuclear power Although they may not have the capacity or capability problem with that is the government is not stable The corruption level is high and then they their infrastructure is not capable of their Democracy level to support this development is not good So you can see a very distinctive difference between the existing nuclear power states and aspiring states The corruption and stability and government effectiveness and all this Showing that there is a potential challenge in the future coming with the new aspiring states becoming owners of nuclear power and Then also the locations of these aspiring states have high instance of terrorism. So again, that's also a concern If you want to have nuclear power you have a lot of actually Homework you need to do you need a lot of money you have to develop Infrastructure you have to have people you have to have a sizable electric grade and then you have to have a lot of Things like sites supply of materials and which is supported through the international connection You have social acceptance and then you have to accept non-proficient Measures these days and a very long-term commitment once you commit to nuclear power. It's a forever commitment It's not just 100 years or 200 years all this are supported by a government initiative if your government doesn't support No nuclear power cannot exist Currently just in terms of supply US friends has been dominating But that's actually going sort of away Russia is rising as a star in an international market Japan's trying very hard with the actually the support by the government After losing this public support from nuclear power after Fukushima Canada remains a supplier and then Republic Korea has Emerged as a major supplier China wants to be a supplier India wants to supplier may not be realized But China is likely to be a very legitimate supplier soon The the scene is very complicated actually the US as a supply is not really true because there is no US entity in terms of industry company It's all merged with Japan The country's a river even is working together with Japan these days in their bid bid for the turkey and Russia actually Rosa Tom is combining all the infrastructure former weapons complex people and infrastructure So Rosh Rosatom is becoming a very formidable player in international market As we know Capco or Korea construction what I call KHNP Doosan everybody actually under that consortium is becoming a very powerful player as well But then the future of nuclear power Something we have to be reminded of Although there is is appeal and the demand will continue and there will be enough supply not all of those demand or Asperation will be met At the same time the supply supply strengths will be determined by the capability The safety records the fuel cycle capability the performance Financial package geopolitical factors and their supplies domestic development in the case of Japan I think they're very aggressive at this point, but if there is no domestic nuclear power infrastructure It's going to be very difficult game in the future And it'll be very difficult for them to sustain some sort of after service when they lose the operational capability within their own state strong government support is very important in in that regard in terms of supplier as a supplier in nuclear export With that Western democratic countries are expected to have lower Governmental support and that means the governments like Russia China More centrally governed control are likely to be a major play in the future as we move on with the more demands coming from Aspowering states Russia and China potentially is a dominant player this slide basically I want to say that nuclear industry is a very complicated very different actors working Customers a party financial packages another party. This is not necessarily their own But then you have federal in your commercial entities entities and many different entities working together United States when they first did this They didn't have anything everything had to be Supported by the government established by providing incentive, but that doesn't exist anymore in the liberalized market Now the only if the Wall Street controls the future of nuclear power is very gleam That may be true and then that may be true Even maybe countries like France in the future if they're support for nuclear power from the government is becoming weak Again, I'm saying that the future of nuclear power the global development Is going to be controlled more and more by centralized governments like Russia and China in terms of future challenges for nuclear proliferation Aspirating states interest nuclear power. I Have done actually statistical analysis of why some countries interesting in nuclear power There helps I mean there is some evidence that there is a dual interest at least in the beginning as their industry become mature The interest in nuclear weapon hurt their development, but at least at the beginning that works Limitations in IA resource is something we know well addressing fuel cycle of fuel cycle needs like fuel supply spent fuel management challenges Wickening us influence on global nuclear governance regime. It's current nuclear governance regime has been established by USA leadership It is not clear whether us will remain in that leadership Rise of Russia and China is a challenge with different philosophy Value of plutonium is different in different countries. Many countries have still this pure plutonium stockpile With different economics Nelson flow-refrigeration culture among newcomer states many of the states do not have nuclear weapons then they develop Nuclear power civilian power and they have a different view on nuclear weapons South Korea is not an exemption the reason why we hear a lot about nuclear weapon development in interest in South Korea is because of that issue Establishing nuclear non-professional culture is a huge challenge in the future if more and more countries becoming nuclear power But that has to be developed and South Korea is a very actually good test bet for the for that case Reducing salience of nuclear weapon in the future while the threshold for first use may be going down compliance and dealing with non-compliance is becoming Challenging challenging issue and the maintaining in this universality also is challenging now. Let's shift out here talk about a little bit about safety You have a lot of plants that's going through asing and equipment and and all the Infrastructure actually is becoming old Maintaining infrastructure for sale safer operation is becoming an issue Workforce is aging and actually if you have no future there is no young people coming into the industry So once that that workforce it retires There is no good workforce to maintain that infrastructure becoming an issue in many of the Eastern European country actually even now the nuclear slowdown basically slowdown the Investment by government on safety and so on that becomes a challenge and then beginning domestic support for nuclear power again All this basically works against the safety of nuclear power in the future newcomer state without any experiences and then operation by Multicultural workforce if you go to United Arab Emirates Nuclear power plant operation will be done by Koreans and then all the people Doing the security will be done by experts like Pakistanis and Indonesia. I mean Asian Indians and so on you have a Multicultural workforce working for one cause it'll be a challenge and something has to be done to actually make sure that everything is under control Minimizing human errors nuclear power has become very complicated It has become very complex machine due to the safety requirements and demand and public So yeah, actually the leading cause of instance nuclear power these days is human error And so operator training has become much more important issue Comprehensive sir severe managed excellent management program after Fukushima extent basically we know now that severe accident can happen and Actually many states are not