 Thank you, everyone, for joining us this afternoon in this terrific facility, and I think everyone has made it through the security line and is here. We're delighted today to have you join us in a presentation and discussion of my colleague Bonnie Claesor's new report on Taiwan's quest for greater participation in the international community, what sometimes is called international space. This is an important issue for the people on Taiwan, of course, but it's also an important issue for the United States and other democracies who fundamentally believe that while there is greater stability in cross-strait relations, ultimately, Taiwan's democracy is an example for the rest of Asia, one to be respected, and that there are legitimate and important issues in international organizations that are discussed where the people of Taiwan deserve and we need to see them get a seat at the table. So Bonnie has done, as she often has in the past on similar issues, a thorough assessment of the problem and a set of recommendations that are balanced, practical, and implementable, and we're going to come back to that in a discussion with Bonnie about the report. A bit about how we're organized our hour and a half here today. We are very much appreciative to Michael Schiffer from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Taiwan caucus members for making this room available. We had expected the two leaders of the Taiwan caucus, Senators Menendez and Inhofe, to open up the proceedings. They're cloistered with Senator Kerry now talking about Iran. I'm sure that's not going so pleasantly for Senator Kerry, but they're over there right now and if they join us, we're going to stop wherever we are in the proceedings and invite them to make some comments. We also have a message from President Ma, which my friend Liu Li, the Assistant Director for Tech Row, will read shortly. Then we'll turn to Bonnie to introduce the report to you and then Ambassador Li and Bonnie and I will have a brief discussion and then we'll open it up for your questions and comments on the report. Before I start, let me also recognize Barbara Schragi and Joe Donovan. Barbara is close to the end of a very distinguished service period as the Managing Director of AIT. She was in the job when I went to the NSC. Without her, I would have been lost and I'm sure that's true for the other NSC senior directors, Assistant Secretaries of State, Commerce, pretty much every part of the U.S. government and U.S. Congress that depend on her to steer us in the right direction on our full gamut of issues, relationships, cooperation and friendship with the people of Taiwan. So I just want to first, it's a little early because she's still out a few weeks. No senior slump, not allowed to back off yet, but I just wanted to quickly thank her and also welcome Joe Donovan who will be taking her place. They're overlapping by a few weeks, so they have to sit together everywhere. But if you could just join me, I want to thank Barbara very much for her service and what she's done for us. She has a few weeks and I'm sure we'll be seeing a lot more of her even after that. And good luck to Joe who's an esteemed scholar, an expert and diplomat on Asia and a good friend of Taiwan and a terrific person for the job. So let's turn it over now to Ambassador Leo Lee. Thank you for joining us. Ambassador Lee was an ambassador in St. Venson's and the Grenades and the Caribbean. And after the past few days, I storm, I'm sure he'd rather be there, but we're delighted to join us and we'll open up if we could with the message you brought from President Ma. Hello. It's an honor for me to read a message from our President, President Ma Ying-jeou. President Menades, Senator Inhofe, Senior Advisor Glaser, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen. Good afternoon. I'm delighted that the Center for Strategic and International Studies is able to host this event to discuss the important issue of Taiwan's international participation and U.S. support for its effort in this regard. As President of the Republic of China, I would like to express appreciation to Chairman Robert Menades and Senator James Inhofe for taking part in this event today. The two co-chairs of the Senate Taiwan Caucus, Chairman Menades and Senator Inhofe, have both been great friends of my country for years. Both of them steadfastly support Taiwan and its effort to participate meaningfully on the world stage. The introduction of S-579 by both senators in support of Taiwan's participation in the International Civil Aviation Organization early this year led to the passage of a law that has helped Taiwan secure an invitation for the first time after a departure of 42 years to the IKO Assembly as a special guest in September. Their presence today demonstrates the enduring support for my country in the U.S. Congress, support that is deeply appreciated by Taiwan. I would also like to, I would also be remiss if I did not thank Ms. Bonnie Gases and her team from CSIS for writing a report entitled Taiwan's Challenges as an international actor. Their report is the most comprehensive study of the need for Taiwan's full participation in international organizations we have seen in recent years. We appreciate Ms. Gases' scholarship and her interest in Taiwan and we are excited this report is being unveiled today. Finally, I would like to wish for the success of today's event and look forward to receiving all of you good friends in Taiwan again soon. Thank you very much. Thank you, Ambassador Lee. And what President Ma said about senators in Hoff and Menendez is absolutely right. If it weren't for this closed-door hearing on Iran, I'm certain it would have been here because of the importance they place on this issue and on our friendship with Taiwan and the leadership they've shown in the caucus and in our Asia policy overall until now. But their leadership positions in the SASC and SFRC make it, you know, basically impossible to not be in this meeting right now with Secretary Kerry at a critical time in our Iran diplomacy and we may yet see them. So with that, let me turn it over to Bonnie to introduce the report and then we'll hear further comments from Ambassador Lee and then we'll open it up for a round table and an audience discussion. Great. Well, thanks to all of you for coming, Michael Schiffer, to help – for helping organize this to Senators Menendez and in Hoff, of course, for their support on this very, very important issue to my colleague Mike Green and also to Ambassador Lee for joining today. This is an issue that I attach a lot of importance to and I think it's important as Mike Green said, not only for the United States, certainly for Taiwan but also for the broader international community. As you know, Taiwan faces challenges in participating in the international community in various ways in international organizations, whether they be UN-affiliated or not, and even in non-governmental organizations where Beijing never misses an opportunity to constrain Taiwan's space to have its voice heard. There are a lot of costs for excluding Taiwan from the international community. First, of course, for the 23 million people of Taiwan and perhaps the best example of this was in 2003 when the SARS epidemic broke out, Taiwan did not receive information in a timely manner and that was, of course, very harmful to people in Taiwan who were not only trying to fight the disease from spreading in Taiwan but also to share information with other nations about how the epidemic was spreading and how it was particularly spreading from the mainland to Taiwan. Even beyond that, though, the exclusion of Taiwan from many international organizations erodes Taiwan's competitiveness and it hampers Taiwan's integration in the regional economy. And I talk about in the report Taiwan's efforts to join, which are really, I think, just getting underweight seriously to join in over the next perhaps few years the Trans-Pacific Partnership and also RCEP. And of course, Taiwan's recent successes in signing agreements, trade agreements, first with New Zealand and then with Singapore. This is really important for Taiwan because both of these countries are founding members of TPP and I think that Taiwan will look to be negotiating more agreements in the future and in the report I talk about some of those, the status of some of those negotiations. So as far as the cost to the international community, it's quite clear that keeping Taiwan out of many organizations prevents Taiwan from adding its