 Good morning, good afternoon or good evening depending on where you're joining us from. My name is Scott Worden and I'm the director of the Afghanistan and Central Asia Program for the U.S. Institute of Peace. I'd like to thank you all as well as our esteemed panelists for taking time out of your business schedules to join us for this important discussion about the ongoing and concerning situation in Afghanistan. We invite everyone to take part in today's conversation by asking a question using the chat box function located just below the video player on the USIP event page. We also ask that you please include your name and specify your affiliation or where you're joining us from when you do ask the question. And finally, you can engage with us and each other on Twitter with today's hashtag, hashtag Afghanistan USIP, all one word. As many of you know, USIP was founded by Congress 35 years ago as an independent, national and nonpartisan institute dedicated to preventing, mitigating and resolving violent conflict. We have been engaged in Afghanistan since 2002 focusing on rule of law, peace building and inclusive governance. And those tasks have never been more urgent than they are today. It's been nearly five months since the Taliban took control of Kabul and the Afghan Republic, the Democratic Republic collapsed. There's been a reduction in violence since the Taliban's military victory with the end of the insurgency. But the hardship for many Afghans has increased as the economic and humanitarian emergency replaces the insurgency as the biggest threat to the Afghan people. The UN issued yesterday an unprecedented 4.5 billion dollar appeal for humanitarian assistance in 2022 and noted that a majority of Afghans face acute hunger and severe poverty in the coming months. The humanitarian disaster that people have been predicting is now upon us. The causes of the current crisis are complicated and they include sanctions and the withdrawal of donor funding for a Taliban regime that is unrecognized and includes leaders on terrorist sanctions lists. Beneath that, however, are much broader governance deficiencies the Taliban have including ethnic exclusion, a total lack of technical capacity and rollbacks on human and women's rights. The governance gap, its implications and possible ways to address it are the focus of today's conversation. To engage in that discussion, we have an excellent lineup of experts joining us. After introducing them, I will ask them a few rounds of questions as the moderator and then invite audience participation. Please again place your questions in the chat box on my event page and we will select from that list. Our first panelist is Ramatullah Amiri who is a researcher and analyst with the liaison office in Kabul and an independent consultant with deep experience as a researcher focusing on peace, reconciliation, humanitarian access and social political issues. We're also joined by Pawash Khakhar who is USIP's Acting Director for Religion and Inclusive Societies. Pawash previously worked at the Asia Foundation in Kabul where she was the Director for Women's Empowerment and Development. As fund year, Mir recently joined USIP as a senior expert in the Asia Center. Previously, he was a fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. His research interests include international relations of South Asia, US counterterrorism policy and political violence and he focuses on Afghanistan and Pakistan in particular. And finally, Andrew Watkins is a senior expert on Afghanistan with USIP after joining us from the International Crisis Group in addition to years of experience analyzing security risks for NGOs in Afghanistan. So let me now, without further ado, begin and Amiri, let me ask you a question about the current situation on the ground. I know you've been in close contact both with Taliban as well as civil society leaders and you've studied the Taliban for many years. How would you describe the current conditions in Afghanistan? How bad is the humanitarian economic crisis that I mentioned? And is it affecting all parts of Afghanistan equally, what you said? Thank you, Scott, for having me in this panel with this amazing panelist. Just to start, the situation is pretty bad right now. So the crisis in Afghanistan, the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, just didn't start with August 15, 2021 with the collapse or fall of the Republic. It was before that, many years before that, the situation in the villages were horrible. But unfortunately, nobody recorded. With the collapse in August 15, 2021, what happened is that a new disaster started, besides the disaster that was already happening in the villages in remote areas. And this disaster was mainly hit, this disaster hit mainly the urban areas, the major cities, thousands and hundreds of thousands of people that worked for the Afghan government, NGOs, and other, they just lost their jobs and their daily income was being hit hard. And so what happened? And then in the meantime, the banking system collapsed. And what happened is that these all crises came together and made a mess in Afghanistan right now. For example, if you go to Eastern Afghanistan, thousands of people were working for MDSF. And now their job list, their families, their families were dependent on those salaries, but they no longer have those salaries coming. And for example, before the fall of the Republic in August 15, 2021, the situation, for example, in Zumaq, some villages that I visited back then, actually, some literally told me that they eat grass. It sounds they eat just bread. They have nothing else. They borrow flour from the family. But because of the restrictions by the donors back then that, you know, you cannot work in the Taliban control area, or, you know, you don't have to pay the, and also the problems from the Taliban side, because they asked for the, you know, the tax. And this created a huge things in those areas. And plus in some areas, Taliban at all didn't allow any aid and donor agencies because they accused them of spying and other things, especially in the southern Afghanistan. So this what created it was, was sort of a system that nobody knew that, okay, what's going on in those villages and areas. And completely those signs were ignored. And then when this crisis happened and combined with those others, it just created them a huge humanitarian disaster. And right now, I mean, the banking system, everything that is collapse, it's making it further and further worse. You know, people don't know what to do. A lot of people are fleeing to Iran and other countries to they think that they can besides security reasons, they think that they can find some sort of jobs and they can send some money. And so yeah, so right now it's a mess, Scott. Thanks for that difficult situation. Let me ask, in your analytical view, how do you think the Taliban are perceiving the situation and their situation as now leaders of the country? I think a lot of people and including some Taliban have said that their complete takeover was a surprise and it happened more quickly than even they expected. So, you know, in some senses is this a case of be careful what you wish for now. Now they're in charge of a government that, as you said, had lots of or a state that had lots of problems before. And then sanctions and other issues compound that. What's their perception or approach to governance now that they are in charge? I think one of their problems that still they still don't own the crisis. That's one of the thing. And it's not just because of them. It's also the international community, the way they're dealing with them, you know, that make them hold accountable for the crisis. You know, they accuse the international community for creating the crisis. Therefore, they have to, you know, find a way to solve this crisis. And this crisis cannot be sold by humanitarian crisis. It's a political crisis. The Taliban are thinking it's not a political crisis without, you know, so without solving the political side of this crisis, I don't think the humanitarian side will have a sustainable solution, you know, and Taliban, I mean, the issue with them is that they're very good when it comes to implementations. But the thing is, they don't have the means and resources, you know, they don't, you know, for the meaning resources because the international community doesn't want to work with them on any of those things. Yes, behind the doors, they work with them, like, for example, from the UN and others, they work with them in some respects in some ways. But for how long? And, you know, I mean, the question is not just that, you know, they work with them. But the thing is, how sustainable are those? I mean, if it's not today, if tomorrow they have to come up and step up, you know, the international community will like the way they did withdraw in August 15, you know, 2021, they will also say, well, this crisis is enough, enough. So I think, you know, that the lack of owning the problem and coming up with solutions that we don't see at this point in time, you know, that and that solution is not that, you know, they think that, you know, if you give us the money, we will solve. No, I mean, that's the problem. They have to first come up with the political solutions because the moment they have a political solutions, they will have, you know, you know, they will find ways how to work with the international communities. When they find a way to work with the international communities, then they will have the resources and collaborations and partnership with the international community have to, you know, come up with the long term solutions and ways to deal with this. But right now, you know, just because, you know, they're ready tomorrow to work with the humanitarian crisis, but the international community will not work with that, you know, because that's not, so it's not just a black and white picture, you know, just it has so many dimensions this crisis, Scott. Yeah, thanks for that. I definitely want to come back to the political side of this. And we have 90 minutes because of the complexity of it. Let me just turn next to Paul Wascha. And we talked about the scope of the humanitarian crisis. And I mentioned at the top, there's also, I think, a rights crisis, a