prepared for civil nuclear accident Integration of safety and security is a very important issue Strengthening public companies nuclear safety challenging again Even if you safety actually improved and you have lot more that record better records public doesn't believe in that regional nuclear liability regime basically case like China you're building nuclear power plants right here Korea Japan is going to get hit it anything happens China doesn't have any good liability or insurance system yet It's going to be an issue in the future if most and more states develop nuclear power without having proper capability the financial package capability insurance capability and Nuclear power is very expensive actually to ensure Blue Ribbon Commission on nuclear Americans could nuclear power in 2012 said US wants to remain leadership on safety non-preparation and security, but We don't have that at this point so many players in international nuclear technology and police arena US has to demonstrate the leadership by engagement and by example, but it is not likely to happen United States cannot exercise effective leadership on issues related to back-end of nuclear fuel cycle as As long as its own program is in this array basically nuclear power program in United States Especially back-end situation situation is in big trouble. They cannot demand anything to other countries They have their own lot of issues. For example, the spent nuclear fuel is accumulated There is no no permanent disposal site US DOE has been paying more than one billion dollars for at the loss of the lawsuit US decided already to not to use purex technology and there is no commercial interest for developing advanced fuel cycle US has a huge problem But then there is no commercial interest no government initiative So it just we wait and wait and wait until crisis emerge So that's something that US people has to be actually mindful of There is this stockpile of plutonium More and more plutonium produced from spent nuclear fuel around the globe and that's something that has to be stopped You don't want to have continued the use of nuclear fuel cycle like purex technology and that's not likely to happen There is no alternative on the horizon as more students countries come on to the stage They want to have some sort of spent fuel treatment Unless something is done you gonna you gonna continue to use this purex technology ROK actually emerges as a credential. I mean credible Player in this game. They have the experience into formation of you know coming from a sort of autocratic Country to become a truly a democratic country. It's a model for atoms of peace Actually, though there is no parallel model at this point in this in terms of realizing the atoms of peace vision They have the proliferation and commitment since 1980 Although 2004 is a fluke actually 2004 IE instant They had all the information on their carry website if they wanted to do something secret Why would you put on those information on the Institute website so anyway In Korea, that's a problem. But anyway There is no secret in this ways and Anyway us I mean ROK is a staunch us li you have a leadership in international nuclear safety training Korea is the only country who has built nuclear power continuously with on time on budget Demonstration so us lacks this expertise us don't have experience in Building new plant and performing pre-operational safety and training U.S. Lost experience. Okay friends does have that Russia has does have that but you Korea actually leading in this Training so you NRC as I asked for Korea to support in that aspects They have the leadership in nuclear operator training. They are uniquely positioned in dealing with nuclear and non-properational use on the DPRK threat so South Korea can become a really true non-properational model for the world If they actually there means of it, they can really be a shining example of Adam's peace nuclear exporter with legitimate bases and domestic Supply chain they actually can be 100% self-sufficient Although at this point they're working with Westinghouse to provide MMIS and consensual I mean direct the coolant pump, but in technical capability. They can be 100% self-reliant But for political reasons they want to work with United States There they have the best cost effectiveness in nuclear power construction. They have the standardization experience They have built plant and designed and operated and licensed With on time on on budget delivery schedule. That's the only actually example of nuclear power In the world right now. They have demonstrated a fuel cycle technology capability through the development of DUPIC That's basically using PWR fuel spend fuel and then turn into candle fuel There is no commercial interest in terms of Capco or KHNP So that has not been commercialized but technology has been demonstrated They have actually developed advanced fast-rector design and advanced nuclear fuel development some of the most advanced fuel and Fast-rector design US has under as estimated the capability of nuclear industry or the R&D capability I mean Korea but South Korea in some some areas actually Exceeded the capability of US they have actually the fifth status in terms of total nuclear power generation and They are trying to maximize energy security by fulfilling the this Capability and then try to effectively manage spent nuclear fuel as part of the long-term fuel cycle policy And then they want to enhance their capability as a nuclear exporter In terms of spend fuel management basically I'm showing that if you have a large nuclear power generating capacity You want or you need to have to reprocessing that's the case with United States although since 1997 1977 we stopped due to proliferation concerns But rest of the world actually still doing reprocessing except ROK Except Germany who is now phasing out their nuclear power Canada is an example exception because they have the huge land with good government trust among the public And they don't need to really recycle this because of the low presence of Rainume 235 due to the use of natural rainume But the rest of the country is if you have more than 20 reactors, maybe even 10 reactors You want to have reprocessing or some sort of capability Taiwan Spain they have a relatively small size and they don't necessarily have to do Reprocessing due to the size of the nature although Taiwan's case you have a very limited amount of size of land So you may have to do some reprocessing Does ROK needs spent fuel treatment? Well, you don't have a place to send the waste right now to a direct disposal Interim storage is definitely is going to be exercise But it's very difficult to find the site public won't accept interim storage without the plan for spent fuel treatment and long-term Disposer why not just on-site storage? Difficulty with demand for removal of nuclear materials with plant closures after plant is closed in 20 years Public do not want to see nuclear power plant. I mean the spent nuclear fuel So it's not really a long-term long-term option. You have to have something beyond that. What about just overseas treatment? It's not likely to happen Politically economically is a very difficult option and they want to obviously Titus the spent nuclear fuel management with sparse recta development and they want to enhance the Stance in nuclear export Just what it want to drive a point the ROK's law and intimacy level low level waste disposal cost is 10 times higher than rest of the world that is going to be likely I don't know hopefully not but then repeated in high level waste disposal. That is going to be a huge issue This is the current policy of South Korea in terms of fuel cycle They want to develop the technology to reduce the volume and then recycle the TRU is from the reactors They want to have the spent fuel coming and then store store them in a facility and then do a pyro processing and then put it into fast Rectors so that you can reduce the amount of waste that goes into a disposal site requires Much less maybe