 Ladies and gentlemen, good evening. I am a Ihsan Genoun, international relations specialist at the OCP Policy Center, a think tank here in Morocco and also one of the partners of the World Policy Conference. I'm very delighted to have on stage Mr. Tatsu, who will be reporting on the workshop on energy as well as Mr. Jean-Claude Richet, who will be reporting the workshop on economy and finance. I will be doing the reporting of the Africa workshop myself. So I'm very delighted to give you the floor, Mr. Tatsu. Do you like to start? Mesivian, bonjour. I'm very happy to talk about energy and climate change. It's a long story, already talked 100 times, but we need 100 times more to talk. I'm very fortunate to say we have a wonderful debate engaging panelist audience on imminent challenges like very hot tissue like U.S.-China trade tensions or Iranian sanctions or short-term and long-term agenda on energy security and sustainability. Above all, our fight against climate change. Let's summarize wonderful debate into just eight points. Number one, recognition of big picture where we are sitting, how things may evolve. Point number one, United States is turning into undisputed leader of oil and natural gas. They are champion of fossil world, fossil fuel world. On the contrary, China is switching to green. They became champion of renewable energy development. Three, solar PV is on track to be the cheapest source of new electricity. Absolutely, some are less than 3% per kilowatt in the main places. Number four, electrification. This is already a very key words today. Electrification will be accelerated in various front, air conditioning, mobility, and digitalization. This is a big point, number one. Number two, about U.S.-China trade tension. We approached from various perspective and the conclusion was tension between two countries will not have big impact on energy trade because U.S. gas and oil has many outlets, not to say of Europe or Asia Pacific, and China is small area for import. And China has many places to import oil and natural gas. Russia, Middle East, Asia countries, and even domestic energy sources. Number three, China is greening very fast its energy system, and that will be accelerated. But it is not just people government policy because of huge market, the size matters, and many players actively competing with each other. Entrepreneurs or big companies, national companies as well. For example, clean tech companies in China was roughly about 2700, 2005. It grew up to well over 50,000 in 2015 and already continued to grow. And China is in the process of launching the world's largest carbon market. Actually, my friend is designing this very carefully and that will be most effective and the largest. Again, the size matters. Number three, over 50% of newly registered EVs in 2017 are all in China. Again, size matters and policy and entrepreneurship matters in greening. Point number four, very topic issue. We discussed one belt, one road here, and there is an energy dimension on that issue. But the story is quite interesting. 130 new coal-fired power plants is in the process of building under Chinese leadership along Belt and Road region. 130 new coal-fired power plants. And just looking back short history, from year 2000 to 2016, well over 240 coal-fired power plants has been built. Under the Chinese leadership, finance, and technology, again in the region. So ironically, China is greening at all and blacking abroad. Number five, impact of Iranian sanction. This is really a hot issue. And we had someone from Aramco. We have someone from Total and Good Exchange. The conclusion was that even though the US pressure could be very tight, China may have a way to set aside all these sanctions and can import directly from China by quoting in Liminbi, not dollars. But in the worst case scenario, if Middle Eastern tension may go up, and geopolitics may override rationally of everyone, there could be a risk of missile attacks against state performance, which could increase skyrocket oil prices again. Nightmare could happen because 20% or more of oil is traded through that homes. Straight and roughly 38% of LNG should have, again, come from that outlet. Number five, number six, there is an optimistic view on transport electric sectors. Because of increased deployment of investment and technology into number one, battery to be mounted on the car. And mass production is making every cost lower. And plus, favorable policy environment. However, and there is a big fiber, some are intervened. Look, there are so many IEC inter-combustion LNG cars are deployed far bigger than the EV. And once they are deployed on the road, they will stay alive at least seven, eight, nine years in some European countries over 15 years. So it's very difficult to replace all these. So I proposed, why not convert used cars into electric vehicles? Cost is much cheaper. And if you recall, wonderful experience of wedding of Henry, Prince Henry, he drove blue jaguar out of the window castle. It was converted electric vehicle. Why don't take the example from this and then compete complement the new EVs and converted EVs? Number seven, nuclear. Nuclear is an issue we have to tackle is talking about climate change energy. But conclusion was, nuclear could be the most costly sources for electricity if it is newly built nuclear power plants. Because of intensified security safety requirements after Fukushima. Only way out would be generation four that is small and medium scale nuclear power plants. But still, SMR is not easy to build. Last point, technology. We always dream about technology. Today, there are many technologies we haven't dreamt of 10 years ago, 20 years ago. So why not new technology surprise us in coming 10 to 20 years and make revolution after revolution? But for that purpose, we recognize two important things. That value of death for technology. First value is technical value to develop into really usable technology. Number two, the financial value of death. Even though there is a demo planned, if no one invests for commercialization, it won't be there. So why not overcome all these? But bottom line is it is a matter of mindset for people because climate change is my mind. So if men don't think that way, women don't think that way, it won't be solved. So last conclusion is now we have plenty of agenda to discuss next year in this World Policy Conference. