 I'm going to start with Emile Sanamian, who is, I think, pretty well known to people here in Washington. He was the editor of the Armenian reporter. From 2000 to 2006, he was a research officer at the Armenian Assembly of America. And before that, he worked at the office of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic in the United States. He'll be followed by Henri Barkey, who is. Oh, you're going to go next? I thought we were going to go down. All right, sorry. All right, then we'll go to Tom DeWall, who is my colleague here at Carnegie, and has written the book on the, in a sense, the concept of genocide and what it's meant in the last period of the last century, really, called The Great Catastrophe. But it's written several other books on Caucasus matters on Karabakh and is our expert here at Carnegie. And Henri Barkey is the Bernard Cohen Professor at, sorry, Bertha Cohen Professor at Lehigh University and has been a member of the State Department Policy Planning staff and also worked here at Carnegie at one of the Turkish matters. So with that, Emil, let me let you start. And we'll turn it then to Tom and then to Henri. Thank you. And thank you for this invitation, an opportunity to share some of my thoughts with quite a few people interested in the subject matter. It's 100 years have passed, and many people are asking, why are we talking about something that happened 100 years ago? And I think there is two main explanations to that. First, the magnitude of the genocide itself. It was a case of severe government repression, sort of the case of a relatively powerful, abusing, relatively powerless. And it was a matter, not just for the Armenian Turks. It's an issue that exists in the world today that we are continuing to confront. And because this particular case was never addressed, the criminals were never properly punished, the consequences remained unaddressed. All of this makes a living cause out of this issue, even though it is a century old. Secondly, the issue reverberates because Turkish government policy towards Armenian Armenians remains highly problematic and frequently hostile. Discrimination remains a problem inside Turkey, and the Turkish foreign policy challenges Armenians already precarious security. The importance of this centennial, many people have looked at it as sort of the second important watershed moment since the actual genocide. And the first being the 50th anniversary, obviously marked in 1965, that became this galvanizing date for Armenian political activism on this issue. For the first 50 years, as Tom's documented in his book and others have, there's been very little Armenian political activism on this issue. The community was powerless, spread out without resources. Armenian itself was obviously under the Soviet Dictat, did not have a freedom of action on this matter. And the 50th anniversary became this galvanizing moment. People are asking, now on the 100th anniversary, what kind of change will we see on this subject? Will it be more of the same? Will Armenians be losing steam? Now that they've been busy with this for 50 years, will there be some kind of a transformation of this issue? There's some sense that there may be more of an emphasis on legal issues related to the genocide, specifically the legislation that had been passed on the return of church properties, the recent legal case launched by the Armenian church to restitute some of the property. But by their very nature, legal challenges are drawn out, exhausting exercises. They're not really a substitute for political activism. So my sense is political activism will continue, and especially now, having marked this centennial, Armenians are really feeling kind of good about themselves because this was really a major event for Armenians this April 24th. And probably no single event had focused the attention of so many Armenians and others on Armenians, perhaps not even genocide itself. At commemorative events, turnouts were just incredible. Of course, there were huge crowds in Armenia as normal is every year. There were more than 130,000 people marching in Los Angeles. Never before so many Armenians come together, not only in LA, but I don't think anywhere else in the diaspora. Many thousands, of course, marched in other major cities. There were small but very remarkable commemoration places like Besieged Aleppo and Kamishli in northeastern Syria, which is also besieged by ISIS. Throughout Iraq and Baghdad, Basra, Erbil, basically all places that ISIS hasn't reached yet. And really, everywhere around the world are the Armenian communities. I got a call from my parents who live in Seattle. It's not a major Armenian community, but they had an event there. And there was this incredible sense of togetherness that Armenians experienced on April 24th. In the run-up to the centennial, and the day since many world figures have spoken out on the genocide, Pope Francis, Putin, Obama, reports of resolutions, another official statements came from the European Parliament, Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, the three countries that are allied with Turkey in World War I. Also Ukraine, Chile, Ecuador, and Iraqi Kurdistan is debating this issue now, apparently, the Parliament of Iraqi Kurdistan. Remarkably, a German president noted this country's complicity in the genocide as Turkey's World War I ally. Predictably, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the leader of the Republic of Turkey and other Turkish officials, lashed out nearly cold a couple of ambassadors. But in another important progression of rhetoric, Prime Minister Davutoglu Ahmed Davutoglu called the Armenian deportations a crime against humanity. This is what it was called by the Allies in 1915, before the term genocide came into existence. All of this, of course, created what the Turkish officials anticipated would be a tsunami of media coverage of things Armenian, probably more Armenian coverage than any point since the 1980 earthquake in Armenia. And of course, this is how it is for small attention-starved countries. The only times they get a lot of attention is when something goes horribly wrong, as we're seeing now in Nepal, for example. But in this case, the horrors were sufficiently far in the past to make the day about the Armenian survival and togetherness. It was also a great distraction from many things that have been going on in the wrong direction for Armenians. The spillover economic crisis into Armenia from Russia and the West, the many ineptitudes of the Armenian government, the direction of Putin's Russia and how it impacts Armenia and all of the former Soviet Union, such as the pressure to curtail ties with the West, crackdown on the Western agents, quote, unquote. The horrific unprecedented murder that rocked Armenia just a few months ago in Ghumati, the devastation of Armenian diaspora communities in Syria and Iraq, and to some extent in eastern Ukraine as well. Last but far from least, the escalating slow war on the border with Azerbaijan. The border, by the way, has been remarkably quiet in the last 10 days or so, for whatever reason, and how many have decided to take a breather from an unprecedented tempo of attacks months prior. Perhaps Aliyev didn't want this attacks caught up in the stream of international attention. Perhaps he's expecting a return favor during the upcoming European games in Baku. We have to wait and see. Returning to the topic of contemporary Turkish government policies, much can be said about the generally improving rhetoric of Turkish officials, the greater acceptance of Armenians inside Turkey, the restoration of churches, returns of the few of the multitude of confiscated properties. All of this is no doubt significant, but the most important test of Turkey's attitude is in its approach towards Armenia and here, worrying trends abound. First, there's no sign that Turkey's six normal relations with Armenia. And many indications, it is using its outreach to Armenian diaspora to neutralize the embarrassing genocide resolutions. Genocide recognition campaigns. The protocol signed in 2009, never implemented, were a prime example in inviting the Armenian president to Gallipoli events, intentionally scheduled on April 24th, the most recent one. All in all, Turkey's policy towards Armenians is the main cause of Armenians' dependence on Russia for security and by extension Russia's grip on the whole of South Caucasus. But of course, none of that justifies Armenia's own passivity in terms of finding new ways of directly engaging with Turkish political class and society. Even without an embassy in Ankara, there is way to engage with Turkish mainstream. Turkey's a remarkable country as far as Armenians are concerned. With all the legacy of the genocide, today's