 On July 21st, 1861, the city of Washington D.C. was full of movement. It was a Sunday morning, which was the only day off for most people, so this would typically be a relatively lazy day. But with the knowledge that a grand battle was going to occur, many people decided they wanted to observe history in the making. Only a handful of citizens had already set up before McDowell's movement from Centroville, Virginia, but more civilians would trickle in over the next several hours, eventually amounting to upwards of 500 spectators. After the battle, their presence would be a scandal. One of the spectators was a relatively famous British journalist named William Russell, and his account of one woman has been the basis for much of the critical perception of the people. He described the woman as using her opera glasses to observe the battle, and in response to some explosion, she exclaimed, quote, that is splendid. Oh my, oh my, is not that first rate. I guess we will be in Richmond this time tomorrow, end quote. It's likely that Russell's account was an embellished truth. Historians have argued that the citizens were not there to just be entertained. They wanted to observe what they expected to be an historical personal event. And they were there because they felt responsibility for some of the soldiers. Some of the spectators were politicians, and one of them, Senator Henry Wilson from Massachusetts, actually brought a bunch of sandwiches to hand out to Massachusetts volunteers. Some of the spectators had children or spouses in the battle, and one set of parents had a son in William Sherman's brigade, and they actually followed the brigade until they crossed Bull Run. Their son, Sam, wrote a letter to a friend saying, quote, mother was the only woman around for miles, end quote. Part of the scandal, especially in historical memory, is the fact that most of the people brought food with them in picnic baskets. But that imagery suffers from some presentist bias, where we think of picnics as being strictly recreational, but these people were just being practical knowing they could be out of the city for a long time, and they had to bring food with them. Some of the women among the spectators brought food to sell. The reality about the observers is probably a combination of all of these elements. It is certainly true that some people were there because they had people they felt responsible for in the battle, and the idea of being part of history was absolutely appealing as well for many of them. The idea that some people were there out of union pride or even just to watch the festivities is probably also partially true. It's likely Russell embellished his story of the woman with opera glasses, but it's unlikely he fabricated it. And if you remember from the episode on Fort Sumter, Charlestonians also set out picnics to observe the action. People are fascinated by the macabre. That's evident throughout human history, so I think the historians who reject this out of hand are probably dismissing this element too readily as well. But the notion that the spectators were there for entertainment value is the narrative that would create scandal in both the union and the Confederacy. For this and other reasons, those who showed up to watch the first battle of Bull Run would come to regret their decision. I'm Chris Calton, and this is the Mises Institute podcast, Historical Controversies. Before we get into today's episode, I want to let you all know that to celebrate the one year mark for the podcast, I will be in the Mises Institute studio to do a live Q&A on August 6th. We're taking questions ahead of time, so please submit any questions you would like to have answered at Mises.org slash QA. I'll also be taking questions submitted live through the chat, but the questions submitted ahead of time are more likely to get answered, so please send me your questions. Mises.org slash QA, and join us on August 6th at 2 p.m. Eastern Time to watch live, and you'll also be able to watch later on YouTube. The first battle of Bull Run, also called the first battle of Manassas by the Confederacy, was not the largest battle of the Civil War, but it was the first large-scale battle of the war, and certainly can be identified as among the most significant battles in the direction the war would take, especially in the early years. Casualty counts for this battle are far from perfect. We're left with estimates and generalizations, but it is safe to say that the amount of deaths that resulted from this conflict would amount to more than half the total American deaths during the entirety of the Mexican-American War, the most recent military conflict in people's minds. This battle would be a turning point in the minds of many people as the point in which the war lost its romance and adventurer appeal and became something much darker. In the previous two episodes, we looked at the early part of the campaign leading up to the first Bull Run, which included the small skirmishes at Hoax Run in Blackburn's Ford. In the next three episodes, we will look at the actual battle of Bull Run that took place on the 21st with the events divided into three parts. The morning of the battle would center on Matthew's Hill, which will be