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Mr. Tatsu. So moving on to the Africa workshop. So the Africa workshop started by drawing up some of the main challenges that are at stake on the African continent. And we identified three of them. So on the one hand, there is obviously providing more opportunities of employment to the growing, to the youngest population in Africa. Africa's population is getting younger and younger, and this is an issue that should be considered because otherwise it comes with some consequences that I will come on later on. Also, there is the issue of managing the economic sovereignty of the states. And with this comes the need for a greater economic integration on the regional and the continental level. So on the economic aspects, some of the main challenges that remain is that Africa as a continent is still quite fragmented. And we can see that because most of the inter-African trade only represents a small share of the global trade at the world level. So African states do not trade enough with each other. And this is because there are some barriers to that. And there are barriers that needs to be lifted in order for the African countries to start trading with each other. In addition to that, we also pointed out that most of the trade in between the African states is composed of manufacturing as well as agriculture, where we as on the outside of the continent, it is mainly under the form of industry and natural resources. So African countries need to bring their efforts together in order to increase the inter-African trade. So obviously the solutions to that is greater integrations. But there are some hiccups that block this regional integrations. And as the prime minister has explained, the transaction costs for trade are still very high in Africa. They're still really high and they undermine the potential of Africans to trade between each other. And they are the highest in the world, and this is still a main challenge for them. There is recently the African Continental Free Trade Agreement that was brought up. It was praised as a great initiative to address the issue of the need for greater integrations. However, there are some technicalities that block this agreement from being properly implemented. And this was pointed out by Dr. Dadoosh, who explained that there are three main challenges to the African Continental Free Trade Agreement. First of all, there is the need for more inclusiveness of this agreement. Why? Because not all of the countries have signed, probably 45 or 46 countries have signed this agreement. Nigeria has not signed the agreement yet, which is one of the biggest economies on the continent. And although it's said that it will implement it, it still has not done so. And Nigeria still has some complex political economy, so we are waiting to see what will happen out of this. The second technicality of this agreement is that they need to explain better what they mean by liberalizing 90% of trade. Do they mean 90% of the volume of trade, which is fine? Or do they need 90% of the tariff lines? In that case, it could be problematic because countries can find ways to navigate around it and skip some of the terms of the agreement. And finally, the other issue of this agreement is the rules of origins. The rules of origins, and we see that very often at the WTO, many FTAs are abused because people change the origins of the product. And so the rules of origins really should be strictly regarded in order for the African continent to free trade agreement not to be abused. So those are some of the economic challenges that still exist on the continent. We also had the perspective of Europe with the minister, Elisabeth Kigu, who explained to us where Europe stands in the middle of this. So she stressed the need for Europe to rethink partnerships together with Africa for a partnership that is more of a win-win partnerships that's more collaborative. And she also stressed the responsibility of the European continent to rethink its perception of the African continent. Europe has to counter the populist discourse because the populist discourse is gaining more importance. With this, obviously it will lead to Europe closing its borders to Africa. If Europe closes its borders to Africa, obviously Africa will have to seek new partners. It will have to seek new partners for addressing its need for infrastructure development. And this is something that could be really problematic if the populist fear dominates on the European continent. So there was also in the middle of this, economy, partnerships comes a very important point which is the migration, the human mobility capital. And this has been addressed as well during the workshop because with an increase in growth, the human mobility will necessarily increase. People are seeking new opportunities abroad and the continent should be ready to welcome those people who can contribute to the growth of their continent as well. And this was also brought up because we need to understand that migrants do not come without, the migrants should not be perceived as a threat but rather as an opportunity to contribute to the growth of the European continents but also to the African continent. Now moving on to an example of how African countries can work together. And here I would like to bring up one concrete example that was explained to us by Chairman and President Mustafa Tehrab from the involvement of OCP Group in Africa. So OCP Group is involved with different African partners, with different African countries and beyond just selling fertilizer, it actually works with the locals in order to adapt the products to meet the benefit and to meet the specificities of African soils. And this comes with some work that has been done on the field with