 This fourth and last panel of Japan update on Japan and its neighbors. Now as of audio, we've had a little technical problem. We'll give you a bit more audio. And through our distinguished panel from the far right, Kuchosi Tanaka, former Vice Minister, Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan, I'm now head of International Strategy in the Japan Research Institute. I'm a senior fellow at the Japan Center for International Economic Exchange. Sir Gupta is from Samuel's International in Washington and a leading expert on territorial issues among other things in East Asia. And Amy Kin, who's here in her own right, but she's standing in for Evelyn Goh, who's ill today. But Amy is from our strategic, Defense and Strategic Studies area in the Coral Hill School in the College of Asian-Pacific. So welcome to you all for a conversation about Japan and its neighbors. I guess if you look back over the last 50, 60, 70 years or so, the defining characteristic of Japan's neighborhood is its economic dynamism. The openness that's developed in the post-war period to economic exchange, the successful embrace of the development and ambition, first through recovery in Japan and then right around the region, and the powerful dynamic of economic growth and development in Asia. And of course that's both defined and changed the region over time. If you look back in all that, Japan's favorite crucial role is the leading edge of Asia's economic development over the years. Going right back to the 1960s when Japan committed the income doubling plan and all that and heavy industrialization transformed Japan's role in the region, including I might say Australia with the procurement of strategic world accruals on a scale that we've not witnessed before in international trade. And of course that from that period forward began to have a big impact on the whole structure of the Asian economy but on Asian politics. Japan through the 70s and 80s of course played a critical role in shaping that through its commitment with Australia in the 80s for example around the intensification of economic exchanges across the region through offshoring and development of these production networks who are now a big feature of the region. Japan played a critical role in the work towards establishing an architecture and a framework which cemented all that in international context the Asia Pacific economic cooperation framework. And that asserted really some important things about the nature of the process that Japan was leading in its region including the way in which it was embedded in global institutions and the global structures after the Second World War and the support they gave to what went on in Japan and Asia in the post-war period. And of course alongside that the development of the alliance structure between Japan and between the United States and its other alliance partners around the region. Of course we had the tragedy of Vietnam along the way in the 60s and 70s and the Korean Peninsula is still festering away there. But for the rest the story is one of growth, development, successful economic transformation and modernization and I guess a benign political environment ordered around the commitment and ambition of everyone including China come lately to economic development. So what's changed? I guess a number of things have changed. One thing that's changed is that if you look back 20 years or so Japan or the United States was the largest economic partner of pretty well every country in the region. Now China's the largest partner of pretty well every country in the region. China overtook Japan in 1994 as the second largest economy in real terms in the world. So the relative positions of Japan and China have changed. There have been more uncertainties about China's intentions and assertiveness China has become a larger economic power and political power. So these things have all changed. But if I turn to the panel and ask you all in a sentence or two to describe what you think now are the defining characteristics of Japan's neighborhood and Japan's dealings with this neighborhood. Hitoshi I'll start with you. How would you describe it? Well I may not be able to describe this in one or two sentences. Let me try. Let me try. I think if we want to look back the past 67 years maybe a little bit in this reading. Because when you talk about the sort of regional international regional structures I think we need to get back to 160 years or so because when Komodo-Perek came to Japan it was 1853 that was the opening of Japan's modernization. And I take the theory that Japan-China relationship changes every 40 years because it's to do with the function of scale of power. 1853, the opening of the modernization of Japan, 1853 then 40 years since then the first Japan-China war and 40 years since then the true first Japan-China war in 1931. Then 40 years after that we did normalize our relationship, 1972. And 40 years since then China surpassed Japan in terms of economic scale. And when I was director general for Asian affairs in 2001 China was only one fourth of Japan in terms of GDP. Now China, given the depreciation of the game China is three times as big as Japan but matters more may not be today but matters more would be 40 years after this, 2050. We discussed about the possibility of tremendous population redaction in Japan in 2050 most probably Japan will maintain not 100 million but probably 97 million people as one of the agency, the government agency forecasted. So the question is we may be having more difficult relationship China as time goes on to the future. So the whole question, I think this change of power structure between the two countries has brought you all ups and downs and now we may be seeing much more difficult reality of time in our relationship with China. That's one of the deciding there. The second element is very much to do with the question of nationalism. Surgeon of nationalism in the afternoon session we talked about all the soft power and indeed nationalism is the main element in China and in the face of China. It is more to do with nationalism as an emerging big power. China today talks about dream of China's dream and we feel very uncomfortable with this concept of Chinese dream. China may think that they should get back to the stage of big power in the 19th century. So Japan's nationalism is more to do with frustration out of the decline of the national power. So this is the second determining element for the relationship. The third element is to do with the United States. It appears to be that the United States will not lose their absolute power in terms of economic power and also military power but yet their external forces are changing very much in particular from Obama from Bush to Obama and most probably into the future as well with thresholds for the United States to use its military capability. Therefore there is a kind of awkwardness in the region that is the United States going to fulfill its promise to the region or not. So there are three determining elements. The change in the scale of nationalism and the surge of nationalism and the question of the United States external posture. Those are the three points and we are going to see it constantly into the coming 35 years or so. That's my observation. So the shift in real power, nationalism and trans-specific political power and scale of key issues. I'll take a more narrow construction on this question. I will look at it just purely from Japan's perspective. I'm looking from the time the Cold War ended. Japan had become very rich, it had become very prosperous but it had worked very hard, kept its head down and worked very hard and they felt at that point of time the Japanese people that now is the time for us to begin to define our identity as to who we are and what our role will be in Asia and the world and this was not necessarily in an autonomous context etc. Tied within the alliance but Japanese finding a new voice. There