 Good afternoon. My name is Tony Brown. I'm a senior fellow of the Institute, formerly the chair of a long-running group on the Balkans. And you're very welcome to this session. And the reopening is aware of the debate and discussion on enlargement. I think one needs to start by doing the formal things, asking people to turn their phones to silent. Though the official policy of the Institute is that you're invited to tweet if you feel so inclined during the proceedings. And also to formally note the exits, which are the entrances where you came in is where you go out as quickly as possible. But as I say, this session is bringing us back in the Institute to a discussion on issues surrounding enlargement. Which has been a theme in the Institute very much since the beginning. I participated in a group chaired by the late Brian Lennon, senior, which dealt with enlargement, which meant the arrival of the after-countries in the 90s. And for the first decade or so of this century we had a regular group on the Balkans, which met pretty well monthly and which produced a regular printed report on developments in the Balkans, which came to an end when the Younger Commission said no more enlargement on our watch. And since then we have kept an eye on the developments. But we are now in a situation where there have been certain recent developments which require our attention. We're all welcome to add to the attendance. Just to say that in the last two or three months we have seen a progress report from the European Commission recommending the opening of talks with Northern Macedonia and Albania while there have been, of course, talks going on with Montenegro and Serbia. Then we had the General Affairs Council twice during June and in October facing a new situation brought about by the strong determined opposition of France to the opening of talks. The European Council in October was unable to agree on the opening of talks again in the face of a view taken in Paris. The European Parliament followed up by a resolution calling for talks saying that the failure to open the talks with these countries would have implications for the European Union's credibility in the region. And then most recently, within the last fortnight, the appearance of what is called a non-paper from France suggesting reform of the accession process. So suddenly issues surrounding enlargement as a whole and the Western Balkans region in particular have come on the agenda. And to discuss this we are in a very happy position of having two speakers this afternoon who are precisely the right people to talk to us about this. Professor John O'Brennan, who is the John Monte Chair in European Integration Studies in Mnuth and also the Chair of the Mnuth Centre for European and Eurasian Studies. John's work in this area is I think well known to everyone who has an interest in it. He has written widely on it including publications for the Institute. And Pat Kelly from the Department of Foreign Affairs, who is the Director of Enlargement of the Western Balkans Unit and has served as Ambassador in the region representing Ireland in Hungary, Kosovo, Montenegro, Slovenia and Bosnia, Herzegovina. So these are the people who know and who will have something considered to contribute. It's very important that we get to grips with this issue because it's on the agenda. It's highly politically controversial and it's also very important that we tease out where Ireland stands on this issue as it moves forward. So what we'll do is ask John to speak first, setting the scene for us, looking at the overall picture on the political dimension of it and then ask Pat Kelly specifically to talk to us about the Irish position and where we stand in the debate. And we will hope to have time at the end for some discussion and we'll deal with that when it comes. So John, would you like to start and bring us up to date? Thank you very much Tony and thank you very much to the Institute for inviting me. I want to do just three things today. First of all, ask where are we now with the enlargement process? Secondly, to look at the French proposals, the non-paper and some of the attached elements. And thirdly, to ask, you know, where do we go in the future? So where are we? Well, in 2014 I published a piece in the European Foreign Affairs Review in which I argued that the process was flatlining. Negotiating chapters had been opened but there was no progress being made. This mood of enlargement fatigue had really taken root right across the European Union. It first appeared during the debates around the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 and then it sort of spreads throughout the EU. And that was 2014. I think we're now in a much worse place indeed. And I would say actually that the process has now come to an end. That a process that goes all the way back to the 1960s and has sort of come full circle geographically, the last piece of the European jigsaw as far as I'm concerned is the Western Balkans which remember is geographically surrounded by European Union member states and the EU has said we are perfectly prepared to keep the Western Balkans in a deep freeze in the empty chamber to membership for the indefinite future. Now, where do we begin? Well, I think in February 2018 because that was the point when the European Commission effectively relaunched the process. You may remember that the Commission has the sort of line manager for the process that was charged with monitoring progress going back to the Copenhagen criteria in June 1993. They published annual reports on each candidate and would-be candidate state and a composite report. Now that hadn't happened for a while, but in February 2018 we get a full set of reports and a composite report. And it was really interesting that the language was different to that used by the Commission previously. It was quite stark and confronted a lot of the difficult truths to be confronted. There was a hope, I think, then that the Sofia Summit under the Bulgarian presidency in May 2018 would really deliver the proper sort of oxygen to take the process forward. It didn't. The Sofia Summit was a disaster. And it was a disaster not because of anything the Bulgarians did, but because President Macron effectively said no, not under any circumstances. Are we going to expand further? And I think we've been dealing with that French obstructionism since then. It's got actually worse, in my view, because now it's a kind of open and declared opposition from France whereas it had previously been at least couched with some caveats. Only yesterday, I think, Josep Borrell suggested that Zagreb 2020 would be the summit where we moved things along substantially, where Albania and North Macedonia, on the basis of the Commission's recommendations, could finally get the green light to proceed to open negotiations. But in my view, Zagreb 2020 is just a kind of repackaged Sofia 2018. It didn't happen under the Bulgarian presidency. I don't think it's going to happen next year, not when we have these significant blockages in the Council. So, to the French proposals, there was a lot of criticism, you may remember, at the European Council summit when President Macron opposed the elevation of Albania and North Macedonia. And I think the onus was sort of put on France to