human rights crisis, a women's rights crisis. People have been quite critical of the Taliban's rollback on rights. People are especially fearful of a return to the particularly restrictive and even, I would say, abusive policies of the Taliban in the 90s. And I'm wondering from what you're hearing, from what you're observing, what is the state of the rights rollback now? How realistic is it for the Taliban to improve on the record of the 90s? Have they moderated at all? And what are you hearing from the ground? Thank you for that question, Scott. It's a really difficult one to answer. And in fact, what we're hearing from the ground from many of our partners and those that we've worked with is that this seems to be just tactics, that the Taliban, their difference of approach where they're now allowing girls say up to sixth grade around Afghanistan to go to school and then in 19 provinces, allowing some of them to go further on, is just a tactic. And there seems to be this push and shove between communities and the Taliban, where the Taliban will implement something and then the communities will protest and then they'll come back and they'll say, OK, well, now we're going to open it back up or we're going to do something different. And it's just people feel like they're just being played with and that this is something temporary until they receive, until the Taliban receive enough international attention, enough international aid and recognition. And so there's a lot of women that are worried and also men that are worried that if this turns into international recognition, the Taliban will just go right back, we're right back to the 1990s. Some of the things that we're seeing, of course, I talked about education. There are some difficulties in health care. We heard in Faria where the Taliban went and spoke to the female doctors and actually told them, you know, you shouldn't be doing X, Y and Z. You need to limit, for example, your treatment of men. You're not allowed to treat men. You're not allowed to prescribe certain drugs, those kinds of things where limitations were given on them. And then we're seeing in the justice sector where no female lawyers, no female judges are allowed at all. The Independent Bar Association has completely been dismantled and been brought under the Ministry of Justice. So there's all these things. And what we're observing also is that women are not going to courts. They're not being observed in courts. And this is even something worse than the past. And the 90s women did go to courts where the Taliban were presiding. And now we're not seeing that as well. And they're feeling that they're not safe. So those are a number of areas. The Taliban have intensified their crackdown just in the last week on women. We've seen that protesters in Polisurkh area of Kabul were actually beaten because of not observing appropriate Islamic hijab. Protesters have been fired upon. And protesters in Kapisa, women, female protesters in Kapisa were detained. The community calls it abducted, arrested, however you want to put it, but they were put in jail. And there was a huge community outcry, including from religious leaders in the mosques that then eventually led to their release. But we've heard also unconfirmed reports of protesters in other provinces, female protesters in other provinces being detained and tortured as well. So that's on the women front. On human rights abuses we're seeing beyond just women. Journalists are being targeted. We continue to see those security forces being targeted. Revenge killings are happening. Even we have reports of doctors being killed. And these are kinds of things that in the past, under the Taliban, there was some sort of a security force that prevented some of this happening. And now it seems like with the jails being open and there isn't as much control over criminal activity that all kinds of things like this are cropping up. And then the final thing I wanted to mention is those that have shown online dissent are also being arrested. We saw the prominent Professor Fazal Ajalal being arrested and recently released. And then others who've been arrested that are not as well known. And still it's unknown where they are and when they will be released. So those are some of the things that we're observing right now. Thanks for that. You mentioned tactics. And I want to touch on another dimension that particularly affects women's rights, but human rights more generally. And the Taliban often have tried to say encouraging things at least to Western audiences about respecting rights. But there's often added the caveat in accordance with Islam. Now, of course, Islam is a broad religion and it's practiced by many in different ways. But I'm wondering, what's your take on that caveat? What do the Taliban really mean by that? Is there any clarity about how they will interpret Islam? Is this just a way of covering what will really be restrictive rights? Or are they open to debate or dialogue on religious grounds about how they should treat social policy in Afghanistan? Sky, I think that that's a really important point because what we're noticing is when they talk about according to Islam or even according to Hanafijir's prudence, there's this very big discrepancy and how they interpret that and what is in Hanafijir's prudence, particularly related to women's rights. For example, in Hanafijir's prudence, there is nothing about women covering their faces. Arwah is not, the face and the hands are not included as places that should be covered according to Hanafijir's prudence. For example, in Hanafijir's prudence, women can be judges. So there's all of these things that are, and then for example, in Hanafijir's prudence, there's a very big emphasis on Bai'a or pledging of allegiance to the head of state and a head of state being basically elected by the people, by the public. And we have the example of Imam Abu Hanifah himself refusing to pledge allegiance to the Abbasid ruler Mahdi saying you haven't been approved by the people, they haven't pledged your allegiance and you need the public to pledge your allegiance. So these are some of the things that are in Hanafijir's prudence, specifically Hanafijir's prudence that the Taliban claim to follow and they're not following those things. So it does seem to be very much tactics, very much politics. However, we are seeing some breakthrough moments where, for example, in Herak, the Ulama were able to overturn the Taliban's ruling of closing the women's Hamams and they were saying the women's bath houses, the Taliban were saying they need to be closed and the Ulama there in Herak said, no, this goes against Islamic jurisprudence. Women should have a place to be able to wash and clean and make their evolutions and be ready for prayer and through their flat was they were able to overturn that and reopen the Hamams. Similarly, with the Kapisa abduction of the women, we saw the outcry from the mosques, the Ulama stood up for those women and asked for them to be released. So we're seeing some of these breakthrough moments where the Ulama are standing up and there's making some changes. But overall, we're not seeing this. We heard the Ulama and Doha speak against the Taliban's decision on education, on girls' education. It didn't seem to make a dent really in what they're doing. We still haven't seen girls' schools above sixth grade open at a large scale in Afghanistan, things like that. So it's a lot of politics and we're still waiting to see really how that's going to happen. But at this point, it doesn't seem very likely that the religious argument is going to do much without some sort of political backing or some sort of political gain that the Taliban will see out of it. Thanks for that. Again, the politics. So we'll definitely flag that as our conversation goes on. Let me turn to Asfandiar and talk about the third significant interest, maybe even the most significant U.S. national security interest, which is the terrorism threat that Afghanistan poses. Of course, the Taliban committed in the U.S. Taliban agreement to prevent al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups, likely ISIS, from launching attacks from Afghan soil. What's your assessment of, one, the, I guess, the sincerity of that commitment toward the U.S. and to other allies since the Taliban victory? Are they still bound by that? Are they still intending to not allow al-Qaeda or other groups to operate? But also, what's their ability, if they are sincere, what's their ability to deliver on counterterrorism commitments considering the humanitarian crisis and the unrest that persists in the country? Thanks so much for this opportunity, Scott, to join this very distinguished group on this really important and sobering topic. I'm delighted to be here, but also as concerned about the continuing distress that the Afghan people faced in Afghanistan. The Taliban have been slowly walking back or strongly carb-yatting many of their key declarations and commitments on various issues that they've made over the last few years. I think Bolusha documented or spoke about some of them. And my assessment is that terrorism and counterterrorism as an issue area is no different. I don't see real sincerity or commitment on part of the Taliban to work with the international community to meaningfully stem the terror threat from Afghanistan in Afghanistan for now. And the Taliban retains strong relationships with various terror groups in the country, despite their commitment as part of the FEPP 2020 US Taliban agreement. What is most concerning is that they are providing what amounts to de facto political asylum to a lot of groups and their people in the country. And they have also ensured that key leaders of many of these groups have freedom of movement, the kind of movement, freedom of movement that they did not enjoy prior to August 15, 2021. Groups that are benefiting from the Taliban's support included my assessment, Al-Qaeda and its local units in Afghanistan. My sense is that Al-Qaeda chief Iman al-Zawahidi remains alive and he may well be in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, could be in Pakistan as well, but I think a reasonable likelihood that he is in Afghanistan. With a lot of Al-Qaeda allies now in key positions in the Taliban's