the subject of today's episode. The early afternoon would be fought on Henry Hill, and the final part of the battle will focus on Chin Ridge and the final retreat. We will also devote some time to the aftermath of the battle, which is important not to overlook, as it tells us a great deal about the mood of the country and the politics that followed, and this is often overlooked by the greater interest in the action of the battle itself. I'm also going to give my one and only warning for the rest of the season. I know this is not a visual medium and any imagery is limited by my ability to describe it, but nonetheless, I want to say up front that one of the reasons that I chose to do the Civil War is specifically because I wanted to underscore the absolute carnage and horror that the people living through it suffered. I get that people know that war is horrible intellectually, but when you listen to history lectures on the topic, the genuine hell of war is never going to be fully conveyed. Obviously, it's not going to be fully conveyed here either, as that's impossible, but when I describe the carnage of the battlefields, I won't be pulling any punches here, and some of the stuff can be uncomfortable to listen to, just as it was uncomfortable for me to read about. McDowell's goal in the battle was to bring his army down to Manassas Junction and destroy it. The problem was figuring out the best way to get past Beauregard's army, which meant trying to predict the most vulnerable areas to cross Bull Run. To try to give you a very brief description of the geography, the main road going east to west was the Warrington Turnpike, which crossed Bull Run at the Stone Bridge. South and southeast of the bridge were various fords that could potentially be crossed, including the fords discussed in the previous episode, like Blackburn's Ford and Mitchell's Ford. North and northwest of Stone Bridge were two other fords, Poplar Ford, and then farther down the river was Sudley Ford. McDowell thought this would be the best place to focus his primary attack. His strategy was to feign two attacks elsewhere to divert Confederate forces. One feigned attack would be at the southeast around Blackburn's Ford, conducted by Richardson, who already engaged in battle there on the 18th. Richardson's brigade was part of the division commanded by Brigadier General Daniel Tyler. Tyler's other three brigades would handle the other feigned attack along Stone Bridge, which would effectively look like a frontal assault, and it would be led by Tyler himself. One of these three brigades, by the way, was commanded by Colonel William to come to Sherman. The idea was that Tyler's assault would look like the main attack, with the intention of crossing Stone Bridge along the Warrington Turnpike, and then moving south toward Manassas Junction on the primary north-south road, which was the Manassas-Sudley Road. But the real attack would come from two other divisions who were instructed to follow Tyler along the Turnpike before turning northwest. This would be the division led by Brigadier General David Hunter, who had two sizable brigades, and the other division was led by Colonel Samuel Heitzelman, whose division included three smaller brigades. These two divisions together amounted to about 13,000 soldiers and more than 20 cannons, making it the single largest attack force the country had ever seen up to this point in American history. This was the flanking column that was to travel wide around the battlefield and cross Bull Run at Sudley Ford, where Heinzelman would stop following Hunter after the crossing, but Hunter would continue pushing on the confederate left, while Tyler moved forward across Stone Bridge, pushing on the confederate front, and Richardson was distracting confederate forces in the southeast. Tyler reached to the Stone Bridge at some time around six in the morning. The three brigades with him were led respectively by Colonel Erasmus Keys, Brigadier General Robert Schneck, and Colonel William Tecumseh Sherman. Schneck and Sherman set up on either side of the road while Keys' brigade held the rear, and Tyler called out his artillery to the front to open the battle. The artillery commander was Peter Haynes, and his pride and joy in this battery was this giant 30-pound cannon, which his men had nicknamed the Baby Waker. Getting the gun over the Virginia Hills was a feat in and of itself. The thing weighed about 6,000 pounds, and its purpose was more to make a demonstration of strength than anything else. It was too large to have practical battlefield mobility, but it certainly made for an impressive first shot of battle. Haynes had the gun aimed at the house of Abraham Van Pelt, which he believed must be the headquarters of some confederate officer. At about 615, he ordered the firing of the cannon, which one reporter present described, quote, the reverberation was tremendous, shaking through the hills like the volley of a dozen plebeian cannon and the roar of the revolving shell indescribable, end quote. The cannonball crashed into Pelt's house, according to Haynes' account, but it was harmless to confederate soldiers. Two more shots followed, one of which took out the tint of Beauregard's signalman, Captain