knowledge, its skills, and its resources to many organizations and Taiwan is a leading actor in so many areas and we can take something like the UN framework on convention on climate change as an example where Taiwan's NGO participation is really, really active and adds a great deal. But Taiwan's government is so far does not have a seat at the table. So Taiwan's approach has really been to gradually expand its participation pretty much on a case by case basis. Under President Ma, we've seen some important achievements. The first was really becoming an observer at the World Health Assembly in 2009. And as Ambassador Lee mentioned, this year Taiwan was invited for the first time to be a guest at the International Civil Aviation Organization assembly or IKO. But even these successes are incomplete. Taiwan's still not a member of the WHO's global outbreak alert and response network, for example. And although Taiwan did attend this recent triennial meeting of IKO, there's really no path forward that is so far that's going to enable Taiwan to participate in IKO meetings, to contribute to them, to join in the deliberations. And I hope that there will be efforts by Taiwan, by the U.S. and other countries to try and push for Taiwan to become an observer in the IKO council in the future. And the U.S. should certainly help Taipei to achieve that goal. I talk a bit in the report about some of the obstacles to Taiwan expanding its participation in the international community and the biggest, of course, is Beijing. And as we know, China opposes treating Taiwan as a sovereign state. But the problems really go beyond that. In my discussions with officials in Beijing over many, many years, and also in preparing this report, I had a delegation that went to both sides of the Strait to talk about this issue. And former Assistant Secretary James Kelly, who many of you know, headed the delegation. And one of the things that I think was reinforced in our conversations was that there's concern in the mainland that if Taiwan is given greater international presence, then that could be used to press somehow for independence in the future. One would hope that with China's growing confidence, its capabilities, its power economically and politically and militarily, that China would become more confident in itself and give Taiwan the opportunity to play a role in any organization that it really wants to participate in or be a member of. So I think that it's extremely unlikely that Taiwan would be able to leverage its participation in an international organization to achieve de jure independence. But there it is. This continues to be a concern, which I think is really unfounded, but one that the international community really should push back on. Beijing's policy of squeezing Taiwan's international space is also quite obviously contrary to China's own goals of winning support from the Taiwan public for better cross-strait relations. If all polls that have been done of people in Taiwan show that participating more in the international community is very high on the list of what Taiwan people want to see their government achieve for them. And so when China blocks this right, when it interferes, even in the case of NGOs or Taiwan film producers or actors and actresses or even recently singers in various events around the world, I think it creates a very, very negative attitude among people in Taiwan, which does not help Beijing's goal of increasing and improving the cross-strait relationship. So U.S. support from both Congress and the executive branch, I think for Taiwan's efforts to expand its international space, is critically important. And Ambassador Lee talked about the support that Senators Mendes and Inhofe gave in first introducing the legislation, which later became law, that directed the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to obtain observer status for Taiwan and in IKO. And there's more work to be done on this in the future. But that assistance, that support, is critically important. I would say that the combination of support, and it is really all of these elements working together of U.S. Congress, of the executive branch, of other nations, not just the United States, and also continued pressure on Beijing that all of these are needed to further promote Taiwan's role in the international community. Now, I'm now going to just summarize a few of the recommendations that I've made in this report. There are numerous. I'm not going to go into all of them. And I do take first them individually, Taiwan, mainland China, and then the United States. So I think the most important thing for Taiwan is really domestically. Taiwan has to undertake the adjustments in its own economy to be more open so that it can be a part of the regional integration process, and it can prepare to join TPP in the future. The pace and the scope of economic liberalization is completely under Taiwan's control. This is something that I think the government in Taiwan needs to do, and the faster the Taipei moves domestically, the more options that it will have internationally with regard to participation in regional trade and regional investment opportunities. Second again is on the issue of bilateral trade agreements. I've mentioned the agreements with Singapore and with New Zealand. These again may facilitate a path for Taiwan to join TPP in the future. So more of those should go forward. When Taiwan deals with mainland China, it sets what it sees as priorities. And I think that when President Ma chooses his priorities very carefully and he pushes for them, he is often successful. This is an issue, Taiwan's greater international space, that Taiwan has to make a priority with the mainland. In pushing Xi Jinping to provide more opportunity for Taiwan to block Taiwan less, there could be a greater possibility to really make more progress. It must be an issue on the cross-strait agenda, because if Beijing wants to continue to veto or block Taiwan's participation, they can continue to do so. A few items on the list for Beijing. The Chinese need to recognize that, again, that their policy of stifling Taiwan's participation in the international community simply breeds distrust in Taiwan, and it's contrary to China's interest in improving cross-strait ties. Beijing really should be more magnanimous and demonstrate some goodwill on this issue. It is really important for Taiwan. It will also send signals to the rest of the world about whether China is going to be willing to give in order to get so that it can have a better relationship. If it can have a better relationship with Taiwan, then maybe other neighbors will draw some conclusions that it too can have better relations with China and benefit from China's rise. I want to mention one thing that's very specific. It may seem like a trivial item, but I think it is really important that China needs to instruct its foreign ministry to stop constraining Taiwan's international space. It needs to tear up the memorandum of understanding that was signed with the World Health Organization. No future such MOUs should be signed that dictate what any international organization should do in dealing with Taiwan that is somehow unique in the organization. This has created a lot of ill-will in Taiwan, and I think was very unfortunate that it happened in the case of the WHO. And then the third thing for the mainland is to provide unqualified support and assistance for Taiwan to participate in the regional economic integration process. Taiwan's ability to participate in regional economic cooperation has really been limited other than through APEC. And there's a lot more that Taiwan should be doing in the regional economic integration process, including participating in RCEP and joining other organizations like the East Asia Summit, which is more than just economic. So for the U.S., the U.S. I think should be more proactive in urging other nations to support Taiwan's participation in the international community. The U.S. has done some things quietly, which are important, and there are certain times we have to keep things quiet, and there are other times that we have to speak out publicly. And in addition to doing more for Taiwan, I think we actually need to encourage other countries to do more. There's a lot of nations out there that are, I think, a little nervous about saying things publicly in support of Taiwan. There's actually safety in numbers. You get a lot of countries out there talking in support of something. China is not going to punish the