 Well, welcome. The Center for Arab and Islamic Studies at the ANU is very pleased to have as a visiting professor, Professor Amr Hamzaoui, who is here for a few weeks and is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and is one of the world's great experts on Arab politics and especially on Egypt. So we're delighted. Welcome, Professor Hamzaoui. Thank you very much. Obviously the events of Egypt are of great concern to many people across the world and you have been living it as well as studying it. And I wonder if you could tell us about how you see the state of the political development in Egypt today. Many of us, of course, are concerned about what appears to be an increasing authoritarianism. So I'd be interested in hearing your view on that. Right. I mean, it's a new breed of authoritarianism which has emerging, has been emerging since the military coup in July 2013. It's more aggressive when it comes to human rights abuses and violations as compared to Egypt prior to the revolution of 2011. So in the three decades long era of former President Mubarak, human rights abuses and violations were not in such a disastrous situation as they are now. In fact, Egyptians are waking up every day to hear about cases of forced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, torture in prison and most of these cases were not as common since the 1980s and all the way to 2011. Secondly, it's a new breed of authoritarianism because it has been using extensively low making as a way to entrench itself into the state apparatus as well as into the management of a social fabric. So just to give you a round figure between the coup in July 2013 and today close to 400 laws were passed by the current government, most of which undermine safeguards for personal liberties and freedoms. Well, that's very interesting. One of the laws that has gained sort of a lot of attention in the West is the NGO laws, the non-governmental laws. And I know that in the past, the law was pretty draconian, but appears to be now even more so. I wonder if you could tell us about that. Sure, you're very right. I mean, through legislation it's yet to be enacted low pending the President's signature. So there's a new legislation which passed parliament in, in fact, two days, which is remarkable for any legislation to pass parliament in two days. And it's a long piece of legislation close to 100 articles. Passing parliament in two days is a signal that this was approved by the government and was pushed to parliament to pass it quickly. When you look at the details, it's more draconian as compared to still existing law of 2002. It imposes more punishments on civil society organizations and civil society activists. And it creates a new environment, quasi-legal environment in which surveillance becomes a key tool of the government to manage civil society. So you can no longer get funds internally or externally without the approval of not simply the Ministry of Social Affairs, as it used to case. In fact, the legislation creates an intelligence-driven government giant, a new body, which is called the Agency to Monitor NGOs. And you have to get permission from that agency to get donations domestically or get funds from outside of the country. It subjects you to additional layers of financial oversight. It subjects NGOs to licensing issues, which basically make it impossible for NGOs to operate freely. So yes, I mean, this is one of the key legislations, which were passed in the last three and a half years. Along with it are the legislations on terrorism, on a demonstration, a demonstration law, different amendments to the penal code, all of which seriously eat safeguards for personal rights and freedoms. So what I take from what you're saying is that you believe that civil society really has deteriorated even more so than it had been under Mubarak. Yes. And I think you're on record as saying that the situation is worse than since the 1950s. Right. And you believe that yes, I mean, it's quite, in fact, there are different similarities between the current situation and the period between 1952 and 1956. We have been looking at a huge number of laws, as I was just saying, passed with the one objective of closing off the public space, in fact, pushing and imposing on civil society a war of extinction. This is no longer a siege, which is imposed on civil society organizations, it's a war of extinction. And as a result, most independent organizations, in fact, left the countries they are operating right now, increasing the out of Tunisia, Egyptian organizations operating out of Tunisia, or out of different European destinations. Similar to the 1952-1956 period, it is the military and the security services, which are directly in charge. This is no longer president ruling with a ruling party or putting himself and his ruling establishment behind the facade of semi-pluralist dynamics or limited pluralism. This is a military establishment and security apparatus ruling and interfering everywhere. The parliamentary elections 2015 were managed directly by the security services, intelligence services. Parliament is in a submissive moment unseen before. They recently expelled an MP, a serving MP, who was occasionally critical of the government, and at literally no opposition, only eight MPs out of over 500 opposed it or abstained. So this is a phase in which a new ruling establishment is entrenching itself using the executive branch of government, but dominating the legislative and the judicial branch of government as well. This is your idea about indirect repression. Yes, exactly. So it's not that they are only depending on human rights abuses and violations. They do have a web of tools, primary judicial legal tools, which have been put in place to create an indirect repressive environment. I'm interested in the external connections here, because it seems that on the one hand, financial assistance from America or the European Union or whatever can be supportive of civil society. I know that bothers the state in some way, but on the other hand, America in particular has a very strong military relationship and the great amount of money, of course, that goes for the support of the military. So in your view, do the external relations would say the European powers are America in particular? Do they help or do they hinder the development of, say, pluralistic order or do they support authoritarianism? Well, it's unfortunate that I have to say that in looking at Egypt's development between 2013 and today, it's unfortunate that European and American tools, different tools related to economic cooperation, diplomatic cooperation, but military cooperation as well, that these tools have not been used in any significant manner to not only not to push for a pluralist arrangement, pluralist state society relations, but even to hinder the government's, current government's appetite for human rights abuses and violations. They haven't been used in any significant manner. In a way, Egypt moving away from the brief democratic opening of 2011 to 2013 into a new authoritarian government seemed to have been fine with most European governments and with the previous, as well as with the current American administration. But moving beyond the West, it's important to look at Middle Eastern actors too. Yes, I would ask you that. Yes, because I mean, any observer of Egypt cannot understand the shifts which have been happening in the last years unless the role of Saudi Arabia, the role of the United Arab Emirates, of key Middle Eastern countries is factored in. Saudi Arabia and the UAE were instrumental in backing the military and in pushing for the military. Why is that? Is it because it's an anti-Muslim brotherhood? That to an extent, yes. I mean, they especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE are, their officials are on the record pushing against the Muslim brothers and for different reasons, which are domestic primarily. In a way, pushing against a movement which seems to be creating tensions in the respective country away from Egypt was confused with pushing against the Muslim brothers in Egypt and of course, benefiting from a stream of mistakes, which a brotherhood committed between 2011 and the coup in 2013. Secondly, it's simply because democracy is not a favored governance model from a Saudi or a UAE perspective. And in a way, there was always a conscious attempt since the Arab uprisings in 2010 and 2011 to undermine the democratic potential of these uprisings. It happened in Egypt, in fact, was attempted in Tunisia in the last parliamentary elections. When you look at the details in Yemen, in Bahrain, which was crushed, a democratic uprising crushed by direct, direct military march of the Saudis. So in a way, it fits into their own vision. This is not a region where they would like democracy emerging, whereas they would like democratic accountable governments emerging and that shaped their behavior vis-à-vis Egyptian development since 2011. Well, thank you very much. Professor, I'm sorry we don't have more time, but we wish you all the best in your time in Australia and with your work.