Edward Porter Alexander, though Alexander was not inside at the time. The hope was that the frightening boom of the giant cannon would scare off the confederates across the bridge, but Tyler was disappointed. The other side of Stonebridge was protected by Beauregard's seventh brigade, led by Colonel Nathan Evans, who actually had been using the Van Pelt house as his headquarters, so Haynes' assumption on that count was not incorrect. Evans's brigade consisted of just over 1,000 men, and the only artillery he had was two smoothbore six-pounders on loan from another regiment. The three regiments under him consisted of one regiment of Virginia Cavalry, the 30th Virginia, and then two regiments of infantry, the 4th South Carolina under the command of Colonel John Sloan, and a battalion of Louisiana volunteers nicknamed the Louisiana Tigers, under the command of Major Chatham Roberto Wheat, who you may remember as having been a character in the filibustering episodes I did on Cuba and Nicaragua. He had also spent some time in Italy serving the revolutionary Giuseppe Garibaldi, but he didn't stay long because he wanted to return to Louisiana after its secession. Needless to say, this guy enjoyed military adventuring. Evans had been prepared for the coming attack across Stonebridge since around five in the morning. He acted quickly by splitting his men into small groups and settling them at different locations around the bridge, having them hide behind trees around the river, and the others to hide behind a small hill where they wouldn't be seen. This would prove to be quite clever, as it would prevent Tyler from ever having knowledge of the size of the force he was facing across the bridge. Tyler had nearly 7,000 men on the other side of the bridge, and he'd have even more once Kies' regiment rejoined him. They were lagging behind to cover the flanking column until they started to move north, so Evans' decision to keep his force hidden was wise. Over the next hour after the firing began, the two forces exchanged gunfire from either side of the river. This amounted a little more than minor skirmishes, and when Tyler realized that the Confederates were neither going to flee nor offer a vigorous response, the Union forces settled in to continue sending cannonballs, but mostly to wait for the battle to progress. Some of the men climbed trees to get a better view of the battle, and some even took naps, which is hard to imagine given all the noise from the cannons, but these men had been on the march since the middle of the night, so they were certainly exhausted. Beauregard's plan was similar to McDowell's in that he also wanted to send a flanking force to his right, which would be the Union left. This was where Richardson was already exchanging similar casual fire with James Longstreet and Millage Bonham, who were still covering Blackburn's Ford and Mitchell's Ford respectively, just as they had been three days prior when they first faced Richardson. Just like Evans at Stone Bridge, they would not take the bait by responding with any kind of energetic attack. For the first hour or so, fighting at Stone Bridge and the South East stretch of Bull Run was relatively uneventful. Beauregard saw no cause for concern for McDowell's faint attacks, but Johnston was a bit more uneasy. He wanted to send more troops to Stone Bridge to reinforce Evans. At 7 in the morning, he gave Beauregard orders to send Thomas Jackson, Bernard B., and Francis Bartow, the first three brigades in the Army of the Shenandoah, to start moving to the Confederate left towards Evans. He also sent the recently arrived unbrigated troops from South Carolina under the command of Wade Hampton III, who was the richest man in the South and owned nearly 3,000 slaves. Beauregard was in charge of the battle plan since he'd been placed at Manassas Junction, but Johnston was the superior officer, and this was definitely a source of tension between the two generals. Bernard B. was particularly upset at those orders since he was convinced that all the action was going to take place on the Confederate right. Accompanying his force were four artillery guns under the command of John Imboden, and on the way Imboden made the mistake of complaining that his men hadn't eaten in more than 24 hours to which Bea angrily responded, quote, you will have plenty of time to cook and eat to the music of a battle in which we shall probably take little or no part, end quote. In a little while though, Bea would come to find himself in the most heated part of the battle. But Beauregard was still set on his plan to attack the Union left, and included in his 7 a.m. orders were instructions for James Longstreet to cross Blackburn's Ford, where his men had to step over the water bloated corpses of Union soldiers from the battle that took place three days earlier and confront Richardson's brigade. At McLean's Ford, southeast of Longstreet, David R. Jones led his brigade across the river as well. Once across, the Confederate soldiers held tight under Union artillery, awaiting the orders to attack. Further southeast from McLean's Ford was Union Mills, which was protected by Richard Ewell's brigade. Beauregard had also dispatched orders for them to cross. Beauregard's