 Hello, and welcome to NewsClick's International Roundup. The past few days saw some major developments in West Asia. On the one hand, Donald Trump and his son-in-law and advisor Jared Kushner went about touting what they called the deal of the century to ensure peace between Israel and Palestine. On the other hand, the United States pressed hard on its allies and other countries across the world to cut down on Iranian oil imports ahead of sanctions. To talk more about this, we have Praveer Purkhaisa, editor-in-chief of NewsClick. Hello, Praveer. Praveer, to start with the so-called peace plan. So as opposed to, say, previous instances in the past, US officials have made it very clear that they don't really care if the Palestinians are not involved in this process. In fact, the message that has gone is that this deal will happen with or without Palestine. So what has led to a shift in this process where the Palestinians are basically being sidelined from the process entirely? I think the issue is that the US has finally dropped the veil, if you will, that it is somehow an independent and neutral interlocutor between the Palestinian people and the Zionists. In this case, of course, the Israeli state. So I think this pretends as being dropped. They are coming out that formally they are on the side of Israel. They are on the side of the Zionist state, and they therefore do not need the Palestinians because it's about what the agreement Zionist state wants that US is proposing. Now it's not that the US has played a very different role. It has always been in the negotiations completely on the side of the Israelis. We have the documents now of various advisors or interlocutors who have sat on this negotiation with Israel and the Palestinian Authority or at the time the PLO. And it is very clear the US has never played a quote unquote honest broker role. But I think even the pretends of being the honest broker is being dropped. So what they are saying is we have a solution to offer. It does not involve the Palestinian. It's only involved the Israeli state, Egypt, and it involves Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia doesn't even have a contiguous border with Palestine. It neither is Lebanon being involved nor of course Syria is being involved. What Jordan's involvement we don't know. Looking at the picture of the so-called plan, and I really don't know whether this is a plan which will be something that even Trump and his, shall we say, allies can push through. One, of course, is the Gaza issue. And as we know, recently the kind of shootings that the, using snipers that Israel has done on the Gaza population protesting at its borders. That has put it in a bad light. There has been condemnation, the world over, even the compliant and pro-Zionist media has not been able to cover the brutality of what has happened. It's also clear that Gaza is a humanitarian disaster which will get worse. It'll only worsen because electricity is in short supply, fuel is in short supply. Any food, construction equipment, anything going into Gaza is checked by the Israelis and half of it is not allowed. Construction activities inside rebuilding is not possible. So it is, as everybody agrees, that it is an open air prison. And it is also true that by definition of what's occupied territory, it still continues to be occupied territory because it does not have air control over its airspace or even its ocean sea borders. It cannot accept any ship coming in from outside. It cannot have a port. So all of this are obviously something which fits the definition of occupied territory. So the attempt is to get the Hamas, after having beaten them up for so many years now in this open air prison, beat them up further and say, well, Egypt has agreed to take over some of the responsibilities. We'll fund, say, industries in Sinai and then you will have at least employment in Egypt and we'll open up some of the restrictions in terms of borders. So you will get partial relief, if you will, from the open air prison and you should accept it because this partial relief will at least let you survive. Now, will the Hamas who dominate in Gaza today, will they accept this, shall we say, break from the prison condition that they face? It's an open question because this is what finally also the PLO agreed in during the Oslo process and the consequences are here for us to see. So that is one part of it. But essentially Egypt then takes over Gaza, something which they have refused to do for a very long time. This has been on the table for a very long time that Gaza be attached to Egypt rather than be a part of Palestine because it's also cut off from the West Bank. So that is one part of it and it really depends on whether Egypt is willing to take the burden of one million Palestinian population but also the Hamas which means it strengthens the Muslim Brotherhood inside Egypt. Will they really do that? Those things we have to see. As far as the West Bank is concerned, I think it's very clear that West Bank will continue to be chopped up in little pieces and made into sort of cantons, small cantons which are not viable. So they'll be totally dependent on the Israeli state and what they would have is essentially some internal autonomy but completely dependent for everything on the Israeli state and also funded by the Israeli state. Now this is the plan that is being put. The people think it's an issue of shifting the capital to Jerusalem. It's really not that. They also have agreed or this is on the anvil, not hidden, that certain settlements which are a part of the West Bank will be attached to Jerusalem and formerly called Jerusalem. What it does is, in effect, is to divide West Bank into two and if you divide West Bank into two, it's not viable. The Jordan Valley will continue to be with Israel. So essentially you do not want a viable West Bank and therefore PA will be at best a prison guards of these cantons. So I think this is something the PA cannot accept and survive. I don't think Abu Mazen can really accept this agreement and yet survive as a leader of the Palestinian people and therefore the argument we don't care whether they come in or they don't come in. I think the other interesting issue is that the resistance which has strengthened in recent years is not, of course, being called to participate in the discussion and resistance meaning the resistance axis consisted of Lebanon, Hezbollah. It consists of Syria and, of course, it consists of Iran. Now with Iraq also being somewhere in the mix, we don't know where. And Turkey not having very good relations in the United States. I think the fact that they kept all of these people out and the thing they can get