inventory of heat that actually benefits the maximizing Benefit of having the maximum use of the capacity and then being able to reduce the effect resources more effectively In terms of fuel cycle economics issue that we discussed earlier. This is a fuel cycle cost comparison basically Just for fuel cycle cost the pyro and SFR actually is better In terms of fuel cycle cost, but this is from Kerry I've done this is a very preliminary result done electricity system generation cost If you do obviously pyro and fast recta combination They'll be more expensive than simply doing once through but then if you just simply do one through and then do pyro Processing just for the waste treatment. It's not bad So they want to have actually this power processing done as a product scale prototype scale by 2025 and they want to have this small first sort of fast record Demonstration by 2008 28. That's a prototype So when can you actually realize this commercial as a commercial technology at this point? If you have a prototype it needs maybe five five years to build it So actually you're not talking about 30 years or 40 years It's much less than that as far as Koreans are concerned The power processing actually step includes five different steps Declaring voluptation oxide reduction and electric refining electric winning and then waste treatment right now all this basically done in Korea using simulated nuclear fuel material and Then current tenure plan says if you want to demonstrate anything with spent fuel you have to come to the United States. I Think if you want to really make perform a meaningful R&D some of this activity has to be done with suspended with a fuel So well, I'm basically trying to say that different capabilities may carry different degrees of proliferation implication Again, I have done the statistical analysis of atoms of peace What affects the potential development of nuclear weapons enrichment definitely is a factor But statistically speaking reprocessing is not a factor in terms of Contributing to proliferation as according to the history of last 20 of I mean 50 or 60 years Rookies spent fuel treatment capability provides the opportunity for us spent fuel management as I said earlier Because us actually needs that technology and there are a lot of issues currently without that opportunity for joint fuel nuclear fuel export nuclear system export opportunity to maybe To address this issue, maybe without too much worrying about joint declaration decolonization Enrichment actually is a different issue. It's potentially just an economics issue Although some people might argue basically K. Chen Pee agree I mean argues that there is a 50% reduction in cost if you today if they do it it domestically and Then at the same time we have this opportunity from United States US has huge excess capacity at this point for you in raining enrichment So I I would say maybe the discussion should be focused on Meeting the needs not having actually the capability in in the soil. I mean on the soil of South Korea So the necessary provision Maybe they should be able to perform R&Ds with spent nuclear fuel But somehow provide some sort of a fuel supply guarantee So as far as US ROK nuclear cooperation is concerned They have to actually strive for the peaceful use of economic development safety and nuclear security or non-properation of the globe and by developing some sort of a collaboration in global scale in Industrial development nuclear export safety and non-properation arena for example, I think When they try to export the technology US and ROK can work together even even developing this financial package For example, US Exim Bank can support some sort of financial package for US produced components in terms of Nuclear power cost reduction design and licensing US NRC can help South Korea to develop this design certificate for APR 1400 In terms of fuel cycle services, they can work together to provide fuel supply as they're as part of their nuclear export bead Again, they can work together in developing this pyro process technology and provide spent fuel treatment services Also waste disposal is an issue and the commission and the contamination is an issue US has a lead in this maybe they can work together and help South Korea's needs in the future and They can work together in developing small modular reactors They can have a research together for spent so-and-so in fast reactors and they can work together for licensing review I just show want to show you an example of when they work together This is actually Russia Currently Russia is I have a very preliminary mother that I've developed who's gonna be the Leader in the occupying the international market in the future Russia is expected to be the leader in the future market share followed by France ROK USA China, I mean Japan and in Canada if ROK US work together They could potentially surface what Russia can do in terms of nuclear safety I think we have to really work together on a lot of issues There are newcomer countries coming in without infrastructure for the safety management You have to have a leadership in global nuclear safety culture development This workforce training and management including multicultural workforce management Integrating safety and security. I think they we can work together in this issue again managing aging of nuclear power plants Collaborating in public confidence building US actually has gone through the cycle after TMI extent They actually work together and they now kind of figure out they now have figured it out how to deal with the public South Korea is facing That issue now Maybe we can learn a lot from United States on that actually issue and then working together on regional nuclear liability regime This is my last slide. I think maybe next to last cooperation in nuclear non-professional culture development Cooperation nuclear security and non-professional standard development and then maybe coming with regional nuclear materials account and raising like a back Arrangement you can do the same maybe in North East Asia Maybe even out of some of the new newcomer countries region just just throwing some of the ideas So desired outcome of this industrial cooperation should be to reduce uncertainty in global nuclear development That may adversely affect nuclear safety and non-preparation to strengthen the position of US and ROK in global nuclear governance Strengths in US ROK alliance and realize the vision of Adams of peace. Thank you Thank you professor in if this kind of joint research is so good to both USA and Korea can somebody answer later that the why the American side is not the enthusiastic about this new technology our second speaker is Mr. Chime Brown and Because you know all the scientific knowledge is not that familiar to most of us I will appreciate if you can distinguish Now what the future cooperation is possible under the current one-to-three agreement and and whether it be more Enhanced cooperation if one-to-three agreement is a to change it Okay, thank you very much Chairman After this magisterial presentation by professor him. I like to concentrate more on Direct near-term cooperation between the United States and Korea in nuclear energy issues Regarding the presentation Though I have some specific argument with this presentation and some of these slides like on Reprocessing and I could refute this line by line, which I'm not gonna do Regarding is economics, but particularly economics of pyro processing I think it's too early to do any economics of this thing because the numbers are not known So we shouldn't draw conclusion about economics However, I see in dr. Professor presentation Many shades of things that I've said in August and in September in Korea And I'm very happy to see that we are mostly in agreement about the basic issues of cooperation But in the United States and Korea I regard it as a compliment that I think converge And it's very nice that we see a process of ideas that come from two sides of the ocean Coming together to somewhat similar idea