plan was to have Ewell cross at the furthest corner of the battlefield and initiate the attack. And upon seeing Ewell's brigade attack, Jones would initiate his attack, which would signal Longstreet to initiate his. But the courier sent to deliver the orders to Ewell, for reasons lost to history, never arrived. Ewell was left on the Confederate side of Bull Run, waiting for orders that were supposed to have been delivered shortly after 7 a.m., and since they never came, he never crossed. And Longstreet and Jones were left facing enemy fire without ever receiving the signal to respond. So just because we don't have the benefit of maps like you do when you're reading a book or watching a video lecture, I just want to clarify what's going on. The Confederate front is facing east across Bull Run, the Union front is facing left. The Union flank is moving north and then west and then south to cross Bull Run to hammer the Confederate left. And the Confederate flank, their right flank, is in the southeast to hit the Union left. So they're kind of sending the attacks in a circle around each other, except for because of the failed orders, the Confederate flank in the southeast never actually initiated their attack. Ewell's undelivered attack orders certainly delayed the combat from the Confederate flanking force, but the Union flanking force on the far other side of the battle was also delayed. McDowell's information about the terrain the flanking force was expected to follow was incomplete, so he impressed a local into his service to head Hunter's division to Sudley Ford. But on the way, this scout said that the originally planned route would subject the Union troops to hidden batteries of artillery, and he offered an alternative, but longer route. Hunter felt he had no choice but to heed the advice of his guide, but his trek towards Sudley Ford was pushed two hours behind schedule. To compensate for the lost time, Hunter and Heinzelman had their men march double time, which meant that they would be even more exhausted by the time they actually saw combat. On the way, the Union troops passed Southern spectators who yelled abuses at them as they marched. One woman they passed came out of a rundown log house and was described by one soldier as having, quote, a very frowsy and dirty personage, end quote. She taunted the soldiers, saying that they were on their way to meet a huge Confederate army, her husband among them. The soldiers laughed at her, but one soldier later admitted, quote, despite her disreputable appearance, it must be conceited, she had fine military judgment, end quote. So two hours after the battle officially started, both the Union and the Confederate plans were falling apart. But back at Stonebridge, Nathan Evans was holding out well by holding fire and not revealing to Tyler how outnumbered he was. One other crucial advantage he had was the Van Pelt House where he had access to a signal station. Edward Porter Alexander, the man whose tent got destroyed by the giant Union cannon, provided a pivotal turning point for the battle. Alexander was a West Point graduate who graduated third in his class in 1857. Two years later, he went to work for an army surgeon named Alfred J. Meyer, who had once studied how deaf mutes communicated with each other. After this, Dr. Meyer spent some time in the West where he observed the signaling system of the Comanches in the New Mexico territory. They would communicate with each other over long distances by using lances, and Meyer thought he could adapt this system for the U.S. Army that would be able to communicate even more complex messages. Together, Dr. Meyer, employing the recently invented telegraph communication system concocted by Samuel Morse, invented a way to use Morse code to deliver messages over long distances by waving cloths attached to poles. He also adapted his system to torches so that the signaling system could be used at night. Shortly after this, he met Porter Alexander, and the two men perfected the signaling system, and they got so good at it that the United States Army ended up adopting the system. When Porter Alexander joined the Confederacy, Beauregard instructed him to take 12 volunteers and teach them the signaling system. At Bull Run, he was Beauregard's chief signaler, and he set up several signaling stations around the battlefield, including the one at the Van Pelt House. The morning of the battle, Alexander ate breakfast with Beauregard and Johnston along with the rest of their staff. Around 8 a.m., after Beauregard issued his orders to the right fling, they all started to move casually toward Nitchell's Ford, which is where Beauregard expected most of the fighting to break out. But on the way, Beauregard ordered Porter Alexander to go to his signaling station at the top of Wilcoxon Hill, which Alexander was not very excited about because, kind of like Bernard B., he thought he was going to miss all the action. But he followed his orders, taking couriers with him, and once he arrived, he sent signals to the other station to let them all know he was in position. Then he began to scope out the region with a spyglass. Shortly before 9 a.m., he spotted something to his north. He couldn't quite make much out, but he