many fertility maps that were conducted in order to understand the specificities of every soil and to produce fertilizers that are adaptable to the needs of those soils. And with this, they brought up very innovative ways to collaborate with African countries. So depending on the different natural resources that every country has, the Moroccan experience comes with phosphates and fertilizers, while the others come with other components that are then brought together in order to present products that are adaptable. And so in this, it's a great example again whereby the African countries can collaborate together to address the need for more fertilizers, for the agriculture instead of going abroad and seeking products from outside the continent. And finally, just to bring up another point on the free trade agreement, Prime Minister Léon-Nilson also pointed out the fact that in Benin, for example, 7.5% of the GDP comes from taxes that are on exports. And this is huge and this undermines the production and undermines the local production and is a barrier to the production going outside of the country. So this is also something that maybe the continent has to address. And finally, I would like to end up on a note that was brought up by former Prime Minister Ademirim Dizalein from Ethiopia, who said that Africa is not a battleground for the other powers. Africa, we should stop with this dichotomy of Africa, Europe, or Africa, China, or Africa, United States. Africa is a growing power. It has its place on the global scene and should be addressed as a partner like the others. It is not a field for battle for the foreign partners. Thank you very much. Mr. Trichet? So as far as our workshop was concerned, we had the benefit of having speakers. I will mention them and the main approach that they had, either KIAO on multidimensional vulnerabilities of the economic and financial system, a vision coming also from China, Jean-Claude Meier, a vision coming from Europe on the risks of a new global financial crisis, Jeff Frieden on the political economy of global economic and financial issues, the world over in time of populism in particular. Daniel Dianou on global economic and financial fragilities in the emerging countries as well as in the global economy. As you see, a lot of concentration on risks and vulnerabilities, by the way. Motoshige Ito on the lessons of the Japanese crisis experience, which came before the big crisis of 2007-2008, and Bertrand Badré on the necessary reset of the financial sector to address, particularly environmental issue. I would say that as an introduction of our very, very rich discussion, we are all incorporating the fact that we are living in a new world of strong criticism of old multilateralism, which is coming, I would say, from everywhere, by the way, coming from the emerging world, criticizing the governance of the advanced economy, and the fact that the G7 passed the baton to the G20 is, of course, a case in point. It comes out of the dramatic crisis where the advanced economy proved to be very clumsy, obviously, because the epicenter of the crisis was in the advanced economy. It comes from the public opinion in the advanced economy themselves, with strong criticism of previous leadership, previous, I would say, governments and the clumsiness of these governments in the crisis, or leading to the crisis. And I would say more generally, it comes also from some executive branches, the US being a case in point where the old multilateralism is also criticized by those who were absolutely key, of course, in running the old multilateralism. So it, I would say, is making an environment which is very, very interesting in a way, but also very negative on global cooperation at this stage. Now, to expose what we have discussed, I would concentrate first on the issue of the risks and vulnerabilities of the global economy and global finance. First, then I will concentrate a little bit on the political economy of the financial sector and of the appreciation of what should be done or not been done at a global level, but particularly, of course, if I may, in Europe and in the United States of America, but true also in the emerging economy. And then I will mention a number of points that we discussed are clearly important, and we are coming out of the discussion itself. But we are not necessarily directly linked to the two previous elements. So on the appreciation on the risks and vulnerability, as I already said, there were clearly more interventions and more remarks, more questions on the vulnerabilities and on the risks than on the assets associated with the present situation. If I sum up a very rich discussion, I would say that maybe we could separate the implicit systemic vulnerability that we are observing today in the system, the global system, and the trigger for a possible explosion. So the trigger would not necessarily represent an explosion by themselves, but they could put the explosive, if there is an explosive, in bursting out and create a big crisis. The probability of the future crisis being as demanding and as dramatic as the last great crisis that we had to cope with was more or less implicitly very high in the minds of many participants in this workshop, which has to be mentioned as an element of, I would say, full understanding of the risks that are at stake. If I concentrate a moment on the trigger very rapidly, I would say that you have a lot of mention of geopolitical risks, a lot of mentions on the fact that at a time, we will probably have a big correction on stock markets in many economies, but particularly perhaps in the US economy as a possible trigger for major difficulties. Of course, the less accommodating monetary policy and the end of extraordinary unconventional measures in particular, which is already implemented in the US and will be in Europe very soon, was also one possible trigger. And I could list a number of other, but I will stop there. As regards the vulnerability of the system itself, I would say, first, the criticism of multilateralism in a global economy and a global