and with that let me continue with my own presentation I am going to talk about two things one is or I could write talk about two things One is direct cooperation between United States and Korea and the other one is a safety regime in East In East China see always Asia's see I'm not going to talk about that because I mentioned this in my November presentation and there's not enough time to cover everything As I said before Everything that I say both is independent of the one-to-three agreement and will support it Indirectly or directly however, those are only my own suggestions rather than the formal position of the US government Yesterday I had to present positions of the US government here. I present my own opinions as seen in Sisak So I think that United States and Korea are now in an excellent position To develop a joint program for cooperation in nuclear energy development worldwide And such an approach if implemented or if continue to continue to be implemented Based on already steps taken right now would support nuclear energy development in the world and would improve global nuclear governance 2029 there will be no spent fuel storage left in the pools of both Olshen station and Shin Olshen station put together All eight reactors spent fuel pools will be completely full This is true. Not just of the Olshen station, but all the spent fuel stations in Korea by 2025 or 2030 there will be no space available in any spent fuel pool in any reactor in Korea So something else will have to be done Of course you could build a power processing plant, but the first power processing plant even if ready by 2025 2030 will not be of sufficient capacity to handle all the spent fuel discharged at that year So something else will have to be done. It's something that cannot be avoided and might as well Make a virtue out of necessity and get on with the spent fuel storage program because it will simply be needed If for no other reason Once that facility will be built It will be a good example to show other country how to do this as part of a waste management program Advice for countries which contain fuel from a joint American Korean program Again, this is a spent fuel storage in Shin Wolsang for Kendo reactor fuel Which are very small assemblies and very low burn-up This is different than PWR fuel element, which are much bigger and fire burn-up And a demonstration program would be something no bigger than this Whereas the final program will look bigger than this So a demonstration program could be started early on and with that let me just summarize I will not go to the rest of my slides because I run out of time All I want to say is right now a river and Rosatom the French and the Russians have got the capability to provide Fuel package at the front end and at the back end as well as reactor supply as well as risk management Korea does not have this capability right now The United States does not have the capability right now to do completely a full package On the other hand if the two countries will combine the resources They will be in a position to offer together jointly a full package of reactor supplies Plant management services and fuel supplies both on the front end of the fuel cycle and advice on how to do Spend fuel management at the back end of the fuel cycle This is the only way that Korea could really obtain full fledged capability to manage its entire fuel and its entire reactor offer and Should this kind of capability be realized it will be beneficial both For the Korean energy system for the United States energy system and for global nuclear governance and with that I'll finish Thank you very much. I saw the speaker will be professor brain for it. Thank you chairman Lee Just a quick point of clarification I do my current employer is actually the University of New Mexico where I'm a professor But I was at CSAC University first our CSAC at Stanford for two years. I just wanted to clarify that very quickly I should also mention that I know both of the previous speakers quite well and know their breadth and range And so this makes it a little bit difficult to follow up So instead of Perhaps rehashing some of these topics I'm going to focus a little bit more on a smaller wedge and go a little bit deeper And so what I'm going to be talking about today, and this was mentioned a little bit Is the integration of nuclear safety and security and perhaps where it's appropriate? So as many people in this room may or may not be aware Words are of course important and safety and security are often confused and used interchangeably. This is an article I pulled shortly after Fukushima Just illustrating this I could find a hundred articles over the course of a year. No problem What they are what the headline of course says is Francis must tighten nuclear security after Fukushima But of course what they're referring to is really safety There's another quick example as those of you familiar with the United States Regulatory Commission We have an advisory committee on reactor safeguards. They don't do anything with safeguards They're really focused on reactor safety, but it's just an example where sometimes words are used interchangeably and they actually do matter Taking a little bit deeper into what we mean by nuclear security and safety These are the set definitions that many people use in the case of security We're interested in the set of measures to prevent theft diversion or sabotage in the case of safety Again, we're also interested in the protection of people environment But there we're interested in the potential harmful effects of radiation a key thing to take away here is that security risks involve strategic interactions between an adversary and a defender while Security risk can be treated stochastically in the random occurrences. This is a very important thing to take away As we move forward in this presentation The reason I bring this up is as many people know in the 2012 nuclear security summit There was an insistence on including Safety into the discussion Some countries were not very happy about that, but one year removed from Fukushima. It seemed quite inappropriate to not include it and the The document that was produced in 2012 in March just after a year after Fukushima One of the items that was raised was nuclear security and safety. I'm not going to read this passage But I want to focus on what I've highlighted in red, which is should be designed implemented and managed And nuclear facilities and in a current and coherent and synergistic manner So should be designed as the important point. This is by design. This is for new installations new infrastructure moving forward The next sentence that I've highlighted is we will also affirm the need to maintain effective emergency preparedness response and mitigation Capabilities in a manner that addresses both nuclear security and nuclear safety So it's really those two points that I'm going to focus as we move forward Most good presentations on a Friday afternoon have to at least one Daubert cartoon in it and this is my Daubert cartoon The words should be designed implemented and managed in a nuclear facility in a coherent and synergistic manner It's a lot of a lot of language maintain effective emergency preparedness response and mitigation capabilities To non-engineers. That's a that's a mouthful to engineers This means a lot and I want to just jump a little bit into that not into the nuts and bolts as much as What what people right now are actually doing in this area? Just a quick risk assessment overview If you were to not differentiate between security and safety risk This is the way you would perhaps look at the problem You have a variety of scenarios that one needs to evaluate Some could be random. These are non malevolent events. Some are not random. They involve a strategic interaction. They are malevolent human acts If we follow along on the top corner the traditional definition of risk for probabilistic Risk assessment for reactor safety is we ask the question of what events can occur