 Section 41. The Critique of Pure Reason by Emmanuel Kant. Transcendental Doctrine of Method. Chapter 1. The Discipline of Pure Reason. Section 2. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Polemics. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Emmanuel Kant. The Critique of Pure Reason. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Polemics. Reason must be subject in all its operations to criticism, which must always be permitted to exercise its functions without restraint. Otherwise its interests are imperiled and its influence obnoxious to suspicion. There is nothing, however useful, however sacred it may be, that can claim exemption from the searching examination of this supreme tribunal, which has no respect of persons. The very existence of reason depends upon this freedom. For the voice of reason is not that of a dictatorial and despotic power. It is rather like the vote of the citizens of a free state, every member of which must have the privilege of giving free expression to his doubts and possess even the right of veto. But while reason can never decline to submit itself to the tribunal of criticism, it has not always caused to dread the judgment of this court. Pure Reason, however, when engaged in the sphere of dogmatism, is not so thoroughly conscious of a strict observance of its highest laws as to appear before a higher judicial reason with perfect confidence. On the contrary, it must renounce its magnificent dogmatical pretensions and philosophy. Very different is the case when it has to defend itself, not before a judge but against an equal. If dogmatical assertions are advanced on the negative side, in opposition to those made by reason on the positive side, its justification, cut a thrope on, is complete, although the proof of its propositions is cut a lethian, unsatisfactory. By the polemic of pure reason I mean the defense of its propositions made by reason, in opposition to the dogmatical counter propositions advanced by other parties. The question here is not whether its own statements may not also be false. It merely regards the fact that reason proves that the opposite cannot be established with demonstrative certainty nor even asserted with a higher degree of probability. Reason does not hold her possessions upon sufferance, for although she cannot show a perfectly satisfactory title to them, no one can prove that she is not the rightful possessor. It is a melancholy reflection that reason in its highest exercise falls into an antithetic, and that the supreme tribunal for the settlement of differences should not be at union with itself. It is true that we had to discuss the question of an apparent antithetic, but we found that it was based upon a misconception. In conformity with the common prejudice phenomena were regarded as things in themselves, and thus an absolute completeness in their synthesis was required, in the one mode or in the other. It was shown to be impossible in both, a demand entirely out of place in regard to phenomena. There was, then, no real self-contradiction of reason in the propositions. The series of phenomena given in themselves has an absolutely first beginning, and this series is absolutely and in itself without beginning. The two propositions are perfectly consistent with each other, because phenomena as phenomena are in themselves nothing, and consequently the hypothesis that they are things in themselves must lead to self-contradictory inferences. But there are cases in which a similar misunderstanding cannot be provided against, and the dispute must remain unsettled. Take, for example, the theistic proposition, there is a supreme being, and on the other hand, the atheistic counterstatement, there exists no supreme being, or in psychology, everything that thinks possesses the attribute of absolute and permanent unity, which is utterly different from the transitory unity of material phenomena, and the counter-proposition, the soul is not an immaterial unity, and its nature is transitory like that of phenomena. The objects of these questions contain no heterogeneous or contradictory elements, for they relate to things in themselves, and not to phenomena. There would arise indeed a real contradiction if reason came forward with a statement on the negative side of these questions alone. As regards the criticism to which the grounds of proof on the affirmative side must be subjected, it may be freely admitted, without necessitating the surrender of the affirmative propositions which have, at least, the interest of reason in their favour, an advantage which the opposite party cannot lay claim to. I cannot agree with the opinion of several admirable thinkers, Salzer among the rest, that, in spite of the weakness of the arguments hitherto in use, we may hope, one day, to see sufficient demonstrations of the two cardinal propositions of pure reason, the existence of a supreme being, and the immortality of the soul. I am certain, on the contrary, that this will never be the case, for on what ground can reason base such synthetical propositions which do not relate to the objects of experience and their internal possibility? But it is also demonstratively certain that no one will ever be able to maintain the contrary with the least show of probability, for as he can attempt such a proof solely upon the basis of pure reason, he is bound to prove that a supreme being and a thinking subject in the character of pure intelligence are impossible. But where will he find the knowledge which can enable him to renounce synthetical judgments in regard to things which transcend the region of experience? We may therefore rest assured that the opposite never will be demonstrated. We need not, then, have recourse to scholastic arguments. We may always admit the truth of those propositions which are consistent with the speculative interests of reason in the sphere of experience, and form, moreover, the only means of uniting the speculative with the practical interest. Our opponent, who must not be considered here as a critic solely, we can be ready to meet with a non-liquid which cannot fail to disconcert him, while we cannot deny his right to a similar retort, as we have on our side the advantage of the support of the subjective maxim of reason, and can therefore look upon all his sophistical arguments with calm indifference. From this point of view there is properly no antithetic of pure reason, for the only arena for such a struggle would be upon the field of pure theology and psychology, but on this ground there can appear no combatant whom we need to fear. Ridicule and boasting can be his only weapons, and these may be laughed at as mere child's play. This consideration restores to reason her courage, for what source of confidence could be found if she, whose vocation it is to destroy error, were at variance with herself and without any reasonable hope of ever reaching a state of permanent repose. Everything in nature is good for some purpose. Even poisons are serviceable, they destroy the evil effects of other poisons generated in our system, and must always find a place in every complete pharmacopia. The objections raised against the fallacies and sophistries of speculative reason are objections given by the nature of this reason itself, and must therefore have a destination and purpose which can only be for the good of humanity. For what purpose has Providence raised many objects, in which we have the deepest interest, so far above us, that we vainly try to cognize them with certainty, and our powers of mental vision are rather excited than satisfied by the glimpses we may chance to seize? It is very doubtful whether it is for our benefit to advance bold affirmations regarding subjects involved in such obscurity. Perhaps it would even be detrimental to our best interests. But it is undoubtedly always beneficial to leave the investigating, as well as the critical reason, in perfect freedom, and permitted to take sides of its own interests, which are advanced as much by its limitation, as by its extension of its views, and which always suffer by the interference of foreign powers forcing it against its natural tendencies to bend to certain preconceived designs. Allow your opponent to say what he thinks reasonable, and combat him only with the weapons of reason. Have no anxiety for the practical interests of humanity. These are never imperiled in a purely speculative dispute. Such a dispute serves merely to disclose the antimony of reason, which, as it has its source in the nature of reason, ought to be thoroughly investigated. Reason is benefited by the examination of a subject on both sides, and its judgments are corrected by being limited. It is not the matter that may give occasion to dispute, but the manner. For it is perfectly permissible to employ, in the presence of reason, a language of firmly rooted faith, even after we have been obliged to renounce all pretensions to knowledge. If we were to ask the dispassionate David Hume, a philosopher endowed, in a degree that few are, with a well-balanced judgment, what motive induced you to spend so much labor and thought in undermining the consoling and beneficial persuasion that reason is capable of assuring us and presenting us with a determinate conception of a supreme being. His answer would be, nothing but the desire of teaching reason to know its own powers better, and, at the same time, a dislike of the procedure by which that faculty was compelled to support foregone conclusions, and prevented from confessing the internal weaknesses which it cannot but feel when it enters upon a rigid self-examination. If, on the other hand, we were to ask priestly, a philosopher who had no taste for transcendental speculation, but was entirely devoted to the principles of empiricism, what his motives were for overturning those two main pillars of religion, the doctrines of the freedom of the will and the immortality of the soul, in his view the hope of a future life is but the expectation of the miracle of resurrection. This philosopher himself, a zealous and pious teacher of religion, could give no other answer than this. I acted in the interest of reason, which always suffers when certain objects are explained and judged by a reference to other supposed laws than those of material nature, the only laws which we know in a determinate manner. It would be unfair to decry the latter philosopher who endeavored to harmonize his paradoxical opinions with the interests of religion, and to undervalue an honest and reflecting man because he finds himself at a loss the moment he has left the field of natural science. The same grace must be accorded to him, a man not less well-disposed and quite as blameless in his moral character, and who pushed his abstract speculations to an extreme length because, as he rightly believed, the object of them lies entirely beyond the bounds of natural science and within the sphere of pure ideas. What is to be done to provide