finance system that are highly integrated and where contagion is extremely likely, as we observed in the last crisis, but would be, even in my opinion, more extraordinary rapid in the possible new crisis. We have the overindatedness of the global economy and global finance, which has been underlined by many interventions. The proportion of data outstanding public and private over the global GDP has augmented after the crisis, as it did before the crisis, which is highly paradoxical because there was a consensus to recognize that the level of leverage and the overindatedness of the economies was one of the main goals for the big crisis we had to cope with. But again, leverage has continued to augment after the crisis, and of course, the leverage has augmented less than before in the advanced economy and much more than before in the emerging economy, which has to be underlined, but which is not particularly reassuring in a way because it has continued to augment, all taken into account private and public debt in the advanced economy, namely putting themselves in a situation of vulnerability that is at least as vulnerable as the day before the last crisis. And in the emerging world, the acceleration of leveraging has been, a financial leveraging has been very, very impressive. It's not absurd to consider that it had been multiplied by five if you compare what happened before the crisis and what happens after the crisis. Another element which has to be mentioned as being part of the systemic vulnerability of the system is the fact that the advanced economy in particular, but it is true also for a number of emerging economies, the ammunitions to counter the next recession crisis is something that is deeply lacking. The fiscal ammunition are very, very bigger in most economies and the monetary policy ammunitions are very, very bigger not to speak of zero level in the Japanese economy and the European economy and are very bigger in the US which is in advance in the cycle, but in the US some remark was made on the fact that it is necessary to have 5% decrease of interest rates to be significant in combating a recession and it's very unlikely that the next recession will not have to, the Fed will not have this ammunition when the next recession come. So all taken into account, you see a number of observation that we're all reinforcing the sentiment that all leaders, all I would say economies, all responsible private and public persons and individuals had to be very, very aware of the fact that resilience in the next possible crisis was absolutely fundamental because again the probability of new correction was quite high. On the positive element which we're also mentioned I don't want to be entirely negative because it would not be fair. I have to mention the fact that some remarks were made on the fact that imbalances, external imbalances in particular had been reduced, all taken into account since the crisis, the current account of China is less important than it was before. In the US we are living today with a minus 2.5% approximately of current account which is not the very, very important level which were attained before the crisis. In Europe it is plus 3.5% which is probably too much by the way but does not signal a drama. So again, this is an element that we must have in mind. The credentials have been improved. I think that nobody dispute that even if there was a lot of screening of the credentials recognizing that a lot of things had been done particularly in the domain of the banks but that a lot remained to be done in the domain of the non-banks, in the domain of the pro-cyclical element that are implicit in for instance accounting rules or in credit rating agences, pasturing or in many other elements that are clearly not reassuring or not fully reassuring as regards the present level of credentials and not fully reassuring in case we have to cope with new drama. But again, I would not be fair if I would not mention the fact that a lot of hard work has been done obviously since the crisis on the basis of a global consensus. So benefiting still from this idea that we are in an integrated global economy and we have to address particularly global finance and global financial credentials through this collegial global approach which has been signaled by the G20 decisions, successive decisions and the G20 is still operating, still giving his own stamp to a number of proposals which are coming from the Basel system of credentials and from the all the I would say committees that have been set up and are overseen by the G20 through the Global Financial Stability Board. Now, let me turn to political economy if I still have time. I have time. Then I have to say that we had a lot of discussion introduction by Jeff Frieden as I said and this idea that we have to cope with a new phenomenon which is linked to what I was saying, the criticism of globalization, the criticism of the old multilateralism with recentment particularly visible in the eurozone in particular, again, adjustment against bailing out the banks, again, transfer in general in many public opinion, we have really an element of strong criticism of what happened during the crisis and we see that in all countries practically, the remark was made that in practically all countries, the previous governments that had the responsibilities, whether they were on the left side of the political persuasion, on the right side of the political persuasion were all more or less weakened in all countries even in the countries that were successes in terms of economy and in terms of combating unemployment, attaining full employment. So it's a phenomenon which is very impressive to the benefit from time to time of the extremist on the right side of the political persuasion or on the left side of the political persuasion or even the extraordinary case of centrism being the, having the benefit of this rejection of previous I would say governmental political parties like in my own country. But all that to mention that we have very, very strong problems which is emerging out of the public opinion