was something tragic in the story from my perspective because just as Japan in the early 1990s came to grapple with its past and came to grapple with its past very honestly and faced many of the difficult questions and we are talking establishment Japan. The Japanese people as a people I believe have totally embraced what has happened in the past. It is part of their system, they're apologetic about it. The way they express their apology isn't a different way. In Asia we just do it a little differently. We don't say sorry, sorry, sorry. We do it through our actions in different ways and the Japanese people did it. Here we have so much promise at that point of time with the Moriro Hoshikawa government and governments thereafter coming to terms with its Asian neighbors and also trying to find an identity of who Japan was and what our role would be in the world. Here's the tragic part. The tragic part is of course the bubble burst out there. Japan's GDP I think in 1995 was more than what it is today. Many of the Asian countries themselves were talking primarily Korea and China. Korea came out through a process of democratization. It found its voice. It also found its emotions at that point of time. In China there was the narrative change also and China started growing but also found in history a different way to identify itself and a lot of these factors you wish came together interacted together and that a platform would be set where these countries could agree, disagree but they could have very intense intercourse across not just economic areas but across cultural political spheres and even find ways in which they could reduce the temperature in terms of some of the political divisions and territorial and geopolitical contestation and the tragic part is that just has not worked the way it was. The promise that existed say between 1990 and 1995 and what you see today in 2015 is too much of clashes and too much of competition in a very negative sense across in ways which have made East Asia a pretty dangerous place and for me I think that this tragic aspect is what I see as the great change. The promise that was there, the promise which was not realized and we are currently living that tragedy right now and hoping to kind of contain it, minimize it and find ways in which people can still coexist and find productive solutions down the line but there is some degree of disappointment and in a very good sense that going forward there is more reason to be cautious and to be more anxious than to actually be hopeful that you could have that period of promise that did exist at the end of the course. You should bore down to that question a bit later on of what was involved in Japan's attempt to redefine its position in the world and whether the fundamental assumptions underlined that somehow were not appropriate assumptions and what led to tears basically but before we do that maybe once you will take on the region where it's at. So I might be slightly controversial here and actually say we're seeing underlying consistency rather than change. Obviously some things are changing but I think the consistency I would point to really since the end of World War II the last 70 years or so is a region in which the economics are very powerfully interconnected strong economic relationships between Japan and its neighbours including China and I'll get to that in just a moment but also a region in which the political and the security relationships between Japan and key neighbours are problematic and again going back to China here in particular. Now we tend to think of the Japan-China economic relationship as a story of the last 30 years and of course that has taken off very dramatically in the last 30 years but my own research looks at how China tried to rebuild its economic relationship with Japan after World War II and that story is very similar to the story that we've seen since post reform in opening China. China looked to, the Communist Party looked to Japan as a source of high tech as an important model on how to industrialise and modernise an economy on a place where they could get expertise from Japanese industrial providers and as a country with whom they actively wanted to trade with. Now for all sorts of Cold War reasons that was very difficult and the trade relationship remained very small. China's socialist economy didn't make that very easy but the origins of the story we see today exist in that post-World War II era as well but I think crucially despite the economic linkages that have always drawn these two countries together they haven't translated into changing the political and security preferences views, identities of these two countries. China always traded with Japan because at a sense of fear of Japan if you like a sense they needed to modernise and they needed to industrialise to become strong. Now the question I think facing us all today is has China changed? Has the China-Japan relationship changed? Has the seven decades of economic independence in the region, led by Japan managed to translate into better political security relations and clearly there are a number of areas where that hasn't been the case. And so with faced with sort of confronted with the bigger political and security challenges now because China is so much bigger because as Tonic Sensei mentions there are questions about the US role in the region and there are all these underlying territorial and other disputes that Surah mentions as well but they have their origins in earlier era. Just take this issue of Japan and China interaction and shift in the balance between the two. Toshi, how do you see the introduction of the comprehensive security bills the collective security bills recently as reflecting that fundamental conflict you identified as a critical part of the changed regional circumstance between the US and Japan here, extensively, is an area of continuity rather than an area of fundamental change but is that how we should be looking at it or is there something more that makes the eye? I am not an enthusiastic fan of Prime Minister Abe but yet the responses Abe-san has made so far in relation to the changing international structure in the region is more or less rushing because given the change I mean by the way this change of power structure in the region may not be a unique problem for Japan it may be a problem to Australia it may be a problem, it should be a problem to Southeast Asia as well the whole question is how to go with China which is rising up but yet we are so interdependent with China therefore China is not Soviet Union we don't take containment policy but yet we have not come up to the right policy mix in relation to coping with the Chinese rights now Abe-san has produced three set of agenda it's like Abenomics, three arts one is strengthening Japanese economic capability and we discussed about Japanese economic future it may not be so brilliant but yet Abe-san has succeeded some extent point number two to develop Japanese national security capability yet under the very basic structural constitution we don't have the night of the constitution but Japan have everything to meet who worked for the Japanese Foreign Service for almost 40 years surprising because when Abe-san talked about various things but yet he succeeded in establishing secret reservation law he succeeded in introducing national security council and he succeeded in changing Japan's arms export policy the arms technology export policy and now he succeeded in changing interpretation of the constitution but yet people talk about kind of you know this is more in peace situation this is Hong Kong constitutional I don't think so because what Japan is going to do is a little bit above the past interpretation of the constitution Japan I mean the whole issue is a question of the collective self-defense but the new interpretation of collective self-defense has got a very strict conditions in case the nation the cross-nation is