against the danger which seems in the present case to menace the best interests of humanity? The course to be pursued in reference to this subject is a perfectly plain and natural one. Let each thinker pursue his own path. If he shows talent, if he gives evidence of profound thought, in one word, if he shows that he possesses the power of reasoning, reason is always the gainer. If you have recourse to other means, if you attempt to coerce reason, if you raise the cry of treason to humanity, if you excite the feelings of the crowd which can neither understand nor sympathize with such subtle speculations, you will only make yourself ridiculous. For the question does not concern the advantage or disadvantage which we are expected to reap from such inquiries. The question is merely how far reason can advance in the field of speculation, apart from all kinds of interest and whether we may depend upon the exertions of speculative reason, or must renounce all reliance on it. Instead of joining the combatants, it is your part to be a tranquil spectator of the struggle, a laborious struggle for the parties engaged, but attended in its progress as well as in its result, with the most advantageous consequences for the interests of thought and knowledge. It is absurd to expect to be enlightened by reason, and at the same time to prescribe to her what side of the question she must adopt. Moreover, reason is sufficiently held in check by its own power, the limits imposed on it by its own nature are sufficient. It is unnecessary for you to place over it additional guards, as if its power were dangerous to the constitution of the intellectual state. In the dialectic of reason there is no victory gained, which need, in the least, disturb your tranquility. The strife of dialectic is a necessity of reason, and we cannot but wish that it had been conducted long ear this with that perfect freedom which ought to be its essential condition. In this case we should have had, at an earlier period, a matured and profound criticism, which must have put an end to all dialectical disputes by exposing the illusions and prejudices in which they originated. There is, in human nature, an unworthy propensity, a propensity which, like everything that springs from nature, must in its final purpose be conducive to the good of humanity, to conceal our real sentiments and to give expression only to certain received opinions, which are regarded as at once safe and promotive of the common good. It is true this tendency not only to conceal our real sentiments, but to profess those which make Anna's favour in the eyes of society, has not only civilized but, in a certain measure, moralized us, as no one can break through the outward covering of respectability, honour, and morality, and thus the seemingly good examples which we see around us form an excellent school for moral improvement, so long as our belief in their genuineness remains unshaken. But this disposition to represent ourselves as better than we are, and to utter opinions which are not our own, can be nothing more than a kind of provisionary arrangement of nature to lead us from the rudeness of an uncivilized state, and to teach us how to assume at least the appearance and manner of the good we see. But when true principles have been developed and have obtained a sure foundation in our habit of thought, this conventionalism must be attacked with earnest vigor, otherwise it corrupts the heart, and checks the growth of good dispositions with the mischievous weed of fair appearances. I am sorry to remark the same tendency to misrepresentation and hypocrisy in the field of speculative discussion, where there is less temptation to restrain the free expression of thought, for what can be more prejudicial to the interests of intelligence than to falsify our real sentiments, to conceal the doubts which we feel in regard to our statements, or to maintain the validity of grounds of proof which we well know to be insufficient? So long as mere personal vanity is the source of these unworthy artifices, and this is generally the case in speculative discussions, which are mostly destitute of practical interests and are incapable of complete demonstration, the vanity of the opposite party exaggerates as much on the other side, and thus the result is the same, although it is not brought about so soon as if the dispute had been conducted in a sincere and upright spirit. But where the mass entertains the notion that the aim of certain subtle speculators is nothing less than to shake the very foundations of public welfare and morality, it seems not only prudent but even praiseworthy to maintain the good cause by illusory arguments rather than to give to our supposed opponents the advantage of lowering our declarations to the moderate tone of a merely practical conviction and of compelling us to confess our inability to attain to apoditic certainty in speculative subjects. But we ought to reflect that there is nothing in the world more fatal to the maintenance of a good cause than deceit, misrepresentation, and falsehood. That the strictest laws of honesty should be observed in the discussion of a purely speculative subject is the least requirement that can be made. If we could reckon with security even upon so little, the conflict of speculative reason regarding the important questions of God, immortality, and freedom would have been either decided long ago or would very soon be brought to a conclusion. But in general the uprightness of the defence stands in an inverse ratio to the goodness of the cause, and perhaps more honesty and fairness are shown by those who deny than by those who uphold these doctrines. I shall persuade myself then that I have readers who do not wish to see a righteous cause defended by unfair arguments. Such will now recognise the fact that, according to the principles of this critique, if we consider not what is, but what ought to be the case, there can be really no polemic of pure reason. For how can two persons dispute about a thing, the reality of which neither can present an actual or even impossible experience? Which adopts the plan of meditating on his idea for the purpose of drawing from the idea, if he can, what is more than the idea that is the reality of the object which it indicates? How shall they settle the dispute, since neither is able to make his assertions directly comprehensible and certain, but must restrict himself to attacking and confuting those of his opponent? All statements announced by pure reason send the conditions of possible experience beyond the sphere of which we can discover no criterion of truth, while they are at the same time framed in accordance with the laws of the understanding, which are applicable only to experience, and thus it is the fate of all such speculative discussions that while the one party attacks the weaker side of his opponent, he infallibly lays open his own weaknesses. The critique of pure reason may be regarded as the highest tribunal for all speculative disputes, for it is not involved in these disputes which have an immediate relation to certain objects and not to the laws of the mind, but is instituted for the purpose of determining the rights and limits of reason. Without the control of criticism, reason is, as it were, in a state of nature, only establish its claims and assertions by war. Criticism, on the contrary, deciding all questions according to the fundamental laws of its own institution, secures to us the peace of law and order, and enables us to discuss all differences in the more tranquil manner of a legal process. In the former case, disputes are ended by victory, which both sides may claim and which is followed by a hollow armistice. In the latter, by a sentence, which, as it strikes at the root of all speculative differences, ensures to all concerned a lasting peace. The endless disputes of a dogmatizing reason compel us to look for some mode of arriving at a settled decision by a critical investigation of reason itself. Justice Hobbes maintains that the state of nature is a state of injustice and violence, and that we must leave it and submit ourselves to the constraint of law, which indeed limits individual freedom, but only that it may consist with the freedom of others and with the common good of all. This freedom-will, among other things, permit of our openly stating the difficulties and doubts which we are ourselves unable to solve without being decried on that account as turbulent and dangerous citizens. This privilege forms part of the native rights of human reason, which recognizes no other judge than the universal reason of humanity, and as this reason is the source of all progress and improvement, such a privilege is to be held sacred and inviolable. It is unwise, moreover, to denounce as dangerous any bold assertions against or rash attacks upon an opinion which is held by the largest and most moral class of the community, for that would be giving them an importance which they do not deserve. When I hear that the freedom of the will, the hope of a future life, and the existence of God have been overthrown by the arguments of some able writer, I feel a strong desire to read his book, for I expect that he will add to my knowledge and impart greater clearness and distinctness to my views by the argumentative power shown in his writings. But I am perfectly certain, even before I have opened the book, that he has not succeeded in a single point, not because I believe I am in possession of irrefutable demonstrations of these important propositions, but because this transcendental critique, which has disclosed to me the power and the limits of pure reason, has fully convinced me that, as it is insufficient to establish the affirmative, it is as powerless and even more so to assure us of the truth of the negative answer to these questions. From what source does this free thinker derive his knowledge that there is, for example, no supreme being? This proposition lies out of the field of possible experience and therefore beyond the limits of human cognition. But I would not read at all the answer which the dogmatical maintainer of the good cause makes to his opponent, because I know well beforehand that he will merely attack the fallacious grounds of his adversary without being able to establish his own assertions. Besides, a new illusory argument in the construction of which talent and acuteness are shown is suggestive of new ideas and new trains of reasoning, and in this respect, the old and everyday sophistries are quite useless. Again, the dogmatical opponent of religion gives employment to criticism and enables us to test and correct its principles while there is no occasion for anxiety in regard to the influence and results of his reasoning. But it will be said must we not warn the youth entrusted to academical care against such writings, must we not preserve them from the knowledge of these dangerous assertions until their judgment