could see the glittering of the sun, which he recognized as the sun's reflection from a brass cannon. He kept his gaze in this direction, and soon he could make out the reflections of bayonets and muskets. He moved quickly, sending the signal to Van Pelt Station, alerting Evans, quote, look out for your left, you are turned, end quote. Then he sent a word to Beauregard with one of his couriers to inform him of the Union flanking force. The message read, quote, I see a body of troops crossing Bull Run about two miles above the Stone Bridge. The head of the columns is in the woods on this side. The rear of the column is in the woods on the other side. About a half mile of its length is visible in the open ground in between. I can see both infantry and artillery, end quote. This proved to be an absolutely crucial moment in the battle. At about the same time that Evans received the warning from Alexander, he received word from one of his outposts of the same danger. This confirmed it, and his decision to keep his men hidden throughout the morning would now pay off. Out of his 1100 men protecting Stone Bridge, he moved 900 of them, taking all of Wheat's Louisiana Tigers and much of the 4th South Carolina. He left behind only the 200 man skeleton force of South Carolinians to guard the bridge, meaning that Tyler could have easily overpowered them, but because he had not let Tyler see his force, Tyler would not realize that the bridge was virtually undefended for several more hours, so Evans effectively used 200 men to hold off more than 7000, since Keyes was just behind Tyler at this point. Historian John Hennessey says that this move by Evans was probably the single most important move made by any of Beauregard subordinate officers during the entire battle. Evans moved his men about a quarter mile down the road and set up a position near Pennsylvania, that's P-I-T-T-Silvania just in case my enunciation isn't clear. He also sent word to Colonel Cock, who was protecting Lewis Ford just to the south of Stone Bridge, that he was leaving the bridge virtually unprotected. Evans underestimated the enemy's route though in stopping at Pennsylvania. He expected the Union flank to move towards Stone Bridge, but when they continued moving south along Sudley Road, Evans realized that they would soon outflank him. He started moving his men again, this time toward Edgar Matthews Farm. Wheat sent a group of his Louisianans known as the Cata Hula Gorillas ahead to act as skirmishers, meaning they were to keep an eye out for potential ambushes and batteries. But Colonel Sloan, the leader of the 4th South Carolina Regiment in Evans Brigade, also sent some South Carolinians out ahead of the rest of his troops, and they moved in a different direction than the Cata Hula Gorillas. Shortly afterward, the South Carolina skirmishers saw one of the men not far from them and they opened fire. The men they shot out returned fire. Then the South Carolinians realized that the men they were shooting were the Cata Hula Gorillas, two of whom had been mortally wounded. Even once the Louisianans realized that they were fighting other Confederates, some of them still fired back out of anger at their injured comrades, and the fighting only ceased after Wheat rode through the men and put a stop to it. This would not be the last instance of friendly fire and troop confusion during this battle. Finally, Evans set up a new position on Matthews Hill at around 930, where they waited for Lincoln's horde of northern barbarians as one of the soldiers called to them. He set up his two small cannons on either side of the hill. But his position wasn't great. Fortunately, shortly after he set his men, Barnard B arrived to reinforce him. B set his force a few hundred yards to the left toward the nearby Henry Hill, along with the four pieces of artillery he brought with him under the supervision of John Embedon. B was much happier now, saying to Embedon, quote, here is the battlefield and we are in for it, end quote. Despite his worries about missing the fight, it now looked like B would get to see the first real battle of the day. Wheat led his Cata Hula Gorillas to the crest of Matthews Hill, where they encountered actual Union soldiers this time, being members of the Second Rhode Island, marching near the front of Hunter's Division. The skirmishers charged the Yankees and let loose a single volley which sent the Rhode Islanders to the ground to take cover from the bullets. But once more Union troops started showing up, Wheat and his men quickly scurried back up the hill. As the Yankees advanced and reached to the top of the hill, the Confederates on the hill opened fire as well, and the Second Rhode Island took the brunt of the first volley. One Union soldier described it as, quote, a perfect hail storm of bullets, round, shot and shell, tearing through our ranks and scattering death and confusion everywhere, end quote. But the New Englanders didn't back down and the fighting broke out at the top of the hill. The Second Rhode Island held out alone for a few moments, but they were shortly reinforced by a battery of six pieces of artillery under the direction of Colonel Ambrose Burnside, which set up only 150 yards from the Confederate