entire international community. We also need to press Beijing, I think, regularly to stop squeezing Taiwan's international space. And then finally, and this is really a recommendation both for Beijing and Washington, and it's one that I heard in the mainland from several scholars. I don't know if the government in Beijing is ready to support this. But the fact that scholars mention it, I think, at least holds out the promise that it could provide a longer-term, more broader solution to the problem of Taiwan's international space. And that is looking into revising the existing charters for international organizations. This might have to be done on a case-by-case basis, and an international lawyer would certainly have to be consulted. But if China is very focused on the issue of the legality of Taiwan participating, and therefore, if there can be created in various charters a new definition of, for example, observer status that does not necessarily say that sovereign states can be the only members. That might open up the door for Taiwan's greater participation. Of course, this is something we would do only with Taiwan's support, but if Beijing and Washington could work with other members of the international community to rewrite some of these charters and create various, maybe a new category for Taiwan's membership or revise the existing categories, then that might address some of Beijing's concerns and open up the door for Taiwan to participate in many of these organizations in the future. And I'll stop there. Excellent. Thank you. We'll go into more detail on some of the recommendations in the report, but let me first ask Ambassador Lee for some comments. Well, thank you. I was given 10 minutes to report on the status of Taiwan's participation in international organization and U.S. support. So I hope I can finish that within the time limit. Dr. Green, Bonnie, distinguished guest, ladies and gentlemen, it's a pleasure for me to be here with such a distinguished audience. First of all, I would like to thank the CSIS for the kind invitation. I would also like to thank Bonnie for writing this very informative report. Personally, I learn a lot from reading her report. I read it twice. Sometimes over the weekend, the other one over during the snowstorm. Okay, we live, as you know, we live in a global village. Today more than ever before, opportunity and threats transcend national borders. Supply chains are global. The SOAR are terrorist networks. More people travel around the world faster than ever before. The SOAR could potential pandemics. Threats and threats are global and our response to them must also be global. This is the rationale behind international cooperation and the guiding spirit behind the creation of dozens of international organizations over the last century. However, Taiwan's ability to work with the international community was severely reduced. Taiwan left the UN in, excuse me, 1971. And to this day, our participation in international organizations is rather limited. This is not by choice. Taiwan actively seeks to join international organizations and to work with partners around the world. But when we try to engage, we are not offered a seat at the table. Taiwan's exclusion from most international organizations not only harms Taiwan's national interests, but also harms our collective interests and global commons. Not only harms the well-being of Taiwan's citizens, but also people hundreds of miles away. Let me share one example of the real-world impact. The response to the SARS outbreak in 2003 was impaired by Taiwan's exclusion from the WHO, which is charged with stopping the spread of epidemic. Our exclusion from global decision-making puts a serious risk for the international community. When we are not at the table to provide real-time data and analysis, whether on H691 avian flu at the WHO or nuclear nonproliferation at the IAEA, the international community loses timely access to valuable and actionable information. Taiwan's voice is not heard when it is needed most. With its record of regional leadership and its commitment to democratic values and free market principles, Taiwan will be an asset to these international organizations. I am confident that one day, with your help, we will obtain observer status or membership in all relevant international organizations. One recent example of Taiwan's leadership is the East China Sea Peace Initiative spearheaded by President Ma. President claims the Diao Yutai Islands as our own, but Beijing and Tokyo have issued competing territorial and maritime claims. Recognizing that the prospect of confrontation and escalation was very real and extremely dangerous, President Ma developed and advanced the East China Sea Peace Initiative on August 5, 2012 to demonstrate that a different path and more hopeful outcome is possible. The East China Sea Peace Initiative as well as our recent fishery agreement with Japan elevates peaceful negotiation over confrontation. It de-emphasizes the territorial nature of the dispute and focuses on resource sharing and cooperation. Taiwan thus is leading the way in reducing tensions in East Asia, justing what we would do, what we could do as full participants on the world stage. At present, Taiwan enjoys membership in only 34 of the 5,000 intergovernmental organizations. More than 2,000 Taiwanese non-governmental organizations seek international participation, but many have struggled to attain it. For Taiwan, participation in international organizations is about more than advancing our own national interests. Enhanced international engagement would enable us to provide more humanitarian and development assistance. Countries in need could benefit from the example of Taiwan's development experience, but unfortunately we are limited in the kind of exchanges and assistance we can provide. Fortunately, however, over the years our friends in the United States have actively supported Taiwan's international participation. In a speech in October, Deputy Assistant Secretary Kim Moy, reaffirmed U.S. support for Taiwan's membership, and I quote, in international organizations where statehood is not a requirement and encourages Taiwan's meaningful participation in organizations where its membership is not possible, end quote. We appreciate the support of Deputy Assistant Secretary Moy and other U.S. officials who have spoken out on our behalf. The U.S. Congress has also passed numerous resolutions on a bipartisan basis, supporting Taiwan's international participation. As you know, Taiwan was recently invited for the first time to attend the 38th Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO, as a guest of the President of ICAO Council. After years of exclusion from ICAO, this development is a major step forward in Taiwan's speed to join ICAO as an observer. At a critical moment in this effort, S-579 co-sponsored by Chairman Melendez and Senator Inhofe and its accompanying legislations in the House passed through both chambers with unanimous support and was signed into law by President Obama on July 12, 2013. This fully complemented an earlier congressional effort regarding Taiwan's participation in the WHO, S-2092, which was signed into law by President George W. Bush on June 14, 2004. The message these pieces of legislation sent to the international community was very clear. On matters of international participation, the United States stands with Taiwan. Taiwan also aspired to join the regional Trans-Pacific Partnership, TPP, as soon as possible. And with U.S. help, we believe it is achievable. Taking at the event at Brookings Institution on November 20, our former Vice President Vincent Xiao explained that the goal of the trade mission he had was to rejuvenate bilateral economic relations by demonstrating our long-standing dedication and ties to the United States, as well as seeking U.S. support for Taiwan's speed to join the TPP. Ladies and gentlemen, as a democracy, Taiwan seeks to fully shoulder the responsibility and opportunities that come with full participation in the international community. In fact, we believe our national security is inextricably linked to our ability to participate fully in the global community. In the speech at CSI's video conference in 2011, President Ma said that, and I quote, enhancing Taiwan's contributions to international development, unquote, is our second line of defense in our national security. We will continue to push for increased international space, but we cannot do it alone. We need the help of friendly countries, like