is ripened or rather until the doctrines which we wish to inculcate are so firmly rooted in their minds as to withstand all attempts at instilling the contrary dogmas from whatever quarter they may come? If we are to confine ourselves to the dogmatical procedure in the sphere of pure reason and find ourselves unable to settle such disputes otherwise than by becoming a party in them and set encounter assertions advanced by our opponents there is certainly no plan more advisable for the moment but at the same time none more absurd and inefficient for the future than this retaining of the youthful mind under guardianship for a time and thus preserving it for so long at least from seduction into error. But when at a later period either curiosity or the prevalent fashion of thought places such as in the sense will the so-called convictions of their youth stand firm? The young thinker who has in his armory none but dogmatical weapons with which to resist the attacks of his opponent and who cannot detect the latent dialectic which lies in his own opinions as well as in those of the opposite party sees the advance of illusory arguments and grounds of proof which have the advantage of novelty and grounds of proof destitute of this advantage and which, perhaps, excite the suspicion that the natural credulity of his youth has been abused by his instructors. He thinks he can find no better means of showing that he has outgrown the discipline of his minority than by despising those well-meant warnings and knowing no system of thought but that of dogmatism he drinks deep drafts of the poison and saps the principles in which his early years were trained. Exactly the opposite of the system here recommended ought to be pursued in academic instruction. This can only be affected, however, by a thorough training in the critical investigation of pure reason. Four, in order to bring the principles of this critique into exercise as soon as possible and to demonstrate them perfect even in the presence of the highest degree of dialectical illusion, the student ought to examine the assertions made on both sides of speculative questions step by step and to test them by these principles. It cannot be a difficult task for him to show the fallacies inherent in these propositions and thus he begins early to feel his own power of securing himself against the influence of such sophisticated arguments which must finally lose for him all their illusory power. And although the same blows which overturn the edifice of his opponent are as fatal to his own speculative structures, if such he has wished to rear, he need not feel any sorrow in regard to this seeming misfortune as he has now before him a fair prospect into the practical region in which he may reasonably hope to find a more secure foundation for a rational system. There is, accordingly, no proper polemic in the sphere of pure reason. Both parties beat the air and fight with their own shadows as they pass beyond the limits of nature and can find no tangible point of attack, no firm footing for their dogmatical conflict. Fight as vigorously as they may, the shadows which they hew down immediately start up again, like the heroes in Valhalla and renew the bloodless and unceasing contest. But neither can we admit that there is any proper skeptical employment of pure reason, such as might be based upon the principle of neutrality in all speculative disputes. To excite reason against itself, to place weapons in the hands of the party on the one side as well as in those of the other, and to remain an undisturbed and sarcastic spectator of the fierce struggle that ensues seems, from the dogmatical point of view, to be a part fitting only a malevolent disposition. But when the sophist evidences an invincible obstinacy and blindness and a pride which no criticism can moderate, there is no other practicable course than to oppose to this pride and obstinacy similar feelings and pretensions on the other side equally well or ill-founded, so that reason, staggered by the reflections thus forced upon it finds it necessary to moderate its confidence in such pretensions and to listen to the advice of criticism. But we cannot stop at these doubts much less regard the conviction of our ignorance not only as a cure for the conceit natural to dogmatism but as the settlement of the disputes in which reason is involved with itself. On the contrary, skepticism is merely a means of awakening reason from its dogmatic dreams and exciting it to a more careful investigation into its own powers and pretensions. But as skepticism appears to be the shortest road to a permanent piece in the domain of philosophy and as it is the track pursued by the many who aim at giving a philosophical coloring to their contemptuous dislike of all inquiries of this kind I think it necessary to present to my readers this mode of thought in its true light. Skepticism not a permanent state for human reason. The consciousness of ignorance unless this ignorance is recognized to be absolutely necessary ought instead of forming the conclusion of my inquiries to be the strongest motive to the pursuit of them. All ignorance is either ignorance of things or of the limits of knowledge. If my ignorance is accidental and not necessary it must incite me in the first case to a dogmatical inquiry regarding the objects of which I am ignorant in the second to a critical investigation into the bounds of all possible knowledge. But that my ignorance is absolutely necessary and unavoidable and that it consequently absolves from the duty of all further reason is a fact which cannot be made out upon empirical grounds from observation but upon critical grounds alone that is by a thoroughgoing investigation into the primary sources of cognition. It follows that the determination of the bounds of reason can be made only on a priori grounds while the empirical limitation of reason which is merely an indeterminate cognition of an ignorance that can never be completely removed can take place only a posteriori. In other words, our empirical knowledge is limited by that which yet remains for us to know. The former cognition of our ignorance which is possible only on a rational basis is a science. The latter is merely a perception and we cannot say how far the inferences drawn from it may extend. If I regard the earth as it really appears to my senses as a flat surface I am ignorant how far this surface extends but experience teaches me that how far so ever I go I always see before me a space in which I can proceed farther and thus I know the limits merely visible of my actual knowledge of the earth although I am ignorant of the limits of the earth itself but if I have got so far as to know that the earth is a sphere and that its surface is spherical I can cognize a priori and determine upon principles from my knowledge of a small part of this surface say to the extent of a degree the diameter and circumference of the earth and although I am ignorant of the objects which the surface contains I have a perfect knowledge of its limits and extent. The sum of all the possible objects of our cognition seems to us to be a level surface with an apparent horizon which forms the limit of its extent and which has been termed by us the idea of unconditioned totality. To reach this limit by empirical means is impossible and all attempts to determine it a priori according to a principle are like in vain but all the questions raised by pure reason relate to that which lies beyond this horizon or at least in its boundary line. The celebrated David Hume was one of those geographers of human reason who believed that they have given a sufficient answer to all such questions by declaring them to lie beyond the horizon of our knowledge a horizon which, however, Hume was unable to determine. His attention especially was directed to the principle of causality and he remarked with perfect justice that the truth of this principle and even the objective validity of the conception of a cause is commonly based upon clear insight that is upon a priori cognition. Hence he concluded that this law does not derive its authority from its universality and necessity but merely from its general applicability in the course of experience and a kind of subjective necessity then arising which he termed habit. From the inability of reason to establish this principle as a necessary law in the acquisition of all experience he inferred the nullity of all the attempts of reason to pass the region of the empirical. This procedure of subjecting the factor of reason to examination and, if necessary, to disapproval may be termed the censura of reason. This censura must inevitably lead us to doubts regarding all transcendent employment of principles but this is only the second step in our inquiry. The first step in regard to the subjects of pure reason and which marks the infancy of that faculty is that of dogmatism. The second which we have just mentioned is that of skepticism and it gives evidence that our judgment has been improved by experience. But a third step is necessary indicative of the maturity and manhood of the judgment which now lays a firm foundation on universal and necessary principles. This is the period of criticism in which we do not examine the factor of reason but reason itself in the whole extent of its powers and in regard to its capability of a priori cognition and thus we determine not merely the empirical and ever-shifting bounds of our knowledge but it's necessary in eternal limits. We demonstrate from indubitable principles not merely our ignorance in respect to this or that subject but in regard to all possible questions of a certain class. Thus skepticism is a resting place for reason in which it may reflect on its dogmatical wanderings and gain some knowledge of the region in which it happens to be that it may pursue its way with greater certainty but it cannot be its permanent dwelling place. We take up its abode only in the region of complete certitude whether this relates to the cognition of objects themselves or to the limits which bound all our cognition. Reason is not to be considered as an indefinitely extended plane of the bounds of which we have only a general knowledge it ought rather to be compared to a sphere the radius of which may be found from the curvature of its surface that is the nature of our priori-synthetical propositions and consequently its circumference and extent. Beyond the sphere of experience there are new objects which it can cognize nay even questions regarding such suppositious objects relate only to the subjective principles of a complete determination of the relations which exist between the understanding conceptions which lie within this sphere. We are actually in possession of our priori-synthetical cognitions as is proved by the existence of the principles of the understanding which anticipate experience. If anyone cannot comprehend the possibility of these principles he may have some