actually declare and set out for people what the reforms might be that President Macron suggested were the answer to unblocking the process. But actually, if you look at the proposals, that's really not the case. And I think we have to actually stand back from this and look at France's position on enlargement over many decades. Remember that in the 1960s, it was France that was opposed to the entry of Ireland, Denmark and the United Kingdom. Now, let's give them that. They may well have been right, about at least one of those three. In the 1990s, it was mainly French objections to Poland and to Romania that presented real problems at the later stages of that enlargement negotiation. So there's a kind of consistency, if you like, to the French position on enlargement. So we might suggest that the way they're behaving now really isn't any different to the way that they've behaved previously. But there's a kind of assertiveness and even an aggression, if you like, about it that may have been absent previously. If you look at the French proposals, they are really mostly what the European Commission is doing anyway. And I think what French officials may have done is sort of quickly gone and packaged these things together and tried to present it as a novel and innovative way of unblocking the process. But actually, if you look at the substance of the proposals, the Commission is doing nearly all of those things, whether it's providing financial aid to support structural adjustment, public administration and governance. They make a great play about talking about chapters 23 and 24 of the 35 chapters. These are about justice and rule of law and so on. But the Commission has foregrounded those for many years on the back of the concerns about Bulgaria and Romania that they've been admitted prematurely and so on. So I think if you would stand back from the proposals, what you see really is actually what is happening within the process anyway. The French talk about a graduated process based on real commitments and real delivery. And here I think they have a point in that there does seem to be a real problem. A gap, and academics refer to it as the gap between transposition and implementation of EU rules. And the sense that in Bulgaria, Romania and in Croatia, candidate states committed to things, put lots of things on the statute books, but then either failed to implement those rules or implemented them partially so that the effect really was to damage the overall convergence process. So the French proposal sees a gradual and escalating series of commitments by the candidate states with graduated access then to full EU programs. But we have most of that anyway if you think about the Erasmus program, about free movement and so on. They are all built into the system and their elements of the system as it currently stands. So again, I fail to see what's new or what's novel or anything else. And I have to say, I really think that the proposals from France really were a kind of smokescreen. They were presented to disguise the fact that what this was really about was French objections to six new small states including microstates like Montenegro becoming members of the European Council and becoming peer countries in the Council. So the protection of French power, French prerogatives, French interests within the European Union more generally, I think that's a big part of the explanation for this kind of protracted objection to the process. And I think if you go and read Emmanuel Macron's remarkable interview with the economists three weeks ago, there were all kinds of interesting things in there. His obsession with sovereignty, whether it's at European level or French level, reveals him to be, in my view, not the liberal that he was presented as in 2017, but actually as a kind of hard headed realist. As a very familiar kind of French president actually, a gallist almost to his fingertips. And here I think this is part of the explanation for France's stance towards the Western Balkans that it is about protecting French power and influence within the European Union and not having it diluted at exactly the point when one of the larger member states is leaving. I think that's up for discussion. Some people might think I'm over interpreting, but nevertheless that's the way I see it. The second issue there is the absorption issue. Macron has said consistently that we cannot expand further until the European Union reforms itself. Now this is about the relationship between the widening process and the deepening process. And this notion of absorption capacity again entered the discourse around 2005 alongside enlargement fatigue. And academics have actually paid a lot of attention to this. This was the idea that if you add more member states you're going to potentially impair the functioning of the council in particular. So it's going to be much more difficult to actually get legislation through the system or to agree on anything. And actually the evidence suggests that hasn't been the case. There are colleagues at the University of Leiden, for example, who've done a lot of work on the transposition and implementation of EU rules and what they show is not only did the European Council not come to a standstill, not only did the Council of Ministers not come to a legislative standstill after 04, actually in some ways the functioning of the council improved. So to argue that there is an absorption problem on the European Union side is simply incorrect. It is not supported by evidence in my view. Now the second issue here I think is about the link between the European Union's promise to the candidate states and aspiring candidate states and the degree of reform entered into by those states. Again the research is very clear on this. There's a symbiotic link between the degree to which the European Union's promise is taken seriously and is understood to be credible in the candidate states and the pace and the seriousness of the reform process that they then adopt. In other words, elite actors in Skopje and Tirana and elsewhere are only going to download the Aki Communitar and do what the European Union says needs to be done if they believe that at the end of that process they really will become members. And let's not forget that the promise that the European Union made to the Western Balkans was in Tessaloniki in 2003. We're 16 years on from there. And the Macron proposal and Josep Borrell is essentially that these states would remain in the deep freeze for an indefinite period of time. So there's a problem here about the credibility of the European Union and it has a direct impact I think on the way elite actors behave. I mean since 1995, since Dayton was signed, you've had this, if we just look at Bosnia, this terrible sort of vacuum where these dreadful ethno-national elites continue to be able to mobilize people on the worst kind of basis pretending to be doing what the European Union wants them to be doing but actually behaving in ways that are completely at odds with the kind of objectives of enlargement policy. So in many ways we actually sustain those kind of pathologies and I think it is right to think about them as pathologies because there is this great divide and there's a big, big credibility problem. I think we need to get back to the