the United States, to amplify our cause for participation. In this regard, we want to express our gratitude to all of you for your continued support. Thank you for your attention, and may you all have a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year. Thank you. Thank you, Bonnie. Thank you, Ambassador Lee. I appreciate your remarks very much, both of you. I thought it was very useful that you mentioned, Ambassador Lee, the East China Sea Peace Initiative, and some of the associated diplomacy by your government with the Philippines, which is very relevant in this discussion, because although those are not issues necessarily covered by the international organizations we're talking about, what it demonstrates is that if Taiwan is at the table, it will bring ideas, it will bring 21st century concepts of rule of law, of win-win resolutions based on market principles, and would I think bring up the level of discussion in all of these organizations, and frankly, might put a little bit of healthy pressure on Beijing to also increase its level of contribution and participation. Taiwan's per capita contribution in the wake of the 2004 tsunami, the Japanese March 11, 2011 disaster, the most recent typhoon in Philippines, far, far outpaces China's. I've been a little bit surprised, frankly, that the Chinese foreign ministry in each successive crisis announces amounts that are minuscule in response to the humanitarian needs. So it might actually help create a little bit of healthy competition, in addition to everything else, in addition to what it does for Taiwan's legitimate need to get information and participate in the discussions. It might actually help set an example for Chinese diplomats and Chinese participants in what a 21st century, I'll say, responsible stakeholder, which is the phrase of art when I was in government, what a 21st century responsible stakeholder does to contribute to international society. And I think there are many, as Bonnie points out, in the Chinese foreign ministry and the Chinese system, who would like to do that. I think it's not zero sum. Let me now do, to Bonnie, something that's incredibly unfair that hopefully she won't do to me on my next report. And that is ask about the prospects for implementation. Usually think tanks, don't worry about that, but we at CSIS pride ourselves on being just a little more results-oriented and pragmatic. My, well, first of all, this report is the most comprehensive study of this topic. And the recommendations are the most comprehensive. And they're well within the bounds of reasonable and pragmatic. And my guess is that you would not get a lot of disagreement from current senior officials at NSC state who work on Asia. And you wouldn't have gotten it from me and my colleagues in Bush and probably wouldn't have been Clinton for the senior director for Asia, the deputy assistant secretary and assistant secretary at state and so forth. My experience has always been with international space. The problem isn't the Asia people. The problem is you have to get very busy, overtaxed assistant secretaries of state for international organizations, the people at Department of Energy or the EPA, just to name one example in the news lately, or other agencies who have a huge complicated agenda with these international organizations are under constant pressure from Congress that often doesn't like these international organizations. And you're asking them to prioritize Taiwan, which is good for these organizations. It's very good for your Asia policy, but it's an extra task for them that they often don't like. And I found that usually, therefore, it has to come from the top. That sometimes, if you're the senior director for Asia, you're the DAS or assistant secretary at state, you can get your colleague in the International Organizations Bureau or in commerce to agree because they've been to Taiwan. They like Taiwan. It's democracy. They see the advantage. They do not. They have so much on their plate to think, good God, another homework assignment. And you therefore have to get some buy-in from the secretary of state or commerce, the national security advisor, somebody higher up. In about 11 years ago, we had that when Tommy Thompson was the secretary of Health and Human Services. He gave a speech calling for Taiwan's participation in the WHA. I called my then colleague in the deputy chief cabinet secretary, Shinzo Abe, and got Japan on board. We talked to the Australians and the Canadians. It took a real effort, and it took some top-level encouragement and cover, and it has results when you do that, but it requires somebody who's got a long list of problems in U.S.-China relations or somebody who has a long list of issues with the WHO or the WHA to decide this is important. So, how do you convince them? If you had to make the brief to help the people in the East Asia Bureau or NSC who I think would be generally supportive, what's the case if you could refine it a little bit more? Why should they take this on, given everything else on their plate? And do you think they will? Well, your approach, Mike, is very practical and very important. First I would say that some of the reasons why we weren't doing more in the U.S.-Taiwan relationship in sort of the later years of Chen Shui-bian had to do with the nature of his policies, right? And so people did not want to stick their necks out for Taiwan for fear that this might embolden President Chen, and there was a sense that Taiwan wasn't really contributing enough to the stability of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. We're in a very different situation right now, and as cross-strait relations have improved, this has opened up space, I think, for the U.S. to do more for Taiwan. And we have, in fact, seen this. And so to put international space aside for just a second, clearly those who work on East Asia have been successful in convincing senior people in the Obama administration to do things like approve the F-16 upgrades for Taiwan and visa waiver, which was very, very important for President Ma, and probably not the easiest thing to do. I mean, Homeland Security had a lot of other issues on its plate. So you're right. Somebody from a senior position had to say, this is going to be a priority. We're going to get this done. We haven't seen this happen, I think, enough in the international space area. And if the only issue were opposition from Beijing, then I think we wouldn't be doing some of these other things for Taiwan. So I think we really ought to be stepping up to the plate, because we are able to do a range of things for Taiwan. Now, let's at least accept that for the time being, as we have these charters and existence, the United States has said on the record, we don't support independence for Taiwan. So we are not going to be pushing for Taiwan to be a full member of an organization that requires sovereign status, as long as the charter has charters have the wording that they do. But there's still so much more that we could be doing, because there are so many ways that Taiwan can participate. And there's observer status, of course, and associate member or corresponding member. And you'll see this explained in the report. And so the Global Methane Initiative, World Meteorological Organization, there's a lot more that we have to do. So if Taiwan makes this more of a priority, and I think it does have to start with Taiwan. And Taiwan faces a very difficult balancing act here, because it needs to get support from the United States and other members of the international community. But it actually also needs to lean on Beijing, as I talked about earlier. And there are a lot of people in Taiwan who say, well, President Ma shouldn't be getting permission from China. This isn't an issue of getting permission. But Beijing is blocking it. And so they've got to be leaning on Beijing, and they've got to find the right balance. Because I think to be quite fair, if Taiwan is only talking to Beijing, nothing's going to happen. And if Taiwan is only talking to the United States and the international community, then they probably also won't make progress. So that's a balancing act that I think that Taiwan has to deal with. And if Taiwan is able to put this issue of participation in the international community, front and center, in the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, as well as in the cross-strait relationship, and again, publicly, privately make its case, then I hope that in the future some of these things