government, my assessment is that the Iran-based Al-Qaeda leadership is in better position than before to relocate to the country if it wants to. And then perhaps one of the biggest beneficiaries of the Taliban's largesse is the group the Tehlike Taliban Pakistan TTP or Pakistan Taliban, as it is generally known. The leadership of this group has stepped up its campaign of violence in Pakistan from bases in Afghanistan. In November, there was some glimmer of hope that perhaps the Taliban are going to get serious about the TTP or restraining the TTP. They brokered a ceasefire between Pakistan and the TTP, but that ceasefire lapsed. And now the Taliban remain non-committal on the future of TTP in Afghanistan. There are various Central Asian jihadis which have relocated within Afghanistan and continue to steadily build up their sizes, most certainly growing. I think there are efforts to further unify some of these Central Asian jihadis to boost their campaigns in Central Asian republics. Then there are anti-India jihadis, anti-China jihadis such as those of the Turkistan Islamic party. So that's the ecosystem that the Taliban are aligned with. On the other hand, I think it's clear more than ever that the Taliban see ISIS in Afghanistan to be one of the most important significant threats they face, perhaps even more significant than the threat due to the humanitarian disaster unfolding in the country. They are fighting ISIS, no doubt about it. They're seeking to target the group, especially in the east of the country. There's been a major crackdown undertaken by the Taliban, especially in Nangarhar. But here is where we are at on that crackdown. You asked about capacity. The Taliban's counterinsurgency is relatively indiscriminate. They are repressing lots of Salafi communities in the east of the country because they see them as associated with providing for ISIS in Afghanistan. And they're also rounding up minorities, political opponents, other vulnerable groups, casting them as ISIS affiliates members as well, which I think is counterproductive. So as a result of that, there are serious supports of ISIS-K activity in various parts of the country, which previously indicated no meaningful ISIS activity. And to top it off, and I think this is where the international community kind of comes in, the Taliban have not been able to detain or neutralize any senior leader of ISIS-K until now. ISIS leader Shahab al-Muhajir, Aslam Farooqi, their main at large, and the Taliban have not been able to get them. The question is, is capacity the reason the Taliban are not going to gain some of these major terror groups that they're aligned with? I think it can be, to be fair to the Taliban, but they have to actually make that determination that they want to do something about these groups. But for now, that is not the fundamental reason for Taliban's support or continuing assistance for all of these groups. I think the reasons of ideology, ideological commitment to the problems of children in jihad who subordinate themselves to the Taliban, I think those reasons are more important to the Taliban's calculus than then considerations of capacity. Thanks. Your description of the different regional actors that are coming into Afghanistan raises another question, which is, when you look at the terrorism threat that might emanate from Afghanistan, is it greater, would you say, for the U.S. and our close allies or greater for the region? And ultimately, are those interests aligned between, let's say, the U.S. and NATO, as well as diverse actors like Iran, China, Central Asia, and Pakistan? My sense is that the more near-term threat is to Afghanistan's neighbors and other regional powers, which is going up substantially. Pakistan certainly faces a more important and higher capacity threat in the shape of the Pakistan Taliban, which Pakistani policymakers have been understating for a while and are only starting to consider seriously now it appears. Central Asian governments are watching the movement of groups like Islamic jihad, Kadib-e-Temam al-Bukhari, Jama'at al-Sarullah, with a lot of nervousness. And I think some of these governments are starting to voice that nervousness, such as the government of Tajikistan recently. And then China, which initially looked like it would move in sort of quickly to recognize the Taliban, appears not so convinced of the Taliban sort of talk on terrorism. And it's not hating what it wants to hear, seeing what it wants to see. And that's because, in my sense, this Chinese assessor, the Taliban are not in the move, not in the mood to move against some of the threats that they are concerned about, like Turkestan Islamic Party, which is why I think China, the aid to Afghanistan, is around the same amount as what Al-Qaeda and the Laden were giving to Ulaanba before 9-11. To be sure, the threat to the U.S. and NATO allies is there, and it's not very far off from the threat that a lot of these regional countries are facing, I think it's building up. ISIS is certainly committed to a major attack against the U.S. homeland. And Al-Qaeda, I will note to its branch in Yemen, in some of the same messaging streams in which it prezes and applause the Taliban has, again, threatened major attacks against the U.S. in near term. So I think the threat against the U.S. and its NATO allies very much remains. Thanks for that. Andrew Watkins, you've been patient. Let me get to you and start to talk a little bit about politics. But in the context of the question, how stable is the Taliban's hold on power here? On the one hand, their military victory was quite complete, and they quelled the small opposition, armed opposition that emerged in Panjshir. On the other hand, the Taliban, one of the surprises of this situation, I think, is that the Taliban were manifestly unpopular throughout their insurgency, never really showing any mass appeal. So you have an unpopular regime with firm military control for now, and all these problems that we've just talked about over the last half hour. I mean, what's your assessment of the stability of the Taliban government right now? Yeah, thanks, Scott. And no problem being patient with a panel like this. It's been great to hear everyone's inputs and thoughts. When we think about the stability of the Taliban as a government or as a ruling regime, to me, the most important, at starting point, is comparing how we might measure the fragility of a state versus how the Taliban themselves might measure either their strength or their effectiveness or their own fragility. What I want to do is ask not how do we think the Taliban look as we think states should look, but what is the Taliban's conception of what a good job would be for themselves? And I think there's a really stark divide, and it touches on everything that our other speakers have spoken about. This is a group that is still mired in a militant movement's modus operandi across the board when it comes to how it responds to the humanitarian crisis, when it comes to the idea of the threat of terrorism or other security challenges. Also, when it comes to human rights and even the core idea of service delivery, this is a group that seems to believe its job is not to serve its population, its people, but to protect them. And that's being very generous. That's giving a bit of a benefit of the doubt to the Taliban and assuming benevolent intent. But we have a group that perceives everything that it does as protection over the Afghan people with a very Hobbesian take on how the world works and all of the dangers and threats that are out there. That just so happens to correspond with what this group has done best over the last 20 years, which is to identify and hunt down and then attack or extinguish threats. At the time for the last two decades, that threat was a government that they believe to be illegitimate. Today, the threats are manifold, and there are so many things that they just don't have the capacity or the resources to do, as Amiri noted. But if you ask the Taliban whether they've done what they really want to do, I think they might say yes. Their sources of instability over the longer term is a really interesting question. Because right now what they've demonstrated in one decision after another is that they're perfectly fine with running a government that effectively just elevates their movement, their insurgent movement, their jihadist movement into the halls of power. But transforming into a political actor, transforming into what we think of as a more conventional state and all of the organs the state requires and nurtures, they don't even seem to have bought into that core concept of what we might think of as a modern state. So in that sense, it's incredibly fragile, and there's a lot down the road that might really trouble them. But if they're fine with running a proto-state, if they're fine with running a national scale version of their militant movement that supplies only the most basic services, most of which would be their ideas of law and order or security, then in that sense they might be able to do that for quite some time. So Afghanistan is the graveyard, if many things people say, among them is predictions. But I want to challenge you and go to the other panelists as well to try to project as you've started down this path, how you see things unfolding over the next year. I think most people presume this humanitarian crisis will actually unfortunately get worse before it gets better. That will presumably generate a certain amount of social pressure on the Taliban who, as we said, has sole control. And we talked about political pressures, of course, and further I'll prompt you for some analysis that say there are internal divisions within the Taliban that are unfolding between different factions. But if you look at this as a, I'm thinking, a pressure cooker, where is the pressure release? Is it toward reform along the lines of at least internationals and their sanctions would hope for? Is it toward a crackdown? Is it toward splintering? How do you see pressure being managed in this system under the current circumstances? And I'll get your views first, but I want other views on that as well. For sure. Unfortunately, I think the most likely outcome, broadly speaking, is crackdowns. And again, that's across the