point made at an earlier stage in this process by Graham Avery, a very seasoned advisor to the commission. He said enlargement is about the us and the future, us. Now I think that is no longer the case within the process and that's a real problem going forward. If we don't believe that the Western Balkan states are part of the European Union that may explain why the current sort of impasse has arisen and it's going to make it very difficult to move out of there. And again we could mention Junker in 2014, I absolutely agree with you Tony. The moment Junker said what he said, he removed any incentive, any of these actors in candidate states had to do the reforms that the European Union needed done. What about the risks then of the European Union sustaining this position? I think they're very significant. First, the potential breakdown in inter-ethnic relations. I don't think I need to spell out what that means in this room. The relationship between Kosovo and Serbia remains extremely difficult. Within North Macedonia the relationship between the Albanian community and the majority of the Macedonian community has the potential to unravel and let's acknowledge the extraordinary efforts made by North Macedonia in particular to conform with European Commission requests. And the response to that has been to essentially kick Zoranza even his colleagues in the teeth. I would make the same argument about Bosnia, the potential resurrection of these kind of imagined communities of greater Albania, greater Serbia, all those things are more likely to materialize if indeed in some cases there's still quite a small risk attached to them if there is no prospect at all of these six entities becoming members. The second is about further economic decline and again the numbers here are really really stark. Two in particular, if you look at unemployment rates right across the region, it is absolutely horrendous. Youth unemployment rates of 60, 70 percent and that has led directly over the last few years to this enormous outflow of people from the region. The population of the entire region is about 18 million people, more or less the same as Romania's, but we've seen probably three or four million people just leave within the last five or six years and it was noteworthy, remember some weeks ago when Tisha mentioned the number of Albanian requests for asylum in Ireland and the number of Georgian requests. It is really, I think, just a reflection of the deep social distress right across the region that so many people are fleeing. Now they have diaspora populations that they can go to, there are all kinds of reasons for thinking it's easier to migrate than before, but people would not be leaving if they saw there was any prospect of a future and so the demographic issue I think is another one that really doesn't get enough attention. The decline, and it's not just limited to the Western Balkans, Bulgaria's population has gone from 9 million to 7 million. You may have seen in the Romanian general election, a big part of the support for Class Johannes was the diaspora, sort of a million people voting for him. Four or five million Romanians have left again over the last 25 years, so that's a real significant problem in the region and I don't think the European position as it stands currently helps, obviously, with that whole range of issues. The third one is geopolitics at the third risk. And this is about the presence in the region and the ambitions of the would-be great powers, Russia, China, Turkey, Saudi Arabia. They're all present in the region to different degrees. The Russian strategy is not necessarily to spend a lot of money but to cause as much disruption as possible to prevent countries joining NATO. For example, they may even have been prepared to stage a coup d'etat in Montenegro. People, I think, might be aware of the parameters of that. So again, if you look at this and refracted through the security issue in Europe, the kind of unraveling of the security order, and here we might mention NATO as well, is another one of these very serious risks that the European Union faces, indirectly maybe, but nevertheless real. And finally, there is the fact that if the Western Balkans is to be kept in this deep freeze, you are not going to change the fundamental parameters of power. So the very rotten people in many of these states who have been maintained in power over a very long period of time, they're going to continue doing exactly what they are doing, mobilizing people on the basis of ethnicity and hatred of the other, rather than on the basis of a more normal politics that centers around all the things that perhaps we take for granted. Okay, so what should we do, finally? Well, firstly, I think we really need to reframe the enlargement process and reframe our thinking about the Western Balkans in more normative terms. Firstly, we should recognize that most of the challenges that I've described are not unique to the Western Balkans. The region is sometimes referred to pejoratively as the underbelly of Europe where all these terrible problems are imported into the European Union. In fact, if you think about transnational organized crime, and this is one of the lenses through which the Balkans is viewed, where are the proceeds of Albanian heroin trafficking groups laundered? It's not in Tirana. It's not in any part of that region. It is probably in London, in Dublin, in Amsterdam, via a whole series of opaque sort of movements to the Seychelles, the Cayman Islands and elsewhere. So we should recognize we are a big part of the problem. And where we kind of neatly separate ourselves and divide ourselves very often in making charges against the region, actually there are member states of the European Union that facilitate transnational organized crime in a multitude of ways. So we are far from innocent here. And again, if you think about the Kinahan Clan and their kind of multinational presence in Europe, how on earth can you talk about Albanian crime camps? It seems to me there are all kinds of contradictions there. So this whole kind of criminal ecosystem is what I think we really need to think about as a collective action problem. I don't know if anybody saw the BBC series Mac Mafia, based on the book by Misha Gleny, who'd written a lot about the buttons in the 90s. It's extraordinary because it just describes this world perfectly. So unless we get serious about money laundering and tackling the root causes of the kind of impunity that these groups enjoy, I think we are not going to get to grips with the problem. And again, if there is an industrial spillage on the Danube in Serbian territory, that's not a wholly Serbian problem. It can very quickly become a Bulgarian, a Romanian problem, and thus a European Union problem. So I think we have to think about all these issues in collective and cooperative terms rather than the kind of adversarial terms that is too often the case currently. So that means getting serious about all these problems, putting an end to the sale of EU passports, for example. And again, we've had reminders in recent days. This is not just about centering Eastern Europe and Southeast Europe. Look at what's been happening in Malta. Look at what's been happening in Slovakia. The murder of journalists, the impunity of criminal