Turkey probably has the largest proportion of our men-of-files anywhere in the world. Second worrying trend is that Turkey has stepped up its military cooperation with Azerbaijan. Since last year, the ground air forces have conducted more joint exercises than ever before. Behind Russia and Israel, Turkey is the third largest supplier weaponry to Azerbaijan. Last November, a commander of Turkish special forces went to Azerbaijan, a trip that was followed by a very discernible change in Azerbaijani tactics on the line of contact with Armenia. Some Armenian military officials have even claimed that Turkish personnel may be directly involved in some of the operations. And of course, it's not been supported by any evidence, but there is that suspicion. And third, while Erdogan's rise to power in his confrontation with the old elite of Turkey created a remarkable opening for democratic development in Turkey and opening on the Armenian issue as well, Erdogan's consolidation of power inside Turkey and increased authoritarianism have begun and will continue to stymie many debates that his original rise contributed to, including on a sensitive matter such as the Armenian genocide. The sudden retirement of Davut Olu's advisor Etya Makhchupyan just days before April 24th and days after he referred to the genocide in a couple of his interviews was notable in that regard. The upcoming election in Turkey, which other speakers will talk about, I'm sure, can give Erdogan a supermajority in parliament and could open the way for a switch over to presidential system. This would risk what some people call now putinization of Turkey. They can produce problematic outcomes both inside and beyond Turkey. Thank you. Tom. Thank you, Jim. It's great to see such a large crowd in the room and I couldn't be happier to be amongst my fellow speakers and colleagues here. Yeah, I do believe we're in a kind of, a new era, April 25th, 2015, marked a new era for better or worse on this issue. When Jim Collins and I were discussing the issue before we started and so this comment should be copyrighted to you, Jim, you said maybe the 20th century just ended for Armenia and Turkey last week and we're finally entering the 21st century with the passing of the centennial. I think, you know, the bad news is that it wasn't a catalyst for the kind of reconciliation and normalization. It could have been, but it could have been a whole lot worse, let's say, this confrontation. And as Emile said, I think it was quite a therapeutic time for Armenians around the world, a lot of media coverage, a lot of togetherness and also a lot of very creative projects. It wasn't just about a kind of imagining victimhood. There's a very good project called 100 Lives, which was supported by our cousin organization, Carnegie Corporation, Vatan Grigorian and George Clooney, which was not so much focused on 1915 as telling the stories of survivors and telling the stories of what they've done in the world in the century since. It was many very creative projects like that. And also commemorations in Turkey, in Taksim Square and on Istiklal Street in Istanbul, there were commemorations in Diyarbakir. So I think this was generally quite a therapeutic moment for Armenians. Obviously, American Armenians were seeking the therapy that they wanted the president to finally, as they put it, honor his campaign pledge and use the genocide word. And of course, when he didn't, they were deeply disappointed and a lot of coverage on that. But of course, because everyone's so focused on the genocide word, which is not unimportant, but I would argue has overly defined this issue, the issue of Armenian-Turkish relations. I think very few of them actually read what the president said. And it's basically a statement that could have been, one, imagine the statement being written, and then the decision is made, last minute, do we insert the word genocide or not into the statement? Because it's basically the substance and tone of the statement actually doesn't change very much whether you use the word genocide or not. For example, there's a reference to Raphael Lemkin, the coiner of the word genocide in the statement. But just amidst the fact that Raphael Lemkin used the word genocide, there's a reference to Pope Francis in the statement. So clearly, this is clearly a statement of a president who personally believes it was a genocide and would have liked to use the word, but for various contemporary political reasons has decided it was not expedient to do so. He states that his view has not changed and he talks about, you know, the Armenian is the first mass atrocity of the 20th century. Beginning in 1915, the Armenian people, the Ottoman Empire were deported, massacred, and marched their deaths, their culture and heritage, and their ancient homeland was erased amid horrific violence that saw suffering on all sides, one and a half million Armenians perished. So that's, if you're an Armenian, reading that statement, I think you should also feel some kind of therapy from that statement. But of course, the word genocide has so defined and sucked all the oxygen out of the bigger question of Armenian-Turkish relations and that that was where all the focus was. I do believe that now the politics around this issue, particularly in this country, has to change. And I'm not the only one saying that. Let me draw to your attention a column by Harut Sasunian, who is a very well-known and quite militant often Armenian colonist in LA, very well-read, very much read amongst Armenians. And he talks about, most of his column is about what are great days these were for Armenians and he was in Yerevan and how moved he was by the ceremonies. And at the end he says, now that the centennial is behind us, it is high time that Armenians turn the page on Armenian genocide recognition and begin to systematically pursue their claims from Turkey through international, regional, and local tribunals. That's not going to be a statement very welcomed in Turkey, but that he's talking about pursuing the legal angle, but he's also talking about turning the page on the issue of genocide recognition. And I think that's a political reality. And that aspect of it, I think, has to be accepted pretty much by everyone that 100 years on, if President Obama, a second-term president, who has been quite committed to this issue, is not going to use the genocide word, then the focus has to now be elsewhere. And as I've argued for a long time, I'm not the only one, I guess my fellow panelists probably agree with me. I think the focus is definitely now in Turkey itself. There are many problems in Turkey. It's not a full democracy, but there's certainly enough space to debate this issue in Turkey and inside Turkish society. And there are plenty of people inside Turkish society who are calling upon Turkey to face up to its path, to look at its history, just as many other nations in the world do, including this one. The United States, including my own country, United Kingdom, we all have our dark pages in the past and some countries have done more to confront that than others. But that is where I think the debate moves and it moves around various factors. I'm sure Henri will talk a bit more about this, but I think one thing I want to highlight is that the Kurdish majority areas of Turkey have moved a very long way on this issue. Diyarbakir was one of the places where the centennial was particularly commemorated inside the working Armenian church there. The Kurdish party, the HDP, has put up a monument in Diyarbakir and issued an apology to the Armenians. They also don't particularly dwell on the genocide word, but in their statements and deeds, it's all about reconciliation with Armenians. Apologizing for what Kurds did in 1915. And I'm sure Henri will address this more when it comes to the elections, but I think the key factor I think is to watch the Kurdish party, the HDP, in the elections. If they get their 10% of the vote and get represented in parliament, they will be a spokesman, not just for Kurdish rights, which is obviously the main issue for them, but I think for minority rights in general, for the idea that that Turkey is a homeland to many nationalities, and that obviously includes the Armenians as well. Conversely, if the HDP doesn't get its 10%, and I think it's a bit, you know, touch and go, then we may see the reverse process. We may see a more consolidation of a more authoritarian Turkey under a new presidential system. So I think that's going to be a key factor on this issue, but obviously on many other issues in Turkey. And what are the issues which are important inside Turkey? Well, I think it's issues of symbolism about monuments, street names, which are still named after young Turk leaders who ordered