board. And I think in response to a variety of perceived threats, that's what this group has honed and refined itself as a war fighting machine for years now, down to the individual level of the young men who have been trained and indoctrinated, brainwashed in some ways, brought up in a system that is intended to teach them and to school them in doing one thing, which is overthrowing the previous regime, those skills and those mindsets and that mentality is geared towards cracking down on what they see as problems or threats or dissent, as we've seen, even peaceful dissents through speech. The idea that this movement could move towards reform would require changing at the individual level, at the level of every rural pocket where the Taliban has drawn its people from. The grievances that they've come to the worldviews that they embrace would require changing away from an idea that what we are is a movement that enforces law and order and security through either violence or the coercive threat of violence. And it would need to transform into a very different idea of what it means to be in power and what it means to watch over and to rule a country's population. That kind of transformation, I don't see evidence, although the Taliban is a close and opaque movement, I don't see evidence of that vast and wide-ranging intellectual transformation taking place, certainly not in the near term. But when you characterized it as a sort of pressure-cooker situation, the severity of what's going on in Afghanistan, I would just, I would maybe suggest that although the pressure is building and this is going to be one of the world's worst crises with devastating impact, it might not take that much of a release valve to release the pressure. What I mean is look at, for instance, just yesterday's news that the Taliban plan to implement a wide-ranging wheat-for-work program, either being unable or unwilling to dip into their own cash reserves to pay civil servants salaries, they're going to start doling out rations of wheat and wheat flour to hundreds of thousands of Afghans in lieu of a monetary salary. Now that sounds outrageous and that could be perceived from our outside view as a serious weakness of the government. But what if things are already getting so bad, have gotten so bad inside the country, that that's actually quite a relief to many of these families and that that might be just enough pressure relieved from absolute disaster that we don't see things bubble up quite the way we might anticipate, or at least not in the near term. Thanks. Thanks. Let me get other views. Amiri, so essentially the same question to you. I mean, amid growing pressure, do you see Taliban hardening, softening, or cracking? So, to answer that, I need to give a little bit more context. I mean, Taliban is kind of entity that, you know, they believe in some stuff. Like one of us that was at 20 years, the international community, you know, did a lot of harm to our communities. And that's why the community hate us. Therefore, the community now needs kind of, you know, our engagement from the bison, we're doing others from religious scholars to bring them back to. So basically, they're saying that they're not against us because, you know, we're bad, because they say we're there against us because, you know, they're influenced by the international community, just to put it in a simple way. So what, so basically their plan is the way they won't support in rural communities, they literally plan each one religious person in each family. So they're kind of thinking that if people become more religious and more, so that's where they can see more people on their side. Once people are on their side, if it's worse or bad, they will support them in any situations, the way the rural communities did in the rural areas, you know. People were in a horrible situation, but did not complain because of Taliban, you know. So they just think that, yeah, that's the way. So they're kind of working on the soft power to kind of have community, but that's actually a miscalculation, you know. I mean, there's like 39 million, I mean, 35 million, 39 million, I mean, we don't know the exact number of people living there. I mean, governance is not going to be just the way it was in 1990s or, you know. So Taliban are actually miscalculating, but Taliban also has their own problem. For example, the internal structure, you know, makes it very difficult for them to make any reforms, you know. The narrative that comes from military commanders, you know, from middle level commander, for local commanders, that actually shaped their policies, you know, their policies and way forward. And at the same time, lack of leadership. I mean, the thing is that Taliban process is a consultative process, you know. Whatever comes, they have to talk to each other, you know, and nobody wants to bring a sensitive issue. For example, inclusion in these things among the topics, because then he will be seeing some sort of like, yeah, why are you advocating for such thing? You know, it's too early. And the other thing is religious scholars, you know, that shape sort of their policies, governance and everything. That's why they called recently for a religious shura, because that will take a lot of pressure from the political actors if the religious scholar decides. Look, religious scholars, you know, play a very important role in their legitimacy, their source of legitimacy is driven by the religious. No matter that the whole country says anything, if the religious scholar supported, that's it. That's what matters to them the most. So that's why when, you know, they try to engage, you know, to kind of have the religious scholars, we want some of these points, some of these reforms, some of like, for example, women's inclusivity and other things. Once they have that, then that will kind of, but still, you know, on one hand, they're kind of bounded by and influenced by the religious scholars. On the other hand, they're kind of influenced by the military guys. And then they're also the process consultative. So that makes it the whole, you know, Taliban dealing with the local issues or the Afghanistan is your national level, very complicated, you know, it makes it more and more, you know, for them to delay further and further and give a very, you know, very standard answers. Now that's one part. On the other part is the international community, the external factors when it comes to the Taliban policy. There's a fairly lack of consistency in engagement from the peace talks to right now, even at this point in time, there's no consistency. What needs to be done? Taliban are thinking that it's a matter of time before everybody recognize that, you know, I mean, this needs to be clearly communicated, you know, millions of people are living day to day. We're hoping that something, you know, that tomorrow news will come, you know, and this, the lack of international community, you know, clear response to engagement. Yes, they did come up with some statements, but those statements are still not very clear. You know, sometimes they say one thing's then the second time they release, they announced a couple million dollars and, you know, they talk about the Afghan people, but there's no who are the Afghan peoples, how are they going to engage, you know, so those actually, you know, sending a very mixed signals to the communities and also to the Taliban, to everyone that, you know, nothing is decided, anything can go any ways. And this makes Taliban think that they have a little bit the upper hand, Scott. Thanks. Thanks very interesting. So, Paul Asha, just get you in on this discussion as well, your reactions on how pressure will impact the Taliban and the governance situation. But I wonder also if you have thoughts on my thesis to begin with, how much pressure do you think will come from within Afghanistan? I think the U.S. audience, the Western audience hears overwhelmingly from those leaders of civil society, many of whom left, but who are oriented more toward Western donors, Western donor programs. Of course, civil society is much broader than that. And Amiri mentioned religious leaders having great influence. There's the grassroots that isn't heard from. Is there going to be significant pressure from within Afghan society, or are they in a position of weakness where there won't be that much pressure on the Taliban to reform or improve? Oh, I think Scott, that's a really good point. I think there is pressure internally. And we're seeing that by the protests that are happening when something happens that they disagree with, that all of my have stand up stood up. I just wanted to clarify, I think that what Amiri was mentioning in terms of the Taliban really listening to the religious scholars is they listen to their own religious scholars within their own movement. And so we need to make a distinction between the Ulamar, the religious scholars within the Taliban movement that they listen to, and then the non-Taliban religious scholars here who have, like I said, in some instances, been able to have to use their leverage and knowledge of the song to make difference, but in general doesn't seem to have a huge impact overall. I don't feel like the internal pressure from the Afghan population, we've seen them demonstrating, we've seen them the outcry, we've seen people dying, we've seen IDPs being beaten when they're trying to go back to their land, all kinds of things are happening. It doesn't really seem to make a huge difference. Some of the protests in some of the big cities seem to have some small effects on certain issues, but we're not seeing that large effect overall. What does seem to make an impact is international community and the role the international community is playing. Unfortunately, when the Taliban decide that they're going to focus on beheading women, girl mannequins, the media seems to follow that and be all up at arms that they're doing this rather than focusing on the starvation that women and children are facing in Afghanistan. And so the Taliban's also lack of attention to the starvation this winter will bring. I mean, there's an estimation that 1 million children will possibly die of starvation in Afghanistan this winter if nothing is done. 22.8 million Afghans are facing starvation