groups, very often close to those in power. These are really serious issues and they go well beyond the region. Finally, we have to get serious about tackling rule of law problems. It's not enough to say we shouldn't have let Bulgaria and Romania join. One of the reasons that people in power in Central and Eastern Europe are able to do what they do is because the European Union does not use the tools and the leverage it has at its disposal. Remember, it's only very late in the day that we've begun to get to grips with the problem of rule of law abasement in Hungary and in Poland. The Commission was very reluctant originally to use infringement proceedings. It had to be kind of shamed into using those proceedings. Look at the behaviour of our big political families. Fidesz being protected by the most senior people in the European People's Party. The hideous PSD party in Romania being protected by the socialists in the European Parliament and beyond. And the Liberals protecting Babish's Anno party, the DPC party in Bulgaria, one of the most rocketed and corrupt anywhere in the world. They have to stop this stuff and they have to recognise that there is a responsibility that they have to uphold the values enshrined in Article 2 of the treaties and how on earth can you dictate to candidate states and aspiring states when inside the European Union there is whole-scale abuse of the rule of law. We might in conversation come back to some of those instruments that might begin to tackle that problem. I think actually the juggernaut is being turned around and the EU is slowly getting to grips with the various issues. But we need to do a lot more. Finally, I think we should set a date. Thanks, Johnny. It's an academic, finally. We should set a date. I think we should set a date somewhere around 2026, 2027 on the understanding that all of the countries in the region will enter the European Union at the same time. How do we tackle the kind of problems that I've described? I think what we should be doing is a troika-like presence in every national capital. And we say to each candidate state, there is a quid pro quo here. You are going to have to accept the deep, maybe unwelcome, penetrative presence of the European Union in your capitals. The Commission sends people into every single ministry. And we have a kind of purchase or traction that has been absent or has been unsatisfactory up to this point. And I think actually there would be an acceptance for this kind of approach within the region because the long-term future of the Western Balkans would then be clearly inside the European Union rather than outside. And we have a moral responsibility. Remember, in 1991, as Vukovar was being bombed, Jacques Pou, the Luxembourg Foreign Minister, he says, this is the hour of Europe. It wasn't, we know. There is a very inglorious history there. And I think we do have an enormous responsibility and we should act. Thank you. John, thank you for a very comprehensive, also quite spirited presentation. President Macron is looking for people to respond. Certainly you're giving evidence that response is possible. I would just say I have a long-standing friend in the political world who decided, in relation to issues about timing, that at a certain stage in every one of his presentations, he would use the word pen ultimately. Aha! To give himself another few minutes. You've talked about the broad issues and you brought it home at the end as to the responsibilities of the rest of the Union. So it's very important that we have here a voice from the Department of Foreign Affairs. That is going to talk to us about the Irish position and it's extremely important as we move forward, hopefully to the next stage of Brexit that we pick up something that is being discussed more and more which is about Ireland's alliances and Ireland's partnerships and how we fit into the membership and the wider family of the Union. So part of it to you is to pick up the Irish dimension of this important subject. Thanks very much, Tony, and good afternoon to you all. It's a pleasure to be here. It's a pleasure to take part in this extremely timely discussion on enlargement. Like Tony, I'll confine myself to three basic points and I'll try and keep it short so there's enough time for Q&A afterwards. Firstly, just to recall why Ireland is so positive and supportive of the enlargement process. Secondly, just to briefly outline how we stand in relation to the current on-pass as it were in relation to North Macedonia and Albania. And then thirdly, just to talk a bit more about our approach or attitude to generally towards the Western Balkans. Why are we pro-enlargement? I mean, I won't dwell overly on this. I know there's a few former colleagues here who are well-versed. There's no point in teaching your granny to suck eggs. But essentially it can be summed up in four words as to why we are a pro-enlargement member state. Fairness, stability, EU credibility and prosperity. They are the four tenets which we have which guide our enlargement policy. Running shouldn't briefly. Fairness, we have always taken the approach that the EU should be a club which any aspiring member state can join so as long as they fulfill all the conditions and that's the basic approach we've always taken. We've approached that position in a way that reflects our own experience. I mean, Ireland has benefited hugely from EU membership, has been transformative and we feel very much that we shouldn't withhold that opportunity to other member states which could simply benefit from becoming members of the European Union. In terms of stability, I mean, I think when we talk about enlargement now we essentially are talking about the Western Balkans region but of course we have to remember that it isn't just the Western Balkans and there is a seventh country in the stable as it were, Turkey which is of course the longest aspirant to EU membership. But I mean, there is now a clear distinction I think between the Western Balkans 6 as it were and Turkey. So in terms of talking about stability I'm talking about the stability of the Western Balkans region because it's still a very volatile region. 25 years on from the lessons between the end of the Yugoslav Wars there is no guarantee that the progress which has been made over the past two decades won't be reversible. I mean, in fact, I'll assign it to the country that could very easily go into reverse. So for that point of view it's very important to maintain the European perspective for the Western Balkans nations because we realise that ultimately the only best way to ensure stability in that part of Europe is to encourage these countries to make the necessary reforms so that they can join and then be locked in to EU membership to be the ultimate guarantee of democracy and rule of law in those countries. In terms of EU credibility I mean, this again goes to EU strategic interests. I mean, obviously Tony is referring to the Tesla Anker summit and the commitments we made to the region back in 2003. Obviously EU credibility has been damaged in recent weeks by what's happened to North Macedonia and Albania but Ireland bleeds very much that it's in the EU strategic interest to expand and to incorporate the Western Balkan countries ultimately. If the EU doesn't or if it