at peace is something which I don't think can really happen. It can happen that in the short run, they ram it down the throat of the Palestinian people. Provided they get Egypt to support it and, of course, Saudi Arabia is clearly on board. So whether this, but whatever they rammed down the throat of the Palestinians in a very one-sided way, the maximum they can accept, they can expect is the acceptance by Hamas of this. And I don't think that this is going to change the geopolitical scenario in the West Bank, in West Asia at the moment and its strength is real claim to peace. So I think the US is making a huge mistake in terms of what it is doing for its own image. So you mentioned the Arab countries, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt. And at least some of them have been historically quite in support of the Palestinian cause. So what is the reason for the shift whereby they are okay with the deal which is so against Palestine? Jordan has always been a US protectorate. So it really doesn't have an internal, it doesn't really have a standing as an independent country, at least not in the sense we talk about it. In the current scenario, Jordan is facing a really strong movement against the Prime Minister which has also been turning against the monarchy. So given that, that I think Jordan is much more dependent on the US and on Saudi money because only way it can bail itself out of the economic crisis is to Saudi money. Of course, Jordan is in a difficult position because a huge number of Syrian refugees also in Jordan. So they have a justifiable claim at least to external aid for handling that. But nevertheless, this is the scenario that Jordan has. Jordan is one difficulty. It is the official protector of Jerusalem and particularly the Al-Quds mosque. So that part of it, if it is handed over to Saudi Arabia which seems to be the plan, I think Jordan is going to have a huge problem. Let's not forget that the monarchy in Jordan claims to be descended from the tribe of the prophets. Therefore, the Hashemite kingdom, they really draw their lineage from the Hashemis. So the Hashemite kingdom, the monarch, can you really relinquish finally all claims to the holy places of Islam? If you remember, it is the Sharif of Makkah who was the founder of both the two dynasties, one in Jordan and one in Iraq. Iraq was overthrown. But the Jordan Hashemite monarchy traces its origins just to the near past, shall we say, to the Sharif of Makkah who was not allowed to get hold of Saudi Arabia, not allowed to control Makkah and Medina which had been promised by the British after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. So that history being what it is, can the really hand over Jerusalem also to the upstarts of the Saudi, shall we say, even the Saud's family is something we have to see. That's a problem that Jordan has. Saudi Arabia is very clear. They are moving much more openly towards United States, openly trying to reach an agreement with Israel so that they can face towards Iran. And they, of course, are at the moment in a genocidal attack on the Yemeni population which we discussed with Professor Ajaz Ahmad two days back. And this part of the Yemeni war in which the US and UK are completely involved along with the pressure it faces for its restive population, the threat it sees in the long term to its monarchy. Therefore, how to balance all of that meant that they want to disengage from the Palestinian cause which they never have really supported but which at least they gave lip service to and openly reached an engagement with the United States and Israel so that they think they can concentrate much more on Iran, which is their avowed enemy at the moment. And if you look at the Palestinians, what options do they have before them now? I think it is a formal burial of the two-state solution. So therefore, the battle in Palestine is going to turn over civil liberties of the people, equal rights towards ending an apartheid regime and that's not going to go away, go away because more than half the population of Israel and Palestine, West Bank is currently of Palestinians. Even if you take Gaza out of it, then there would still be about 40 to 45% of the population. Can you continue in the 21st century with an apartheid state is a question that we have to see how it plays out. But the Palestinian people are definitely not going to accept this. They're taking the streets, they'll continue to struggle and I still remember when I had gone to Palestine, one old woman who was the head of the village and her sons were either in jail or had been killed or were essentially ex-turned from the village, she said that we are making a 14, 15 year, 16 year children come with us, that was a grandchildren to come with us to till the fields. We're robbing them of their childhood, but one thing is clear, we are not going to leave this land. So this mistake, quote-unquote mistake that they made in the Nakba, that they left the land thinking they'll come back to it after one month, 20 days, 15 days, they never thought they'd never be able to come back to it. That's a mistake they're not going to make again. So they're there on the land, this is 40 to 45% of the population without Gaza, with Gaza, today probably about 55% of the population. This is a scenario which is only going to get worse for the Zionist state. The second part of it, if we'll take the geo-strategic balance, it's only in the long run going to go against the Zionist state again. For clearly, the United States is a weakening power, of course, a weak United States is still militarily a strong power, still has enormous destructive capabilities, but it is no longer able to control the region. We have seen that in Syria, we have seen that in Lebanon, and with all the Saudi money and military cyber-attling by the United States, things are not changing on the ground. So the geo-strategic balance is going to increasingly shift away from the Zionist state. Given these two dynamic, I think we are going to see a long-term decline of the Zionist state's ability to control the captive Palestinian population. At the same time, the short-run scenario looks rather bleak for the Palestinians. The good part of Palestine, and I always comment this when I talk about Palestine, that if you are in struggle, you still feel a sense of joy, even if your situation is in the short-run bleak, because there is a joy of the struggle. So you can see the Palestinian population which have been in the struggle for decades now. They still laugh, they fight, they struggle, they have a life. You feel that there is something vibrant over there, and the vibrant part of the Palestinian life is struggle. While if