right now in this winter. It's very, very severe. And the fact that there is instead of focusing on how do we overcome this starvation, how do we give jobs to people, how do we pay the teachers instead of preventing the teachers from going to school to work? How do we pay women? How do we give them jobs? How do we make sure that people have an income that doesn't seem to be the focus rather than some these petty issues seem to be coming up? And that's really unfortunate in terms of what we're seeing play out with the Taliban. And it does seem that the international community's attention to starvation is really important here and trying to bring some sort of relief to this. But what I do want to mention is that just bringing wheat into the situation or rice or flour or oil isn't really going to solve the problem. You've seen in the past where those kinds of things have been brought in, they spend $150 on rations and then the family actually needs the money for something else and goes and sells that for $30 and uses it for something else. It's really a huge loss. The importance is purchasing power. And how do we increase purchasing power in Afghanistan? There's a number of different ways to do that to be able to get money into the hands of Afghans. I think that's really the key issue that international community needs to work on and pay attention to to safe starvation in Afghanistan at this point. Thanks for that. And I appreciate a good segue because I want to move to a third round of questions. And there is an arc to this which is the current we've heard about the current situation. We've had projections about the future. And then I want to ask initially the what to do about it question. And I'm also going to turn to the audience after this. So if you haven't put your questions in the chat, please do so and we'll select from from there. Let me go to you as Fandiar and get your kind of regional perspective on how to address what you said before is a significant regional problem. We talked about terrorism but certainly the collapsed economy of Afghanistan hurts regional trade. The the more nobody's mentioned refugees but but the more economic and hardship and hunger there is presumably the pressure for refugees to go over into neighboring countries increases. With these risks facing the region, what do you see as their incentives for action? Are they more likely to just close the borders and harden the situation? Will they help to Taliban? How do you think the region can or will act to alleviate at least their own security risks? Yeah, I think the region has a lot of tolerance for dysfunction in Afghanistan. Really, unfortunately, which goes generally underappreciated. I think the last few years we've had this this analytical consensus at least here at the West that the region is the worst affected and the region really wants to prevent the worst case outcome in Afghanistan. But while the region continuously chastises the United States government for its missteps and I think many a time they make good points about that. We have not seen the region exert the kind of pressure on the Taliban that is necessary to move them on governance on issues of political inclusion, terrorism counterterrorism and human rights concerns. So, you know, I think you could argue that the region is withholding diplomatic recognition. So in a way the region is punishing the Taliban, but I'd contend that the region is only withholding diplomatic recognition, de facto Taliban stands, recognized much of the region is doing is engaging with the Taliban in multiple different ways. Why is the region not pushing the Taliban harder? I think it's because the region has other interests in Afghanistan, which it prioritizes all the sources of potential spinovers due to the humanitarian disaster of the economic crisis. So, you know, China and Russia Iran, they wanted to see the US out. And their priority was to sort of see the US out. And I think going forward, it remains to not allow the US to again, have major political influence in Afghanistan. China in particular doesn't seem to mind for the erosion of Afghanistan, the economy, which is, you know, which is somewhat puzzling to me. For Pakistan, no surprise, it has always been about keeping India out and even amid all its growing challenges with the Taliban. Pakistan is kind of content with the fact that at least the Taliban are not close to India like the former Afghan government. So, you know, my depressing sort of conclusion here is that the region will not act at least in time or force the hand of the Taliban to fix things. But, you know, in the off chance that the region becomes really very concerned that the Taliban are this fundamental obstacle that they are the source of the current crisis. And if Afghanistan has to be fixed, the Taliban have to be fixed. I think we might see attempts and manipulation of the Taliban's internal politics to influence the group for more favorable governance policies. You know, I think Pakistan could take a lead, Pakistan and China could coordinate. We are already seeing Iran trying to do more, trying to bring in the political opposition. The question is, will they succeed? Will the region succeed? Very hard to say at this time. Andrew Walkins, what do you see as opportunities for the US, for other international actors to positively influence the situation? What are the levers that will work, which should be pulled first? Yeah, thanks, Scott. Just a quick thought following up from Asfand Yar's points, which I agree with. I think he's absolutely correct in the broad picture. But in terms of points of leverage, I think it's been interesting to see even in the past week, some of the regional powers and neighbors. Although, as Asfand Yar notes, their tolerance for what we might consider unacceptable Taliban behaviors is much greater, and that goes back to a completely different set of national interests and priorities that many of the neighbors have, they're also able to exercise leverage in a way that I think perhaps only neighbors and regional states can, because of the very real tangible payoffs and quid pro quos and benefits that they might be able to offer. The meeting that Iran seemed to put together, and perhaps probably insisted on, between the Taliban's former foreign minister and several key opposition leaders in Tehran this past week, on one level that could have been largely symbolic, that may be dismissed as a photo opportunity for PR purposes. We've yet to see if that will turn into something more real, more substantive, but it does appear to be an instance of successful leverage of Iran, which the Taliban very intently needs a technical working level engagement on a number of issues, not just trade, but even water rights and water usage between the two states, et cetera, number of issues. Iran successfully leveraging what the Taliban needs from them in very real terms to at least inch towards something that we've all been speaking about in very vague, abstract terms, a more inclusive system or inclusion of other political figures and voices. So that's an interesting point. Maybe what I say on the US and various European and other donor states is that it's not as clear if the US or other European countries have that leverage. And I think the belief that the massive amounts of aid and even development assistance that the US, the EU, its member states, et cetera, are able to bring to bear, I think there's long been a hope that that can prove to be a source of leverage, but you only need to look at the track record of the past 20 years. It's incredibly difficult for states that are disengaged and are fairly distant geographically and in many other ways to exert that leverage of donor support, unless they truly are willing to back off. In the Taliban's case, the issue is not the one that we had with the previous regime, where we have committed all of this aid and now feel like we can't really credibly threaten to take it all away as it was with the Islamic Republic. But today, it might not even be credible the idea that we would give them as much aid as the Republic saw. And so if we think that the promise of future money and funding and engagement and benefits could tempt the Taliban into moderating, are we really serious if we make that promise, that hypothetical promise? Thanks, Paul. Asha, you mentioned you were on the path towards some concrete recommendations, I think, with purchasing, increasing purchasing power. You referenced earlier the Taliban's strong desire for international recognition, maybe that amounts to leverage. I just want to invite you to continue on what would be your top actions and opportunities for the U.S. or other international actors to positively influence the situation. Thank you. Yeah, as I was mentioning, I think it's really important to think of the Afghan people and giving purchasing power to the Afghan people and supporting the Afghan people through this crisis, rather than thinking about the Taliban government, per se. And I think that finding ways to support the people through this crisis is really important and not giving international recognition to the Taliban is really important. I think those are two things that we have to figure out how to square the circle because in terms of supporting the people, how do we do that without giving recognition to the government? It's a big question. Even though it's very clear that there's a specific list of 139 people on the sanctions list in Afghanistan, still banks are risk averse and we're still having trouble getting money to Afghanistan. It's just not going to happen. So whether there are ways to make it very clear or to help that process, that's something that I hope could be investigated in some solution. Some resolution could be found to help Afghan people, particularly over this crisis, and find some way out. In terms of leverage with the Taliban, the way Andrew ended his point about whether it will make any difference, I think that's something we need to pause and think about. Will giving some sort of sanctions relief on a specific issue or conditions-based issue really tempt to the Taliban to change? We haven't really seen any sort of concrete move towards that. We do have the Doha agreement with the U.S. of the Taliban signed that they have