deportations, people like Talat Pasha. It's about Armenian cultural monuments, churches, some of them have been restored, but there are many more out there in ruins which need restoration, which are, there are cultural monuments, which in some sense belong, in one obvious sense belong to Turkey because they're on the territory of Turkey, but they also belong to Armenians because they're Armenian cultural monuments. And it's about the history books, it's about changing the school books and getting more honest discussion in the education system about Turkey's past and about what happened in the past. But for me, that's all important, but for me, obviously the biggest issue is Armenia-Turkey relations, which Emil has already referred to, and obviously the big game changer would be if Armenia and Turkey could normalize relations and the border could open. That would be by far the biggest catalyst for an improvement in Armenian-Turkish relations across the board. As we know, unfortunately, that project failed, the last attempt at normalization failed in 2010, with the failure of the protocols process. And that was basically because the Karabakh issue intervened. Azerbaijan felt very insecure and uncomfortable about the protocols. I think that was mishandled on a few levels. I think it could have been a win-win for everyone, including Azerbaijan, but maybe not enough was done behind the scenes to work with Azerbaijan on that issue. What we've seen since is Armenia as it were being driven further into its fortress, a true base agreement with Russia, now committing to join the Eurasian Union, and also an intensification of the conflict on the line of contact. I think, Emile, this is your figure at 72 casualties last year on the line of contact, which made it by far the worst year since the mid-90s. So the conflict, far from being resolved, is actually heating up. I see a role for Turkey. If Turkey could be smarter diplomatically and politically, certainly in Turkey's interest to be a bigger power in the Caucasus and to open up communications, Turkey's not being very smart in the way it's handled the Karabakh conflict, but it does have leverage both over Armenia and Azerbaijan. They're the two small actors who are kind of imprisoned, who are taken hostage by this conflict. It's very hard for them unilaterally to take moves to de-escalate and to move towards resolution. But there's plenty that Turkey could do, and I think now with April 24th and the centennial behind us, this is a moment for Turkey to ask itself what it can do to use that leverage to work on de-escalating and perhaps resolving the Karabakh conflict. It's not Cyprus. It's not a frozen conflict. It's a smoldering conflict. It's dangerous. It's not sustainable in the long run. And unlocking it would be the key to unlocking and resolving many issues. But if it gets worse, then it gets worse and worse. So I'll stop there. Great. Thank you, Jim. Thank you, Tom, for inviting me. What I will do is actually try to confuse you a lot more because I'm confused. In large measure because I will look at take the Armenian question and then put this in the context of Turkish-American relations where they are, where they're going to go in reference to to the elections coming up in Turkey. But let me just start by personal anecdote. During the 2008 presidential campaign I was on the Obama team I was writing the night notes for the campaign on that part of the world Turkey, Caucasus, et cetera. So one night I wrote I think at least a little note on the genocide question which was a little bit nuanced trying to say, look, historians and politicians are two different types of animals, I didn't use that word, but something to that effect and then that, you know, kind of it was a little bit nuanced not using the genocide word. And next morning I get slapped by my team leader says, don't you know that the candidate is committed to using the word genocide? It's been six years and we saw what happened this last week and as Tom showed you the president went into incredible contraption to wanted to use it. When you read the statement he said he really, really wants to use the word genocide but he can't do it and somebody is holding him and says, don't do it. So what happened? Clearly, if he was going to use it the moment to do it. In fact, actually I would say that if he was going to use it he should have maybe done it in 2009 just after he came to the office because that's when he was most powerful, that's when he was I mean, the world was looking at a new leader in the United States and he could have literally done anything he wanted but I think the reason he probably didn't in 2009 is because Turkey at the time was a very different place than it is now. Turkey was a place in the country that was on the move. It was doing everything right from its economy to its foreign policy to, yes it had disputes with some of our allies etc. but in general the AKP government was literally from human rights to the Kurdish question to even on the Armenian issue was doing everything right. So why take a chance and upset the apple cut in 2009. And I think probably this was a much more important argument in terms of not using the G word then. But in any way in many ways we've come to 2015 and you see this continuous struggle is really it's a struggle about the way Turkish-American relations have been in the past and are today and depending on how the elections go will be in the future. On a daily basis Turkish and American officials interact in hundreds and hundreds of different instances from the most important to the most mundane on issues. We need each other and we talk and interact with I mean our officials I should say interact on many, many different different levels. So there is this ongoing very intense relationship but it is a relationship in which I think both sides have taken each other for granted. And this is not new by the way this really goes back to before AKP came to power it's essentially a post-world World War II phenomenon and despite the fact that we do all these exchanges despite the fact that whether in alliances in alliance structures like NATO in many other international institutions and in bilateral relationship and despite the fact that people say always very, very nice things about each other. I think with the exception of very, very few people on both sides the relationship has never really been warm. It is not a warm relationship it is a relationship in which I think both sides pretend that they like the other side. Look, I'm not an official so I can say what I want. So it is really a transactional relationship and for Turkey it was a question of look we need to hitch a wagon to the number one power in the world. That was the, for many ways for Turkey it was very important and Turkey benefitted a great deal from its alliance with the United States. For us too it was an important component because we had a big enemy in the Soviet Union and we needed as many countries as possible and it doesn't matter who we are if we could bring them in we brought them in. So I think that was a fundamental building block of the relationship it is not the kind of relationship we have with many other European allies. Jumping to today I just want to show you how interesting many ways the relationship is. Look at President Erdogan's rhetoric whether it's on the agenda side or it is on Syria. When the United States decided to intervene in Syria specifically in Kobani we if you remember the PKK affiliated groups in Syria were putting up a stiff resistance to the Islamic State in the town of Kobani and Kobani was about to fall and clearly the Turks wanted Kobani to fall because that was going to weaken the PKK etc. And the United States made a decision essentially at the moment to help Kobani because what it saw in Kobani was that the Islamic state had invested enormous amount of resources to take that one time. So it provided the U.S. Air Force with unbelievable damage opportunities as they would say in the Pentagon and the United States did bomb intensively and did enormous amount of damage to the Islamic State well over a thousand other combatants died in that. This was the major difference between the Turkish United States but look at the rhetoric of that Erdogan came up continuously. He said what's in Kobani gold oil diamonds why is the United States intervening that as if the only reason the United States would intervene is if there was gold or diamonds actually I didn't know what diamonds are but anyway but what I'm trying to say is in the rhetoric it's consistently amazingly negative and he said this over and over in 2013 in May 17th Erdogan was in his last visit here and it was at the time when Turkish-American relations were actually quite good and Obama