being attacked we may make a judgment if it is directly to do with the Japanese security very basic Japanese being or not is there any clear evidence about that? it should be minimum Japanese action must be minimum and only when there is no alternative we will join in alarmation to fight against you know for the sake of Japan's national security but yet I think there is going to be rather sort of important implication of it meaning that goes to my third point Abesan's third argument that is to do with the expansion of partnerships with right-minded nations such as Australia such as India such as ASEAN such as European Union we, I mean it's amazing all the friends, Australian friends of mine came to me visiting me in Tokyo saying that the Australia partnership has never been better and it was for the past two to three years Japan and Australia has established very intensive security relationship as well into the future there is going to be more joint exercises it's not for the sake of you know attacking someone it's for the sake of preparedness of security in the region so Abesan has established all three agenda like we are all in his economics but there is a missing element yet that is diplomacy I mean how could we sustain this current relationship with China, Korea and it's observed in a sense there would have to be much more sort of strenuous efforts to improve the relationship as you say economy may play a certain part because for China economic growth is priority number one without substantive economic growth they cannot continue social problems such as the income disparity such as the air pollution water pollution and all sorts of things therefore China needs certain income growth no question about that China end of the month they may pursue much sort of deny policy in order to get their domestic economy fixed but the more questions we don't know we do not want to see China pursuing to create their hegemony in the region we cannot let China do that for that we would have to introduce various set of policies I will be discussing about those policies later so we raised a lot of issues that we want to come back to the air and in particular we want to come back to this if I may describe at the hold and the donut of Japanese strategy towards the region which importantly has to do with China but has to do with a number of other countries as well but I'd like to take get Syriza and Amy's take on the collective self defence bills and how they play into regional relationships as you put it and as we read it it's a very limited change it's a reinterpretation of the Constitution fundamentally that puts very strict constraints on Japan's security engagement with allies and partners and whether that is how the risk of the Japanese community sees is another question and whether or not that's how the region sees it was another question so Syriza, what's your take on that? Yes, as Tamika-san said it is very restrictive in terms of collective self-defence and it's a very constrained form of collective self-defence though there are within those bills other issues also which also which also passed which in terms of logistics support etc which do not fundamentally in any way violate the Japanese Constitution what Japan will not be doing is using force to settle international disputes which is using force overseas and it will continue to maintain its exclusively defence of defence posture the bills are very useful in what I would call the Treaty 6 area of the US-Japan area area of responsibility it tightens defence arrangements it builds trust and in areas like grazing situations and other areas where there was a sense that there were gaps in deterrence, posture or capability it allows for greater coordination and therefore it forms a basis on which there will be greater rules of engagement and cooperation between these countries in that context helps also relations with Australia because the areas where in strategic affairs with ties with Australia have really jumped have made great improvement are things like acquisition and cross-servicing and logistics support and those areas now I would say the dangers arise in a regional context in when Japan wishes to participate or is asked to participate in missions which are beyond the theatre beyond the area 6 area of responsibility which is basically Article 6 is you would say Mashi Channel Philippines and for the up north and the western Pacific but where we are talking the South China Sea and of course the Indian Ocean Straits of Malacca etc. there is a certain degree of vagueness in terms of what exactly and specific obligations will be to its partners in those areas I mean Japan, it's not that there is vagueness it's just Japan is not really obligated or committed in any significant way and therefore partners or countries should not be imagining and I'm talking here of Philippines I'm talking here of India I'm talking here of Vietnam that things are going to change markedly in this regard in terms of how we can be more interoperable and can have greater Japanese support in whatever context even in a logistics capacity the security bills are very much to tie Japan more tightly to the alliance and to the key partners of the alliance which is Australia Is this what Abe attended Abe would have liked it to be a little bit more expansive his panel wanted it to be very expansive I would say very expansive because language would effectively would have enabled Japan to assist our new collective service and activities or assist in American missions anywhere in the world and the main logic underlying this was that if trust in the US-Japan alliance fails then the deterrent power in the Asia-Pacific also fails so we will do what we need to do in whichever mission where ever so as to build trust to the Americans and keep that relationship tight but also that concomitantly ensures that Japan's the roles that Japan could have gotten sucked into way beyond the Asia-Pacific area might have been very large of course it depends on Japan's judgment whether to participate in the missions but the tendency is that they would kind of with American pressure be forced into some of these missions out there and this was obviously whittled down and whittled out primarily by Kometo and it was as Sanapasad said those three criteria for which have to be met were essentially criteria laid out in 1972 I think cabinet legislative bureau a statement of what Japan can do in terms of use of force and that was used as the basis for this reinterpretation and that's why it has also left Japan with a very constrained capability for collective self-defense and so it's that's how it has evolved and that's part of how politics works because Abe did not have yet he has huge numbers in parliament in the diet but he doesn't have his majorities so he has to work with Kometo and credit to Kometo they are doing a 180 or at least 120 degree term on many of their positions and at the end of the day there are things to complain about but there's also much to comment on let me explain what he stated the audience may not know fully about the US-Japan Security Treaty he talked about the security treaty an important element of the security treaty is consisted of two articles the article 5 and the article 6 the article 5 talks about the situation where Japan is being attacked by someone else and the United States has an obligation to defend Japan that article 5 article 6 talks about Japan's obligation to provide base facilities to the United States not just for the sake of Japanese defense but for the sake of preserving international security in far east there has been constant responses on the part of the government what is the geographical definition he talked about also the Philippines inclusive Taiwan and Korea the government has constantly made clear that far east is not the geographical concept it is originally was to do with the US defense area because the United States has got the reciprocal