isn't serious that it's enlargement perspective for these countries then EU leverage will diminish very rapidly and I know from my own time when I was Ambassador Montenegro the head of the EU delegation there was this kind of on pass because it would directly affect how we could manage the process of accession in Montenegro and that would result in damaging the leverage that the EU has over Montenegro and I think that probably is coming to pass now. So we have to kind of maintain our perspective because other countries will step in. There are varying views about the extent of the influence of other actors in this region but they are there. There's no doubt about it. China is probably the most obvious in the EU but Russia clearly have their interests Turkey clearly has great interest in the region and of course the Gulf countries as well. Then in terms of the final issue, prosperity again ultimately Tony alluded to some of the problems which the Western Balkans face so it's in very much our interest to help these countries to reform and to become functioning market economies which can ultimately be integrated into the European internal market and in that way it will ensure greater prosperity for all and there will be opportunities for Irish companies. That in a nutshell is why we raise much support to the enlargement perspective of the Western Balkans countries. We're not naive. Our bottom line is that countries have to fulfill their criteria to become members. We're not going to compromise on conditionality. I think certainly in terms of some of the newer member states we have been very vocal in terms of expressing our views that if there's any backsliding or failing to fully uphold EU values then we will be vocal. That's certainly the case in relation to Hungary and Poland. Certainly in relation to enlargement we expect those countries that wish to become members to make serious efforts to carry out the necessary reforms and to seriously uphold EU values in terms of rule of law and democracy. That's basically the Irish approach outlined in terms of the current difficulties the French veto last month obviously we'll make clear the time or our deep disappointment about that decision. We still strongly support the commission proposal to open that session negotiations and we very much hope that that can still take place in the coming months. Obviously Tony has expressed a degree of skepticism about the possibility but I think we would still feel that a green light for opening negotiations is not possible and we would have hopes that certainly in the first half of 2020 at such a step can be taken. Obviously that brings us to the French position and to the non-paper what we've been clear all along is that we're happy to consider the proposals which France has made. Their demand at this stage is that the proposals should be reformed. The papers obviously won't be closely looked at this stage. Undoubtedly you can always improve things and I think we're largely guided by the response of the commission and certainly we know that the commission are quite happy to again review the enlargement process and see how it can be improved and they'll come forward with proposals to reform the base as to how the enlargement process can be reviewed but we're quite clear that this has to be separate from the issue of opening accession negotiations. We can't have any linkage between the two matters and that is an argument we will continue to make and we will hope it will influence the future presidency and we hope it will inform future decision making within the council. I think having you know France is obviously the chief skeptic in this regard they're not alone, I mean Denmark and Netherlands are also somewhat skeptical but France is very much in the driving seat as it were but I think France is also conscious that Dervito last month was something which I think they were surprised by the degree of reaction that it met and the reality is that most member states are supportive of enlargement and the enlargement perspective. There really are no more than probably three countries which are opposing this so even if you are a big country that's not a comfortable position to be within council and to be blocking the vast majority of member states so I think France will reflect on the debate over the past month as I say the commission will conform with proposals next month and we hope that will allow for a reasons discussion on how we can improve the process but it will have to be separate from the opening of accession negotiations and we'll see how France will react I mean it is very much I think a matter which is decided at the very highest level in France and I don't think that's going to change but I don't think that are supportive of enlargement are going to change their views either and I think certainly the new commission will also continue well it would be interesting to see but I mean certainly they have been making noises on enlargement we now have a Hungarian commissioner for the enlargement process and Hungary has a very distinct position on enlargement which is basically that they would like all starting Montenegro and Serbia in tomorrow everyone else ASAP now that's the Hungarian position at one end of the spectrum France is at the other end but certainly it would be interesting to see how Mr Varaj pursues his mandate over the next five years in fact yesterday he stated that his goal at this stage was to have at least one new member of state admitted before his terminal office ends in five years time so we'll see if that's perhaps realistic or not so that's where we are at the moment in the accession process we're not I wouldn't say we're overly confident but we're not pessimistic either that we can't get it back on track in the first half of 2020 just briefly on Ireland's position generally in relation to western Balkans it's obviously it's an area where our representation is quite in we don't actually have any direct embassy presence in any of the six western Balkan countries are present we're aware of this gap in our network as well and it's something that's been looked at in the context of global Ireland which as you know the Tishik and the government are actively pursuing trying to build up Ireland's diplomatic presence around the world so we are reviewing our approach to the western Balkans region it's a region which we have made a major contribution to over the past 20-25 years and that leads to our peacekeepers and we continue to have troops serving in Bosnia and Kosovo also to remember the Garde as well we've been active in the move of all missions in Bosnia and Kosovo similarly and there is certainly from my own experience having been ambassador to three of the six Canada's countries there is a very warm disposition towards Ireland in the region and certainly I think there's much we can build on so it's a vision that's been actively looked at within the department and that's the area hopefully in the context of global Ireland that we can step up our level of engagement with the western Balkans in the coming months and certainly we will continue to prioritise the enlargement because ultimately we feel it's very much in the EU's own interests that the EU expand and that there isn't a limited set at this stage on the number of