invited them to dinner to his house something he doesn't often do with foreign dignitaries and they had these agreements it was essentially about al-Nusra etc but the optics were great two weeks later the Gezi protest started in Istanbul right again the rhetoric of Erdogan his newspapers and he controls a great deal of the press now in Turkey his his advisors was amazingly anti-American as if we instigated the Gezi protest even on the Armenian general side question even though Obama did not use the word general side the rhetoric has been very nasty what am I telling you all these things compare this to Putin Putin in Syria is helping the Assad regime the Assad regime would not survive it wasn't for Iran, Hezbollah and the Russians Putin went to Iravan Putin called the genocide genocide have you ever seen I don't say anything nasty about Putin and the question is to me is why is it that the United States puts up with it right and in fact it goes back to this issue of transactional relationship and it goes back to there's a way in which the US basically says look the Turks will say this we don't care what they say we need certain things from them and we have to get them because they are vital to our interest and we will put up with a lot of stuff that is not the basis of the kind of relationship for a NATO member you can argue that there may be other NATO members also whose rhetoric is not as politically conducive but given how strong the relationship between Turkey and the United States has been and given the fact that I'm sorry, Adon and Obama had really established a very good relationship whereby especially after the onset of the Arab Spring these two guys were talking to each other continuously so why is it that you turn around like this and why is it that the United States literally spoke to the White House or the State Department I'm sorry, why are you saying these things about us? For some reason the United States is afraid and I would argue that in part again it's because of the critical nature or location of Turkey location, location, location as you know is the most important thing and what is about to come up and all you have to do is read this wonderful piece in the New York Times about the stress on the Assad regime and what is about to happen to the Assad regime. The Assad regime is not going to survive and may end up being just a little hamlet between Damascus and Atakia but the point is a huge calamity is about to descend in Syria and we will need the Turks and you cannot manage the crisis in Syria without Turkey there is no other way to manage Turkey, it's too influential it's too invested and has a way with all the capacities that no other country has in the region to deal with Turkey and look, whatever happens to Syria it is Turkey that's going to rebuild it Turkey has the infrastructure has the companies the private sector that can do it they've done it in many other parts of the world including Russia and they'll do it in Syria so Turkey in that sense is amazingly well poised to play an important role and that's I think in part plus the fact that the the United States has decided to I just want to say one thing I meant to say earlier when I focus on Erdogan I should also say that previous Turkish governments were better in terms of the rhetoric with the United States I mean as of his rhetoric was pretty nasty maybe Demir El Iuzal is probably the only exception President Iuzal was the only person who generally appreciated the United States and generally liked the United States and generally enjoyed being with Americans and I think in terms of leadership it's been very glad to have a Turkish leader I think the United States tries to and I think with Iuzal when you talk to ambassadors who serve when Iuzal was there they all have a very, very different impression of the relationship let me finish by focusing on the elections because I think these elections are going to be exceedingly critical I don't see a good outcome here what do I mean by this Erdogan wants to have his presidential system right and he has done everything in his power to achieve that result the problem is that there is no increasingly a reaction to that in Turkey but he still, look Erdogan still has largest chunk of the Turkish public behind it in large measure and the Turkish public looks at Erdogan and says, at least this guy brought us where we are today economically especially and what is the CHP going to do for us they've never done anything for us in the past MHP doesn't have an economic program so I pitted a Turkish voter who really has a dilemma here so if Erdogan succeeds and gets his 67 seats in parliament to outright change the constitution in parliament he's not going to get that, that's impossible even if the HDP doesn't make the 10% threshold but he will get 330 seats he might get 330 seats in which case they'll change the constitution and go for a referendum and the likelihood is they will make sure that the referendum goes through and any change, I'm not saying that the Turkish system today is perfect but any presidential system that focuses so much on one individual is clearly very, very difficult it's Putinism I think as Tom said I'm sorry it is definitely Putinism but what happens if he succeeds he will succeed with the Kurdish party, HDP barely missing the 10% threshold imagine a situation where HDP gets 9.99% and doesn't make it because 10% threshold is 10% threshold so first of all there will be suspicion of cheating likely so because there has been cheating in the past but clearly that election will be seen as being illegitimate so that's going to create a political crisis of monumental proportions right so if he wins and HDP misses it by 1% or half a percent or whatever that's going to create it if he doesn't win and the only way he's not going to win is that HDP crosses the threshold passes the 10% and gets enough seats in parliament and therefore deny AKP its majority everyone is going to be stuck in a way to undermine either the election results or undermine the system in such a way to undo the election results and I don't know what he's going to do and this is what part of my conundrum is in terms of trying to figure out what happens after the elections but I suspect either way there will be a major crisis in Turkey and I don't know how it's going to be resolved and during that time we're going to rely more and more on a Turkey that is in a leadership that is completely focused on its internal divisions on its internal ambitions and we will have to worry about Iraq and especially Syria on that note go well thank you all three of you it doesn't sound to me like we're off in a new century at least not launched very well but I think it's time to let the audience participate here but I think I would put one question to all of you there is another dynamic at work around the region you've alluded to the Syria conundrum which is a mess which means much of the southern part Iran's border orientation is also somewhat in question depending on how the nuclear talks are done but you also to the north have this whole conundrum of Russia now mired in Ukraine and an uncertainty about Ukraine and so forth to what extent does any of the this sort of preoccupation by others to the north and south and even perhaps to the east provide them opportunities for Turks Armenians and others to take advantage of a different and perhaps more benign context to do anything constructive does anyone see that you haven't described much positive but I'll just put the question on the table really the world generally tends to look in flux but this particular region over the last couple years I think unfortunately slid back into the 20th century if it wasn't the 21st century you know what's been going on in Russia terribly worrying considering it's one of the largest countries in the world with a huge nuclear arsenal and the behavior of its leadership is highly suspect I think Turkey has been sort of you know going in kind of a weird direction as well positive news are out of Iran Rouhani sort of makes good contrast with Ahmadinejad and of course the progress and the negotiations have been sort of the positive element of it in Turkish Armenian finding constructivism in that relationship I think it's always been sort of you know the function of Turkish attention to the subject because there's always a whole bunch of other things and also positive attention because attention could be negative as well there is I think discernible dichotomy between how Erdogan approaches this issue and Davutoglu approaches this issue of course Davutoglu is very much an Erdogan's loyalist but things have gone in different directions in various places and depending on how things pan out there there might be some some dialogue