history the security treaty with the Philippines with Taiwan with South Korea now it doesn't make much sense no longer it is as and alive in the United States so this is what is about the US defense treaty so this current change in the security new security regulation is not to do with the concept of far east at all it is the concept is basically how intensive threat Japan will suffer from certain situation it is not necessarily far east it can be outside far east but one thing is quite clear in my mind Japan is a subordination Japan will have to make judgment that Japan will help or not help whether or not Japan provides logistical support or not suppose Australia joining in the United States in relation to South China Sea Australia and the United States may ask Japan to make a logistical support Japan is a Japanese school Japan has to make judgment at that time you have to be very very serious because there is a constitution there is a spirit of constitution and there is an international community Australia may be criticized by the rest of the world those 80 hands are making this war clearly Japan will suffer from the consequences of Japan's decision to join so in past Japan is a normal nation why don't we make independent sovereign judgment whether or not we shall provide logistical support or not but even under that situation there is a very severe limitation it would have to be to do this Japan's own security so please do not misunderstand the whole concept on the other hand this is I guess this explores the vagueness that we talked about and this is the vagueness clearly wearing a lot of Japanese including some very conservative Japanese about the whole passage of the films and I guess that's what plays into the regional relationship absolutely another diplomacy Amy how do you see this playing into the relationship with China? I completely agree with the panelists here that Japan's security legislation responses are incremental they still require a lot of judgment call entirely legitimate and rational response to changing security circumstances and yet the response in China has been pretty vociferous I guess and consistently so official Chinese responses since the security legislation was first raised have constantly referred to are they attempts to change the post-war order they've pointed out frequently how much the Japanese domestic population is in question over these issues as a way of saying you should listen to your population the credibility from China in that regard is not necessarily that strong and on the day after the security bills were passed in Japan Shinhua's response was that Japan was putting peace and stability in East Asia as well as the international post-war order in jeopardy so incremental on the one hand an entirely rational one yet this is the kind of response from China and I think we need to understand that however incremental and rational these security legislation changes are and how legitimate they are for any country to pursue they're coming at a very particular moment in Asia's history and Asia's changing strategic order and until we can get that crucial issue about how the region makes strategic space for China if it does or not all of these sorts of issues get found up in questions about is this an attempt to constrain China or not is this about putting in a U.S.-led regional order which it certainly could be interpreted as being putting all of Japan's cards potentially around the U.S. alliance and like-minded friends and now all of these phrases can be interpreted in many different ways and so for China the response is an understandable and I suppose that Japan is moving in such a way that is seeking to constrain constrain China's rise and ultimately we see perhaps the lack of diplomacy between Japan and China on these sorts of crucial issues the real problem that I guess we'll get to at home but the lack of kind of a mutual shared vision on Asia's future Let me sort of add one thing to this debate China some extent Korea has increased the establishment of the world as I said it's not to do with aggression it's to do with the defense of Japan but yet I can understand a kind of concern you just mentioned and you mentioned as well the question of confidence in Japan and I don't think a kind of revisionist approach to the history would help to increase confidence in the region about Japan it's wrong therefore I do think that the statement Prime Minister Abe issued in August 13th he very clearly talked about one which is very important to me he stated all the historic recognitions of the past prime ministers will be unshakable you talked about promises I'm not sure about promises but yet if you were to to amend the kind of historical recognition on part of Japan yes indeed you talked about the Murayama statement and the Hosokawa statement that's recognition is now being shared by the Japanese Prime Minister Abe so I can't say anything more that is going to be the basis for Japan to operate in relation to the past history so clearly Japan needs to you know be engaged in much more diplomatic efforts but yet if you take this security registration itself I cannot agree to be criticism by China and clearly China will precise something which will you know contribute to the security capability on the part of Japan, about the Australia on the part of the United States if you were to make criticism of that we will say to Chinese what about South China Sea we have strong concerns about your unilateral approach but at the same time we would have to be very productive in relation to our diplomacy as well so as I said confidence and diplomacy will be required for Japan into the future on that issue the statement in particular what you really say is that statement is a reliable expression of Japanese security psychology what do you mean by that I mean see if you get it right well you talked about the statement particularly the element in the Q unshakable unthinkable unshakable is a reliable expression that is the premise of the statement and that has been approved by the government and if Prime Minister wants to interpret the other way then we suffer from these consequences I think on the other statement it positively surprised a number of people watching it went a lot further than they expected and the regional responses are fairly positive there was some mutual criticism but on the whole I think they were pleasantly surprised but I think I like your first confidence and diplomacy is a nice note and I think that the speech showed a great deal of confidence and particularly the latter half of the statement that spoke a lot about the contributions that Japan made to the region stability and prosperity and the contributions it would continue to make including through the security legislation and other forms but and are they in the second half of that statement spoke about all of the sorts of things that he wanted to see in the region and on use of force to settle disputes an open international economic order all of these things, preservation of the status quo all good things and yet without diplomacy with China and I guess we have the confidence that we don't have sufficient diplomacy and without the diplomacy with China in particular no number of apologies in Washington in Southeast Asia can I guess make up this So it is a reliable basis on which you could engage in an act of diplomacy the question is is there a will and inclination to do that on both sides I suppose not on the Japanese side It may not be necessarily only Japan who needs to think about future vision it is to do with the future vision of the region not necessarily the act of diplomacy with China clearly in bilateral relationship and in China you know it is indeed an important element of this vision but I think Australia has got the same issue you have changed from very conservative to somewhat less conservative I don't know what will be stood out of this but it is crucial issue how to focus