EU members Good, thank you that was a very clear statement of the position and of the understanding of the problems and the time issues the idea of the new commissioner saying he hopes for one to get in within the next five years leads to the thought of there's ambition for you but it's a statement of reality I've got some time for questions will conditions apply state your name and if there's a relevant affiliation or interest that would be helpful and this session is on the record quite often here the discussion is off the record but for this purpose we're on the record Thank you thank you to the speakers for understanding the enlargement I just want to I remember the where is Germany I had a a and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and democracy, as the home of democracy, should have every entitlement become a member. But again, in the 1990s and late 2000s, maybe for reasons of geography and of trade and some degree of self-interest, Germany was very much champion of enlargement. And it could be argued was the big winner of enlargement if you look at the range of activities of German companies. But more recently, it's been much more schizophrenic, in my view, where it's generally been more favorable than France. It's become a lot more reluctant, I think partly because of the huge wave of migration in 2015 and the pressure this has put on Mrs. Merkel in Berlin and in many of the individual lander as the AFD has made ground. Because you know, many people, when they look at the Western Balkans, they just look at more refugees and kind of nothing else. I think that's part of it. So these currents of nativism, sovereignism, whatever you want to call them, they're as important in Germany as in France. And I don't discount that in the French case that that's part of Macron's kind of calculus when he looks at this. The German support now also requires the support of the Bundestag. And that was not the case previously. And I think that's just one more kind of complicating factor that's made Germany a bit more cautious than it might have been previously. But even there, I think, there is a bit of frustration with Macron that he has been so insistent on this. And again, that could be because German interests are more kind of apparent in the media. But I think there's generally a kind of normative disposition in Germany. Germany was divided and then was united after 1989. A lot of people, when they look at the German position on recognizing Croatia, they think, oh, it's because they were Catholic and part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. No, I think most Germans kind of honorably looked at what was happening and thought, we have the right to self-determination, so do the Croats. So I think Germany has much more in this to some degree. But they will be very important, particularly the next German president. Whether Merkel is still there or not, they're going to play very important role. Because if we go back to the end stage of the Eastern enlargement talks, there was a complete impasse. The French really feared Poland having access to cap funds and the displacement of France within the pecking order. And it took a last minute meeting. So you're absolutely right. At the very top level between Schirach and Schroeder to resolve that problem before the negotiations could absolutely be concluded. So I think Germany will be very important. Absolutely. Yeah, just I mean, I think absolutely. I mean, for Chancellor Merkel, I mean, you can't emphasize too much how much the concept of European unity means to her. I know this from having been an ambassador in Hungary. For her, and I'm personally for the government she's led, the idea that Europe has to kind of think about its own Western northern neighborhood. But I mean, that's taken into account the views of all member states and has to overcome the divisions. I mean, you know, Germany genuinely does not like it is to functionally EU. And it does not like divisions in the EU. And I think it's part of its mandate or its mission to sort of try and stop such divisions where it can. So I think very much that will continue to drive Angela Merkel as long as she's in office. And I just, you know, delaying too much longer. I mean, I think it's also important to realize that in terms of Albania and North Macedonia, the Bundestag took a position where they more or less said we will give a green light to North Macedonia. We will give a green light to Albania but with conditions. Now, that position obviously was not sort of acceptable or certainly wasn't the basis for an agreement in the council last month. But I think it's one that still holds. And I think, you know, don't take your eye off it because I think ultimately it may come back into play at some stage next year because I think, I don't think Germany is going to back down. I mean, certainly privately they are saying they are certainly still very positive about the knowledge and I think, you know, let's face it, Berlin and Paris don't like being a slug of heads either. So I think France will have to recognize that. Marie, thank you. Thank you both very much. That's really very interesting. I'm just going to say that was an advocate question. Marie, not to introduce yourself. Sorry, Marie, not to introduce you. To the man at the street, it just looks that this has not worked very well in terms of bringing countries that have difficulties into the EU. We have Cyprus, we brought in, out of our day, and the whole picture might be in, but still isn't. There are five countries that still don't recognize. Five EU countries that don't recognize possible. Things have gone downhill once we brought in Hungary and Poland and the world is all there. It has gone worse rather than better, which would have been the whole. And in Romania, there is an enormous struggle to get straightened out and in terms of corruption. So what could we say to people who, not looking so closely at the political reasons, which are overwhelming, I don't accept, what would be, how could we persuade people to bring in six board and states to the EU? Firstly, we were at the Bosnia of Europe in 1972. We had a income per head of 50% of the then community average. We had a conflict on our island that was burning up literally by the day, and yet the European Union invited us to become members. So I just don't accept the argument that there are too many risks. And if you look at the kind of region as part of Europe and the problems of the region as European problems, then I think you kind of reframe it decisively. On Hungary, Poland, the problem there, in my view, wasn't about EU policy not working after a certain point in time. It was because of the deliberate choices made by elites in Warsaw and in Budapest. The aesthetic of conditionality wore off. Now the EU says, well, we didn't have any levers to try and put pressure on either of those states, but it was the deliberate choices of their elites that have brought them to this point in time and combined with that, the lack of instruments on the European Union side for tackling the democratic backsliding, which is, this is a full lurch towards autocracy. We should be kind of clear about what's happening. There's nothing kind of incremental about it. It's quite brazen. And when the Hungarian foreign