How often can this event occur and then we move into the the consequence phase? How bad is it if this happened? Will we be concerned? If we follow along on the bottom axis, this is really what we talk about when we consider security risk Where we're asking malevolent human acts can someone cause this to happen if they want to if so, how would anyone do this? If they could how big And the result is your traditional three three pillars if you will of of risk the Quantification of the definition of risk the risk assessment part and then of course how do we manage the risk moving forward? Just jumping a little bit more into the question of security risk versus safety risks I've taken this slide from a colleague at San Diego, Agüice who does a lot of work in this area What I really want to point out here is the likelihood of the scenario is where we really get into a lot of trouble Predicting the likelihood of both internal and external events for for reactor safety. I would argue in Right now we have about 14,000 reactor years of operation We actually do quite well in terms of internal events as dr. Yim had mentioned earlier one of the key issues we have in reactor safety is really the human reliability component Now there's another part of that coin which of course is the external events While we have 14,000 perhaps odd reactor years of operational experience. We may only have 200 300 years of Records for for external hazards whether it's flooding Earthquakes things of that nature there were interested in continental timescales were in fact 14,000 reactor years is nothing So a lot of the emphasis right now in the reactor safety community is moving towards the external hazard assessment portion But I just want to point out that the likelihood Likelihood of a scenario is where really the distinction is where you do have high commonality is really actually the consequence side So we'll talk a little bit later about what the consequences are But if you start to look at a radiological sabotage or a security event really the consequence base is quite similar for a reactor safety perspective Again, I took this slide from a colleague I just I was trying to put in a different way But I couldn't I thought it was really excellent the way he does it But this is a way people are now starting to think about how we can look at security risk management Moving forward really it's a series of three questions that one would ask Could I do it if I wanted to? This is of course the adversary what I do it if I could are the expected expected consequences high enough How we would respond to that is we would of course make the attack scenario more difficult Make the attack scenario more difficult to reduce the potential consequences Reduce the potential or expected consequences of the scenario that's sort of a mouthful But the point is this is a very fundamentally different process the way we look at reactor safety and it's key to point this out Therefore for our scenarios risk we're really more interested in how hard is the scenario and how large are the expected consequences as opposed to really focusing on how much Can we quantify probability of attack or things of that nature? Easier attacks that produce higher consequences are more likely to be chosen and attempted by an adversary And these are really the high-risk scenarios that we're concerned about and risk management is really the name of the game for security risk Where we're really focused on understanding and controlling these these preferable scenarios So how not to do safety and security? This is a great animation. I've also taken from a colleague that I just want to show If we're looking ahead, how can we improve the way we do this? This is the way we currently do it Essentially you start off with a system design you work on the functionality you hand it over to the people who do safety Then it goes back to the people who are worried about operability. The security is done and it just goes back and forth in this process Safeguards is another area, of course where there's a lot of discussion about integration And this process just goes back and forth and what it would have basically you end up with is basically this volleyball spiral design process Again, this is for people designing new installations, but one could very very quickly use this analogy for existing organizational Entities that run both safety security and safeguards for existing infrastructure What is this produce of course? This is essentially the the outcome of what we currently have and there's countless examples We're not factoring safety and security early on ever have resulted in installations that perhaps have it have inferior or Very costly retrofits Just very quickly as an example of this SBO stands for station blackout. I should have put that in but of course at Fukushima We were under station blackout conditions The way we currently do this is we have basically a safety assessment a security assessment we do an evaluation of the external challenges and these lead for strategies for mitigating consequences of long-term station blackout the plant guidance I've Listed a set of documents that are important for people that run these facilities But this is really if one wants to integrate safety and security moving forward, especially as we start to talk about newcomer nations It's really this area of the training This guidance here that really is the crux of the issue The reality if we look at what historically happened, of course post September 11th We had an extensive review of our security assessment for critical nuclear installations we did a review of all of our the guidance that I mentioned earlier And we made many many changes now post Fukushima, of course in the United States We had a very similar process, but we looked at it from the safety side But there was very little draw to evaluate the security implications of many of the changes that occurred And this is a little bit of a problem moving forward. There's ways to integrate this in a manner that is that is certainly Better than we than we currently are doing Another issue of course of the challenges with transparency for security versus safety As many people know in the case of security, it's a climate by which Transparency is perhaps not encouraged. It's Secrecy is the name of the game in terms of access control Where a safety there's strong measures put in place to share information and to drive up capacity factors on a on an international scale But however, there's there's there's there's significant challenges with respect to ensure inadequate transparency. So looking ahead Just want to close up With a couple key points moving forward Of course there's a strong need to establish levels of acceptable safety and security and of course this is what was meant In the in the in the documentation that came out of the sole security summit with respect to safety and security But there's some real key challenges the way we look at what acceptable region. What's an acceptable risk varies from from country to country And and the way countries actually handle assessing risk and defining Regulations and guidance by which our releases are acceptable vary quite a bit another challenge Of course is the role of the design-basis threat. It's it's it's an evolving Process some people don't think we should even have a dbt because it causes more harm than than good not not saying that we shouldn't have Of course adequate security, but just the process of the dbt presents a lot of challenges Human reliability for both safety and security events This is a key area moving forward in terms of our ok us Collaborations as well if you start to look at regional a lot of the the discussion that Hyman and dr. Yim mentioned earlier This is really one of the the key areas that we could hope about collaboration can really emerge in terms of human reliability and performance As well as transferring best practices amongst operators I Will raise of course there is that there is a large number of new well relatively