forces. Close range artillery was a Napoleonic strategy, but when Napoleon was conducting artillery charges, he was only facing short range, smoothbore muskets. Many of the men fighting at Bull Run had rifled muskets, which made artillery more vulnerable at such a short range, and Burnside's men quickly learned the difference. The Confederates let out a volley against the Artillerists, shooting horses out from under the men riding them. The Artillerists had never faced such gunfire before, and they were finding it much more difficult to do their job with bullets flying over their heads. Men from both sides started dropping, but the Union men lost a handful of their officers. The commander of the Second Rhode Island, Colonel Slocum, took a bullet through the skull while he was climbing over a fence, yelling for his men to show the Confederates what Rhode Island can do. One of his men wiped the blood from his face and, with the help of some others, carried him to the Regiments Ambulance that took him to the nearby Matthews' house, where he lingered in a coma for two days before he finally died. Major Sullivan Ballew had his leg ripped off by an artillery shell, killing both him and his horse. The most significant casualty was the Division's commander, David Hunter, who took a bullet to the neck. He would survive the wound, but it was enough to take him out of the battle. Before he rode off the field, he put Ambrose Burnside in charge of the Division in his stead, but Burnside passed the commander, Andrew Porter, commander of the First Regiment in Hunter's Division. The governor of Rhode Island, William Sprague, was also part of the battle, riding a beautiful white horse named Snowdrop. Snowdrop was killed, but Sprague quickly mounted another horse. He was soon shot off that horse during the battle, which was decapitated by a shell fragment, and then he had to get on a third horse for the battle, still being uninjured himself. Horses were all over the battlefield, by the way, because they were commonly used to pull artillery, but they were large targets. And if you want to fully understand the carnage of battle, you can't leave them out. I had a friend who went to film school and he took a screenwriting class where the teacher told him it was a lot less common for animals to be depicted being killed in movies because audiences have stronger emotional reactions to seeing animals killed than they do humans, presumably because animals are seen as being entirely innocent. I think that's probably true for a lot of people, and in this case it certainly adds to the horrors of war. The gruesome scene from Matthews Hill wasn't just the bodies of the soldiers, but it also included the entirely innocent bodies of horses littering the battlefield, twitching from their wounds, some of them having limbs ripped off by artillery. The horses didn't care about unionism or secession, and many soldiers wrote about them after the battle, many of the men holding the view that of all the deaths that took place, the horses were the most innocent victims. Out of the 130 horses pulling the Rhode Island battery on Matthews Hill, only 65 made it out. But the Confederates did not have the advantage of numbers here, and more Union regiments started climbing up Matthews Hill from other sides. They were swarming on the Confederates. At about 10 a.m., though, Evans and Wheat thought they saw a vulnerability in the Union line. Wheat ordered his 400 Louisiana Tigers to charge. One of the men wrote of the charge, our blood was on fire, life was valueless, the boys fired one volley, then rushed upon the foe. They were charging at a line of Union Marines manning a few cannons under the command of Major Reynolds, taking out their cannons, horses, and artillery crew. The Tigers didn't have bayonets, or at least many of them didn't, and that isn't entirely clear to me, but they either used their muskets as clubs or drew bowie knives as they passed the Marines and moved toward the second Rhode Islanders. But this time, the Rhode Islanders were dealing with guns dirtied with gunpowder residue, making it increasingly difficult for them to reload, and some of them were out of ammunition altogether, forcing them to check the corpses lying around them for extra rounds. But they held their ground against Wheat's charging Tigers, and those who could fire unleashed a devastating volley against the Louisianans. They fell back to their original position, much to the delight of the canoneers they crippled on the way. At this point, Evans rode to Henry Hill to ask Barnard B to reinforce him. B, who'd been observing the combat on the adjacent hill, told Evans to retreat to Henry Hill instead. Evans declined. He wanted to halt Matthews Hill and said he could do it if B backed him up. B gave in, eager to join the fight. The largest regimen in B's brigade was the 4th Alabama led by Colonel Egbert Jones. They led the charge, but when they came under Union fire, they ran back and found cover, moved around Matthews Hill, and started up the other side, where Matthews Hill combined with another smaller hill, called Buck Hill. As the Alabamians reached the top of Buck Hill, about 300 yards from the center of the battle, they faced more Union bullets, so