minister where the new commissioner says he wants to bring in new member states, they do. They want authoritarian creeps like themselves beside them in the European Council. That's what they want. And they're quite brazen again about saying this kind of openly. But Vucic is somebody they really admire. If you do the circuit in Brussels, Vucic has a very good reputation. He shouldn't have. I mean, the memetic kind of qualities, if you compare Orban and Vucic are kind of extraordinary. So again, I think we do well to not separate the region kind of mentally and cognitively. And if we do think about Europe inclusively, I think we come to very different conclusions about the range of problems. And if the problems are specific to Hungary and Poland or to Romania, there are solutions for these things. For example, linking the dispersal of structural funds to rule of law performance, which is something that is now seriously on the agenda, supported by Germany. And many, many other member states. The MFF negotiations are incredibly difficult. We know that. This is one added element that's going to present more difficulty, but I think we have to do it. And if we do it, then I think that will have a very chasening kind of impact. In addition to that, the new position of European public prosecutor, I think potentially, is going to be very important. It's really interesting that it is a Romanian national Laura Caudreau de Covesi. A heroic figure in my view, for standing up to the crooks in her own country. For that, they opposed her nomination to this position. Now, this is an opt-in agency. I think it's going to become a permanent agency, and it'll become a really important body for fighting the kind of corruption in the dispersal of EU funds that's being associated with Orban and his cronies, for example. So I think there are mechanisms. There is a lot of, you know, I think there are mechanisms. There is leverage there, along with the use of infringement proceedings. If you just notice how much more willing, after the article seven, procedures were opened against Poland in late 17 and against Hungary in the autumn of last year, the commission is using infringement proceedings much more frequently. And I think that's another way in which we, but those are things that are internal to the EU. I don't think really that we can put all of that on the candidate states and say that they are kind of perennially diseased and we just shouldn't bother with it. I know that's not what you're saying, and I wouldn't dare to put those kind of words in your mouth, but I think that is a common kind of view. Yeah, and just briefly, the economic argument as well, I mean, sort of, you know, in Ireland, you know, as you've already said, it's not a matter of import, it's stability, it's rather a matter of exporting stability and the reality is that, I mean, unless we hold out the prospect for these countries to eventually become EU member states and to have, you know, to become more prosperous, we will continue to have basically the brain drain from central and eastern Europe to western Europe. I mean, the reality is that, you know, it's still a problem in those, the newer member states, I know you as well, but ultimately we have the EU has to come up with instruments which will ensure that there is convergence. And I mean, you know, from our own experience, that is what can happen then. Obviously it becomes more difficult when you have a larger union, but I mean, it is not from a challenge, but I think the only way, if you want to stop migration from these countries, and you know, to Ireland or to wherever it does, you know, you have to give people a reason to stay in their countries and to have a life before them. Ultimately, the accession process and membership is the best way of guaranteeing that. I'll take two more questions, because we're running out of time. Thank you very much. John Weir, a member of the UN, said that we were doing most of it. And when people talk about enlargement, it seems to me that there's an unspoken assumption that what we are talking about is the union increasing inside. In other words, the number of member states increases, the population increases, but otherwise the union stays the same. And the assumption is that if African countries accept the company criteria, that they will join in a seamless way and nothing will change in that number. But of course, experience shows that that isn't for reality. And 2005 or 2004, the accession through a lot of problems that should have been adhered to, solved by the accession process of the world. And of course, we talked about some of them, a few minutes ago. So it seems to me that in any discussion of large amount, we should be asking the question, what impact would this have on the union and possibly the union that emerges with enlargement look like and how would it function? And it seems to me, although I don't know if it's like information on this, it seems to me that that is what's not wrong with union, is posing a question perhaps in a different way, but essentially asking, what would the impact of enlargement mean on the union? And John Belly said that he was concerned about the impact of French influence. That seems to me a whole new addition that's going to come to hold. And indeed, it's one that we should be asking as well, because we are facing a movement that reaches much more to the east than to the connoisseur. The six new United States, which is a very limited relation, and it's interesting that having opened 25 venues in other nations about two years, we haven't yet opened a single one in any of the accession countries. So that suggests to me that our national interest in countries is still quite slashed. There's also a question about our money, because these states are much poorer than we're in average. They will have to require a lot of transfers in Europe where they've got money to come from by seeing that moment, the debates under the next budget, which are much more needed. So I think there are a lot of questions and questions in union that need to be answered. I accept everything that John has said about the modern imperative, the practical imperative of helping the country, but we don't have time to take a week in the new process. Sorry, could you... He was right at the end. Yeah, he was, yeah. Okay. Two very quick questions. Sorry. I'm sorry. So, two quick questions in relation to some of my plans under the Tour de France recently. For example, I thought you had a ticking time bomb, not very original, but this was in reference to returned jammies, whatever, which are much more in the room, than there are in France. But just that, one question is to what extent is this ample and to a more general view of moderation as a media consequence of EU enlargement impacting on policy and then more specifically particularly the body cake, how is EU lack of engagement actually creating and kind of fueling a ticking time bomb of a much more kind of local origin in terms of exacerbating international tensions, those kind of imagined communities with genocide denial in full swing on certain side. Another prize being awarded to a genocide denial? Absolutely, absolutely. And also the notification of pro-war criminals to mark the anniversary of a certain person's demise. So