 Can you put him from the outside? Well, welcome back to Act 2 of the conference here. We certainly had a great start with the tremendous historical perspective provided by Ambassadors Panov and Togo, and then some, I thought, a very rich discussion of what the national security views are. I'm looking forward to the economic discussion this afternoon, because I think that was somewhat missing from our discussion this morning, especially the energy sector possibilities, which seem to be opening up. So I think we still have some more important parts of this three-way or four-way relationship to factor into this conference. But for the next 45 minutes, we are going to hear from Dr. Eugene Rumor, who, as you heard, he directs the Eurasian research effort here at Carnegie. But where Gene and I first met each other was when we both worked in the Director of National Intelligence Office, and Gene was the National Intelligence Officer for Russia. The National Intelligence Council is a very important branch of US government. It's part of the intelligence community, but it not only has access to all of the classified information that is developed by US intelligence, but it very much takes advantage of outside analysis and expertise. The National Intelligence Officers like Gene often come from backgrounds outside of the intelligence community, academic think tank, some of them working on Capitol Hill. So they bring in the outside contacts. Many of them have lots of experience in the region. And then when they come in as National Intelligence Officers, all of the classified information is provided, of course. And then their job is to provide strategic intelligence at a very high level to the National Security Council members, and in fact, the highest policymaking parts of the US government. So we always have counted on them to tell it the way it is. They're not always the most popular members of the executive branch. They often have to commit the unpardonable sin of telling the truth, but that's important for good policy. And Gene rumor was certainly a strong, active, and respected National Intelligence Officer for Russia. So we've asked Dr. rumor to tell us about sort of an overall and American evaluation of overall Russian security policy, because I think it's important to fit Russia's Asia policy, which we've heard quite a bit about this morning, into the wider context of how Russia is moving in the world and the domestic pressures within Russia, which of course are probably, as they are in any country, the most important factor in doing that. So Dr. rumor will speak to us for a few minutes. There will be time for questions afterwards. So we're very much looking forward to it. Gene. Thank you very much, Director Blair. Thank you for inviting me to speak here. It's an honor. It's also a learning experience just this morning in the first two panels, as well as inside conversations with colleagues I spoke to. I have realized how much I don't know about the subject of Russian-Japanese relations about the Asia-Pacific region. So it is a rather intimidating experience to stand here before you at this conference, because really I'm not an expert on the Asia-Pacific region. I deal much more with Russia. And in the past two years almost, it's been the Western direction of Russian foreign policy that has been the dominant theme. And all of our research, I think we like to say that for the past two years, almost the three things that have occupied our attention have been Ukraine, Ukraine, and Ukraine. And now, of course, it's also Syria. So what I am going to speak about is really something that comes from a student of Russia who is not schooled in the history of the nine-dash line, who is not well-versed in the intricacies of the Coral Islands dispute or the Senkaku Islands or someone who doesn't even understand the significance and the terms of the TPP. But what I do know, and I think all of you know as well, that the history of Russian-Japanese relations has very deep roots. It includes two wars in the 20th century. And one of the thorniest disputes, territorial disputes, or perhaps equatorial disputes, we should call it, in the world, as many of you have already discussed this morning. I'd like to take one issue, however, with something that was said by a previous speaker. And that is the United States somehow. And it's the point that was made earlier that the United States somehow has not been interested in the resolution of the Russian-Japanese issue, the territorial issue, and the peace treaty for its own set of ulterior motives. I'd like to remind all of you, and I'm sure it really is somewhat superfluous, that US involvement in the Russian-Japanese relationship has very deep roots as well. The treaty that ended the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 bears the name of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and it is no coincidence. And those of you who had the privilege of having visited the Roosevelt Room in the West Wing of the White House, had a chance to see the medal, the Nobel Peace Prize that was awarded to President Roosevelt for his role in arranging that treaty. That said, of