large number of potential nuclear newcomers in Southeast Asia I think these countries do present some serious challenges with respect to integrating safety and security However, they also present many opportunities One of the responses in the United States Of course the Fukushima was to pursue a flex-like strategy for accident mitigation as opposed to a very heavily preventative approach As one starts to look at emerging newcomers There's there's certainly regional solutions that one could look at with respect to flex-like the flex-like solutions that should be explored And of course finally ensure a positive feedback. We can do better with new installations People sort of forget that there's a lot of work that's going on into new reactor technology where these lessons learned are being incorporated That that feedback loop needs to continue moving forward and of course Hyman mentioned earlier the Carnegie or the exporters of principle of conduct These are these are potential mechanisms by which we can improve This feedback process for for both safety and security. So having said that I think that's my last slide and also stop Thank you very much, especially for your animation a did it's And then okay, let me buy two discusses Sharon you go ahead. Thank you Thanks for having me some really interesting presentations Unfortunately They were hard to study because you went through them so quickly So I would love to get a copy of of both of them and sort of follow-up conversation Online or offline or whatever you want to however you want to call it. I'm gonna Make my comments brief because I know there are quite a few experts in the audience who will have questions Overall and I'm gonna confine my Comments mostly to Mansung and Heim's presentations I believe that there are enough Strategic interests particularly we heard in the this morning's session Well in all the sessions preceding this one. I think there are enough strategic interests to not have to stretch it There were a lot of creative ideas Put forth both by Mansung and Heim, but I see some problems with them I think it's reasonable to for us to collaborate Particularly on dry cask storage. I Think it's particularly reasonable be a good idea to collaborate on repository work particularly on deep borehole I Don't think it's helpful to be overly confident either about Korean nuclear Industry or capabilities Or US nuclear capabilities in my opinion The nuclear industry has a habit of overselling itself Which is why there's a problem with public acceptance. So if you can step back from that I think that would be helpful. So where do I think? You were stretching cradle to grave. So Heim guess what in your presentation? There is no grave there and US and Korean Collaboration is not gonna make a grave now by that. I mean Final disposal of nuclear waste whether or not you reprocess, right? To say that you know, there's only one country currently that has offered to do that and that is Russia Arriva is not going to do that. They may help with they may offer reprocessing services But there is a French law that prohibits keeping foreign nuclear waste in France. So I think this whole you know cradle to grave would be fantastic I think that the US should take foreign nuclear power reactor fuel back But for a whole host of political reasons that is not about to happen The whole notion that the US and Korea should collaborate to provide these Integrated fuel cycle services because that's going to make them more competitive. I think we can question a little bit after all Korea won the UAE bid over Arriva over Russ Adam They won it without having any fuel cycle capabilities beyond Fabrication right so I mean sense, you know enrichment or reprocessing So I think that's an indicator that you don't need integrated fuel cycle services to be a good competitor Another area which I think you're stretching SNF spent nuclear fuel treatment using pyro processing So as far as I understand it the Korean version of pyro processing is meant to be used in conjunction with Fast reactors, which means you've got and in a burner mode, which means you've got dirty fuel So let's think for a moment. How many countries now have commercial fast reactors? That would be one Russia the BN 600, which is not fueled with plutonium. It's filled with HAU for the moment, so Even though That may be something in the future. It's not probably even 2050. It's probably The year 3000 So so that that notion that we're gonna you know that the power processing in any way shape or form could help Korea's competitiveness I think is a little overstated on third area where I think you're stretching regional nuclear accounting like ABAC and People who've heard me speak before know that I think ABAC is oversold Mainly I guess or perhaps because I was there at the beginning ABAC is not your atom Not in terms of its accounting capabilities I know a lot of people put this forth as a terrific example of regional cooperation But but even if it were Do we think that that would be possible in Asia where? We heard this morning about the deep historical rifts I it would be nice, but I don't think it's about to happen anytime soon on Small modular reactors fourth area where I think you're stretching and Korea there is actually a little bit ahead of the US In terms of the smart reactor, but in general small modular reactors This is not the saving grace of the nuclear energy industry And I think that the nuclear industry over sells small modular reactors. There are a lot of things I mean their main virtue is that you can modularize them in terms of Installing so that the upfront capital cost is not as huge as a regular thousand megawatt reactor Right, so it's not going to cost you five billion. It might cost you a couple hundred million or maybe a billion But that ignores I think all of those other very complex Issues you have that we haven't figured out yet So if you have a Six-pack what they call a six pack of small modular reactors. You've got six on a site. What does that do to all your? You know to your control room, so we haven't even figured out Do you have one control room for all of those if you're just building one every ten years? How does that happen? So anyway, I think a little oversell and then on Korea I Buying into Enrichment capacity elsewhere that I think is a great idea And I agree with what man song said that you know It's it's about meeting needs rather than about having the capability on Korean soil. I would however I'm I wouldn't Persuade them to buy into you sec. I Wouldn't I wouldn't advise my friends to buy into you sec. I think there are other enrichment Concerns that have a better track record perhaps a little more Viability reliability there I'm gonna stop there and Invite I guess Toby next Please well, thanks for having me. It's it's been for me a very valuable day to hear these different perspectives and what I thought I would do was try to Put some of what we heard back in the context of the discussion this morning and in particular I think it's You know as the theme of this session suggested a little bit reflexive to Try to solve political problems by arguing for more cooperation and I understand in a problem-solving context That's kind of the natural inclination But I would ask I would ask the question is that really what's required in this situation? Is it even a good thing is even you know if you're an American policymaker you have to ask the question is that even what Korea really wants and I suspect from you know, just a Not very in-depth Perusal of Korean discourse on this that there's actually probably a lot of Koreans that would not want to have deeper cooperation with the US on nuclear matters But actually would probably prefer a little bit more space to do your own research and development and so forth And so I guess I would I would ask the question Is this really a good thing? You know to the extent that more cooperation is good. I Would think that there would have to be a persuasive Technical and commercial rationale for it