right of China how to make sure that we will not suffer from Chinese unionism or Chinese perseverance but yet China is not Soviet Union let us engage China what would be the right engagement policy we haven't discussed in the region we haven't discussed with Australia the United States a little thing I think that is going to be crucial I guess one thing that we have skirted around we haven't got half of it yet but I do want to throw this open to the audience so that we get a reflection of wider interests in this subject but one thing we haven't thought about is you know the relationship between economic independence in the region and the political military security interests that are being pursued through and how we bring these things together and it seems to me that often these things are discussed as if they are in parallel universes and yet the world in which we live in reality means that they are crucially independent security in the economy how do you think the Chinese look at that in particular in respect of their approach, political towards Japan I mean I think they are absolutely fundamentally intertwined in a couple of ways I mean on the one hand since Xi Jinping came to power and even before this but in particular since Xi Jinping came to power economics, economic development mutual economic benefit has been front and centre in every single speech he has made about the region and where he sees China going in the future and you know that is I guess given practical significance in the new AIB one road and various other economic diplomacy strategies he doesn't mention it quite so openly but clearly the Japan-China economic relationship is fundamental to China's ability to keep on growing highly dependent on the high-tech expertise from Japan and the China-Japan-Korea trilateral looks like the first positive development we are going to be setting in a particular North East Asia relationship coming up in the next month or two so there is some really positive elements there the other thing I think and this to give a plug to our recently published East Asia Forum Quarterly about Chinese contributors makes the important point that China has much it can learn from Japan on regional, economic institution building and all the rest in terms of official development systems and everything else Japan has made enormous contributions to Asia in that regard so one hopes that that message is playing into Chinese thinking about how to run these major institutions and do this before the economic diplomacy in the region and how the economics and the way in which that plays into these relationships earlier in Toshi and the element of that which focuses on developing more expanded and deeper economic relations with like-minded economies the TDP framework for example David where David has talked about that this morning is an important element potentially in the TDP group I want to do to say that I doubt those numbers frankly I don't think it's the most unlikely even if it did would it make any difference at all to the nature of the economic relationship between Japan and China and the rest of the region and what does Japan do about that because it seems to me that still you're left with that hole in the donut there which is China and the rest and that's almost entirely absent from certainly official thinking if not the private and non-official thinking about Japan's strategies towards its natives I talked about the premise of this efforts for regaining strength of Japanese economy but the like-minded the cooperation with like-minded nations like Australia is not just limited to the economy it would have to include both economic, political and security and clearly the relationship between Japan and Australia is kind of flourishing on three-dimension no question about it remember that we had very strong resistance from agriculture when we talked about the economic partnership agreement but yet we succeeded in it and all the security cooperation I hope Australia will decide on just in some way I mean this cooperation will go wrong so I'm more talking about just economic elements in this like-minded cooperation but responding to your question I think TPP is enormously important China joined in WTO in 2001 and 10th anniversary 2011 Chinese newspaper wrote about now this is the 10th anniversary of China joining in international community let's celebrate and this joining into WTO has helped China to grow no question about it TPP I think it is going to be a major disaster if United States Congress fails to approve it it would be I'm sure it is going to be major, major disaster for U.S. strategy because this is important because this talks about today I think some talked about important element not necessarily that is all of rulemaking and it's essential rule we would like to abide by and probably China in 10 years China cannot join today because of the existence of huge state industries China cannot but yet I'm sure China will be able to join in 10 years and this TPP is going to be the basic standard risk of rules of economy which we can assume based upon those rules trade and investment and other things therefore TPP is very important this is yet another crucial for the stability I don't like to see Chinese economic system in the region no way and I'm sure China would like to join it eventually so it's very important for us to talk about our desire that China should join Korea should join, other nations should join I think you're absolutely right about the political disaster TPP didn't get up elsewhere maybe I have a slightly different view about how easy it's going to be for China to join TPP in 10 years or even 3 years time because of the way in which the negotiations are already constructed but that's another issue so I want to turn to the audience and like questions and comments from the audience about any aspects of these issues we've already discussed about other issues but before I do that I just want to give sort of an opportunity to come in on that last set of issues in the way in which in particular Japan's strategy economic strategy towards the region to complement TPP's strategy might be important in resolving some of the political tensions within the region I know that Japan and China have begun in some respects to compete with each other in Asia in the area of development finance and if it becomes kind of high profile when somebody wins a contract and somebody loses a contract etc etc the fact of the matter is that in Asia there is so much scope for development finance there really is not about and should not be about losers and development finance particularly is hardly a zero sum game and so you will have situations like Bangladesh I believe the Japanese want a contract on this was there's a lot of money going into that the Chinese wanted to do it in terms of foreign direct investment project which is more competitive for the Bangladeshis it made more sense to go with the Japanese offer and then you have it in Indonesia where the Chinese because they're willing to give guarantees etc on that project but maybe just to explain this point easiest is perhaps in India where you have what is a Delhi Bombay freight corridor which is being developed with Japanese money and then you have a high speed or kind of high speed corridor between Chennai and Delhi which the Chinese are developing not doing a feasibility study on so there's ample space and ample scope for this that's one this is on development finance side in terms of trade liberalization and trade competition there's frankly in my belief a certain degree of danger that in this whole process of mega regionals we are really downgrading the most ever nations principle at the multilateral at the multilateral system within the multilateral system it might seem a small thing today but down the line when you have not only competing blocks but you have this sort of competition between areas it's just distortive in terms of how trade