course, the problem of Russian-Japanese relations has not dominated the headlines for a long time. Very little has been happening there, despite some of the points that were raised here. Instead, the attention of policymakers and scholars have been drawn increasingly in recent years farther south, to the South China Sea, to the territorial disputes between China and most of its neighbors, to the competing visions of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and freedom of navigation, as well as to the Russian-Chinese alliance. Outside the Western Pacific, the attention of the international community has been focused on Syria, the threat of ISIS especially in the last few days after the tragic events in Paris, the refugee crisis in Europe, and of course, the events in Eastern Ukraine, and the rising Cold War-like tensions in Europe. So it seems paradoxically that 25 years after the end of the Cold War, both ends of the Eurasian landmass have returned to a Cold War-like condition, with little, in my view as well as in the view of many of those of you who have spoken here, with little, if any, prospect of resolving these issues in the foreseeable future. And these are really the key issues that have upturned, upended, disrupted the regional security orders in Europe and in the Western Pacific. In Europe, the standoff is between Russia and the entire transatlantic community over the annexation of Crimea by Russia and its conflict in Eastern Ukraine, which at present time is frozen, and we hope that it will stay frozen. But this frozen condition really is the best we can hope for because, as Mr. Kosh and I believed said earlier, there is no durable resolution for this conflict in sight for the foreseeable future. In Asia, fortunately, tensions have not risen to the level of an outright military conflict as they have between Russia and Ukraine, but it is hardly a reassuring observation. In both Europe and the Western Pacific, there's plenty of mutual suspicion, accusations of violations of established norms and agreements, and brinkmanship that could result in a real catastrophe. The possibility of a Cold War-like standoff resulting in a real, hot, not cold military confrontation, either as a result of a miscalculation or as a result of a deliberate provocation is all too real and all too dangerous, especially considering how much is at stake for all concerned. I'll repeat a familiar phrase that there will be no winners in that situation. And with mutual suspicions running as high as they are, there is not an obvious party who could step in into either one of these two areas of conflict to act as a mediator, so mediation will be exceedingly difficult. So those are the similarities, and they're rather grim, between Europe and the Western Pacific region. Let me say a few words about the differences between the two. And here, unlike with the similarities, there may be some room for hope, very slim hope, but nonetheless, and possibly discussion of opportunities to begin to address the problems, some of them seemingly intractable. But let's suspend our disbelief. Let's be optimistic. Let's be naive. Let's not speak like the seasoned, wise, and somewhat cynical, perhaps, experts on the regions that we study. The biggest difference between the situation in Europe and the Western Pacific region has to do with Russia. In Europe, it is the key party, and it is the culprit of the conflict that has divided the trans atlant, that is, in a sense, united the transatlantic community, and has divided Europe. It is a crisis that is touched on issues that have been considered settled, not just since the end of the Cold War, but since the end of World War II. So this is really big, and this is really serious, and Russia is at the core of it. However, Russia is largely absent, and this is puzzling. Again, and I'll return to it in a few minutes, but it is largely puzzling from the crisis in the Western Pacific. It is something of a paradox to my mind, but whereas the crisis in Europe cannot be resolved without Russia, the crisis in the Western Pacific has not involved Russia at all. The absence of Russia from the theater in the Western Pacific is surprising because of the professed importance of Asia to Russia, especially in the last few years. Russia has, in effect, announced its own pivot to the Pacific, pivot to Asia, and has declared Asia to be the primary, the key focus of its foreign policy, at least according to Russian official statements. In fact, the Asian pivot in Russian foreign policy has been one of the most remarkable features of the entire post-Cold War era. By far, the most important element of it has been the normalization of Russian-Chinese relations. That was after 30 years of a very tense standoff, as all of you know, that on some occasions has resulted in bloodshed, something that has never happened, actually, in Europe during the Cold War. For most of the post-Cold War era, Russian-Chinese relations have not been without certain signs of hesitation on the part of Russia because of the obvious difference in their size, potential trajectories, because Russia was still struggling to regain the full measure of