I think going back to the the protocols process one of the things that I think Armenian side did wrong from a get-go in that process was reaching out to Abdullah Gül rather than Erdogan and you know of course Erdogan being the number one politician in the country but they did their sort of negotiations and made Gül part of the process and Erdogan it was much easier to discount this or dismiss this process because he was not personally involved so at this point I don't see any kind of positive dynamic there in Armenian-Turkish relations let alone Armenian-Azerbaijanian relations I think those relations are highly highly flammable right now I would just say on the unfortunately when it comes to Russia Armenian has been a sort of proxy for Ukraine we recall that the September 2013 was when the Armenians said they would join the Eurasian Union and that was I think less about Armenia at the time than trying to persuade the Ukrainians to do it and of course the Ukrainians went in a different direction and Armenian became more of a kind of acquired more of a symbolic value for the Russians as a consequence the Armenian economy is nothing for the Eurasian Union for Russia but as a political and symbolic issue the Russians have clung onto it as a success story in their fight with the EU and I think it doesn't promise anything good for Armenia that project but they're stuck with it I was pretty pessimistic did something funny happen last week there was an election on Sunday I guess on the Turkish part of Cyprus in the Northern Republic of Cyprus and the candidate that was not backed by the Turkish government won an overwhelming majority 60% against the anointed guy and I don't think it very badly the Ambassador Mustafa Künce who's actually a very decent guy and so if we were to extrapolate if there was a major defeat not just HDP crossing the threshold but there was a really significant defeat in in the next elections in Turkey whereby AKP does not even get a majority of the seats in parliament and therefore cannot form a government without forming a coalition with somebody that will probably spur a change within the AKP because there are voices within the AKP that are looking Abdullah Kürt to mention following up on the mail Abdullah Kürt is clearly sending signals he's not a very strong leader he's always been in Erdogan's shadow but whether or not a major defeat opens up an opportunity for him to challenge and maybe split the party and then you have a new AKP that emerges that this goes back to its roots of the 2003-2008 period of a liberal attempted liberal party maybe that's the positive all right let me open to the audience yes sir Rich Kosler it's from George Mason University let's go back to are we going to the 21st century or back to the 20th how much of an opportunity do we in fact have now for Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan to really address the Nagorno-Karabakh issue because I really can't think of any other thing that would really define movement into the 21st century than progress on that Minsk Group co-chairs and the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan just met the normal outcome but it strikes me that there's an opportunity here if suddenly these three parties show the political will to solve this because otherwise we are going to go back to the 20th century my personal concern is that once we get past the European Olympic Games in June that whether there's a hiatus now or not in the military conflict the risk of an outbreak of even more serious fighting rises so is there anything that would suggest an opportunity here to move on this finally or are we in fact going to go back to the 20th century including the possibility of war Tom you want to start yeah unfortunately I don't see it Rich I don't think you do either I fear that the only good scenario I see is also a bad scenario that it gets worse before it gets better I do believe that you know the leaders in both Baku and Yerevan in a sense imprisoned by commitments they've made over the last 20 years to victory rather than to compromise and they don't have Heydar Aliyev may have been the last figure with the kind of authority to change that paradigm and they don't see Ilham Aliyev or so suddenly changing that paradigm so if it's not going to change from within is it going to change from without and there's no it's not an issue which has big international interest or consensus the consensus is actually breaking down over other issues so it's not so Washington and Moscow are meeting to talk about the Karabakh issue so I think we have to be pessimistic it's all we see why it needs to happen but we can't see how it's going to happen just like a point the only congruence or sort of overlap I think that's happening right now between Armenian Azerbaijan is just this general sense of fear of Putin you can see it and how you know the leaders of Armenian Azerbaijan interact with him how they comment or not comment on what he does there is that overlap however I don't know if you know the somehow could come to their senses and realize that by sort of running intensifying this conflict basically they're driving themselves both of those countries into you know into I don't want to call it the Russian but really Putin's project because clearly those countries should have close relations with Russia it's a natural extension economically in other ways however the project that I see now Putin sort of spearheading you know I would not have agreed to sort of Clinton's characterization of you know Putin wanting to recreate the Soviet Union when she made those comments but now after Ukraine I think those are legitimate comments and legitimate war is a legitimate worry and I think there's got to be sense in both Armenian Azerbaijan that they have some interest in common in the situation okay yes sir it's important and it's basically an empty system for providing students who are in Turkey and to your remarks don't you think you can look at that like Turkey is not only strategic to be important for the country, don't you think there's more to it than that don't you think that there is more stronger things that the United Turkey and United States don't think that they're able to change its transition the fact that there will be an election in the street on June 7 and the fact that people were commemorating various narratives on what happened a hundred years ago made Turkey important for the United States it's a prominent location because there are more strategically located countries in religion as well but none of them have the abilities of Turkey characteristics of Turkey despite the Johnson letters, arms embargo and the proof supported by our countries Turkish people also carry a background in the United States and the second question is you talked a lot about the legal aspects of this issue but how do you base a legal case without legally defining there is a document without defining what the allegation is how do you build the case on this and talk about this I guess you and Emile, why don't you start with two look what I criticized on Kobani was not the fact whether or not Kobani is strategic or not strategic whether it's empty or not empty it was strategically important for the United States because given the amount of equipment ISIS had captured and given the amount of people that it used to attack Kobani and given the amount of people it put forward I mean as I said it's more than a thousand ISIS fighters were killed in Kobani alone so clearly for the United States it was a strategic location I don't, wait my criticism was not if anyone had said look I think the United States is making a mistake this is not strategic that's perfectly fine that's very legitimate but the kind of rhetoric I quoted you the only reason the United States might be interested is because oil or diamonds or gold in Kobani clearly that is amazingly condescending and he did not say it once he said it repeatedly over and over and over that's what I'm saying he wouldn't say why is he not saying the same thing about Putin who has bankrolled financially and especially militarily this Assad regime which is clearly we agree Turkey and the United States agree on the Assad regime that it is a horrible horrible regime that has done enormous stuff to its own people and yet I have not seen a single criticism of President Putin from Mr. Erdogan that to me shows a very interesting imbalance so if in the United States Mr. Erdogan once would be taken seriously right he needs to calibrate disagree we don't have to agree allies don't always have to agree with all kinds of allies we disagree and I do agree with you that in fact the relationship between Turkey and the United States ought to be a hell of a lot better but it isn't and it isn't