flows between countries it's really not that much reason for it for example I know TPP is a high profile high standard in many respects not in some respects but in many respects there's hope that it will create great welfare gains I think the Japanese government actually the day it signed on to the negotiations put out a paper as to what the gains were actually very small but the gains will come in terms of structural reform in certain sectors like agriculture and on which can open up relatively important gains but we have our stuff happening on the side which is everybody downgrades it as what's going on out here but for all you know I mean a more community style liberalization wherein there's more buying and then there's a greater degree of desire to harmonize the regulations etc as well as create corridors connectivity corridors might actually have far greater gains in that process so this is again not a zero sum contest and let different versions play themselves out just like in India let the Japanese do a high speed drill corridor and let the French do another one and let the Chinese do another one and let's see how the whole process works out and I think it's these are all positive some gains in this in the area of geopolitics where there is it is a relative sum game and those games that game is becoming more starker with rise and relative declines he has in the past six negotiations presumably our can't agree more we need ourselves instantly we need trilaterals between Japan China and Korea and we need very sort of solid cooperation on energy and also environment you are very right in saying that we have been in situation by increasing inter-bundant relationship and for that matter I do think that Japan should join in AII Japan should work from inside the transparency the bank who would like to put the first question you go with that one this has been a very good discussion I think I'd just like to say that in terms of China which has been brought into the discussion here and there and AII was to their response to Abe's statement that was the very least the Chinese had to do in the circumstances they had to respond that way the problem is that we are dealing with a country that for 150 years was a poor man of Asia it was under the subjugation effect of the colonial powers of one source or another until the revolution in 49 and then it imposed its own autarky and lost another 25 years before the opening up after the Cultural Revolution so we are dealing with a country that has felt very aggrieved that it's behind Japan behind the United States behind the developed world and it now feels that having risen so quickly economically that it should be given the respect that comes from that that's why it behaves the way it does it really believes that it's arrived back again to its position that's on the threshold it's not already the dominant power in East Asia and that it gets upset that countries don't have granted that status so without in any sense apologizing for China they behave that way and that's also why they appear to be so uncompromising about statements that need to be reaching out a little bit about the other states for example as far as China is concerned however the fact that they're feeling their own they feel that they should be pushing their life in terms of achieving their aim of being a powerful country in the region that is when it comes up against the inevitable existing order that feels that it has a right to have a position in the region namely Japan and others and that's why we have this conflict on all the time and so I think I completely agree with Hitoshi that what we need is a lot more diplomacy coming from both Japan and from China and we've seen a little bit of an improvement over the last two or three years since the complete standoff after the the the but there's a lot more need perhaps now that Abe's through this agenda this collective security agenda he may feel that he's achieved that and can go into China a little bit more this sort of or nationalistically and perhaps Xi Jinping that famous photo on the front page of the Asia forum which was a staged photo was a photo that Xi Jinping had to show and he wasn't smiling because he had to go against that and how Abe didn't really want to look very happy about it either one of the best photographs ever in the statement of what the world's really about let's turn that comment into a question and ask Hitoshi you know is the space diplomatic space now for Abe to take more interest towards China will we see that happening in the next few months or so well it appears to me that the initial stage of the encounters but you know perhaps it appears that it's going to be a rather open China and Korea and Japan and I think we need to gradually build up the networks clearly you talked about the importance of economic development and China is going to be a crucial thing I am not entirely sure if China can achieve what they call new normal which is probably around 6% it would be extremely difficult idea for China to maintain even 6% and for that we actually need much more sort of stronger sort of investment into their work so Japan can play a very important role and I do think there is a need for Japan to come up with not just bilateral but yet regional initiatives Japan needs to establish something of military confidence building because it is so dangerous for us to see accidental, too soon accidental collision in the air around Senkaku and other places strongly for Japan China, United States and Korea those nations create what we call military confidence building mechanism and we need also very strong operative scheme for energy without energy cooperation in the region how could we achieve in 2050 East Asia is producing the world GDP without people with solid ergonomics energy cooperation we cannot achieve that we should start a very sort of strong energy member that cannot be done by Russia that would have to be done probably on the East Asia summit basis which include both United States and Russia so Japan and Australia you mentioned in Korea Japan China before the asset process but I mean the problem of the East Asia summit process as distinctly urgent but six processes basically the ergonomics they have energy and you're actually right Japan's capacities plays in but it's including the climate change in China incredibly positive lots of opportunities do you want to say something? I completely agree with the point you raised and I think happily there was a slightly bigger smile on Shijin think space when they met in Jakarta and obviously there's a whole domestic political context to this relationship but this is the Japan update so we shouldn't focus too much on that but I think since probably October November of 2014 we've seen some positive signs particularly back child diplomacy Yatsushita has always been very active in travelling between the two capitals Lika Chung has made a few positive initiatives we've seen a result in the business to business delegations travelling military delegations some sort of tentative steps in the direction of the maritime crisis mechanism although I think we shouldn't hold our breath yet on that one so that's all good because order is created through these kinds of conversations through these debates and discussions about those points of tension but for better or worse we're still at a point where the two sides China have fundamentally different views about the post-war order in Asia and that was beautifully demonstrated in the World War II anniversary commemorations last month and China is clinging very much to an order which sees Japan as playing its abnormal role in the region until China can work out a vision of the region's future strategic order in which Japan feels secure and until Japan can work out one that meets kind of China's ambitions it's not exactly entirely but at least acknowledges and meets those to some extent I think we're a long way off and Peter's