reason to doubt whether they are really a priori but he cannot on this account declare them to be impossible and affirm the nullity of the steps which reason may have taken under their guidance. He can only say if we perceive their origin and their authenticity we should be able to determine the extent and limits of reason but till we can do this all propositions regarding the latter are mere random assertions. In this view the doubt respecting all dogmatical philosophy which proceeds without the guidance of criticism is well grounded but we cannot therefore deny to reason the ability to construct a sound philosophy when the way has been prepared by a thorough critical investigation. All the conceptions produced and all the questions raised by pure reason do not lie in the sphere of experience but in that a reason itself and hence they must be solved and shown to be either valid or inadmissible by that faculty. We have no right to decline the solution of such problems on the ground that the solution can be discovered only from the nature of things and under pretence of the limitation of human faculties. For reason is the sole creator of all these ideas and is therefore bound either to establish their validity or to expose their illusory nature. The polemic of skepticism is properly directed against the dogmatist who erects a system of philosophy without having examined the fundamental objective principles on which it is based for the purpose of evidencing the futility of his designs and thus bringing him to a knowledge of his own powers. But in itself skepticism does not give us any certain information in regard to the bounds of our knowledge. All unsuccessful dogmatical attempts of reason are fascia which it is always useful to submit to the censure of the skeptic but this cannot help us to any decision regarding the expectations which reason cherishes of better success in future endeavors. The investigations of skepticism cannot therefore settle the dispute regarding the rights and powers of human reason. Hume is perhaps the ableist and most ingenious of all skeptical philosophers and his writings have undoubtedly exerted the most powerful influence in awakening reason through a thorough investigation into its own powers. It will therefore well repay our labors to consider for a little the course of reasoning which he followed and the errors into which he strayed although setting out on the path of truth and certitude. Hume was probably aware although he never clearly developed the notion that we proceed in judgments of a certain class beyond our conception of the object. I have turned this kind of judgment synthetical. As regard the manner in which I pass beyond my conception by the aid of experience no doubts can be entertained. Experience is itself a synthesis of perceptions and it employs perceptions to increment the conception which I obtain by means of another perception. But we feel persuaded that we are able to proceed beyond a conception and to extend our cognition a priori. We attempt this in two ways either through the pure understanding in relation to that which may become an object of experience or through pure reason in relation to such properties of things or of the existence of things as can never be presented in any experience. This skeptical philosopher did not distinguish these two kinds of judgments as he ought to have done but regarded this augmentation of conceptions and if we may so express ourselves the spontaneous generation of understanding and reason independently of the impregnation of experience as altogether impossible. The so-called a priori principles of these faculties he consequently held to be invalid and imaginary and regarded them as nothing but subjective habits of thought originating inexperience and therefore purely empirical and contingent concepts to which we attribute a spurious necessity and universality. In support of this strange assertion he referred us to the generally acknowledged principle of the relation between cause and effect. No faculty of the mind can conduct us from the conception of a thing to the existence of something else and hence he believed he could infer that without experience we possess no source from which we can augment our cognition and no ground sufficient to justify us in framing a judgment that is to extend our cognition a priori. That the light of the sun which shines upon a piece of wax at the same time melts it while it hardens clay no power of the understanding could infer from the conceptions which we previously possessed of these substances much less is there any a priori law that could conduct us to such an assertion which experience alone can certify. On the other hand we have seen in our discussion of transcendental logic that although we can never proceed immediately beyond the content of the conception which has given us we can always cognize completely a priori in relation however to a third term namely possible experience the law of its connection with other things. For example if I observe that a piece of wax melts I can cognize a priori that there must have been something the sun's heat preceding which this law although without the aid of experience I could not cognize a priori and in a determinate manner either the cause from the effect or the effect from the cause. Hume was therefore wrong and inferring from the contingency of the determination according to law the contingency of the law itself and the passing beyond the conception of a thing to possible experience which is an a priori proceeding constituting the objective reality of the conception he confounded with our synthesis of objects in actual experience which is always of course empirical. Thus too he regarded the principle of affinity which has its seat in the understanding and indicates a necessary connection as a mere rule of association lying in the imitative faculty of imagination which can present only contingent and not objective connections. The skeptical errors of this remarkably acute thinker arose principally from a defect which was common to him with the dogmatists namely that he had never made a systematic review of all the different kinds of a priori synthesis performed by the understanding. Had he done so he would have found to take one example among many that the principle of permanence was of this character and that it as well as the principle of causality anticipates experience. In this way he might have been able to describe the determinant limits of the a priori operations of understanding and reason but he merely declared understanding to be limited instead of showing what its limits were. He created a general mistrust in the power of our faculties without giving us any determinant knowledge of the bounds of our necessary and unavoidable ignorance. He examined and condemned some of the principles of the understanding without investigating all its powers with the completeness necessary to criticism. He denies with truth certain powers to the understanding but he goes further and declares it to be utterly inadequate to the a priori extension of knowledge although he has not fully examined all the powers which reside in the faculty and thus the fate which always overtakes skepticism meets him too. That is to say his own declarations are doubted for his objections were based upon facta which are contingent and not upon principles which can alone demonstrate the necessary invalidity of all dogmatical assertions. As Hume makes no distinction between the well-grounded claims of the understanding and the dialectical pretensions of reason against which however his attacks are mainly directed reason does not feel itself shut out from all attempts at the extension of an a priori cognition and hence it refuses in spite of a few checks of this or that quarter to relinquish such efforts for one naturally arms oneself to resist an attack and becomes more obstinate in the resolve to establish the claims he has advanced but a complete review of the powers of reason and the conviction then arising that we are in possession of a limited field of action while we must admit the vanity of higher claims puts an end to all doubt and dispute and induces reason to rest satisfied with the undisturbed possession of its limited domain to the uncritical dogmatist who has not surveyed the sphere of his understanding nor determined in accordance with principles the limits of possible cognition who consequently is ignorant of his own powers and believes he will discover them by the attempts he makes in the field of cognition these attacks of skepticism are not only dangerous but destructive for if there is one proposition in his chain of reasoning which he cannot prove or the fallacy in which he cannot evolve in accordance with a principle suspicion falls on all his statements however plausible they may appear and thus skepticism the bane of dogmatical philosophy conducts us to a sound investigation into the understanding and the reason when we are thus far advanced we need fear no further attacks for the limits of our domain are clearly marked out and we can make no claims nor become involved in any disputes regarding the region that lies beyond these limits thus the skeptical procedure in philosophy does not present any solution of the problems of reason but it forms an excellent exercise for its powers indicating its circumspection and indicating the means whereby it may most fully establish its claims to its legitimate possessions and of discipline of pure reason in polemics section 3 the discipline of pure reason in hypothesis this critique of reason has now taught us that all its efforts to extend the bounds of knowledge by means of pure speculation are utterly fruitless so much the wider field it may appear lies open to hypothesis as where we cannot know with certainty we are at liberty to make guesses and to form suppositions imagination may be allowed under the strict surveillance of reason to invent suppositions but these must be based on something that is perfectly certain and that is the possibility of the object if we are well assured upon this point it is allowable to have recourse to supposition in regard to the reality of the object but this supposition must unless it is utterly groundless be connected as its ground of explanation with that which is really given and absolutely certain such a supposition is termed a hypothesis it is beyond our power to form the least conception a priori of the possibility of dynamical connection in phenomena and the category of the pure understanding will not enable us to cogitate any such connection but merely helps us to understand it when we meet with it in experience for this reason we cannot in accordance with the categories imagine or invent any object or any property of an object not given or that may not be given in experience and employ it in a hypothesis otherwise we should be basing our chain of reasoning upon the mere chimerical fancies and not upon