its power because China was undoubtedly rising. And the signs of hesitation and reservations about getting too close to China seemed to fall by the wayside in the past two years with the onset of the crisis in Europe, the crisis in Ukraine. Russia has embraced the pivot to Asia with unprecedented vigor to the point where at times it appears is the principal focus of its foreign policy. However, again, clarification is needed here. To be precise, Russia's pivot to Asia has been essentially Russia's pivot to China. There is really little else other than the robust and increasingly, at least in declaratory terms, partner-like relationship with China in Russia's policy in Asia, in the Asia-Pacific region. Russia does not appear to have an articulated position on many thorny issues in the Western Pacific. In fact, some of our colleagues have pointed out here, Russia takes a certain amount of pride in not having a position and not having a view on many of these issues. Considering the importance of Asia, considering the importance of those disputes for the region, it is difficult to understand how a country that aspires to play a major role in the region can stay away from the major issues and not take a view on this. The Russian presidency of APEC and hosting of the summit in 2012 does not appear to have resulted in a more robust Russian engagement with the region beyond China once again. And in fact, this year, President Putin's decision to skip the APEC summit in Manila again raises questions about Russian commitment to this pivot to its presence in Asia and building a more robust set of ties beyond China. So speaking as an outsider, as a student primarily of Russia rather than Japan or Asia, I find this imbalance, lack of balance in Russian policy in the Pacific absolutely puzzling. For especially so for a country that has elevated balance, balance of power, balance of interest to the key principle of its foreign policy and its system balance in its policy in Europe, the lack of balance in Asian policy on the part of Russia is something that is very difficult to understand. And here, I would say Mr. Putin is missing a huge opportunity because Japan could be precisely that source of balance stabilizer to the one-sided Russian policy in Asia vis-à-vis China that so far has been missing from the overall equation. Mr. Putin has been invited to visit Japan but no data has been set and it appears that his Tokyo trip is on hold indefinitely. And in any case, even if the visit does take place, especially in the light of the conversation this morning, it is difficult for me to understand what that visit can deliver, especially if you consider the recent Russian statements about, I apologize, Mr. Kushan, you contradict at this point, but it did sound like Russia is planning a military buildup in Aquile Islands. At least that's the line coming out of the official statements. The stepped up Russian air patrols and even an incursion into Japanese airspace. And I'm not going to repeat the provocative statements made by Russian officials in the aftermath of Mr. Medvedev's visit there. But again, none of this really helps build a more robust and productive Russian-Japanese relationship. If anything, I would say it raises questions about Russian intentions there. So in the interest of balance, I would say that both Russia and Japan are missing a big opportunity. By not pursuing more vigorously the resolution of the issues that divide them. But overall, I would say Russia is the bigger loser of the two here. So let us once again suspend disbelief and imagine for a moment what an alternative to the present impasse could look like. And I know that there'll be more conversation about this in the afternoon. So I'm not going to really dwell on, for example, economic issues. But if you look at the Russian economy, if you ignore what Ambassador Panof told us about the preference of the local elite in the Russian Far East, it appears that the two economies were almost deliberately built in a mutually complementary and supporting way. And the complementarity of the two is rather obvious. Russia is incredibly rich in mineral wealth and energy. And I see Ed Chow here, so I know this issue will be covered in detail. But there's timber, there is all manner of raw materials that I'm not even going to attempt to enumerate. Japan could be a source of investment, but again I have to suspend my disbelief here in the light of Ambassador Panof's comments about local elite's attitudes to foreign investment. But in theory at least, this is not necessarily an economic opportunity that is going to transform the currents in the Asia-Pacific region, but this could be the engine of economic growth for Russia that is practically unique and would provide, given Japan's weight in the world economy, could provide Russia with a much, much needed balance to its, once again I repeat, one-sided trade and economic relationship with China. However, that's not all. There is more because potentially the strategic consequences over Russian-Japanese rapprochement, especially now at a time when Cold War-like environments exist both in the West and in the East of the