because of this I don't know how to put it if there's termites in the relationship that has undermined the basis of it that can change but it will take enormous amount of work it will also take look I spend and you probably do the same thing I spend reading Turkish newspapers all of them every day and the stuff that I read is amazingly worrisome not because some wacko guy says something is because a lot of this the stuff that is being said about the United States and the United States allies are the people who are very very close to the president and who travel with him all the time that to me is what is worrisome okay thanks Jan for the question on the legal side well I mean I don't see much many legal avenues here I think Emile's already made the point that it's about politics it's also about society I mean clearly no one's going to get prosecuted for crimes committed in 1915 everyone is dead there were actually prosecutions it's often forgotten in 1919 by the first post war Ottoman government but that process collapsed after a few months and what's often forgotten in a genocide debate is that the United Nations Convention in 1948 was on the prevention of prevention of the crime of genocide it wasn't on prosecuting past genocides the Nuremberg trials were held not under the genocide convention it was about preventing future genocides it wasn't about it had no the genocide convention has no retroactive basis when it comes to reparations I think that clearly there are some Armenians around who carry some title deeds but you know are those properties standing those are title deeds in the Ottoman Empire you're basically talking about trying to re-litigate World War 1 which is an incredibly difficult process in which millions of people Armenians of course but many other nationalities were displaced so I don't see that as being a very promising avenue either just maybe a couple of words on the legal aspect things certainly this shift towards the emphasis and Tom already mentioned Harus Asunian he's been writing about that for a number of years basically his argument has been we are getting some publicity out of the campaigns to have the genocide word used in resolution or statement somewhere but we're not really getting anything out of it in terms of actual result so why don't we go in the other direction and Armenians have gone in the legal direction starting maybe 15 years ago starting with the lawsuits against the insurance companies major European insurance companies also New York Life Insurance in the United States those insurance companies that issued insurance policies to Armenians were killed during the genocide and subsequently their deeds remained unclaimed actually Turkish government tried to collect on those claims but it was not always successful and they managed to settle several of those cases New York Life and French insurance company AXA and some of the others and there was some real outcome there they've run into some issues with the German insurance insurer who resisted paying and they some of the other legal cases basically were out of US jurisdiction when it came there was a lawsuit for example launched about 4 or 5 years ago on some of the land and now the interleague base used by US Air Force in Turkey apparently some of that territory was confiscated from an Armenian owner that was a question of jurisdiction now the Armenian church specifically Armenian church based in Lebanon which used to be based in the town of Kozan in historic Silesia in Kalikia the Armenian name for this city is CIS of course their property was confiscated in the aftermath of the genocide they're suing for that particular territory there they're suing for the first time in a Turkish legal system which is different from what's been going on until now and I think that shift has to do with not just with the sort of general shift towards legal this kind of losses were really unimaginable 20 years ago with an Armenian church especially the nationalist church based in Lebanon would be able to come in and hire lawyers in Turkey and progress in a secure way this has only become possible in the last 10-15 years so they will pursue those whatever they can in terms of the institutions in terms of the individuals but I think more success is likely to come from lawsuits by Turkish citizens of Armenian descent and Armenian foundations of Turkey regarding properties confiscated by Republic of Turkey which have which has also confiscated a lot of Armenian properties and the instituted that attacks on the minorities during World War II there's a whole bunch of issues arising from that period of Turkish history more recent than the genocide so there's definitely quite a few legal avenues to pursue some will be successful, some will not be successful, in this case I think the church sort of going to the constitutional court without I don't think real expectation to win in the Turkish constitutional court but to be able to then appeal to the European court the human rights so you know that's but I don't think that's going to be the only thing Armenians will do I'm sure there's going to be quite a bit of political activism around these issues as well Wayne Thank you the panel has essentially addressed the centennial as a missed opportunity by Turkey I'd like to ask them to come in a little bit about another opportunity that's out there and that is Cyprus which is no longer a frozen conflict it's warming in very positive ways this weekend's election has created a correlation of political leadership on the two sides of the island such as we have never seen before I mean it's difficult and I say this is somebody who's worked the Cyprus issue it's almost difficult not to be optimistic which is unprecedented on Cyprus but now we have the perspective situation in which the two sides on the island might actually be willing to make a settlement and not be able to sell it in Ankara I mean because Erdogan's initial reaction was not just negative to the election it was petulant and I see that as contributing to a pattern of Turkish behavior that's not fulfilling the old ambition of good relations with all of our neighbors but almost one of creating bad relations with all of our neighbors and a Turkey that sees itself as being this new important regional power which it is but of pursuing a go-it-alone posture not just from NATO in the European Union United States but almost a go-it-alone from its periphery and I'm wondering where this all leads because it's not every day that a Cyprus settlement presents itself to Ankara practically on a silver salver not to take advantage of that strikes me as a lost opportunity of a worse diplomatic failure than the lost opportunity of this Antonio of the genocide and I'd like to comments look I I don't want comments where I mean I think your characterization is correct but I would say that we have yet to see how Turkey is going to react in the sense that sometimes you do I don't assess things and Turkey does something different it kind of comes down and it gets focused on something else and then I think if there is a great deal of momentum and clearly if the new president Mustafa Khan does have a great deal of support on the island it may be very very difficult for the Turks to stop it it all depends on also what the other European countries are going to do it also depends on how the Greek Cypriots but look the Greek Cypriots in the past also had came close to it to a solution and they were the ones who walked away so it's not on the island it's not just the Turks with missed opportunities the Greek Cypriots so I think it's a little bit too early to say I brought it up only because I think it's an indication of people kind of saying maybe enough is enough of the overbearing style of Erdogan maybe at least in some places and if it happens in enough places there is a reaction I know people in Istanbul who for not in a million years would have voted for a Kurdish party who are not getting organized you know nice middle class people who did not occur from from anybody who was just a bad word are all now getting together to vote for HDP only as a means of stopping Erdogan so change happens look Erdogan himself in 2003 was in an enormous in amazing positive change I mean 2003 to 2008 was Turkey of dynamic confident in a positive way confident Turkey did and did ever try to undo and we heard today in terms of the stuff that some of the stuff that is still happening is because of that period of 2003-2008 right CHP mainly the Republican People's Party was the party of the state that Erdogan took over all the Armenian and other minorities properties the other ones who have who instituted and imposed draconian measures on the Kurds on all kinds of minorities so AKP and Erdogan were a real