and let the market sort that out and if it makes sense then great You know, I think having having seen the the gene up experiment here You don't want to have a heavy government presence trying to force Collaboration in areas where it's very difficult to actually formulate and implement a long-term nuclear strategy. I think Sharon's laid out quite a number of questions for for Chaim and Professor in Manseung so I would ask a couple questions for Professor Blanford One, you know having participated now in this series of discussions with Koreans Do you think that there's any sort of consensus view about the appropriate sort of mix or approach to managing safety and security between us US government or the US nuclear community and the Korean nuclear community and secondly to a point that Manseung raised in his presentation You know to the extent in Nuclear newcomers there might be multicultural workforces. How do you? Start to communicate these these ideas where there are you know tensions between them and the bureaucratic approach at least that we've taken and that you know Korea has taken but is trying to resolve How do you communicate? to countries that will have You know expat workforces that have multiple different experiences and so forth and on these complicated and you know issues that are somewhat intention We'll stop there Before a three presenters respond maybe I like to invite one or two questions from the floor Okay, over there at the at the end One question, I guess these are one question of crime and one question for me now Manseung the Question for Chaim is you had an emphasis on the front end as a package arrangement and that's not the way it works Generally in the industry people buy as you know if people buy services Independently they don't buy package deals. So what what's the real advantage of coming up with a? Illusion that we can come up with a full package to reactors when people are buying enrichment separately conversion separately Uranium separately the utilities usually want to have control of that themselves And for me some the Well, there's are two questions one is that you said we don't have to have once the reactors shut down. We need to move Move the fuel well as far as I know there's no reactors that need to shut down in Korea till at least 2040 So I'm not sure why this is such an urgent issue to deal with pyro processing in that case There's also you said the cost of pyro without sodium fast reactors would be Economic but with sodium fast reactors would not be economic Well, that's exactly the concern of the United States government Which is afraid that you're gonna run pyro processing and then not run the sodium fast reactors accumulating the separated material in the process So that doesn't seem a very strong argument from the Korean side Let me ask In my song to respond first Well, I'll go start I'll go first from miles Well, you said something about UAE deal Although it was pointed at I'm you actually asked for fuel supply guarantee from South Korea and South Korea couldn't do that So you asked hey, if you cannot deliver fuel, what would happen and South Korea said well if we have a situation where you cannot we cannot provide fuel at least for the first few You know reload Will use our own fuel to make sure that you have a fuel even if we may not have a fuel for our own vectors So that could become an issue In the case of using pyro only I'm just using that as an example of economics comparison But although many people say pyro doesn't make sense if there is no spend I mean sodium fast reactors That may be true in terms of long-term fuel cycle policy, but in terms of just waste management Pyro only could could provide the benefits for waste management in terms of repository needs and so on and Economically, I think sodium fast rect basically takes up a lot of chunk in the overall equation going to Tobias point about this Industry Development can actually this be done under maybe government initiative Maybe we should just let the government and let the market sort it out That I think that's the one of the points. I wanted to make United States industry will not figure it out Period the market the Wall Street will not figure it out. Even if we wait for 100 years Will South Korean market figure it out? I don't think so, but that's the point unless we figure it out From some of a normative, you know philosophy We will lose the opportunity the rest of the world move on with Russian and Chinese services Is that the world we want to see so if there is something we want to do Maybe South Korean government still have some leverage in this. They can control the industry at this point still they can actually Organize the structure of the industry and they could actually sort of be coordinated through US participation And maybe that's how we could gain the leadership in the international future market development. Anyway, that's the point I was going to make Going to Sharon's questions Can any of these two countries develop? disposal capability Good question, I hope Actually, maybe after a woman administration goes away, Yaka Mountain will be revived as far as I see I think South Korea has definitely an opportunity If North Korea is really serious about the economic development They have this nuclear weapon test sites It's already contaminated out of nowhere If the circumstances is right, maybe there could be a possibility for South Korean nuclear fuel going into North Korean nuclear weapons site just being creative or There is some rumor in Korea these days the fortune teller saying this Upcoming months there may be something happening in North Korea. So the problem may be solved Anyway The the fast rector is South Koreans developing It's not fixed yet, but the current one is obviously as you pointed out is a bono rector is not blanket But it could be changed depending on what actually is the strategic goal of that pure cycle development So I'm simply saying that maybe there is an option. We can still and entertain in the future Abak as you said is an oversold idea, but I'm sort of simply talking about vision If we can have that maybe there is a way to include North Korea in this dialogue as well as a way to include North Korea In this dialogue, maybe that's a way to start some sort of a discussion at least So I mean small module reactors, it's it's not demonstrated, but then us has the capability actually through the Submarine reactors and MPOW reactor from BNW at least that is something that has been demonstrated as far as the core design is concerned and Again, there is no current market It's very difficult at this point to find the market But I think the world will find it find the market some of the some small countries like Africa or Middle East Some of those small country with that without having large electric grid size We'll find the market for that and somebody is going to provide it and at this point Russia is actually again a leader in providing The technology so there is a need for something to be done here in the United States or Korea or collaboratively I'll stop there Okay Several comments here First of all, I agree with Sharon does the need to develop a repository in Korea There's no argument about that as Professor Yim has also indicated The issue is so much You cannot run before you learn how to walk and in this respect You need to start with spend fuel storage before you get to a repository My comments address the near term need within the next 20 years Rather than the repository, which is quite necessary whether you do power processing or you don't do power processing But that will come later. So you definitely need to get there in time and I hope there's some kind of a program Regarding fast speeder reactors are the reason much Development in the program in the world. Do I think that Sharon over sells or negative comments here? So I'd say that there's a brittle program in India, which might start the reactor pretty soon There may be two reactor programs in China And several other countries spent in lower