right that's not just a conversation between Japan and China but at the moment that's the big gap in all of this that's the conversation that's not really happening well maybe it will never be resolved entirely between Japan and China maybe that's the answer Japan and China have never or they've had a minor sort of an economic agreement by that of an agreement but all of that that occurs between Japan and China on the economic front is done with them it's not done with them by that of a structure but let me take some more questions yes there we go Kesar up the back and then thanks very much I was tempted to sort of raise a question about the statement on previous Japanese government statements remaining unchangeable into the future because I still don't understand what that means and I think most people don't understand what that means but I'm going to ask a different question actually which is we haven't heard anything about North Korea in this discussion and it seems to me that it's sort of an elephant in the room obviously it's really difficult to predict what may happen in North Korea but it's a place where all sorts of things could shake up the region in really alarming ways and I wanted to turn that around and ask it in a more positive way and say I mean is the scope for more positive cooperation and collaboration and dialogue between the other countries of the region about how they would react to different sorts of scenarios that might play out in North Korea this is yours and what is going to happen with North Korea nobody knows but yet there are a couple of things which we need to be sort of prepared clearly one is a creation of contingency plan in particular on the part of US, Korea, South Korea and Japan because in case North Korea is going to collapse there's going to be huge role of refugees the question of who is going to sort of control nuclear weapons all the nightmare questions there is a very strong need for at least other starter United States, Korea and Japan to prepare for contingency China needs to be included into the future I'm not entirely sure if China will continue to still consider North Korea as their buffer that as China rises China will have to take care of the international repetitions as well China has built a much better relationship with South Korea so what type of future visions China had I think it was what I wanted to talk to therefore there is a need even in the absence of the participation of North Korea there is a need for us to think about informal fight party or whole party Russia may not join but yet I think it's made sense for us to have informal discussion China, United States, South Korea and Japan in relation to scenarios you talk about there are a variety of scenarios you know wraps or rules of control or military provocation yet another nuclear testing yes you are right in saying that there is probably we can create common state in relation to the question of North Korea so I think that is about time for you so question up the back here my name is Osamizawa coming from Japanese embassy my question is really possible I'd like to hear about the opinion on democratization of China China the Chinese authorities put priority on the economic development political stability is necessary so we need very strong central government so this is a rationale against democratization in China but I think that it's a high time for the like minded countries for Japan, Australia, United States to speak a little bit about democratization of China in the future once we say fought war we should do that this is my question that's an interesting question that everybody will have perhaps a different cut on I mean it's interesting to me particularly because historically when you think of Japan and all the rest of Japan historically a terribly important role in moderating international thinking on the transition of political system in Asia including in Korea at a critical time in China really but what is thinking shifting dramatically in that respect there's no residue of that victim Japan's diplomacy towards the region Hitoshi Well a few years back good friend of mine Chinese friend of mine asked me is it a good promise democracy Japan is pursuing Japan is producing Prime Minister every year is it a good democratic process and so the United States has made a lot of mistakes shooting from the air to the civilians and tortures and is it a good thing for democracy so I don't believe that the United States and Japan and Australia maintain what we call good democratic regime but yet one thing is very important for all of us that is the question of human rights question of universal values such as rule of law such as transparency and all things we should start talking about those sort of values not democracy or not it's not easy for China to introduce the democracy under plural political party principles so it's up to Chinese I don't consider that China will come to establishment of such a type of democracy but yet what is important for us is basic human rights you understand not a very strong view frankly it's for ultimately the Chinese people to to see greater social space greater political space and there after find at their time of choosing it's not of choosing they don't get to choose this but when they feel that they have the momentum that they can move to a different sort of a political system it's for them to choose it's helpful though that you have fora like the UNHRC where these sort of questions are continually at least talked about and discussed because one of the issues here has been that it's typically particular countries get targeted to be democratic while other countries who are also rule breakers but on the right side of friends are given a complete free pass and it happens that way and there's a tendency then for kind of a basic hypocrisy to build into that process ultimately I think the Chinese and Chinese themselves know that the greatest one single greatest political risk that they have is what happens to their system and it's just an open question which will never go away and the hope is as issues that China has risen to sufficient degree of sophistication and economic wealth that they are safe to become democratic without becoming destabilizing that's the hope but obviously so everybody's mind the system is not going to be permanent when is that there when it is not when that permanence fades and I think the Chinese perhaps feel the most thank you I mean it's a hugely thorny question isn't it and I think anyone looking at Xi Jinping's China over the last couple of years would say they're moving not in the direction of democracy there are two contradictory elements there one is a consolidation of power but then the other is the extensive attempt to invade the rule of law across a whole range of issues so there is a big contradiction there in what's going on in China I don't think we've read that clearly here that's true but I guess if you look at signals like what's happening to human rights lawyers and crackdown on corruption and things like this it's targeted and it's you know there's a lot more talk about the rule of law but in particular areas no no there's a lot of human right institutionalisation but some really concerning moves as well but I think in all of this it's never been public lecturing of China by other countries that hasn't helped in any way to move it towards great democracy at most other countries can have these conversations behind the scenes this is your question but this ought to be a central part of our dialogue with China the idea that from outside we can basically manage this process which is a very complex process I think I mean I happen to believe that unless China moves to a more representative form of government it will not achieve what it wants to economise there's a stage of which it will have to come but the idea that that's going to be done from outside is dreamland one quick final point I guess that one