can be done by an administration. I don't think that the argument that Beijing is somehow going to take punitive measures actually holds water, because, again, we're not pushing for Taiwan to be treated as a sovereign state. We're not pushing for Taiwan to be treated in a way that is inconsistent with our bilateral agreements with Beijing. But the challenge is, as you say, in any administration, not just this one, people have a full plate. You've got to convince people that this is important. I think some of the arguments that I've made here, I've made in the report, Ambassador Lee has made Taiwan's a democracy. It actually sets an important standard and model for many other countries, including mainland China. It is a good citizen in so many of the organizations that participate. It brings so much to the table. It can help advance American interests. So if we have a set of interests that we want to achieve in a particular organization, whether it be WHO, IKO, UNFCCC, having Taiwan on board helping us to advance our interests, I think would be useful. We're always looking in multilateral settings to get countries to be working with us to advance an agenda. So I think that Taiwan has shown a willingness and ability to get out there and support many of the interests that the U.S. wants to advance in these organizations. It's going to be a tough slog, no doubt about that. But it's one that many of us have to keep fighting about and bringing it to people's attention. And Congress plays, I think, a very important role, as it did with IKO. I think that for a few years support for Taiwan in Congress has been a little bit on the downside. I see that as picking up. We have a lot more people, individuals in Congress now, who are really willing to work on some of these issues, and that helps. It puts pressure on the administration, brings the issue out into the public realm, and particularly when it builds momentum to be able to have on a particular issue to have something that then the president signs into law that directs the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to achieve a very specific goal that's very, very powerful. And maybe now that they've done that in this case, and IKO maybe that can be done for others as well. I think that's a strong case. And when the Secretary says you're right, Bonnie, let's do it. The next question will be, how is Beijing going to react? So let me ask a follow-up question. Do you think, as you've noted, and I've also heard this, there are Chinese scholars, diplomats even, who will privately or in some cases scholars will publicly write that it's time to be more flexible to sustain the stability that's been added to cross-strait relations, because it could go backwards if expectations aren't met. And I think smart analysts and diplomats and experts in Beijing and in China have picked up on that. But looking at it sort of from the top, do you think that under Xi Jinping, there's a satisfaction with the overall approach to cross-strait relations that in effect the response might be the policy is working? We're keeping just enough pressure on Taiwan. It's working fine. We don't need to change. Do you think there may be some give in the months and years ahead at the leadership level in thinking about these issues in Beijing? Well, we all know that Xi Jinping worked for many years in Fujian. He's very familiar with Taiwan, with businesses in Taiwan, and many of the issues that are at play in the cross-strait relationship. He has inherited what I think is a fairly successful policy toward Taiwan in cross-strait relationship. But undoubtedly, he doesn't want to be in power for 10 years and just see it sort of muddled through. I think he's going to want to make progress as well. I don't see any signs that he has any great ambitions to achieve reunification any time in the foreseeable future. I think the Chinese continue to hold that out as a longer-term goal. They have patience that they can move in a deliberate way to improve cross-strait relations. And as I said earlier, they've got to win over the hearts and minds of the people in Taiwan. And they know that. And people in the mainland pay very close attention to polling on Taiwan. And when people in Taiwan say that they think that they feel oppressed by the people on the mainland, people pay attention to that. So I think that Xi Jinping will not be opposed to considering new ideas. There's a lot of smart scholars in the mainland who I think are making suggestions to their government all the time about how to further promote the cross-strait relationship. And sometimes there are policies that remain in place for reasons just due to inertia. You know, they've been there for a long time. And the fact that the foreign ministry is just constantly squeezing the Taiwan's international space is actually somewhat incompatible with some of the other things that Beijing is doing with Taiwan. To me, that's sort of a relic of the past when there weren't even the thousands of exchanges that we see taking place and the economic and trade cooperation and the 800, I think, or so flights a week that are now taking place between the two sides of the strait. So this is something that I think that Xi Jinping could be convinced to reconsider. Because ultimately, if he wants to further develop the cross-strait relationship, this is, I think, an opportunity, a means of doing that. And I think what he has to be convinced of is that the downside is not as great as China has feared in the past. And again, I would just say with China's growing role in the international community, this is not something that China should really be fearful of. There's a lot more opportunity, a lot more upside, I think, for China than downside. So maybe some people in particularly the influential scholarly community in the mainland need to put this idea on the desk of President Xi Jinping and challenge the notion that the existing policy actually continues to serve China's interests. And so I hope you're going to translate this into Chinese. OK. Not personally. Let me turn to Ambassador Lee, then we'll open it up. I remember when I was in the NSE and we were contemplating a free trade agreement with Korea, a very senior USDR official said, we need to make sure our Korean friends understand that doing a trade agreement with the US is like going to the doctor and getting root canal surgery with no novocaine. And that was actually more pleasant than it actually is. And our Japanese friends are finding that out right now in the TPP negotiations. It's hard negotiating these things. The results are always very significant, but the process is hard. It requires some big decisions. And I note that Ambassador Lee and President Ma, others have expressed a clear interest in joining TPP as quickly as possible. But it's going to take a lot of work. And I think the example of Japan and even Korea shows that there's a kind of pre-negotiation even and that momentum really has to build to convince the other partners, especially the US, but the other partners that a new entry is ready to take on the liberalization and the reform and restructuring necessary. And you now have experience with Singapore and with New Zealand. And I wonder, Ambassador Lee, if you could say something about what you've learned from that. The L.Y. was very tough on cross-trades negotiations. But in general, how would you describe the attitude towards these kind of agreements in the wake of more experience negotiating these things with Singapore and New Zealand? Well, thank you. As far as I understand, in terms of trade liberalization, we are very committed. I think this is one of the aspects that both parties, the bipartisan consensus on that. You can see that this A-step, our FDA with Singapore and our FDA with New Zealand are quickly approved by L.Y. And I think one of the problems, I think, as it is in Japan, is the vested interest in our domestic economic sectors. There are vested interests who are very powerful, for example, the pork industry and so on and so forth. So they don't want to see more opening up in terms of trade. But as far as the government is concerned, we are very committed. And our approach is the so-called building block approach. And as to that, we want to, first of all, with the United States, we want to sign BIA, a bilateral investment agreement within the United States. And we have already signed a different agreement. For example, the e-commerce agreement within the United States. And so we want to sort of set up more