 I'm Takuro Yamashita. I'm an assistant professor in Tudus School of Economics. I did my Bachelor and Master in Hitotsubashi University in Japan, and then I did a PhD in US. I'm in this microeconomic theory group in Tudus, and people there study questions about mechanism design, game theory and so on. My main research field is microeconomics, especially I do a mechanism design, which studies what kind of social institutions or rules of the game in economies are desirable in the social perspective. One of the topics I'm working on currently is a combination of mechanism design and so-called information disclosure problem. So to give some idea, imagine that you are the center of some used car or second hand car, and you know the quality of this car. Of course, like you want to make a high price so that you can get a lot of money, but at the same time there is a classical trade-off that if the price is too high, of course nobody wants to buy. But here there is another dimension of the problem, which is what kind of information and how much information to disclose. If the car is in a good condition, you may want to disclose this information, but if it's in a bad condition, of course you may want to hide it. You may want to systematically decide what kind of information to communicate with the consumer. In this situation I find that actually it's better to disclose all the information systematically. That's the best way to get the highest possible revenue. This question of course has been there in the literature for a long time, but in the sense that we don't have a good mathematical tools to analyze this question. So now we know how to model correctly these questions and solve these problems. So we can now use these tools to study these important economic questions and get new insights and so on.