they took cover in the woods to their right, stepping over the Louisiana Tigers who'd been dropping during Wheat's charge, and then they started up toward the Union center, stopping 100 yards away. There, Jones told his men to lie down and open fire. This wasn't a good position for the Alabamians, and they could see more Union forces taking position on the hill. B sent word to the other regiments in his brigade, the 7th and 8th Georgia, and the 2nd and 11th Mississippi, to back them up. Technically, just for those who might be confused if they know of the history before I tell it, the Georgians were part of Francis Bartow's brigade, but at Henry Hill, the higher ranked Barnard B had essentially taken command of both brigades, superseding Bartow's authority for the moment. With the Confederate reinforcements coming up Buck Hill to join the Alabamians, Reynolds turned his six cannons on them and opened fire. This was good motivation for the Georgians and Mississippians to pick up their pace as they climbed Buck Hill, but more Union troops, the 71st New York, joined Reynolds, bringing two Howitzers with them to add to the artillery aimed at B's Confederates. They couldn't even get horses to pull the Howitzers, so the New Yorkers had to drag the cannons up the hill themselves. One of the New Yorkers described the scene, quote, the cannonballs were plowing up the earth all around. Shells were bursting and crashing through the trees, directly in our rear, and the mini balls were battering and humming in all directions, end quote. The Alabamians took the worst of it. They were cut to pieces. Their leader, Colonel Jones, was sitting on top of his horse yelling out orders when he was shot off his mount, injured, but not killed. To the right of the Fourth Alabama, the two Georgia regiments were not faring much better. They dropped like flies under a hell of Yankee bullets, but they held their position and returned fire. The Confederates were outnumbered on Matthews Hill at this point, even with B's men joining the fight, but they held the Union soldiers at bay. The battle had turned to chaos. One Rhode Islander said, quote, shells were exploding and the cannon roaring made such a noise that the cry of the wounded could not be heard, end quote. Another soldier said that he felt something between his legs, only to look down and find one of his comrades lying on his belly, firing his gun from between his legs of the other soldier. Another man had his leg ripped off by a cannonball, spraying blood on everyone nearby. Soldiers watched as their friends fell around them. One man from New Hampshire left this account, quote, a cannonball passed between myself and the man next to me, and struck a man just behind us and killed him instantly. Another man near me was facing the enemy, and someone said something which made him laugh. Just then, a ball struck him in the mouth and knocked his head off, end quote. Another Union soldier sent a letter to his sister, Libby, about the horrors he encountered, quote, since I left home, the awfulest sight I ever saw was at the battleground. It is a sight that never can be forgotten. To see the men slaughtered, some of them dead, some of them with their legs off, one in particular with a cannonball, through his body, there was a hole through him big enough to stick your head in. Oh Libby, it is awful, but I fear it not all through, end quote. The captain of one of the Mississippi regiments tried to give a battlefield speech. Shouting over the cannon fire, he yelled to his men that they were facing, quote, a most bitter and damaging enemy, and one that does not only propose to rob you of your property, but to deprive you of your constitutional rights and privileges for which your ancestors fought, bled, and died. He wasn't done with his speech, though, when a shell exploded right above his head, causing him to dive for cover. When he stood back up, he wiped the dirt from his mouth and said, quote, I will finish my remarks when this thing is over, end quote. A South Carolina volunteer described a similar scene for his wife, quote, the cannons, although they make a great noise, were nothing more than pop guns compared to the tremendous thundering noise of the thousands of muskets. The sight of the dead, the cries of the wounded, the thundering noise of the battle can never be put on paper. It must be seen and heard to be comprehended, the dead, the dying, and the wounded, friend and foe all mixed up together, friend and foe embraced in death, some crying for water, some praying their last prayers, some trying to whisper to a friend their last farewell message to their loved ones at home. It is heart-rending. I cannot go any further. My eyes are damp with tears, end quote. The Eighth Georgians pushed forward, coming to face the Second Rhode Island, who was still holding out on top of the hill. Each regiment saw dozens of men go down, and these two regiments would suffer some of the highest casualty rates of the battle. The leader of the Eighth Georgians, Colonel Gardner, was one of the casualties. He took a bullet to the ankle, barely managing to limp away. Only a few minutes after he was hit, his adjudant, John Branch, took a bullet to the chest, mortally wounding