conceptions of things thus we have no right to assume the existence of new powers not existing in nature for example an understanding with a non-sensuous intuition a force of attraction without contact or some new kind of substances occupying space and yet without the property of impenetrability and consequently we cannot assume that there is any other kind of community among substances than that observable in experience any kind of presence than that in space or any kind of duration than that in time in one word the conditions of possible experience are for reason the only conditions of the possibility of things reason cannot venture to form independently of these conditions any conceptions of things because such conceptions although not self-contradictory are without object and without application the conceptions of reason are as we have already shown cannot relate to any object in any kind of experience at the same time they do not indicate imaginary or possible objects they are purely problematical in their nature and as aids to the heuristic exercise of the faculties form the basis of the regulative principles for the systematic employment of the understanding in the field of experience if we leave this ground of experience they become not the possibility of which is quite indemonstrable and they cannot consequently be employed as hypotheses in the explanation of real phenomena it is quite admissible to cogitate the soul as simple for the purpose of enabling ourselves to employ the idea of a perfect and necessary unity of all the faculties of the mind as the principle of all our inquiries into its internal phenomena although we cannot cognize this unity in concreto but to assume that the soul is a simple substance a transcendental conception would be announcing a proposition which is not only indemonstrable as many physical hypotheses are but a proposition which is purely arbitrary and in the highest degree rash the simple is never presented in experience and if by substance is here meant to the permanent object of sensuous intuition the possibility of a simple phenomenon is perfectly inconceivable reason affords no good grounds for admitting the existence of intelligible beings or of intelligible properties of sensuous things although as we have no conception either of their possibility or of their impossibility it will always be out of our power to affirm dogmatically that they do not exist in the explanation of given phenomena no other things and no other grounds of explanation can be employed than those which stand in connection with the given phenomena according to the known laws of experience a transcendental hypothesis in which a mere idea of reason is employed to explain the phenomena of nature would not give us any better insight into a phenomenon as we should be trying to explain and sufficiently understand from known empirical principles by what we do not understand at all the principles of such a hypothesis might conduce to the satisfaction of reason but it would not assist the understanding in its application to objects order and conformity to aims in the sphere of nature must be themselves explained upon natural grounds and according to natural laws and the wildest hypotheses if they are only physical are here more admissible than a hyper-physical hypothesis such as that of a divine author for such a hypothesis would introduce the principle of ignava ratio which requires us to give up the search for causes that might be discovered in the course of experience and to rest satisfied with a mere idea as regards the absolute totality of the grounds of explanation in the series of these causes this can be no hindrance to the understanding in the case of phenomena because as they are to us nothing more than phenomena we have no right to look for anything like completeness in the synthesis of the series of their conditions transcendental hypotheses are therefore inadmissible and we cannot use the liberty of employing in the absence of physical grounds of explanation and this for two reasons first because such hypotheses do not advance reason but rather stop it in its progress secondly because this license would render fruitless all its exertions in its own proper sphere which is that of experience for when the explanation of natural phenomena happens to be difficult we have constantly at hand a transcendental ground of explanation which lifts us above the necessity of investigating nature and our inquiries are brought to a close not because we have obtained all the requisite knowledge but because we abut upon a principle which is incomprehensible and which indeed is so far back in the track of thought as to contain the conception of the absolutely primal being the next requisite for the admissibility of a hypothesis is its sufficiency that is it must determine our priori the consequences which are given in experience and which are supposed to follow from the hypothesis itself if we require to employ auxiliary hypotheses the suspicion naturally arises that they are mere fictions because the necessity for each of them requires the same justification as in the case of the original hypothesis and thus their testimony is invalid if we suppose the existence of an infinitely perfect cause we possess sufficient grounds for the explanation of the conformity to aims the order and the greatness which we observe in the universe but we find ourselves obliged when we observe the evil in the world and the exceptions to these laws to employ new hypotheses in support of the original one we employ the idea of the simple nature of the human soul the foundation of all the theories we may form of its phenomena but when we meet with difficulties in our way when we observe in the soul phenomena similar to the changes which take place in matter we require to call in new auxiliary hypotheses these may indeed not be false but we do not know them to be true because the only witness to their certitude is the hypothesis which they themselves have been called in to explain we are not discussing the above mentioned assertions regarding the immaterial unity of the soul and the existence of a supreme being as dogmata which certain philosophers profess to demonstrate a priori but purely as hypotheses in the former case the dogmatist must take care that his arguments possess the apodictic certainty of a demonstration for the assertion that the reality of such ideas is probable is as absurd as a proof of the probability of a proposition in geometry pure abstract reason apart from all experience can either cognize nothing at all and hence the judgments it announces are never mere opinions they are either apodictic certainties or declarations that nothing can be known on the subject opinions and probable judgments on the nature of things can only be employed to explain given phenomena or they may relate to the effect in accordance with empirical laws of an actually existing cause in other words we must restrict the sphere of opinion to the world of experience and nature beyond this region opinion is mere invention unless we are groping about for the truth on a path not yet fully known and have some hopes of stumbling upon it but although hypotheses are inadmissible in answers to the questions of pure speculative reason they may be employed in the defense of these answers that is to say hypotheses are admissible and polemic but not in the sphere of dogmatism by the defense of statements of this character I do not mean an attempt at discovering new grounds for their support but merely the refutation of the arguments of opponents all our priori synthetical propositions possess the peculiarity that although the philosopher who maintains the reality of the ideas contained in the proposition is not in possession of sufficient knowledge to establish the certainty of his statements his opponent is as little able to prove the truth of the opposite this equality of fortune does not allow the one party to be superior to the other speculative cognition and it is this sphere accordingly that is the proper arena of these endless speculative conflicts but we shall afterwards show that in relation to its practical exercise reason has the right of admitting what in the field of pure speculation she would not be justified in supposing except upon perfectly sufficient grounds because all such suppositions destroy the necessary completeness of speculation a condition which the practical reason however does not consider to be requisite in this sphere therefore reason is mistress of a possession her title to which she does not require to prove which in fact she could not do the burden of proof accordingly rests upon the opponent but as he has just as little knowledge regarding the subject discussed little able to prove the non-existence of the object of an idea as the philosopher on the other side is to demonstrate its reality it is evident that there is an advantage on the side of the philosopher who maintains his proposition as a practically necessary supposition Melior est condicio posidentis for he is at liberty to employ in self-defense the same weapons as his opponent makes use of in attacking him that is he has a right to use hypotheses not for the purpose of supporting the arguments in favor of his own propositions but to show that his opponent knows no more than himself regarding the subject under discussion and cannot boast of any speculative advantage hypotheses are therefore admissible in the sphere of pure reason only as weapons for self-defense and not as supports to dogmatical objections but the opposing party we must always seek for in ourselves for speculative reason is in the sphere of transcendentalism dialectical in its own nature the difficulties and objections we have to fear lie in ourselves they are like old but never superannuated claims and we must seek them out and settle them once and forever if we are to expect a permanent peace all tranquility is hollow and unreal the root of these contradictions which lies in the nature of human reason must be destroyed and this can only be done by giving it in the first instance freedom to grow nay, by nourishing it that it may send out shoots and thus betray its own experience it is our duty therefore to try to discover new objections to put weapons in the hands of our opponent and to grant him the most favourable position in the arena that he can wish we have nothing to fear from these concessions on the contrary we may rather hope that we shall thus make ourselves master of a possession which no one will ever venture to dispute the thinker requires to be fully equipped the hypotheses of pure reason which although but leaden weapons for they have not been steeled by the ordinary of experience are as useful as any that can be employed by his opponents if accordingly we have assumed from a non-speculative point of view the immaterial nature of the soul and are met by the objection that experience seems to prove that the growth