you come to countries like Algeria, which don't have this kind of a struggle, you find the people much more gloomy, depressed, and so on. So even two days back, I was talking to a Palestinian activist over Skype, and you could still see that the determination they have, that has not gone away. So I don't think this is a short-term issue. It's really a long-term issue, and the Palestinian people are going to secure their rights, even if the world does not, at the moment, support what they're doing. And moving on to Iran, basically, a lot of what happens in this issue is also, in some ways, connected to Iran. So the United States, over the last couple of weeks, has really attempted to tighten the screws around the sanctions regime, basically. So, and at least certain companies in certain countries have also agreed to it. For instance, you have PSA Motors, the second-largest car maker in Europe, withdrawing from its deals in Iran. And certain European oil companies have also withdrawn from import of Iranian oil. And the Trump government has asked that all countries stop Iranian oil imports when November 4th, when the second round of sanctions come into place. So on the other hand, for instance, Turkey has refused completely to bow to the US dictates. So when you compare with the earlier sanctions regime, that was there in the, what do you call it, the late 2000s, for instance, what is the difference? And there are more waivers given to companies, and it is slightly more flexible. What is the reason for the more hard-line stance that is being operated now? Well, one should not attempt to predict what is in some individual's mind, in this case, President Trump. Let's look at it from the point of view that the US unilaterally has pulled out of an international treaty which involved many more partners in the United States and Iran. So it was a six plus one treaty in the sense five plus one security council plus Germany, plus Iran, of course, with the other party. So all of these parties are still wanting to continue with the deal except United States which is pulled out of the deal. The United States gets its clout, of course, from its military strength. It is effectively the guarantor, if you will, of the European Union. So therefore, it has a military power and it has been trying to set the European Union against Russia. Therefore, they need the protection of the big bully of the world, the United States. Leaving that out, it also is the dollar which is the reserve currency of the world. And all this external trade, essentially in oil, is settled in dollar. So given the fact dollar means it has to go in some sense to the United States. United States has the ability to impose sanctions on all these countries. So they can make it difficult for oil to be bought from Iran. As we know, there are already banks which were being used to route the money for various refineries in India. They're already now saying we can't handle this transaction anymore. This is something which had happened earlier and we were for some time using the Turkish route to do that. So even Turkey at that time was helping beating the sanctions. So I don't think that is something which is new. The question that we have to answer is, are countries like India willing to accept standing up to the United States on a patently unilateral sanction which has no international recognition? Indian government has said it doesn't recognize this, but the question is what will they do in practice? It's an open question because as you know, senior functionaries of the government have said all options are open, which really means nothing. If you take European Union, most of the countries have given lip service to say it will stand up to the sanctions and they are doing certain cosmetic rules and regulations in Europe, but essentially the companies which were involved in Iran are pulling out because they think the market with the United States are facing sanctions in the United States is not in their commercial interests. So you have that part of it that the cascading effect of the sanctions are already visible on the various European companies. China of course is not going to accept the sanctions. It is the biggest buyer of Iranian oil today. It has a tanker fleet which has been built up just for this purpose. Earlier the sanctions were extended to all tankers because insurance was given by companies which were either located in the UK or located in the western world. So China has insulated itself for Iran oil trade, doing all of this. Question is, can they underwrite other people buying oil and will others agree to do that that they become essentially dependent then on Chinese yuan and shift from the dollar to yuan? Now let's face the other part of it that Venezuela is also in the sanctions and they are also in other countries with huge oil reserves. So two of the biggest oil exporters are facing US sanctions. Will it be in a shift to an alternate currency? And in this case the yuan is the more attractive one. For Venezuela, they tried the cryptocurrency route by making it denominated against the oil reserves. I don't think that's really worked. So I think we have to see whether the oil economy can be de-dollarized and Trump's attempt to use sanctions, also the trade war which has been unleashed. All of this, can it combine to weaken the dollar in the medium term though it may not happen in the short term? So what would Iran's future strategy be? They have two paths that they can follow. One is try to finish the sanctions as they did in the past with various one-to-one deals with India, barter deals, rupee trade. With China, of course it's much easier because China has a convertible currency which has international traction. This is the simple strategy of trying to see how you can beat the sanctions. The second part of it, and this is something which is an important question that Iran needs to work out for itself, that if the European Union really doesn't stand by it, then should it stand by the agreement itself? Till now they have said we'll not break the agreement. Should they start going back to the centrifuge route or not? And then do what North Korea essentially did. I think this is the longer term issue that we have to see. It's not good for the world to, for that to happen. But I think US is precipitating a scenario. They're forcing countries to go nuclear because they're not willing to give it guarantees of peace and security. And given American penchant for military intervention, obviously countries think that if they declared evil empire part of evil nations, then they need to protect themselves. Thank you, Praveen. That's all we have time for today. Keep watching USClick.