building blocks. And finally, we can sign an FTA within the United States. We know it's difficult, but we are determined. And so we enter negotiations with other countries, especially members of the TPP. We have finished the feasibility studies with Indonesia and India. And we are now conducting feasibility studies with the Philippines and Malaysia and so on and so forth. So the effort is still there. We are continuing to work hard to negotiate some kind of, through building block approach, some kind of economic cooperation agreement with other countries, especially members of the AIPAC, TPP, and so on. Thank you. And that momentum is important. Mani was right to say the biggest obstacle to greater international space. For Taiwan, it's China right now, but it's very hard for Taipei to control that variable. But the variable you can control is your own domestic decision making. And market liberalization. And with real momentum and participation in TPP, Taiwan will instantly have 12 de facto allies to get greater international space. Because the issues in TPP cover or intersect with a lot of the issues in these international organizations. And you will have 12 governments that know you well that want you to be part of this process. And so to me, that is the most important thing I would argue that Taipei can do. Not Bonnie has it in here. But it may matter more than anything else. Of course, we also have to get trade promotion authority. We have a bit of homework on that front, too. Let's open it up to questions. I'll recognize people and start with you, sir. We have a microphone. John Zan with CTI TV of Taiwan. Thank you. In Taiwan's effort to expand its international space, we all understand the need for the United States to help soften or overcome China's objection. That's, you know, we all understand something that we all understand. What I do not understand is sometimes there are things the United States can do. Even without China's objection to help Taiwan. For instance, the proposed and now canceled visit to Taiwan by the EPA administrator, McCarthy. Why wouldn't the United States go ahead with the visit? Because even China did not voice objection. I don't understand this. Bonnie and Mike, could you help me? Thank you. I would say I'm not familiar with the details of this. I've seen some reports, and I think sometimes there are things that are reported that are not completely accurate. There were some reports about why Representative Jing Puzong was called back to Taiwan, which are clearly not true. So rumors have a way of developing and often are really turned out to be not factual. But I'm just going to give you my personal opinion on the issue of the United States sending cabinet level officials to Taiwan. This is something that we used to do quite frequently in, for example, when Bill Clinton was president, I think 13 years ago was the last time we did this. And as I talked earlier about some of the waning of U.S. support under Transwebian for some of the things Taiwan was doing, I think that this issue sort of got caught up in that period. And now it has been a long time since the United States has sent a cabinet level official, and Beijing has gotten somewhat used to it. I have certainly heard Chinese officials say that this is not something that the United States should return to, this practice of doing so. United States cooperates with Taiwan on so many important issues. Energy, environment, even, you know, we have similar veterans affairs organizations. There are many kinds of exchanges that we should have. And so, you know, I think that this is just something that Beijing shouldn't oppose. I don't know about this particular case, but I just think that this is a practice that it should be part of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. And it can be done, I think, in a way that is consistent with our commitments, not only to Taiwan, but also to the mainland. So if we can get some trip scheduled in the future by a cabinet level official, I think that that's, it's good for the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, and I don't think it should be seen as harmful to Chinese interests. The visit was canceled, presumably, because press reports came out a few hours before the scheduled formal announcement. Why is that, Mike? I don't know. I mean, like Bonnie, I'm just reading those reports as well. I do know from my own experience in government that, and this was during the Chen Shui bien years, it was tougher, that cabinet members who don't work directly on foreign policy, who are the only ones who are under our system supposed to go, are easily frightened by the appearance of Chinese opposition. So even if there's no formal protest by the government, it doesn't take much for Beijing to signal its displeasure and deter a cabinet member. And if you're, you know, the Secretary of Energy, EPA administrator, you have a long list of very hard issues with China. And it basically takes the National Security Advisor or the President calling and saying, I really need you to make this trip in many cases, or maybe the Secretary of State. And so, well, I don't know the specifics of this case, but I would hope it would cause a rethink within the administration so that they start getting the signal up to the top that this is a priority to get cabinet level meetings back on track after 13 years. I can understand why someone would not want to be the first one to break the ice after such a long time. And so it really, there has to be top cover and there has to be a decision that I think comes from the high up that this is important and to start talking about who should be the one to go. But that said, I don't know the specifics here. I don't even know if for certain that it was canceled. This is just a report. So, right, sir, you don't want to comment on that, I assume. Ken, one from TBA. Thank you for this great report, Bunny. This is good. My question is about Taiwan Policy Art 2013. So I record the content in the Taiwan TBA. They spare out the participation of international organization. So the question I have is how feasible are the TPA to replace or to enhance the TIA? Or maybe next year, shall we push that TPA to help our participation in the international organization? Okay, thank you. Well, there are obviously many different ways to promote Taiwan's greater participation in international organizations. This TPA is one of them. But of course, what happens in something like the Taiwan Policy Act is then there's lots of other provisions. And when you put all of these provisions together, I think you won't get as much support because there's lots of things that are involved. I think that by breaking out, for example, the legislation regarding Taiwan's participation in IKO, that enabled Taiwan to get much more support. I mean, it's just huge majorities in the House and Senate that were willing to support this. And then of course, the President's willingness to sign it, which is also critically important. So I think that whether it's the recent TPA or the one that was being developed several years ago, I think it's just harder to get a lot of support from a majority of Congress and from the executive branch when you're putting in a lot of different issues together. Hi, Nadia Chau with Liberty Times. I have a question to Bonnie and Green, but not necessarily related to government. I think many young people, bright young people in Taiwan, just wondering if they're really interested in the international affairs and they have a dedication to serve the global common, but they don't have any chance to even intern for an international organization like INF or World Bank. I wonder when you talk about Taiwan's participation, is that more practical to help those young people to be able to intern or work for the international organization? So a younger generation coming will not feel like disconnected from the whole international community. Thank you. I think that's a very good point and that is one more reason why this is an important issue. Taiwan is at the leading edge of a lot of technologies, technological development. Taiwan has a despite the debates over nuclear reactors, which Japan and Korea are going through too. Taiwan has a quite sophisticated energy policy and strategy. I'd answer just by connecting it to the earlier question about how to get cabinet members to go. It seems to me that Taipei ought to be thinking about how to connect policy experts, not just like me and Bonnie on Asia policy or relations between