and decay of our mental faculties are mere modifications of the sensuous organism we can weaken the force of this objection by the assumption that the body with the fundamental phenomenon to which as a necessary condition all sensibility and consequently all thought relates in the present state of our existence and that the separation of soul and body forms the conclusion of the sensuous exercise of our power of cognition in the beginning of the intellectual the body would in the view of the question be regarded not as the cause of thought but merely as its restrictive condition as promotive of the sensuous and animal but as a hindrance to the pure and spiritual life and the dependence of the animal life on the constitution of the body would not prove that the whole life of man was also dependent on the state of the organism we might go still farther and discover new objections or carry out to their extreme consequences those which have already been adduced the generation in the human race as well as among the irrational animals depends on so many accidents of occasion of proper sustenance of the laws enacted by the government of a country of vice even that it is difficult to believe in the eternal existence of a being whose life has begun under circumstances so mean and trivial and so entirely dependent upon our own control as regards the continuance of the existence of the whole race we need have no difficulties for accident in single cases is subject to general laws but in the case of each individual it would seem as if we could hardly expect so wonderful an effect from causes so insignificant but in answer to these objections we may adduce the transcendental hypothesis that all life is properly intelligible and not subject to changes of time neither began in birth nor will end in death we may assume that this life is nothing more than a sensuous representation of pure spiritual life that the whole world of sense is but an image hovering before the faculty of cognition which we exercise in this sphere and with no more objective reality than a dream and that if we could intuit ourselves and other things as they really are we should see ourselves in our spiritual natures our connection with which did not begin at our birth and will not seize with the destruction of the body and so on we cannot be said to know what has been above asserted nor do we seriously maintain the truth of these assertions and the notions therein indicated are not even ideas of reason they are purely fictitious conceptions but this hypothetical procedure is in perfect conformity with the laws of reason our opponent mistakes the absence of empirical conditions for a proof of the complete impossibility of all that we have asserted and we have to show him that he has not exhausted the whole sphere of possibility and that he can as little compass that sphere by the laws of experience and nature as we can lay a secure foundation for the operations of reason beyond the region of experience such hypothetical defenses against the pretensions of an opponent must not be regarded as declarations of opinion so soon as the opposite party renounces its dogmatical conceit to maintain a simply negative position in relation to propositions which rest on an insecure foundation well befits the moderation of a true philosopher but to uphold the objections urged against an opponent as proofs of the opposite statement is a proceeding just as unwarrantable and arrogant as it is to attack the position of a philosopher who advances affirmative propositions regarding such a subject it is evident therefore that hypotheses in the speculative sphere are valid not as independent propositions but only relatively to opposite transcendent assumptions for to make the principles of possible experience conditions of the possibility of things in general is just as transcendent a procedure as to maintain the objective reality of ideas which can be applied to no objects except such as lie within the limits of possible experience the judgments announced by pure reason must be necessary or they must not be announced at all reason cannot trouble herself with opinions but the hypotheses we have been discussing are merely problematical judgments which can neither be confuted nor proved while therefore they are not personal opinions they are indispensable as answers to objections which are liable to be raised but we must take care to confine them to this function and guard against any assumption on their part of absolute validity a proceeding which would involve reason in inextricable difficulties and contradictions end of the discipline of pure reason in hypothesis it is a peculiarity which distinguishes the proofs of transcendental synthetical propositions from those of all other a priori synthetical cognitions that reason in the case of the former does not apply its conceptions directly to an object but is first obliged to prove a priori the objective validity of these conceptions and the possibility of their synthesis this is not merely a prudential rule it is essential to the very possibility of the proof of a transcendental proposition if I am required to pass a priori beyond the conception of an object I find that it is utterly impossible without the guidance of something which is not contained in the conception in mathematics it is a priori intuition that guides my synthesis and in this case all our conclusions may be drawn immediately from pure intuition in transcendental cognition so long as we are dealing only with the conceptions of the understanding we are guided by possible experience that is to say a proof in the sphere of transcendental cognition does not show that the given conception that of an event for example leads directly to another conception that of a cause for this would be a saltis which nothing can justify but it shows that experience itself and consequently the object of experience is impossible without the connection indicated by these conceptions it follows that such a proof must demonstrate the possibility of arriving synthetically in our priori at a certain knowledge of things which was not contained in our conception of those things unless we pay particular attention to this requirement our proofs instead of pursuing the straight path indicated by reason follow the tortuous road of mere subjective association the illusory conviction which rests upon subjective causes of association and which is considered as resulting from the perception of a real and objective natural affinity is always open to doubt and suspicion for this reason all the attempts which have been made to prove the principle of sufficient reason have according to the universal admission of philosophers been quite unsuccessful and before the appearance of transcendental criticism it was considered better as this principle could not be abandoned to appeal boldly to the common sense of mankind a proceeding which always proves that the problem which reason ought to solve is one in which philosophers find great difficulties rather than attempts to discover new dogmatical proofs but if the proposition to be proved is a proposition of pure reason and if I aim at passing beyond my empirical conceptions by the aid of mere ideas it is necessary that the proof should first show that such a step in synthesis is possible which it is not before it proceeds to prove the truth of the proposition itself the so-called proof of the simple nature of the soul from the unity of a perception is a very plausible one but it contains no answer to the objection that as the notion of absolute simplicity is not a conception which is directly applicable to a perception but is an idea which must be inferred if at all from observation it is by no means evident how the mere fact of consciousness which is contained in all thought although in so far a simple representation can conduct me to the consciousness and cognition of a thing which is purely a thinking substance when I represent to my mind the power of my body as in motion my body in this thought is so far absolute unity and my representation of it is a simple one and hence I can indicate this representation by the motion of a point because I have made abstraction of the size or volume of the body but I cannot hence infer that given merely the moving power of a body the body may be cogitated as simple substance merely because the representation in my mind takes no account of its content in space and is consequently simple the simple in abstraction is very different from the objectively simple and hence the ego which is simple in the first sense may in the second sense as indicating the soul itself be a very complex conception with a very various content thus it is evident that in all such arguments there lurks a paralogism we guess for without some such surmise our suspicion would not be excited in reference to a proof of this character at the presence of the paralogism by keeping ever before us a criterion of the possibility of those synthetical propositions which aim at proving more than experience can teach us this criterion is obtained from the observation that such proofs do not lead us directly from the subject of the proposition to be proved to the required predicate but find it necessary to presuppose the possibility of extending our cognition a priori by means of ideas we must accordingly always use the greatest caution we require before attempting any proof to consider how it is possible to extend the sphere of cognition by the operations of pure reason and from which source we are to derive knowledge which is not obtained from the analysis of conceptions nor relates by anticipation to possible experience we shall thus spare ourselves much severe and fruitless labour by not expecting from reason what is beyond its power or rather by subjecting it to discipline and teaching it to moderate its vehement desires and extension of the sphere of cognition the first rule for our guidance is therefore not to attempt a transcendental proof before we have considered from what source we are to derive the principles upon which the proof is to be based and what right we have to expect that our conclusions from these principles will be voracious if they are principles of the understanding it is vain to expect that we should attain by their means pure reason for these principles are valid only in regard to objects of possible experience if they are principles of pure reason our labour is alike in vain for the principles of reason if employed as objective are without exception dialectical and possess no validity or truth except as regulative principles of the systematic employment of reason in experience but when such delusive proofs are presented to us it is our duty to meet them with the non-liquid of a matured judgment and although we are unable to expose the particular sophism upon which the proof is based we have a right to demand a deduction of the principles employed in it and if these