 Well, Brendan has introduced a lot of this material just to repeat that on our visit we met with a couple of think tanks for five government departments actually if you include the prime minister's office, two political parties, two newspapers, the central bank, the trade union confederation who met us at a very high level and many individuals including academics. People were remarkably open and frank about the situation and many people we met were very angry for reasons that we can all well understand. There was a great deal of interest and curiosity about the Irish situation, about the Celtic Tiger, about getting out of the crisis and I suppose there were really two poles to this. It was a kind of a naive belief that the Celtic Tiger was a question of silver bullets, that if you had low corporation tax and if you had tax conformity, a big issue in Greece obviously, and if you had a more liberal labour market than they have in Greece then you would march on to economic prosperity. So that was kind of one end of the scale, at the other end of the scale and I won't attribute it to any organisation but you can work it out for yourself. There was a sort of belief that Ireland was some kind of a regulatory swamp, that we had a third world attitude to worker protection, to wages, to the environment, etc. So we spent a goodly part of our time dealing with those kind of issues, suggesting that the Irish success encapsulated in what we unfortunately called the Celtic Tiger was much deeper, much more long run, much more complex than they thought. And that there were no simple lines that could be inserted into a political manifesto that would solve aspects of the Greek situation any more than could describe the Irish situation. And as Brendan says, we didn't go there trying, and as Tony intimated, we didn't go there trying to come away as experts in the Greek situation. We went there to try over four days to get an impression of what the reality was, what the underlying factors were, etc. To get, as I say on the slide, a kind of a helicopter view of the situation rather than to become experts. Impressions. Well, Greece, just to remind ourselves, has a fiscal crisis to the debt crisis. It now has a banking crisis. And on the back of all of that, it's got a social crisis, some of which we saw ourselves manifested on the streets, but in a fairly benign kind of way. But much deeper than the social crisis than the what's manifest on the streets are some of the factors that Tony referred to and that Brendan will deal with about. I mean, we're used to cynicism about the political system here, justified or unjustified, but in Greece it is really deep seated with a huge anger behind it. So there is really a considerable social crisis. And in trying to address all of these issues, they've been asked to dismantle or certainly severely contract large parts of their social security system. Now, it doesn't matter whether you agree or disagree with the need for or the justification for, but you have to consider the impact of doing that on the Greek population who by and large regard themselves as having some kind of a Greek social model. There are huge reductions in public sector employment. A lot of that employment being rather driven by political cronyism, but nonetheless people are employed in the public sector and now losing their jobs and in the meantime losing their wages. There is a big privatisation programme. The reform modernisation and liberation of the economy is an enormous task, ranging across all the kind of sectors that we're being asked to make further structural reforms, but they're much more deep seated in Greece. Labour market changes, no doubt necessary, but radical and public administration reform, taxation reform and all of these changes are being pushed simultaneously by the Troika. So there is a huge amount of severe pain being inflicted on people for long term and for what the ordinary citizen must regard as somewhat uncertain gain. There is the question of the capacity of the Greek system, political administrative etc to reform. I'm not going to go into the detail of this because Brendan's going to deal with some, but just looking at it from an overall point of view, I don't think we met anybody or any people who didn't believe that wide raging reform was necessary, even though in the here and now they might be vigorously opposed to much of that reform or we would think they were. And the historic roots of the problems which they have in the political system, in the economic system, in the administrative system are, as Tony has already said, the historic roots are deep. There are some people who spoke to us who went back to the very early days of Greek independence in 1830. Now we're capable of doing that kind of thing in Ireland and we know how relevant that kind of analysis is, but that's what people did. But certainly the aftermath of the war with Turkey in the 1920s and the civil war in the 1940s between left and right, these would appear to be quite deep seated and form some of the background to the problems they now have. We found everywhere, research institutes, advisers to government departments, et cetera, a very impressive intellectual analysis and probably a deeper intellectual analysis that you would get generally in Ireland of the nature of the change that was required. But there was little actual administrative experience of executing change. So they were taking on huge agendas with little prioritisation and in a situation where it was even more uncertain than it is in this country that if you pull a lever of administrative change that anything actually happens at the other end. We now know the difficulties in this country of bringing about change. Each of the two main political parties, PASOC, which is now in government and New Democracy, which are the previous government, are split or appear to be split between people who do recognise the need for modernisation and conservatives. And they have succeeded in combining to a limited extent in parliamentary cooperation on a change agenda, spectacularly so in the reform of the university education sector in recent months. That in itself is a whole case study of problems but suffice to say at the moment, suffice to say they did cooperate in that and have cooperated on a number of other issues but agreement between them and the depth of certainly the rhetorical differences is huge. However, the dividing line between them on many issues seems to be that of timing rather than of substance. The point was certainly made to us by one political person that there had been a history of administrative change of a sort which is one we would recognise in Ireland of creating executive agencies and some decentralisation and so on. But that on change of government and governments in Greece since the fall of the kernels in 74, the governments in Greece do tend to alternate and the tendency has been to abandon the previous government's changes and then proceed with a whole new set of them. A team that came up quite a lot was Greece isn't Ireland or Greece is Ireland or Ireland isn't Greece. I mean this is fairly trite stuff but I mean we do have an open relatively modern economy that's attractive to FDI. Greece probably 25-30 years behind us maybe with the current situation that can be truncated somewhat as Royal Manual has said never waste a good crisis and hopefully Greece will make use of this crisis to catch up. In our case a banking crisis based on profit lending led to a fiscal crisis poor bank regulation was a feature of the system whereas in Greece the fiscal crisis led to the banking crisis. They didn't have a banking crisis as the starting point of their problems. They had banking regulation that was fit for purpose for normal circumstances until the fiscal and debt crisis hit. Mind you they had a fiscal crisis throughout just that nobody bothered recognising it. In Ireland we have a so-so kind of public administration that needs a lot of modernisation. In Greece it's arthritic, it's cronious, it's clientalist, it's under professionalised and it just requires absolutely enormous reform. But the big difference is that Ireland we have an economic engine that can pull us out of the station albeit with considerable social pain for an awful lot of people but we can be dragged out of this mess given reasonable international conditions. Greece has no such engine and is insolvent as a result and no amount in my humble view of financial retrenchment is going to solve the real Greek underlying economic crisis. What is desperately needed is a Marshall plan for Greece to accompany austerity and write-offs and demands for change etc. And that Marshall plan includes both investment and technical assistance. So to conclude I would hold the view that Greece has been asked to do too much too fast probably as a result of an inadequate or a politically acceptable analysis of the nature of the crisis at the very beginning. Substantial debt write-off such as we're seeing at 50%, it's probably not up to the task but that's what's achievable, will ease the fiscal and hopefully the social pressures but it won't necessarily create a modern economic engine. And in fact you could see circumstances in which an easing of the fiscal situation could actually slow down a reform process. The reform process doesn't need to be slowed down, it needs to be prioritized, it needs to be sequenced but not abandoned and there needs to be a massive investment in the productive economy. Greece is a sophisticated society, in fact it's a very sophisticated society and it was nice after a gap of 20 years to be reminded of that. And it's geographically very well placed as a communications hub for that part of the world and it's well placed to develop a modern economy. They could do well to emulate some of the things that we've done over the past 30 or 40 years in the education sector and so on, particularly in technical education but nonetheless this is not a third world country, this is a country with great potential but it needs help. Thank you very much.