us, but to connect people who are experts on energy policy, environmental policy, get them to Taipei or bring delegations here and nurture a cohort so that when they become the special assistant to the APA administrator or they become the Secretary of Energy, they know Taiwan, they like Taiwan, they know how much Taiwan has to offer, that would take care of both the problem of making sure there are people around our cabinet secretaries who are experts on energy, environment and so forth who know and like and appreciate Taiwan's contribution, but also it's an outlet for younger Taiwanese who may not or experts who may not be able to join international organizations to interact with their counterparts and shape the debate. So what you're getting at is a consequence of this effort by Beijing to limit international space for Taiwan and it's unfortunate, but there are ways around it. I would just add that I think it's really important to get more students and young people from Taiwan coming to the United States. I haven't looked at the numbers recently, but my sense is just from being around Washington, going and visiting universities, I go speak. There's more and more people coming from the mainland, fewer people coming from Taiwan and I think many of them go to the mainland, that's great. They see more opportunities there, but if Taiwan wants to be part of the international system, then its students they have to go everywhere and I'd like to see more of them coming to the United States. I talk to many professors who just tell me they have fewer students from Taiwan and their international affairs programs. So in specific answer to your question, I think we have to do both things. If you probably can't get students involved in trying to intern even at a place like the IMF, if they don't see that there's a career path that's going to get them to be able to have some job down the road and they may have more prospect in the IMF than they have at some place that's like a UN organization that Taiwan doesn't play any role in at all. So if we could work both of those things, we're opening up doors for Taiwan and its people, its NGOs, as well as as a government to participate very broadly in different aspects of international organizations, then I think naturally students, young people are going to want to be part of that because they'll see career opportunities and they'll see it as exciting to be part of what's going on internationally. So I think it's really important to get youth involved, but we've got to make sure that they have opportunities to develop that into a career. My name is Garrett van der Wies, editor of Taiwan Communique. It's a very important topic and many good recommendations did come out of it. There's one, though, where I would have a bit of a hesitation. At the end, you said, Bunny, that US and Beijing would have to work with international organizations to revise the existing charters so we can have observer status and so on and so forth. Wouldn't that really open a door to cement Taiwan status as a second rank nation if it is in the WHO as an observer and IKO as a guest every three years and everybody says, well, it's okay, Taiwan has been taken care of and the basic question of really the right of the people in Taiwan to be a full and equal member in an international community is then negated and pushed to the side or do you propose this as a kind of intermediate step towards a longer-term full membership in international organizations? Can I add to his question? Because this struck me, too. I didn't have the same reaction. My reaction was, how would you do this and not violate the Six Assurances, one of which is that we don't settle the suspicion of Taiwan bilaterally with Beijing and I'm sure you've thought of this because you are encyclopedic on that issue but if you could explain in process terms how you do that. Okay, Mike's point is very important and you will see in my recommendations where I have listed this recommendation that I very clearly say with Taiwan's support because I wouldn't advocate that the United States and China settle a problem that Taiwan has even if it's in Taiwan's interest without working with Taiwan. So this is something that would have to be through consultations with Taiwan as to how government in Taipei, how the people would like to see this proceed, whether indeed it is a good idea and it may not be. And again, the huge caveat here is that I'm not an international lawyer but since I've heard this from lawyers on the mainland it really has gotten me quite interested and the mainland is increasingly this looking at issues from a very legalistic perspective and sometimes I think that they raise this as an obstacle. You know, we can't have Taiwan participate in the UNFCCC because observer status just is not for non-sovereign states, end story. So I agree with you, Garrett, that there should be no closing of the door to Taiwan's full membership but one could envision how charters could be changed either to first allow Taiwan maybe to be observer in organizations that now they can't be and UNFCCC really is an example of that. You look at the charter and NGOs can participate but apparently the way that observer status is defined Taiwan cannot. The IKO council as a sort of regional entity or I forget what the exact wording is, you know, Taiwan could be a full observer. So if you create these opportunities in some of these charters Taiwan might be in the near term able to participate far more easily but in the longer run I agree with you. Taiwan should be a full member and eventually maybe some of these organizations need to be opened up to non-sovereign states if Taiwan does not become a sovereign state. So but this is something that also Taiwan and the mainland are going to have to work out and at the end of the day there may be some resolution I don't know in the years to come between mainland and Taiwan about how to deal with this issue. Maybe the mainland will say that Taiwan can sort of, you know, nominally just say that it is it is it is a China whatever China name it wants to be and it can participate in international organizations. You know it's it's hard to say we all have to be creative in trying to promote Taiwan's interest and you know that even better than I do. Bill Tucker, I served in the Reagan administration and and I recall a situation where the president of Taiwan was going to visit his alma mater Cornell and and the Chinese raised all kinds of objections to this new visit and and they even threatened to do all these kind of things and then the Congress passed a resolution as you're saying he could that we could issue the visa. Well they ordered the State Department to issue the visa and so the State Department issued the visa and he came to Taiwan. I mean he came to Cornell and you know the earth didn't stop rotating and so why do we why do we listen to all these objections that China makes over what Taiwan or we do. I mean we are an independent nation also and we I think we pay too much attention to what China says we should the relationship between our country and Taiwan should be and I'd like your observations just why we why we listen to this. I mean China would have as much to lose as we would if the if relationships are deteriorated between the two countries. We are have a lot of businesses in China. China could not maintain their economy without the US and and the businesses from the west and so we've got we've got nothing to lose by standing up to China and I failed to understand why we don't do what we should do as a nation. I very much appreciate your your your question. I do think it's in US interest to stand up for Taiwan more and as I said earlier if we have lots of other countries around the world doing the same you know China is not going to strike out at all of us. We need we have to be a leader. I would like to see like-minded countries. I'd like to see the EU and Australia. Japan has been pretty active in standing up for Taiwan and so there's more work to be done and there are countries that are nervous about intimidation from China and in some cases their concerns are reasonable and we have seen in recent years China's willingness to use for example economic measures to coerce countries to change the policies on specific issues. We've seen this for example last year against the Philippines because the Philippines has brought a case to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea which involves China's nine-dash line in the South China Sea and so the