breath of fresh air because they also felt they had been oppressed so there was sympathy with all the other oppressed but something happened after 2008 and so two steps forward now in the step backward thank you just to talk about the chance that have been given to actually all the source caucuses region we all here speak about some chances of things getting optimistic and we somehow here being pessimistic of describing the conflict in the region that for example after the solution of Soviet Union and there isn't an elephant in the room now that nobody calls the main problem in the region is the conflict and why conflict emerged is the territorial claim so we are talking about the casualties on the line of contact and actually this line of contact goes through the territory of Republic of Azerbaijan so there is occupied territory and actually the borders between Turkey and Armenia hasn't been closed 100 years ago it has been closed in 1993 after the occupation of the territories out of the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan which were the Kalbajar so that's the issue that we should talk about here too because the main problems there territorial conflict as Tom mentioned Harut Sasunyan's urge after 100 years that opened all the aggressive policy of those people of those who would support against territorial claims against Turkey also because we all know that during this well marching all over the world of Armenian diaspora the one of the main chanting and motto was like Eastern Turkey is a Western Armenia that was also the case that's another elephant in the room here so don't you think that we should have the example of where the successful story of cooperation between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey that we see now and that's one of the priority projects that we are working now for example Energy Gas Coordination another international project don't you see the possibility of Armenia to stop these territorial claims let's say get engaged in the integration in the region do you think that it would be possible and one last issue that Tom mentioned it's interesting that Tom you're always proponent of the point that the main actors all we can do on the conflict that can be done either in Yerevan or Baku and you right now said that Turkey has a leverage and actually whenever we have these kind of gatherings and we put the point that US and Russia has the points and I think that much more than Turkey you're kind of not agree with that so that was interesting and where the last point that Mr. Samyam said that we have something in common with Armenia which we do but I wouldn't say that it's being scared of Mr. Putin because actually Azerbaijan a year ago voted a UN General and voted yes and we were not scared for anybody we have very good relations with all our neighbors unfortunately except Armenia because of the occupied territories but we are having our independent policy there and Armenia were among 11 countries that voted against the territorial and negative Ukraine maybe that indicates some being scared or not but I'm sure that for example on Armenia is and we know that Armenia tried to include their also occupied territory so that's the thing that we should talk about but my question would be isn't that the way to just eliminate the problem to stop the territorial claims in the region and try to look further we're talking about 21st century and go on, thank you Thank you, well if any it was so simple on one side we'd suddenly see the light but unfortunately I mean I don't want to go back of the whole history of the Karabakh conflict but it didn't start as an armed conflict it started as a political dispute back in 1988 and then it became violent and there are many disputes over territory and sovereignty in the world some of them are violent and some of them are not and it's not just up to one side to give up it takes two to negotiate and unfortunately both Armenia and Azerbaijan in that period failed that test they didn't manage to have dialogue on that issue and it ended up with a conflict it wasn't just that one day Yerevan decided we're going to take a piece of Azerbaijan it was a much more complicated thing as you know including Azerbaijani violence against Armenians and then Armenian violence against Azerbaijanis so it's a conflict it's a dispute and the only way it's going to end is if both sides give something I think that's basically it of course you say that Azerbaijan isn't scared but I do detect insecurity both in Armenia and in Azerbaijan certainly and on the Ukraine issue I see Azerbaijan as being quite divided on one side supporting territorial integrity of Ukraine on the other hand a very strong line against the Maidan principle that we don't want to see a Maidan that Maidan was bad and we don't want to see a Maidan in Azerbaijan as has been said many times by the presidential chief of staff Mr. Myrtyev I think there's been really a change in rhetoric in Azerbaijan as far as Russia you could just polar opposites from what it was in the 90s to what it is today if in the 90s officials of Azerbaijan would refer to genocide by Russia against Azerbaijan today it's all of the issues between Russia and Azerbaijan pretty much forgotten from the official lexicon all of the official lexicon is directed towards the United States towards Germany towards the Armenian agents in the US government and the European governments look this is a very difficult conflict to resolve it was a very difficult conflict to live through we don't want basically to go through another cycle of bloodshed to basically come back to where we are today again look at where we were in the 90s really years after after the after the war when Heydar Ali was still president of Azerbaijan I think that period in the retrospect was a period of healing between Armenians and Azerbaijanis there was quite a bit of exchanges Heydar Ali would receive Armenian journalists Armenian leaders would receive Azerbaijanis journalists Azerbaijani news media and vice versa what has happened under Ilham Ali is a complete control freak type of regime where no one is allowed to talk to Armenians other than him and his foreign minister the people who have some kind of involvement in the civil society are portrayed as enemies of the state and in prison more and more of them are in prison I think that direction takes us away from the resolution I don't think it makes Azerbaijan case stronger I don't think it makes Armenians more intimidated because really there's never been much of a choice there as far as Armenians posture in Karabakh so I think it's counterproductive I think there's got to be a way to rethink what's been done in the last 15 years in Azerbaijan and I think it's an interest of Azerbaijan and the entire region as well I'm Karan Israelyan embassy of Armenia thank you very much for all your speeches and all the ideas I just have one very short comment and a question if I may our colleague from Azerbaijan kind of managed to bring all the elements of their state propaganda in this very short video to address I'm not going to touch on the topics which we assume that have a lot of historical inaccuracies and discrepancies one Tom Deval has already touched on the main causes of the problem and the second one regarding the fear I just want to assure everybody here that the Republic of Armenia makes its decisions based on its national security we may have some concerns while making those decisions but fear is never a factor there so this is just a comment and a question I want to ask the question to all the panelists the main idea that was kind of circulating here in this room was that there is a need to close the 20th century and open the 21st relating to the issue of Armenian Turkish relations and there was an idea that once the centennial is passed we can assume that the 21st century is closed I just want to know your opinion on because I understand all of us are thinking that 21st century is something progressive, something forward looking don't you think that if Turkey manages to follow the calls 20 or even more countries and major European and international organizations to reconcile with their own past and to recognize the genocide don't you think that this will pave a way for more better 21st century rather than just closing the centennial date and looking forward thank you very much can I make a comment? first I just would say I don't think I put the question that it's ended the question is has it ended and I think there isn't I think the returns are out from at least the discussion so far and so I think it's important to understand that the panelists really here we're trying to discuss the question of whether or not it really has ended or not or whether we're still living in the 