principles have their origin in pure reason alone such a deduction is absolutely impossible and thus it is unnecessary to trouble ourselves with the exposure and computation of every sophistical illusion we may at once bring all dialectic which is inexhaustible in the production of fallacies before the bar of critical reason which tests the principles upon which all dialectical procedure is based the second peculiarity of transcendental proof is that a transcendental proposition cannot rest upon more than a single proof if I am drawing conclusions not from conceptions but from intuition corresponding to a conception be it pure intuition as in mathematics or empirical as in natural science the intuition which forms the basis of my inferences presents me with materials for many synthetical propositions which I can connect in various modes while as it is allowable to proceed from different points in the intention it can arrive by different paths at the same proposition but every transcendental proposition sets out from a conception and posits the synthetical condition of the possibility of an object according to this conception there must therefore be but one ground of proof because it is the conception alone which determines the object and thus the proof cannot contain anything more than the determination of the object according to the conception in our transcendental analytic for example we infer the principle every event has a cause from the only condition of the objective possibility of our conception of an event this is that an event cannot be determined in time and consequently cannot form a part of experience unless it stands under this dynamical law this is the only possible ground of proof for our conception of an event possesses objective validity that is, is a true conception only because the law of causality determines an object to which it can refer other arguments in support of this principle have been attempted such as that from the contingent nature of a phenomenon but when this argument is considered we can discover no criterion of contingency except the fact of an event of something happening that is to say the existence which is preceded by the non-existence of an object and thus we fall back on the very thing to be proved if the proposition every thinking being is simple is to be proved we keep to the conception of the ego which is simple and to which all thought has a relation the same is the case with the transcendental proof of the existence of a deity which is based solely upon the harmony and reciprocal fitness of the conceptions of an ensraelisimum and a necessary being and cannot be attempted in any other manner this caution serves to simplify very much the criticism of all propositions of reason when reason employs conceptions alone only one proof of its thesis is possible if any when therefore the dogmatist advances with ten arguments in favor of a proposition we may be sure that not one of them is conclusive for if he possessed one which proved the proposition he brings forward to demonstration as must always be the case with the propositions of pure reason what need is there for any more his intention can only be similar to that of the advocate who had different arguments for different judges this availing himself of the weakness of those who examine his arguments who into any profound investigation adopt the view of the case which seems most probable at first sight and decide according to it the third rule for the guidance of pure reason in the conduct of a proof is that all transcendental proofs must never be apagogic or indirect but always extensive or direct the direct or extensive proof not only establishes the truth of the proposition to be proved establishes the grounds of its truth the apagogic on the other hand may assure us of the truth of the proposition but it cannot enable us to comprehend the grounds of its possibility the latter is accordingly rather an auxiliary to an argument than a strictly philosophical and rational mode of procedure in one respect however they have an advantage over direct proofs from the fact that the mode of contradiction which they employ renders our understanding of the question more clear and approximates the proof to the certainty of an intuitional demonstration the true reason why indirect proofs are employed in different sciences is this when the grounds upon which we seek to base a cognition are too various or too profound we try whether or not we may not discover the truth from its consequences the modus ponens of reasoning from the truth of its inferences to the truth of a proposition would be admissible if all the inferences that can be drawn from it are known to be true for in this case there can be only one possible ground for these inferences and that is the true one but this is a quite impracticable procedure as it surpasses all our powers to discover all the possible inferences that can be drawn from a proposition but this mode of reasoning is employed under favor when we wish to prove the truth of a hypothesis in which case we admit the truth of the conclusion which is supported by analogy that is if all the inferences we have drawn and examined agree with the proposition assumed all other possible inferences will also agree with it but in this way a hypothesis can never be established as a demonstrated truth the modus ponens of reasoning from known inferences to the unknown proposition is not only a rigorous but a very easy mode of proof for if it can be shown that but one inference from a proposition is false then the proposition must itself be false instead then of examining in an extensive argument the whole series of the grounds on which the truth of a proposition rests we need only take the opposite of this proposition and if one inference from it be false then must the opposite be itself false and consequently the proposition which we wish to prove must be true the apagogic method of proof is admissible only in those sciences where it is impossible to mistake a subjective representation for an objective cognition where this is possible it is plain that the opposite of a given proposition may contradict merely the subjective conditions of thought and not the objective cognition or it may happen that both propositions contradict each other only under a subjective condition which is incorrectly considered to be objective and as the condition is itself false both propositions may be false and it will consequently be impossible to conclude the truth of the one from the falseness of the other in mathematics such subreptions are impossible and it is in this science accordingly that the indirect mode of proof has its true place in the science of nature where all assertion is based upon empirical intuition such subreptions may be guarded against by the repeated comparison of observations of little value in this sphere of knowledge but the transcendental efforts of pure reason are all made in the sphere of the subjective which is the real medium of all dialectical illusion and thus reason endeavors in its premises to impose upon us subjective representations for objective cognitions in the transcendental sphere of pure reason then and in the case of synthetical propositions it is inadmissible to support a statement by disproving the counterstatement for only two cases are possible either the counterstatement is nothing but the announcement of the inconsistency of the opposite opinion with the subjective conditions of reason which does not affect the real case for example we cannot comprehend the unconditioned necessity of the existence of a being and hence every speculative proof of the existence of such a being must be opposed on subjective grounds while the possibility of this being in itself cannot with justice be denied or both propositions being dialectical in their nature are based upon an impossible conception in this latter case the rule applies non entes nola sunt predicata that is to say what we affirm and what we deny respecting such an object are equally untrue the apagogic mode of arriving at the truth is in this case impossible if for example we presuppose that the world of sense is given in itself in its totality it is false either that it is infinite or that it is finite and limited in space both are false because the hypothesis is false for the notion of phenomena as mere representations which are given in themselves is self-contradictory and the infinitude of this imaginary whole would indeed be unconditioned but would be inconsistent as everything in the phenomenal world is conditioned with the unconditioned determination and finitude of quantities which is presupposed in our conception the apagogic mode of proof is the true source of those illusions which have always had so strong an attraction for the admirers of dogmatical philosophy it may be compared to a champion who maintains the honor and claims of the party he has adopted by offering battle to all who doubt the validity of these claims and the purity of that honor while nothing can be proved in this way except the respective strength of the combatants and the advantage in this respect is always on the side of the attacking party spectators observing that each party is alternately conqueror and conquered are led to regard the subject of dispute as beyond the power of man to decide upon but such an opinion cannot be justified and it is sufficient to apply to these reasoners the remark each must try to establish his assertions by a transcendental deduction of the grounds of proof employed in his argument and thus enable us to see in what way the claims of reason may be supported if an opponent bases his assertions upon subjective grounds he may be refuted with ease not however to the advantage of the dogmatist who likewise depends upon subjective sources of cognition and is in like manner driven into a corner by his opponent but if parties employ the direct method of procedure they will soon discover the difficulty nay the impossibility of proving their assertions and will be forced to appeal to prescription and precedence or they will, by the help of criticism discover with ease the dogmatical illusions by which they had been mocked and compel reason to renounce its exaggerated pretensions to speculative insight and to confine itself within the limits of its proper sphere that of practical principles and of the discipline of pure reason in relation to proofs it is a humiliating consideration for human reason that it is incompetent to discover truth by means of pure speculation but on the contrary stands in need of discipline to check its deviations from the straight path and to expose the illusions which it originates but on the other hand this consideration ought to elevate and to give it confidence for this discipline is exercised and it is subject to the censure of no other power the bounds moreover which it is forced to set to its speculative exercise form likewise a check upon the fallacious