him. Branch was serving in the regiment along with his two younger brothers, Sanford and Hamilton. Even after the rest of the Georgians retreated, Sanford stayed on the field with his dying brothers, allowing himself to be captured by the Yankees. Later, when writing to his mother from a union prison, he wrote quote, I thought I would look behind me to see if any of my company had fallen, but mother, just think of my horror to see John, dear John, real and fall. I dropped my gun and ran to him. I got there just after Dr. West, and who, dear John, asked whether there was any chance or not? When told he must die, he replied, very well. He would die like a soldier and a man. I cannot write any more now, as I was taken prisoner standing by his body, end quote. These weren't the only siblings to suffer in such a way. One young Alabamian, George Anderson, took a bullet to the skull, killing him instantly. His younger brother, only 14 years old, was next to him. And when his brother fell, he ran to him and threw himself over his brother's body sobbing. The captain of a small company, the Koneku guards, tried to encourage him, telling him to stand up and avenge the death of his brother, but the young boy couldn't do anything but continue to cry and hold on to his brother's corpse. As the Georgians and Alabamians were being cut down, some of them started a retreat. As one Georgian was taking off, an officer rode up on a horse and angrily asked how Georgians could be running while South Carolinians were staying to fight. The soldier threatened to shoot the officer off his horse, whoever he was. The officer, as it happened, was the South Carolinian officer, Barnard B. As other Georgians started yelling similar curses at B, he said, quote, I must admit that you are ready enough to fight. I withdraw the words I should not have used, end quote. As the Georgians scattered, their leader, Francis Bartow, picked up the regimental flag dropped by one of his men who'd been killed. He waved it above his head and yelled, on my boys. Right then, he took a bullet to the chest, and according to the men who witnessed his death, his dying words were, quote, they have killed me by brave boys, but never give up the ship. We'll whip them yet, end quote. While all this fighting was going on at Matthews Hill, General McDowell sent orders to Tyler to finally push across Stonebridge to reinforce the Union flanking column. Tyler was hesitant, still unsure of how many Confederates were on the other side of the bridge, but his subordinate officer, General Sherman, was aching to join the fight, and he'd spent the morning scouting out for a place to cross Bull Run, which he discovered around 9 a.m. So when McDowell sent his orders, Sherman didn't hesitate to lead his five regiments, nearly 3,500 men, toward Matthews Hill. One of his subordinates, the leader of the 69th New York, was Lieutenant Colonel James Hagry. He'd been reported as killed during the Battle of Blackburns Ford three days earlier, and as he was leading the way, he commented that he, quote, felt very warlike for a dead man, end quote. Only moments later, a hidden Confederate from Tyler's skeleton crew protecting the bridge popped out and shot Hagry off his horse, this time killing him for real. But Sherman's brigade made it to the battlefield, and there was no way that the Confederates were going to keep their position. The Louisiana Tigers had already been decimated, and now their leader, wheat, took a bullet as well. Evans and B finally ordered the retreat. As they left, Colonel Jones, the wounded leader of the 4th Alabamians, yelled out, men don't run. Some of the histories I've read made it sound like he was worried his men were leaving him, but others say that he simply failed to hear the retreating order, and that does seem more plausible. When the Union came and took Jones prisoner, he said, quote, Gentlemen, you have got me, but a hundred thousand more await you, end quote. He would not survive his wound. At this point, the Union soldiers had upwards of 18,000 men watching 3,000 Confederates retreat. They started to wave their hats in celebration, shouting, they are running, victory, the day is ours, and thanks of this nature. It was shortly before noon, one of the Union soldiers, Charles McCook, joined the crowd of spectators where his dad, Daniel McCook, was watching the battle, and they had lunch together. A Union officer also wrote up to the crowd of onlookers and said, quote, We've whipped them at all points. We've taken their batteries, they are retreating as fast as they can, and we are after them, end quote. With the Union victory on Matthews Hill, the battle looked to be coming to a close, and McDowell would be able to claim credit for a quick and easy win over the rebels. But instead of retreating completely, the Confederates were regrouping on Henry Hill, and as more of Johnston's army of the Shenandoah continued to arrive at Manassas Junction, fresh Confederate soldiers would give Beauregard a much-needed edge in the afternoon. The battle is far from over, and we will pick up the story here in the next episode. Historical Controversies is a production of the Ludwig von Mises Institute. 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