of the evolution of political persuasions in certainly in Europe. But I would say in all advanced economy not to mention the UK with the Brexit and the United States of America where we see a lot of strong criticism, job losses being attributed to the mobility of capital which is of course part of the global economy has it as function until now. A very strong still criticism of bank bailouts even if in my memory we do not have at the level of significant institution losses made by the treasury on the contrary. It was also the case in Europe. In most cases in Europe, profits were made by the governments out of their intervention on the financial markets but nevertheless in the mind of the population, in the mind of our fellow citizens, these bank bailouts were very, very costly and are still considered as extremely abnormal as I said including and perhaps even more in the United States of America. So it is of course what I say is a recognition that the main political problem in the advanced economy and perhaps if you look at Brazil and that other emerging economies in all participants in the global economy is that we have a wave of nationalism, protectionism and in some respect fight against immigration which is very, very important. Perhaps the most important political problems for leaders in all societies and nations. It seems to me that it is just to say that we understood in the workshop that those complaints were fully understandable that a lot of our fellow citizens were very much in danger particularly the part of our population that is less educated, less able I would say to cope with the new challenges and is hurt by not only as I already said by the competition which had intensified all over the world, the global economy and of course put those fellow citizens in a difficult situation but also science and technology that are galloping and are also new difficulty for those of our fellow citizens, I would say education of which and the franchise of which is weakened by the digital revolution and by their enormous difficulty to catch up with the new technologies. And of course I could elaborate on this. So as you see we spend quite a lot of time on reflecting on this interaction between an obvious political problem and the global economy and global finance with a sentiment that global finance was very much at stake in all this new era and of course called for appropriate responses. I already said that we had also a number of other views, dimension of this highly multi-dimensional discussion we had. We had a very interesting discussion on the Japanese experience and not forgetting that Japan had to cope with more or less the same kind of challenges as the other advanced economy but a long time in advance, say more than approximately 10 years in advance. And it's a little bit sad to recognize that the other advanced economy at the time were thinking or saying very eloquently and publicly that the Japanese were extremely clumsy in dealing with their problem and that it was possible to solve those problems in a much more skillful way. And of course when they were themselves in this dramatic situation we could see that they were more or less following up on the previous tools and recipes that the Japanese invented, QE was invented by Japan before it was applied by the other advanced economy and it is something which is really telling in terms of understanding exactly what is happening. We had also a discussion on the overall sentiment that we could transform or reset the terms was, I would say, utilized by Bertrand Badré, the overall global financial potentials and approaches in order to privilege the environmental issue, which is by many considered as a major one. I would add myself that we probably have a lot of other dimension in the global finance that we should have in mind. Of course the green issue and the environmental crisis issue which is there, and I have to say that Laurent Fabius was extremely reluctant on that, but we have of course also a lot of issues that are associated with developments and so are more on the problem of the countries that are not yet emerging, that are in the developing world not yet emerging. We have also the issue which is gigantic of inequalities, inequalities in the advanced economy and inequalities also in the emerging economy which is a major, major issue associated with perhaps some reset of the overall approach of global finance. Now I see that I have only three minutes left. Let me conclude. It seems to me that there was a consensus in that group on the fact that a lot of hard work remained to be done in the overall credentials and approaches of global finance that it would be made even more difficult at a time where we did not yet had a new multilateralism crystallizing on the basis of a new global consensus that we were in a very difficult situation from that standpoint. I think that all participants were in favor of working out as soon as possible this new consensus on the new multilateralism which would be necessarily much more multipolar, much more de-concentrating if I may, much less in the hands of course of the advanced economy as I already said. But again, the forces that are coming from executive branches, from public opinions and from all the continents in the world against a rapid new consensus are there and we have to be fully aware of that. I would say also that vigilance and a call for resilience of all the economy participating in the global economy and the global financial world was something which was considered essential taking into account that the sentiment that new correction, new challenges, perhaps as grave as that we had to observe in 0708 and the Lehman Brothers collapse, perhaps less. We all hoped of course that it would be less demanding but certainly putting into question nevertheless the solidity of all our economies, of all our society. So the reinforcement of the call for vigilance and for improving resilience in all part and parcel of the world was certainly also a consensus in that group. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.