not held on their part. Unfortunately, there are so many pieces to that that we can go into, and I think, as Fundar did as well, a little bit, that could be points where we could say, well, hey, you didn't uphold this part of your bargain. And if you do uphold, then there may be some ways that we can work. I really don't see any of that happening and making a difference. The only one thing that in terms of international pressure is looking to religious scholars, particularly those that are borderline on the Jihadi side that may have influence on the Taliban's movement that are connected to political powers that the Taliban care about that might have some way of leveraging on particular issues inside of Afghanistan that might help the situation. That's something that could possibly be an area to explore. But again, I really think that international efforts should be to help the Afghan people really work on ending starvation in Afghanistan and finding ways to get help on the ground to the people and not recognizing the Taliban government at this point. Thank you. Thanks. And just before going to the audience questions, Amiri, what's the biggest point of leverage and what should it be used for? Just to add, I mean, just one point on the Ulama or religious scholars, a lot of them, the Taliban are quite popular in a lot of religious scholars. That's one point. And second is, look, the traditional boxes are not going to work. That's one thing we have seen. That's not going to work. There has to be a new way out. If we just stick to the old traditional boxes and think that a different result, I think it's just a waste of the people of Afghanistan, people who've been suffering for the last 40 years. So here, what I mean, we've been thinking and working with a lot of people on the ground. One of the way that we see, I mean, let's talk a little bit more practical than just, I believe, shooting in the air is that engagement with the locals. One of the things that Taliban are really afraid of, engagement with the locals, more engagement. A civil society is not, is there. They're active. People are active. People want to participate in politics. People want to challenge Taliban on their decision. I think the international community should work with them, meeting them. Every time, for example, I see these envoys go to Kabul. They don't meet those local Afghans. I think it's time to work with those locals. If one wants to challenge the Taliban in the future, they have to have, they need to work with the local population. One of the ideas is to kind of even form a sort of like a local representation, engage them. Every time, for example, a special envoy goes there and meets with these guys. Yes, it takes a lot of risk, but with a risk that you will not be able to achieve anything. I mean, there's a risk. So those traditional boxes, coming back to the traditional boxes, they're not going to work. Working with the locals on provincial level, local, national level is the best way forward. I'm not talking about the, you know, the warlords. Today, whatever we see is the reason of engagement with those warlords of the last 20 years. I'm talking about the new generations who have hope aspirations, you know, and they're willing to do a lot of things for their country. It's not necessarily that they're against the Taliban. It's not about necessary against the Taliban. It's about reforms. It's about, you know, bringing something good for their country. You know, if the international community ignores, and for example, right now, so far what we see is just humanitarian aid, you know, feeding people. That's not going to take Afghanistan anywhere. And that's not going to take, you know, Taliban to the, you know, to more reforms. What Taliban will, what will bring Taliban into more things is reforms and engagement is people, you know, when they know that people are actually upset when they know that, you know, they cannot control people when they know that, you know, that people demand, you know, their rights. And that can be done by engagement. You don't have to like, you know, educate them on Western philosophy or all those things. No, simple things, simple rights that Afghan wants for themselves. Just support them on the local level, engage them, you know, meet them and on all level. So just as simple from my side, I think the best way is engaging the locals. That's the best way to go forward. And that will bring Taliban into a lot of, into the table to talk about a lot of things. Scott. Thanks, Paul Washer. Let me get, let me get your views. You might have a different perspective. Yeah. So, you know, some women are calling for another bond process similar to what Amiri was saying in terms of bringing people together. But I think even at the local level, there's been, you know, outcry that as internationals are coming to meet the Taliban, where are they coming to meet the women? Where is the engagement at the local level? So if they're engaging locally with people, they'd also need to engage and make it very clear they're engaging with women. We have examples in Libya, when Deborah Lyons was working on a peace agreement that she made initiative to make sure women were in the room when she was in the room and really advocate for that. That made a huge difference on the peace process there. So we have evidence that this is really important. And that can be done in Afghanistan and a lot of those level meetings. It has to be done carefully and, of course, thoughtfully, but it can happen. And that's another thing about local meetings. The other thing is that women themselves have repeatedly, local women in Afghanistan have repeatedly demanded to talk to the Taliban about their issues. And we haven't been able to facilitate those kinds of conversations yet. And so, again, the same line as what Amiri is saying, the importance of facilitating those local conversations, we need to facilitate some of these conversations. The women want to talk about their demands to the Taliban directly. They haven't had those avenues to do that. How are we supporting those kinds of dialogues that can happen at the local level? So those are some of the things that adding on to that it's important to recognize and then figuring out the role that particular groups, I mean, if we're thinking about women, we also need to think about minority groups as well and the inclusion in some of these local meetings and also thinking about how we can facilitate those kinds of conversations, whether it be locally or internationally, for broader inclusion. Yeah, thanks. And I'll just note that Secretary Blinken did just recently appoint a special envoy for addressing Afghan women's issues and broader human rights issues who many in the Afghan policy community know. And so hopefully there is now more means to facilitate those kinds of interactions. Let me take another question, this one from Kareem Merchant who says, looking at the diverse approaches of the international community, won't the Taliban exploit these differences and continue to seek legitimacy from, quote, less demanding international community members? So playing one off against the other region against the the broader community. Andrew Watkins, let me get your thoughts and then maybe I'll also read you guys from your on that. Sure, I think I think this question speaks to a lot of what a Sunday was was speaking about earlier. What is interested me is watching the Taliban's own posture. As it has changed, I suppose from some point in the thick of US Taliban negotiations with our special representatives on my house in 2019 into 2020. And then as especially with the change in the US presidential administration, as the Taliban began to read the tea leaves and see that they might not get everything they had hoped to in their understanding of the Doha deal, you saw a real shift in the year before their takeover of the country as they sort of pivoted towards a what I've thought of as a regional first strategy. They began to place less importance on meeting benchmarks or moving with a sense of purpose or speed through the negotiations with Khalzad and certainly not with with representatives from the Islamic Republic for for supposed peace talks, but they really began ratcheting up their regionally oriented diplomacy. To the extent that in the first weeks after their takeover of Kabul, you heard some really almost ecstatic public rhetoric from some Taliban officials about the idea of cooperating with China. And indeed, you there's a sense of optimism, perhaps overblown optimism that we've heard from Taliban officials and spokespersons and supporters, especially in the first weeks and months after their takeover, the idea that the region would that they would be able to play different elements of the international community off one another, that they would be able to go to, for instance, China and that China would be able and willing to put in so much of the funding that they assumed they would lose from the United States and European powers. It hasn't played out that way. China has not put forward actual money, hasn't made any firm commitments and hasn't even gestured towards the idea of major projects or investments coming in the near term future. And at this point, the Taliban have, if they haven't already, are beginning to look around and realize, oh, there really is only one part of the international community that ponies up the kind of money that we might need to run a state or to deliver certain services or to meet certain goals. And so you've seen the Taliban lurch one way, but then begin to reconsider their position. I'm not certain that they're going to be as successful as they may have thought in terms of trying to play different sides off another. Thanks for that. Svanjir, what's your take? So I partly agree that the Taliban have been able to play countries off each other, have been able to exploit the lack of cohesion in the international community, the lack of an international consensus on what needs to happen in Afghanistan. And my diagnosis is that at least since August 15, 2021, this is because of lack of US leadership on Afghanistan, you know, on a license that there is no real US policy on Afghanistan for now. And so, you know, my prescription is that the US government, the administration