pretensions of opponents and thus what remains of its possessions after these exaggerated claims have been disallowed is secure from attack or usurpation the greatest and perhaps the only use of all philosophy of pure reason is accordingly of a purely negative character it is not an organon for the extension but a discipline for the determination of the limits of its exercise and without laying claim to the discovery of new truth it has the modest merit of guarding against error at the same time there must be some source of positive cognitions which belong to the domain of pure reason which become the causes of error only from our mistaking their true character while they form the goal towards which reason continually strives how else can we account for the inextinguishable desire in the human mind to find a firm footing in some region beyond the limits of the world of experience it hopes to attain to the possession of a knowledge in which it has the deepest interest it enters upon the path of pure speculation but in vain we have some reason however to expect that in the only other way that lies open to it the path of practical reason it may meet with better success I understand by a canon a list of the a priori principles of the proper employment of certain faculties of cognition this general logic in its analytical department is a formal canon for the faculties of understanding and reason in the same way transcendental analytic was seen to be a canon of the pure understanding for it alone is competent to announce true a priori synthetical cognitions but when no proper employment of a faculty of cognition is possible no canon can exist but the synthetical cognition of pure speculative reason is as has been shown completely impossible there cannot therefore exist any canon for the speculative exercise of this faculty for its speculative exercise is entirely dialectical and consequently transcendental logic in this respect is merely a discipline and not a canon if then there is any proper mode of employing the faculty of pure reason in which case there must be a canon for this faculty this canon will relate not to the speculative but to the practical use of reason this canon we now proceed to investigate section one of the ultimate end of the pure use of reason there exists in the faculty of reason a natural desire to venture beyond the field of experience to attempt to reach the utmost bounds of all cognition by the help of ideas alone and not to rest satisfied until it has fulfilled its course and raised the sum of its cognitions into a self-subsistent systematic whole is the motive for this endeavor to be found in its speculative or in its practical interests alone setting aside at present the results of the labors of pure reason in its speculative exercise I show merely inquire regarding the problems the solution of which forms its ultimate aim whether reached or not and in relation to which all other aims are but partial and intermediate these highest aims must from the nature of reason possess complete unity otherwise the highest interest of humanity could not be successfully promoted the transcendental speculation of reason relates to three things the freedom of the will the immortality of the soul and the existence of God the speculative interest which reason has in those questions is very small and for its sake alone we should not undertake the labor of transcendental investigation a labor full of toil and ceaseless struggle we should be loathed to undertake this labor because the discoveries we might make would not be of the smallest use in the sphere of concrete or physical investigation we may find out that the will is free but this knowledge only relates to the intelligible cause as regards the phenomena or expressions of this will that is our actions we are bound in obedience to an inviolable maxim without which reason cannot be employed in the sphere of experience to explain these in the same way as we explain all the other phenomena of nature that is to say according to its unchangeable laws we may have discovered the spirituality and immortality of the soul but we cannot employ this knowledge to explain the phenomena of this life nor the peculiar nature of the future because our conception of an incorporeal nature is purely negative and does not add anything to our knowledge and the only inferences to be drawn from it are purely fictitious if again we prove the existence of a supreme intelligence we should be able from it to aim existing in the arrangement of the world comprehensible but we should not be justified in deducing from it any particular arrangement or disposition or inferring anywhere it is not perceived for it is a necessary rule of the speculative use of reason that we must not overlook natural causes or refuse to listen to the teaching of experience for the sake of deducing what we know and perceive from something that transcends all our knowledge in one word these three propositions are for the speculative reason always transcend it and cannot be employed as imminent principles in relation to the objects of experience they are consequently of no use to us in this sphere being but the valueless results of the sphere but unprofitable efforts of reason if then the actual cognition of the cardinal propositions is perfectly useless while reason uses her utmost endeavours to induce us to admit them it is plain that their real value and importance relate to our practical and not to our speculative interest I term all that is possible through free will practical but if the conditions of the exercise of free volition are empirical reason can have only a regulative and not a constitutive influence upon it and is serviceable merely for the introduction of unity into its empirical laws in the moral philosophy of prudence for example the sole business of reason is to bring about a union of all the ends which are aimed at by our inclinations into one ultimate end that of happiness and to show the agreement which should exist among the means of attaining that end in this sphere accordingly reason cannot present to us any other than pragmatical laws of free action for our guidance toward the aims set up by the senses and is incompetent to give us laws which are pure and determined completely a priori on the other hand pure practical laws the ends of which have been given by reason entirely a priori in which are not empirically conditioned but are on the contrary absolutely imperative in their nature would be products of pure reason such are the moral laws and these alone belong to the sphere of the practical exercise of reason and admit of a canon all the powers of reason in the sphere of what may be termed pure philosophy are in fact directed to the three above mentioned problems alone these again have a still higher end the answer to the question what we ought to do if the will is free if there is a God in a future world now as this problem relates to our conduct in reference to the highest aim of humanity it is evident that the ultimate intention of nature in the constitution of our reason has been directed to the moral alone we must take care however in turning our attention to an object which is foreign footnote 78 all practical conceptions relate to objects of pleasure and pain and consequently in an indirect manner at least to objects of feeling but as feeling is not a faculty of representation but lies out of the sphere of our powers of cognition the elements of our judgments in so far as they relate to pleasure or pain that is the elements of our practical judgments do not belong to transcendental philosophy which has to do with pure a cognitions alone and footnote to the sphere of transcendental philosophy not to injure the unity of our system by digressions nor on the other hand to fail in clearness by saying too little on the new subject of discussion I hope to avoid both extremes by keeping as close as possible to the transcendental and excluding all psychological that is empirical elements I have to remark in the first place that at present I treat of the conception of freedom in the practical sense only and set aside the corresponding transcendental conception which cannot be employed as a ground of explanation in the phenomenal world but is itself a problem for pure reason a will is purely animal arbitrium brutum when it is determined by sensuous impulses or instincts only that is when it is determined in a pathological manner a will which can be determined independently of sensuous impulses consequently by motives presented by reason alone is called a free will arbitrium liberum and everything which is connected with this free will either as principle or consequence is termed practical the existence of practical freedom can be proved from experience alone for the human will human will is not determined by that alone which immediately affects the senses on the contrary we have the power by calling up the notion of what is useful or hurtful in a more distant relation of overcoming the immediate impressions on our sensuous faculty of desire but these considerations of what is desirable in relation to our whole state that is is in the end good and useful entirely upon reason this faculty accordingly announces laws which are imperative or objective laws of freedom and which tell us what ought to take place thus distinguishing themselves from the laws of nature which relate to that which does take place the laws of freedom or of free will are hence termed practical laws whether reason is not itself in the actual delivery of these laws determined in its turn by other influences and whether the action which in relation to sensuous impulses we call free may not in relation to higher and more remote operative causes really form a part of nature these are questions which do not here concern us they are purely speculative questions and all we have to do in the practical sphere is to inquire into the rule of conduct which reason has to present experience demonstrates to us the existence of practical freedom as one of the causes which exist in nature that is it shows the causal power of reason in the determination of the will the idea of transcendental freedom on the contrary requires that reason in relation to its causal power of commencing a series of phenomena should be independent of all sensuous determining causes and thus it seems to be in opposition to the law of nature and to all possible experience it therefore remains a problem for the human mind but this problem does not concern reason in its practical use and we have therefore in a canon of pure reason to do with only two questions which relate to the practical interest of pure reason is there a god and is there a future life the question of transcendental freedom is purely speculative and we may therefore set it entirely aside when we come to treat of practical reason besides we have already discussed this subject in the antitomy of pure reason end of section 44