on those two issues which have been really enlightening. Okay. Do you want to go first? When you go first on this one. These one on the two. Well John, in terms of your comments about again, you can certainly put that argument that surely this is what you want to lead to maybe in a way sort of a poorer EU given that you have missing small and at the moment poorer member states but you know I think in a way enlargements obviously you can never completely put a a terminus or a limit to us but I mean to some extent at least six countries are I think somewhat different from everyone else. I think Turkey now because I think there is a clear distinction now between the Western Balkans and Turkey in that regard. So I think Europe does have an obligation to these countries and I think if we turn our back on them then they will just become the negative trends that are there and some of them will just become far worse and ultimately it will come back to bite us and I think that's the bottom line so it's of course it's going to require more resources and of course we're now net contributor but I think the teaching has been very clear now about the budget that we need to sort of stop looking at this really in kind of accountancy terms we have to realise what the benefits of the EU are and certainly in terms of the way we're approaching the current budget negotiations that's what we're saying that people have to realise that okay we're paying more to the EU but look at what the EU has bought us over the past 45 years and if it means somewhat even higher level of contribution in future years in terms of whether we reduce migration greater opportunities for other companies in that part of Europe so I think that's how we would approach it on Bosnia I mean briefly I think it was unfair characterization by President Macron of the country I think for all reasons kind of keep a close eye on what's happening and he's now very active in terms of kind of counter-terrorism and security and sort of it was it didn't really properly take account of the overall situation within Bosnia maybe President Macron was just expressing frustration with the the fact that the data and agreement is far from a perfect peace agreement and has led to internal difficulties in terms of its own internal governance but I think you know that in a way it was kind of a caricature because when you travel in the western Balkans I mean and Bosnia and Kosovo and all the rest I mean it's a different form of Islam it's a secular Islam and of course there are others who are trying to work against this but I mean for Europeans in that part of the continent who are of those things they have a totally different approach to kind of governance and the kind of basic way a country should be run in two sizes yeah firstly on the money we're talking about a region of 18 million people this isn't difficult in financial terms the kind of supports that they might get and the real financial supports will only kick in once they're around the table at the European Council in the late 90s when I was writing my PhD I did a comparison of the amount of subvention coming into Ireland the other countries within the European Union and we were getting proportionately vastly more than Poland was or any of those states it was only when they actually got to negotiate the MMF that they could potentially redirect money and actually you can see now in the various iterations of the MFF there's money being taken away from some Central East European countries some elements of the budget and there's a kind of rebalancing going on but let's be honest I think we're at a point in time where we really need to stand back and ask what is the EU budget for this is part of that debate I think but that's not going to change and I think there's every argument for putting in more subvention but we should also be very careful about what the EU budget is and what the EU budget is and what the EU budget is and what the EU budget is but we should also be very careful about where this money is being spent because it also does to go into Brona's second question it does definitely fuel some of the underlying actors capacity to be disruptors so the very people sometimes that we have to entrust reforms to and the very people that are the biggest problem, the biggest transgressors remember when we were negotiating with Milo Yokanovich who was allegedly allegedly at one time the biggest cigarette smuggler in Europe what do you do? I'm Bosnia Macron's comments were just dreadful and that was the entire focus I think for unsettled reasons in Bosnia he seemed to be, I think this was pitched to some degree at a domestic audience but particularly unaware of all the extraordinary number of homegrown jihadists that France has produced over the years and he might well be better off looking at the reasons for that production line of jihadists and how French state policy actually contributes to producing all of that. There are pockets of salafism not so much in Bosnia, I think Kosovo is actually much more dangerous potentially for a variety of reasons but he overstated the case spectacularly. Bosnia has not a jihadist time bomb, again for the reasons that Pat has set out as well and is the EU helping to fueling problems you know the old adage if you are not part of the solution you're part of the problem I think it absolutely applies here and I think everything should start from just a very simple formulation that the western Balkan countries and western Balkan citizens are European that has to be our start point and our finishing point Good, that also has to be our finishing point I thought that would be a nice piece we rehearsed that before I want to thank John and Pat for giving us a great deal of insight and bringing it up from the beginning by bringing it up to date and also I think both in what they have said and in the questions that they provoked giving the institute something seriously to think about at one stage we had a systematic approach to talking about enlargement of the Balkans this was overtaken by other events but I think this is back on the agenda now and not just on a technical agenda about talks but because of the latter part of our discussion because it does touch on very fundamental issues about the nature of the union and about the unions placed in the world particularly when we talk about relations with Russia, the China issue and so on this is all encapsulated in this part of Europe so there's a lot to think about I just, when the money question came up what occurred to me was the recent council debates initial debates on the MFF where 1.3 was being talked about and then 1.2 was being talked about and then 1.1 was being talked about and it would grave danger of breaking the 1% thing going down so there's a huge issue there about resources as John said as to where they're spent but that is for another day and I hope that we will be able to organise that other day and other relevant days thank you all for coming apologies to those who I got the impression were beginning to develop questions and we'll have to wait for another day thanks again to our speakers thank you for coming and as usual we've opened up probably more than we've closed today but that's what the thing tack is about so thank you all thanks John