needs to take more active interest. Current policy is in drift. It is unclear to me at least what the goal of withholding assets and blocking financial channels to Afghanistan really is. That's not to say that the US should recognize the Taliban. It should be active business with the Taliban. I think the US government needs a more calibrated coercive policy which involves proposing a roadmap, conditions under which the relationship with the Taliban can improve and conditions under which we might see more punishment against the Taliban. I think there's a need for some real political energy, more senior level involvement. And I also think that the multilateralism that we saw at one stage needs to be revived. We need a consensus among major powers on the situation in Afghanistan. And finally, the USC has to go back to the region, which as Andrew noted, it has more leverage, some real tools that the US government doesn't. And one of the threats, which I think the international community at large, not just the US has to put on the table, is meaningful support for the Taliban's political opposition. Right now, that's off the table. I think the political opposition, even though it was backed by the US the last 20 years, is not getting any real support. And that trend needs to be on the table. And I think that provides some leverage. The Taliban are sensitive to that. Yeah, that's great. I want to continue on that and bring in a question as well. I mean, you mentioned a roadmap. So that's a good conceptual tool, what would be on that roadmap? So human rights concerns are one. And that's where I'll get in any four-timers question, which is what are the top human rights demands that the international community could realistically make of the Taliban in exchange for incremental improvements to the Taliban's standing or increases in funding? So that's one piece. But I also want to get other thoughts on the roadmap, because you mentioned, importantly, the political opposition, which has not been mentioned very much at all. And I'll be the first one to say the words Karzai or Abdullah Abdullah. I don't know who the political opposition is per se, but that presumably some kind of inclusive politics would be on the roadmap. Let me ask the other panelists, you know, the human rights question, but what else would you put on a roadmap that you could see as being productive in terms of leveraging recognition, money, and other things? Pawasha, let me go to you, Amiri, and then Andrew, briefly. Right. So of course, you know, all the demands around women and girls' education is out there. That's been something that's been loud and clear. Women's right to work, you know, not being as limited. All of these things are out there. But I think some of the really important pieces are around the human rights abuses that we're seeing more recently that are much more troubling in terms of the detention of women and men for things that they say either protesting or things that they say against the government, the Taliban government. So ending those kinds of detentions, abductions, people disappearing in the night, stopping the unknown gunmen from killing people, those are the kinds of things that, you know, need to really end to show difference and ending both human rights abuses against women and men alongside of showing inclusive governance options and making sure that women are part of the equation at all levels. Amiri, what are your thoughts on both the human rights demands and a broader roadmap? I think, I mean, the human rights is obviously one of the main one. But besides that, it's freedom of expression, freedom of speech. That's the other area. That's one of the things that the Taliban definition of national interest, what is national security and all those things are very narrow. And, I mean, so far they've been collaborating to a large extent, especially the leadership, but the local level, I think the local level commanders and fighters, that's a big problem on that level. So, yeah, I mean, the thing is like people are like those superficial things, like for example, what do you wear, you know, probably not a big thing for the international community. But that's what they interpret even in those superficial things, you know, like what are you wearing, why you catch your beard, why you have long hair, why you have this kind of, you know, like those like simple things for an Afghan. So my point is to look at not just from the international perspective, if you want to be succeeded in Afghanistan, look it from the Afghan perspective, you know, if you want to, you want to depend on something, yes, I mean, there are some national, you know, there's standard things that, you know, you want to put it in those standard terminologies. But before you put it in those standard terminologies, what you need to do is actually map it up. What are those things? So for Afghans, I mean, they just need like political inclusions, like especially the, I mean, they studied a lot of things. They wanted to play a bigger role. It's not about, you know, I mean, nobody is a big, you know, I mean, from my perspective, it's a big, you know, thing of elections. But what they want is some sort of representation, you know, how, what that representation will be. That's a question, you know, like, for example, we have in the Kings R. Shatam, we have, so representation, inclusivity, freedom of expressions and human rights, those are some of the things. And also, you know, the personal sphere, which is one of the main things. I know it's not a big thing for the international community, but if you go to Kabul and another major urban centers, that's one of the main issues that people are really afraid and scared. And, you know, so I will say these are the few things that I think are important. Thanks. Any additional points for you, Andrew? Yeah, a thought or two. I appreciate in this format. Forzheimer's question, the need to be pragmatic and realistic about what the international community, especially Western states and donors, can reasonably go to the Taliban and ask them to consider and to work with them on. I think one thing that the Taliban is a movement have postured themselves and have tried to demonstrate, not just to the international community, but to Amiri's point, to Afghans and domestically as a movement, something they believe and care about strongly is the idea of anti-corruption. The Taliban, in order to survive as an insurgency, made a lot of deals with various devils, ranging from smuggling from the country's vast narcotics production and illicit trading industry and sector, but a whole host of other illicit activities. And this was something that they did to survive in order to achieve their goal and to move forward, but they're in a really unique position now where they can either uphold their own rhetoric about anti-corruption, about the purity of their movement and of striving towards a more Islamic system, or they can permit the same kinds of hypocrisies and corrupt practices and money-making activities to go on as the prior Afghan government, to be quite frank, and so many other central governments in Afghanistan have in the past. This notion of whether or not they will take anti-corruption seriously is something that I think the international community has a window on, maybe not through the United States directly, but certainly through the UN mission and its agencies, its presence on the ground, it has field offices that don't just sit and cobble, but stretch out across the country. I think there's a real opportunity for number one dialogue at a more local, at least provincial level, and number two, potentially even monitoring, holding the Taliban to account if you say to your own people that you will do X and Y, why not allow us to come and observe and to see that being demonstrated. And that could be the monitoring of, over time, a more robust form of pressure, first monitoring, and then discussion about the very basics of rule of law and not rule by might. Thanks. Thanks. I want to interject my own question here, because I think this point about inclusion has been made, and I want to continue to try to drill down on what inclusion means, what inclusion might look like. Amiri, I also appreciated your use of the word representation, and that relates to what I asserted was the fundamental unpopularity of the Taliban, at least as an insurgent movement. We have an interim government now, self-declared interim government by the Taliban. That raises the question of what a permanent government might look like, and it raises the question of what a process for a permanent government might look like. So in this space from interim to permanence, do we have any indications of how the Taliban plan to structure a longer term government? How will they represent people? How will they include people? Amiri, I'll go to you back on that, but I welcome other thoughts. Oh, that's a very important question, because that's what been discussed among a lot of Afghans. They're trying to pitch all kinds of ideas to the Taliban, but Taliban so far literally does not want to even say a word. They just say, well, this is the government, that's it. And they do not just go further like, well, this will be forever the government that we want. So they do not want to go further down and share how it's going to look in the future. But like I said, Afghans sound like all the governments, you know, Taliban are also reactionary. If they see something moving, they will react to that and make a certain decision. That was one of the reasons why, because this was initially the actual government that they would announce. But then after a lot of discussions and a lot of international media and a lot of actors, they actually came under sort of pressure to announce this as an interim government, not as a as the government, you know, so if so see, that's one of the things. So I mean, right now, I mean, the questions a lot of Afghans ask is what is the internal legitimacy of the Taliban, you know, and how the state is going to look under the Taliban. And, you know, what is the constitutions that the Taliban hasn't really provided any answers to those things. I mean, right now, the Amir just appoints people. He doesn't really interfere much in the local politics and