level of activity in terms of joint European build a program And still even limited capacity in Japan and in the United Kingdom So I wouldn't say that there is no interest in be the reactor programs In China it would be very much commercialized in Russia, it's going to be commercialized in India It's going to be commercialized. It's not going to be a research facility. So let's be careful about it Regarding abac it may be oversold But let's not forget where it came from it came from two countries that had the nuclear weapons program And they stopped border nuclear weapons program and agreed to inspect each other's facilities in itself That was a revolutionary move It's applicable not to safeguard there's to safeguard but even to safety the concept of joint inspections And by the way, this is probably the best way to manage the North Korean reactor of which there are major concerns You cannot do it probably on a government to government basis But you might say face all around by doing it on a power plant to power plant basis And a good example would be several power plants on the Chinese side of the border in Jilin and in Liaoning province not far from North Korea And you could do a plant-to-plant Corporative agreement similar to abac between those Chinese plants and the reactor in North Korea that way there's less of a National sovereignty issues involved and more plant-to-plant issues involved which might be acceptable Politically to both countries which will let the world in a little bit into the North Korean program and let the North Korean program learn a bit more about what happens in the world Maybe the Chinese are not the best example of nuclear safety But definitely they are better than what you see in North Korea right now So looking at this model and applying it creatively to somewhere else in the world may still have some potential Regarding SMR's SMR are not ready yet. It's true But let's not say that they don't need to be developed because there are some technical issues that need to be resolved If two reactors are built and demonstrated that will go a long way toward resolving some of those safety issues and One though once those issues are resolved. We could see what happens next I don't think small reactors are panacea to everything But it's still better to build some of them see how the operate learn from them and see at that point What applicability they have to other places in the world? Regarding Yusek, I won't necessarily sneer at them the other options which are Which are Eureko have got problems of their own Eureko is now selling the owners are seldom apart And they are not into the situation where they could afford Unsolicited buyer to buy into the properties at the moment Arriva are talking about building a plant in the United States, but it's not clear at all that that plant will be built The only other plant that exists in the United States is the use of program The use of program in terms of technology. It's a revolutionary technology It's an American technology that deserves support in its own right. It's something extraordinary You think you've got financial difficulties because it's obligation to the United States government for other issues Not so much because of the problem of the centrifuge program it may support It may deserve support in its own right and for the moment that It's most likely the most realistic option available to anyone that want to participate in the American enrichment program As regard to the question in the back regarding package deal It's true that fuel is being bought in terms of specific activities sold to different when vendors There's a conversion verdo vendor enrichment vendor for vacation vendor and the uranium supply vendor That's true, but supply or utilities would like some time to see a package of all of them so the reactor provider or the Provider in charge provides a whole package going to separate vendors and collecting them into a package It's true that it will the package will include different components, but it will still be sold as a package That's my comments Yeah, I'll try and be very brief I won't jump into the fray about sodium fast reactors I will just comment that not all SMRs that are being considered right now or six pack or 12 pack variants There are niche markets and 150 megawatt for example the smart reactor that Kerry is developing is not a six pack or a 12 pack And in fact, there was a recent agreement or announcement that was made between SNPTC and Westinghouse To internationally export the AP-1000 that just recently happened this week In addition to developing the Westinghouse SMR Technology so it's not just B&W. There's I think a global element that people need to factor in Just to Toby's questions earlier I'll just briefly address them Is there a consensus agreement between the US and the South Koreans on what's an acceptable level of safety and security? No, I don't think that's the case for for for many countries And I think it's it it does present a lot of issues Of course one of the things that people in the reactor safety community like to bring up post TMI was the inception of info But of course info works well in a liberalized marketplace and it's unclear whether that model can really emerge Perhaps we have a more centralized approach in terms of the multi multicultural workforces and This is a real problem. I think this is a real real concern There is there is I don't think there is a quick solution I think when you're talking about security culture, this becomes a real real challenge and Even just I have some colleagues who and I'm I'm not saying I necessarily share this Viewpoint but even people in Japan post Fukushima There was some concern about the regional location of Fukushima as opposed to Onagawa, which is a plant just upstream and The fact that TEPCO was perhaps a utility that was further away from Fukushima as opposed to Onagawa Which has a much more local operator even within a country you have some of these issues about having you know Are the people running and operating the plant really from that region? Whether that's true or not that that's that's that's been discussed But but I do I do think that creates a problem and I of course don't have an answer to it, so Thank you very much I think we have to conclude these sessions and I'd like to thank you especially fire panelists for educating us You know when we discuss policies we always say wow we need a scientific evidence and after scientists speak Oh, okay. Can you be brief? What's the policy implication? So I think we got to be patient each other But anyway, it's a great experience to learn and Sharon and I as opposed to offer the closing remarks and With the two years of extension of this one-to-three agreement our Conversation and discussion will continue and especially the East Asia Institute will Carry out the Paul survey in near future because there is I realize there is a much need for the more Neutral think tank to to offer more reliable data. So We'll provide survey exclusively Asking these issues in in various aspects and and and I'd like to thank you all the participants here to stay until the end of The the conference and and then I relate to Sharon to say Thank you, well, it's been a pleasure This is the not the first conference we've done together and I thank the East Asia Institute I think Today's discussions have demonstrated the complex array of security economic technical and political Interests of both sides I think they also demonstrate that we're really no closer in terms of agreement on some of the core Issues and I agree with Gary say more that You know a two-year extension is probably not going to be enough to resolve some of these more Fundamental issues. It's not clear how this is going to go forward with the US Congress or on the Korean side with the National Assembly But we'll continue this dialogue and Prevail upon all the expertise in a variety of Areas both technical and political to come up with some creative solutions. So thank you for your attention