mainland quarantined bananas and tropical fruits you know coming in from the Philippines and of course an even more well-known case was in 2010 when Beijing wanted Japan to release the fishermen the captain of the of the fishermen the fishing boat that had been arrested and curtailed and sought to halt the the export of rare earth minerals to Japan. In the case of Norway we saw when Leo Siabour was was given the Nobel Peace Prize by the Norwegian Peace Committee not by the Norwegian government you know the Chinese tried to stop importing salmon and to some extent Norway is really still in the doghouse and I can give more and more and more examples it's there's just many of them so countries are worried so I think there has to be an effort to prevent Beijing just from hyping off individual nations and punishing them and yes we need to be a leader I think that there's probably less that China is willing to do to us than some other nations but we should be standing up for our rights and our values and I completely agree with you on that score but there is I think growing angst in this country in lots of quarters that our relationship with China is so important that we should not be challenging China on specific issues whether it's visas for our journalists that are about to be kicked out of China or for Taiwan I mean there's a long list of issues and I would say that when it comes to our own interests and our own values we shouldn't hesitate to stand up for them I just had we I think you were getting this we should be more confident in the future of US-China relations and I think the temptation to withhold support for Taiwan in international space comes from a fear that we're going to irritate China and that US-China relations could easily spin out of control and easily go into crisis and and that the way to avoid that is to avoid irritations in the relationship and that often is the view of senior people in Republican and Democratic administrations and if they if they studied Asia better if they if they knew China better I think they would be more confident it's usually not the China experts at senior levels of government who are saying this it's people who don't know China that well and are very very nervous that things could spin out of control if they allow irritations to grow in the relationship so that is why you know certain people tend to be more cautious but we ought to be more confident about US-China relations I think that's what you're getting at and and the other thing is you know it depends on how you think about the rise of Chinese power it seems to me and I think a lot a lot of people that Taiwan is exhibit a in how China will use its power as it gets more power there are other examples Xinjiang the examples Bonnie gave and so as a practical matter not just because we're democracies and have common values but as a practical matter we ought to be very concerned about how China uses coercion or is agile and open with less powerful counterparts because that is the future of how China will use its power and these are issues that you know where there are different views in government and that's why our policy tends to change a little bit depending on who's in charge in certain agencies and I'm not making a partisan statement here there are people in Republican and Democratic sides who have both views we the one other thing I'd say just you know we I was in Tennessee the first five years of Bush we we lost something in those years during Chen Shui-bian it wasn't all president Chen's fault but we lost something we lost a level of trust at the highest levels and we also lost the congressional relationship and the encouraging thing even though this the senators couldn't make it today the encouraging thing is that senators men is in and off we're willing to come here that they pass this legislation we've lost Inouye we've lost we've lost a lot of senior Asia people in the Senate and the House but it is encouraging as Bonnie noted that they're replacing that step by step so that's that will help I think yeah we have time for one more I think sorry I gave a long monologue there yeah I'm Konodoo I'm from Taiwan visiting fellow at Atlantic Council a very good presentation I have a question about the ADIZ it's very interesting issue that just a couple days ago Korea declared his own K ADIZ I think there's a contentious issues right now it's happening right now some scholar argued that that will help the United States to substantially shift his focus to the to Asia region and I think in the near future it doesn't seem that China will back down by cancel that the that the ADIZ I just have one question about that what do you see the the United States will resolve the problem especially that area overlapped so many countries involved in the ADIZ and what Taiwan should to play in that issue thank you are you air force oh no I'm marine ah okay all right all right so what do you care about airspace well well first we should tell everybody here may not know that Taiwan has its own ADIZ Korea has recently extended announced that it will extend the ADIZ but of course had a pre-existing ADIZ so it's not just Japan in China but now a few years ago Japan extended its ADIZ into Taiwan's ADIZ so there have been some problems with overlapping air defense identification zones so you know clearly I think maybe you suggested in your question that somehow the United States sees these increased tensions as an opportunity to rebalance to the region I don't think that's true I don't think that the United States is looking for increased tensions in the region when countries in the region get nervous I think there's actually a lot of expectations then for the United States to come and help solve problems which really creates potential challenges for the US because there's become sort of angst and nervousness in the region that maybe we don't have enough resources or staying power or commitments or somehow we're getting sucked back into the Middle East but you know what's driving the United States to Asia is first and foremost the economic dynamism in the region the desire to be part of the economic activities in the region the growth of the region expand our exports and of course to reinforce peace and stability in the region and you know Mike's going to tell you about the book he's writing but historically the United States has played a very important role in preserving peace and stability and there has been a consistent desire by the vast majority of countries in the region for the United States to continue to sort of play that role as a as balancer and I think that there are many countries that believe that if the United States is less attentive to the region or in a worse case if we really were to pull out that that would be disastrous and I would say even China sees potential downsides I think it's ambivalent about about US presence so you know this is a moment where there is there are steps being taken by various countries to defend their own interests I think that China sees this as a way of defending its its interests but its interests are expanding it's expanding out into the near seas right the East China Sea the South China Sea and the Yellow Sea and and the Chinese want to signal other countries that their interests are going should be respected and and and adhered to by others the problem is there's a lot of countries that also have their own interests and so this is this is really an issue that could potentially get quite dangerous on the I think that the declaration of this new ADIZ by China has really increased the potential for an accident that nobody wants to see and and certainly the country that really last wants to see war in the region is China there after all trying to rise peacefully and continue to develop economically so you know this is this isn't a good thing for the United States but hopefully we can help other countries to manage it thank you Bonnie congratulations on the report I look forward to the Chinese edition and I appreciate very much that Michael Schiffer helped arrange this and the interest here on the hill and this this document will be useful I think for those on the hill who want to keep the administration honest on this issue and useful for people in the administration who care about it and for all of us so congratulations Bonnie thank you and thank you all for joining us I actually already have a Chinese journal that is going to print a long excerpt yep really it's called leaders yep I think it I think it has my name