implementation in those things. I mean, so far that we see is mostly the appointments. I mean, there is, I mean, I always tell people that we lost the change Taliban the very last minute, you know, Taliban were changed, you know, we lost it the very last minute when the the Republic collapsed, collapsed in August. So that kind of, you know, all the things that they thought of it kind of, you know, washed up, especially the Taliban leadership, and they kind of got themselves in a situations that where they kind of thought like, well, there's no need for anything because everything has just, you know, we got everything, you know, there's the international community give up. And, you know, even in the back then there was a chance, even like in early August, there was a chance of some sort of, you know, even Taliban controlling Kabul, there was a chance of some sort of, you know, bringing Taliban into some sort of engagement with the political, with the other political opposition. So, I mean, so the good point is that just, I don't know how it will look in the future, but the good point is that there is a chance. So that's the most important thing. It's not about what it would look like. The good thing is that there's a chance to shape in, you know, if Taliban is going to remain as a government, there's a big chance to make a lot of, you know, to put pressure to bring a lot of reform and changes. It's how it's a million dollar question. It needs a lot of more time. Scott. Thanks, Pawash, a million dollars on the table for the how what's your what do you see that there's a chance and and how do you see the Taliban maybe moving from interim exclusive to maybe permanent more representative or inclusive. Yeah. So in terms of the process that Mary was talking about in terms of that there was a different kind of a Taliban that could have taken over that was more progressive and we might have gone to something different, but then we lost that chance. I think that, you know, those elements are still in the Taliban. And so we have these different groups within the Taliban and they are at odds with each other. And we saw, you know, some of that play out where Malabra that had to go to Kandahar because, you know, they couldn't get along in Kabul. So so there are these groups and tensions we still have yet to see who, you know, how that will play out and what will happen. And I do think that, you know, the regional countries and international community has a role to play in supporting various groups within the Taliban to support some of those more inclusive approaches or different approaches. I think that that's something that has to be considered clearly because there are those tussles and tensions and what happened with the current announcement of the government was also, you know, supported by regional powers in order for this government to be announced. So that tension needs to be recognized. In terms of, you know, what will happen next or what the process will be, it's a good question. I think that there's a lot of options within Islamic governance. You know, we're looking at the different models, even within Hanafi jurisprudence, within Islamic governance, looking at the rightly guided caliphs in the early times, how head of state was elected, inclusive processes that already exist within Islam. And, you know, if there is appetite for looking into those models, there's a lot of hope that there, you know, we could have a different kind of governance system. The question is, is there still appetite? And what are the different powers within the Taliban in terms of who went out over these different arguments? And I think that has yet to play out. Great. Let me ask the final question now. We've had several in the chat that get to the question of leverage. Who has the leverage and how to use it? I think we have been talking about that. I'll ask one in particular and use that as an invitation for final thoughts. Julia asks more specifically about the reserves, the central bank reserves, almost nine billion that are frozen. And so is it in the interest of the international community to put Afghanistan in the same situation as Iran or Venezuela? With no access to foreign reserves, it doesn't seem to foster progress in the long term. You know, I want to broaden that. You can take that on, but also just broaden that to this question that is underlying a lot of the debate. Do we want the Taliban to succeed or to fail? How do we support the state but not the government? Final point question on leverage is the international community, or even the U.S., let's say, acting against its interest by starving the state of resources, or is that in fact a productive lever to get the changes that we want? Andrew, let me go to you first. I'll do a Spanbier and then see if there are any other points quickly. Thanks, Scott. It really is the key question. And, you know, the U.S. government still seems to be grappling with that question and how it wants to answer as many other previous donor states. I think what Paul Washa was just describing gets to the heart of this question, while the U.S. and other states deliberate over whether or not they want to see the Taliban succeed or whether or not there is a way to keep the state alive without strengthening this movement or perhaps getting some moderation or good behavior out of the Taliban. Every day that goes by while we're either deliberating or waiting to see how things go, that's one more day that the more militant aspects of this movement, that the more extremist aspects of this movement are engaged in internal debate within the Taliban. And they get to say to whichever moderates may exist, to whichever personalities within the Taliban may want to do more in terms of service delivery or of a truly inclusive form of governance. That's when the more militant minds get to say, see, they don't want us to succeed. They don't want to work with us. They have nothing to do with us. They're just waiting for us to fall apart. There's great risk and there's no guarantee that we're going to be rewarded with more moderate Taliban behavior if we as the international community engage. But every day that we don't and we sit back, we're only strengthening the hands of those voices within the Taliban who feel as if they don't need us at all and as if they have their own draconian way of running a country with brutality and the bare minimum. Thanks. Thanks. Amira, you were nodding. Just very briefly, do you agree? What's your quick, very quick take? Yeah, yeah, I totally agree with Andrew at this point. The more the U.S. and international community wait and, you know, thinking that, you know, Taliban will collapse or, you know, they will come to the more they will crack down on the locals and strengthen their positions inside the country. Once they're in better positions, then bringing them or squeezing them, squeezing any other deal out of them will be even more difficult. You know, I mean, Taliban has the potential to turn things into much more into much more problems. So the only way is, I mean, at this point in time is engagement and not just engagement, like just, you know, providing them with assistance. I mean, the reserve, I mean, those that directly benefit them should, yeah, I mean, to some extent can be whole, but those large is some of that actually goes to the population, the Afghan people. And I think that's going to make Taliban more popular and eventually, you know, and will make them stronger and push for more crackdown and further control. And that would be, and that will have a horrible consequences. That's fine, dear. Look, I'm most concerned about terrorism issues. I mean, that's my beat. That's what I follow. Taliban's ties with all these groups that have been documented in my writing that spoke about them. That said, these financial reserves are not a source of leverage for terrorism issues. And most certainly not the $900 or so million dollars of savings of ordinary Afghans. I think they're not a source of leverage. They are not going to change the behavior of the Taliban. And I think the international community at large and the U.S. government in particular have misdiagnosed sources of leverage at one point, the Doha process was doubted as a source of leverage, that it would provide the Taliban with international recognition, but it wasn't. So I think the U.S. government needs to more carefully identify leverage. And in this context, in the current situation, do the right thing by letting the Afghan people have their money back. And I would make a strong case for looking for some real sources of leverage. And I go back to support for the political opposition. I think it is going to make the Taliban really unhappy. And the international community at large needs to very seriously consider that. Thanks. Very briefly, Pawash, you have the final word. I wasn't expecting that one. Yeah. So I agree with Espen Yar in terms of the money not being the leverage at this point, particularly those that are owned by the Afghan people. And I think we have to go back to figuring out what is best for the Afghan people. And I think it's a very difficult question to unravel in terms of how do you support the Afghan people but not support the Taliban? How do you support the success of a country while not supporting the Taliban? And we have some clues here from Andrew Watkins telling us about how there are these internal dynamics and how we need to understand that as well as supporting the people and the people's voices as Amiri mentioned. And I think within that, we need to pay particular attention to women and to minorities as we're moving forward to make sure that the Afghan people are successful and come out successfully from this and are able to save the crisis this winter particularly. I think that's in everybody's minds at this point. So thank you. Well, thank you. Thank you very much, panelists, for really useful insights. Thank everybody in the audience for watching. I think I'm going to end with the three-word takeaway, which is the need for sorry, the need for engagement. I've heard that a lot, the need for representation and also the need for respecting human rights. So I'm going to end on that and thank everybody for their interest and we'll continue this conversation as events unfold.