role that foreign countries can play is continuing to open up other waters to tourists because you know Chinese tourists travel to Japan, to Taiwan, to Australia get to see what other forms of government are black contractors and I think that seems to be the long game of my job for instance in Taiwan now it's maybe a very long game but that's just which one can I just try and jump in one then just one small element where this can actually get a little dangerous where you see that the Chinese people are not there getting that democratic but you have you have secessionist movements in China and you have in Tibet and Xinjiang and there might be a temptation that you know what at least maybe if we can foment a little bit of rebellion out there that we can and these factors and these these aidlers themselves are of a more democratic bent of mind maybe they might rub off in some way but I think that's actually a very very dangerous argument and it could feed into that temptation and that could have more geopolitical tensions and create tensions and worries and really have anything to do much with democratization time for one more question and then we probably just get that back thank you for that engaging Tor two or three years ago your view was on the TPP was that it was not not very positive and you favored or I thought you favored the RCEP system now that the TPP is new completion has your view become a bit more positive on TPP's current frame in particular I'm moderating that the short answer to that question is that what next after TPP is one achievement and particularly important for the US-Japan relationship not much for the rest of us but particularly important for the US-Japan relationship but this is a question what next? It's dealing with the rest of the region the rest of China and so the success if we can manage it of RCEP will be really rather critical and managing that the economics and the politics of that will be critical filling in the hole that Joshy mentioned on the region Japan will go to Europe but it's actually Europe is hardly the most dynamic part of the world and if you look if you look at Asia despite many analysts again saying China's collapse the truth of the matter is that even on the latest downgrade of growth in the region this is a region that's growing at 6.5, 6.3 percent I think the more common objective for us is to show that China will follow the international system international rule of law and also think and again in order for us to be able to do it we need to have some type of countervailing power that's TPP that's our objective of concluding agreement with Europe RCEP as well we would like to scale up the world of you know rules even in relation to trade and investment China will follow China cannot survive without international system that's what we would like to aim this is the global vision so this is probably an appropriate point of which to turn to you all together finally to ask you about you know what strategies are arrangements including global and international arrangements you would want to put in place to manage the relationship between I mean political, security, economic to manage the relationship between Japan and its neighbors over the next 10, 20 years or so why don't I start with you and then we'll end up with the question soon well I completely agree with the point about the importance of diplomacy and I think diplomacy in particular countries that have been on the ground in recent years we've seen some good steps but that needs to continue in terms of what strategies and again this is embarrassing a second plug for the East Asia part but one of our one of our goals with this special issue was to get voices from Japan and China more important than the rest of us in some way this could be the exact question to get them to talk about what's next for the future of that critical relationship and there are a number of strategies identified there about what's needed internationally bilaterally and domestically on both sides to get that particular relationship moving forward and I think if that relationship can move in a healthier direction it will make all the questions for Australia, South East Asian countries and the US third first taking just with regard to Japan I would like to see ideally if Japan can rebuild the bases of its political relations with China we have seen prime ministers during this past decade I'm talking to Mr. Hatoyama and I'm talking to Mr. Fukuda who came in with a different approach towards China and it automatically changed the nature of that relationship in a very short period of time this is doable but it must not only depend on the prime ministers themselves that whole cadre of not pro-China lawmakers but China affiliate of politicians in Japan to a large degree I think has been eviscerated and over the last 50-20 years and I would like, I don't know how but it would be useful for history to rebuild that cadre simply out of make virtue out of necessity China is there it's rising, it's great and it just has to be done and this relationship has to work on that basis secondly in terms of terms of deterrence be very clear and specific in terms of when you have your rules of engagement with your allies and partners as to what you will do and give a fair sense of what will not be done and there is a tendency to talk up of all the problems and how we are getting together to do things but there are also areas where obligations are not extended and that can create areas where there is real danger because if obligations are not going to be executed you can have the opponent run right through and make it seem that way thirdly I would like to see East Asian multilateralism flourish I know there are competing regionalisms but as much as possible try to locate as many solutions as possible at the East Asian regional at these regional forum and finally again just coming back to Japan Japan doesn't have good relations with Korea doesn't have good relations with Russia doesn't have good relations with China and North Korea is a different all together it's just you just cannot come out there and say like this because that party is doing that party is doing that Japan is not in relative ascent it's more in relative decline it has to make virtue of necessity and find that these relationships are productive from a diplomatic standpoint and that has solved a lot of the insecurities and worries and competition competition not too worried about the coming tendency there is a clear sign of improvement of the relations with China with Korea I don't know we cannot go beyond a unity among the rest but yet I think eventually we will have better relations with Russia in my mind the question we are dealing with is enormous impacts difficult question how to go picture big big rise but yet we need them so for that it's very simple sort of the measure will not be suffice I would like for what we call multi-layered nationalism in this specific function we have different properties in terms of hard security we will have to rely upon this U.S. Japan and also we will try to other types of we would like to create the confidence building mechanism in the region with small number of nations like Japan, China, Korea but at the same time we would like to increase common stake with China and other members of the region that is to do with trade investment in our set and also energy and environmental cooperation you may not be comfortable but yet I would like to see East Asia summit to be important for that with this concept of multi-layered functions depending on the function we have different national nations that is probably one of them to focus in the future I think it's a question making that mechanism work and it doesn't work at the moment I think it doesn't work at the moment because of its history and structure it needs to be related to the mechanisms that you make it with but this has been serious fun so join me in thanking the family