20th century and we've got a ways to go well I mean I would only say of course we want Turkey to reconcile with its history and of course as I mentioned it's not just Turkey it's many countries around the world I mean you pull out a $20 bill a portrait of Andrew Jackson on there which I think may be not very friendly message to Native Americans when they're thinking about their history so it's not just Turkey the question is how you get from here to there and I don't believe that maybe 20-30 years ago when this issue was completely taboo in Turkey maybe outside pressure did make a difference but now it's got to be what's happening inside Turkey and I think the outside campaigns become secondary particularly after this Centennial. As far as what's next I think there's a lot to be said about working inside Turkey in terms of the Turkish society I had an opportunity a few months ago to visit Turkish Parliament for the first time in my life I've been to the presidency before but not the Parliament it was an interesting experience really the stranger part was when we met with Mr. Demertas, leader of the Democratic Party of Peoples of Turkey not just one people he was completely forthcoming on this issue he was basically it kind of felt like meeting with your congressman here on the Capitol Hill he was so much aligned with what many Armenians are when it comes to Turkey you know there is a plenty that Armenian government and Armenian institutions non-government institutions can find ways to be present in Ankara and there's been some talk about that there is at least until recently quite a few Armenians running on this parliamentary elections I don't know if any of them get elected but there might actually be a situation where there's going to be more Armenians in Turkish Parliament than they're say the numbers been shrinking there so as far as the recognition of the genocide it's not it's not it's not a finite process it's not like you said it forget about it there is a whole set of issues around this of course president making this annual statement of course it's kind of ridiculous at this point that Obama uses the G word Putin uses the G word then he gets some Turkish criticism and he gets Medvedev to use the G word again to make sure that they hurt the message so it is kind of ridiculous it does feel especially from the Armenian perspective that you know Putin has Kohones and the guy here unfortunately appears to not and come around those particular terms but I don't think it's a finite process had Obama used the term in 2009 or just in the last statement I don't think that would have ended the process of lobbying here it is going to be a process that continues until Armenian government, Armenian diaspora organizations have a stake in friendship with Turkey when that situation is created and I think some foundations have began as far as the Armenian diaspora so many Armenians now go into Turkey so many Armenians having personal experiences in Turkey that are far divorced from their worst expectations of the country but as far as the Armenian-Turkey relations a lot needs to be done and like I said my commentary is not an optimistic one on that Yes Thank you, I'm Mikhail Mamedev I'm also from George Mason University I actually wanted to ask this question at the beginning of the discussion Well, first question is to Emil Emil Sunamand when President Circassian received invitation from Erdogan to attend Gallipoli celebration what do you think, what was the meaning of this invitation was it just refusal to attend commemoration at the Tsar-Kanabert or did it have some other meaning and the second question is to Anri when you talk about importance of Turkey for United States do you think it's something between a question and comment I think it's more like a question do you think that Turkey is also very important for Russia too because Russia is very concerned with the security of the straits and also Russia is desperately trying to save the gas well, it used to be called South Stream and now it's trying to rehabilitate the South well, some kind of form of South Stream putting this gas pipeline to Bulgaria to Serbia, maybe to Hungary and we remember 2008 when Turkey locked its straits for American ships do you think that Turkey is very important for both countries and for Russia? Thank you I mean by definition the answer is yes of course I mean Turkey for many of the reasons that you mentioned is strategically this location is very strategic and in a way, look some countries have oil Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and they make money from and they win what we in academia we call from this and some countries earn grants from that strategic location Turkey doesn't have oil much in terms of real natural resources but its location is what is most important and that's why it has been always a critical place where you've seen the two alliances colliding in some ways where why for the United States it was so important to have Turkey on its side and the Soviet Union to essentially contest of course it's critical it's a straits, it's a location and also the fact that Turkey today is a very important economic power it is one of the G20s so it is a huge market it is a country that exports a great deal look at what also Turkish airlines has done in terms of expanding around the world so I mean this is no longer the Turkey of the 1960s where it was basically trying to make everything at home its ambitions were very limited this is a country with huge ambitions and those ambitions have now and this is a success I would say of Adwan and his party that those ambitions have been injected into the Turkish population so there's a great deal more self confidence I mean that's a big change that has taken place since Adwan came to power so of course yes and it's going to be even more important in the future and it's not a question of alliances it's also because of as I said the power of the Turkish economy and the world is becoming much more integrated as far as Gallipoli basically what the brief short prehistory of that is that Armenians were invited to Erdogan's inauguration and took the opportunity to personally hand them the invitation to the genocide commemoration but it was not a very thought through move again giving the government that was really not on the same page on this issue an opportunity to hijack this process they did not take that opportunity thankfully but they came up with another stranger kind of smart idea some advisor must have suggested to Erdogan out clever the Armenians let's do Gallipoli on the April 24th it has nothing to do with Gallipoli battle and sort of steal the show from the Armenians so of course that only added additional fuel additional commentary inside Turkey outside Turkey about this whole issue so when they were inviting Sir Sargsyan to come to Turkey for Gallipoli it was their non-response response to the invitation for Erdogan to come to Armenia and of course Sir Sargsyan declined because it would have been highly controversial thing for him to be at the Gallipoli celebration in Turkey but my sense of it was that there might have been an opening for Sir Sargsyan to come and commemorate the genocide in Istanbul not to come to the Gallipoli but you know of course it's a tough decision to call of course just the logistics of it to be in both places at the same time even though some people have actually done it but you know with people type of Putin and Olaan deriving in Armenia it was not something that you know probably was going to work for president of Armenia to be in both places but you know it could have been some other official Christina Jeffers with NDI one of the things that we saw with the centennial was you know just this enormous outpouring and rallying of the diaspora community including some high-profile Armenians and regular Armenians who basically made pilgrimage to Yerevan and I was I really I wanted to ask Emil and maybe Tom do you think that this energy could be harnessed to sort of get the diaspora reengaged in modern Armenia which is you know former Soviet Armenia which is at a really critical point economically and politically strategically and whose course could really be set I think over the next five years or so let's hope so is my short answer I mean that would that's really what Armenia needs yes I agree with Tom all right but with that I want to thank everyone for coming I guess any last words from the panel just want to mention that we are actually live streamed so you can tell your friends who missed it that you can actually they can watch the whole thing again on the internet thanks for coming okay well thank you all for coming and thank the panel and I think the returns remain out on whether we are in the 21st century