Eurasian landmass, strategic consequences would be even greater. It is no secret that the current Cold War-like situation in Europe, for example, the current impasse between Russia and the West serves nobody's interests. In all sides, it is obvious, would like to break out of it. Russia is hurting under the weight of sanctions. Europe would like to get out of the sanctions regime as well because Russia is an important trading partner for it than European companies are losing money. Besides Europe has other problems to worry about these days other than dealing with Ukraine and Russia. And for the United States, I would say the crisis in relations with Russia is at the very least an unwelcome distraction from other major foreign and security policy priorities. However, all sides have dug in their heels and nobody seems to be willing or able to step away from the red lines that they have drawn. Japan's position, however, in these circumstances is different and we've seen some evidence of it already. Its role in this crisis in the Western end of Europe and Asia is limited largely to showing solidarity with NATO and the European Union. Prime Minister Abe, as others have spoken here, has made it clear that progress in relations with Russia is one of his top foreign policy priorities, if not the top foreign policy priority by the sounds of some comments in this room already. He's been very persistent in his courtship of Mr. Putin. They've had multiple meetings, I believe 10 if I'm not mistaken. He visited Russia in 2014. First Japanese Prime Minister visited in over 10 years if I'm not mistaken. And of course he invited Mr. Putin to visit Japan at a time when very few world leaders have any interest in engaging Mr. Putin personally. So the question is this, could Japan take the lead in engaging Russia at a time when nobody else can? A breakthrough in relations between Russia and Japan could be a major turning point in the evolution of the present crisis toward a gradual, I emphasize gradual, normalization of relations between not only Russia and Japan but also between Russia and the West. With none of the parties invested in the present crisis, all are looking for a way out. A thaw in the Far East could also produce a thaw in Europe. For Japan, this would be an opportunity to assert its leadership on a global scale, which no doubt would be welcome in the United States and Europe despite the discomfort I'm sure associated with Japan's breaking out of the sanctions regime. I think that is something that would be well worth the price. For Russia, this would be an opportunity to begin to dig itself out of the hole that it dug itself into and keeps digging deeper. For Russia, most importantly, I believe, it would also be an opportunity to rebalance its relationship with China. It would give Russia's pivot to Asia a new and much needed quality, new, much needed balance. Now, if you think that this is a radical vision, let me conclude with a passage from a recent book by British historian Dominic Levin about pre-World War I Russian policy. Levin quoted a memorandum written by the Russian envoy to Tokyo, Baron Roman Rosen, written for Tsar Nicholas II. In that memorandum, Rosen discussed the relative merits of Russian foreign policy in Europe and in Asia. So here's a brief passage and I apologize for reading, but I think it's really important to highlight the enduring themes in Russian foreign policy and perhaps give us some ground for optimism. So the basic point in Rosen's view was that Russia's overriding interest in Europe were the security of its Western frontier in its hold on its non-Russian borderlands. By far the best guarantee of these interests lay in the old alliance with Germany and Austria, read Europe. Good relations with the neighboring empires that secured Russia's Western border from invasion throughout the 19th century. They would continue to do so as long as Russia avoided involving itself in Balkan and West European issues that were remote from its interests. If Russia could avoid getting dragged into European conflicts then the future belonged to it. In the competition for empire that would determine the world's future, it was far better placed than any other European power. All its attention should be focused on preserving peace and developing the immense potential of its Asiatic territories in comparison to the huge importance of Siberia, the Pacific region and the fate of China, the European issues that obsessed public opinion and drove Russian foreign policy were of minimal significance. So if a long time envoy to Tokyo, someone who was well steeped in intricacies of Russian-Japanese relations at that time could write so optimistically about it, I think I can be forgiven for a dose of unreality and optimism as well. So thank you very much, I'll stop it there. Well, thank you very much, Jean, for that very provocative set of remarks. I think that maybe strategy in a country only exists in the analysis of analysts from other countries, that's what I'm beginning to think about hearing this. Others impute strategy to the United States and no less an authority than Doug Paul says for a strategy-free zone.