 As you've heard, it's been a very busy year. 2013 was a very, very productive year for the agency. The commission, among other things, developed a new rule on venting strategies, or instructive staff developed a new rule on venting strategies. We developed a new rule on risk-informing low-level waste disposal. We launched a new policy statement regarding our relationships with the tribal governments, and we responded comprehensively to court decisions related to high-level waste. So it was a very busy year. Also in the last year, as you know, the commission appointed a new EDO, Mark Satorius, and also a new general counsel, Margie Dome. And I think both of them are here today. Fortunately, neither yet has retired to Florida, so I guess it's not as challenging as they were concerned. But we all have the lost ability to. We still have the same old Eric. Eric is still here. And the four years I've been here, Eric has taken this position and guided these plenary discussions along with Brian, and they do a fantastic job. So thanks to both Eric and Brian for their work in making this happen. For me personally, it's been a very busy year as well. This year, I walked on a basemap rebar the first new nuclear power plant to be built in this country in a generation. At the same time, the very same year, just a few weeks later, I was in the control room of the first nuclear power plant to ever be shut down this country for purely financial reasons and watching that plant power down for the last time. And the last year I've also addressed members of Japan's diet to talk about nuclear safety, how NRC works. I've met with the Premier of Taiwan to talk about regulatory independence and ministers in Indonesia. I've also met with scores of not hundreds of young people who are either entering or are beginning their careers in nuclear technology, and press upon them the awesome responsibility they're undertaking as members of the nuclear community. So it's been a busy year for all of us, but it's only one of many that this agency has had in the 40 years since the energy reorganization was enacted 40 years ago this coming October, as a matter of fact. But as varied as our activities are, they all focus on one single concept, the concept that nuclear safety is at the focus of our activities. Nuclear safety is why the NRC was created. Out of the great accomplishments and the great controversies of our predecessor, the Atomic Energy Commission, NRC was created to provide a clarity of voice, a singularity of purpose, and an existential focus on nuclear safety. Or to be more precise, to assure that the utilization or production, especially nuclear material, will be in accord with the common defense and security and will provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public. As many of you know, this phrase is taken from section 182 of the Atomic Energy Act in 1954. The legislation provides a core of our authorities. The Atomic Energy Act is a far-reaching and comprehensive piece of legislation, but it's still just a haiku compared to what Congress puts together these days. And while it's a creature of the depths of the Cold War, it remains the subject of active conversation today. And despite many amendments, its foundational principles remain intact. But how we interpret and imply those principles has evolved considerably since the Act was passed 60 years ago this coming August. How the broad authorities bestowed by the AEA in the area of Eisenhower are made manifest in the area of Obama reflects many other laws passed by Congress, many court decisions, and decades of regulatory experience in precedent. The NRC itself is built upon thousands of experiences reflected in guidance and procedure. This is reflected in the inculcated culture of the organization, the evolving work practice of generations of staff, and the decisions made by the 33 people who served as NRC commissioners. The result is not simply a regulatory framework, but it is a collective wisdom. In the Book of Proverbs it's written that wisdom has built her house, she has hooned out her seven pillars. Our house is based upon the pillars of wisdom that reflect what we have learned and what we continue to learn. Our regulatory framework rests upon the pillars hooned out over the decades, but its wisdom is not static and has never been. Our understanding evolves with experience in the ongoing commerce of ideas. Thus, while we apply our current foundations to prepare for the future, our greatest challenge is to allow those pillars to shift without shaking the entire edifice. Among the pillars that support NRC's framework is the understanding that narrow purpose is its own power. Part of the reason NRC was created was to address public concerns about the scope and power of the Atomic Energy Commission. The NRC's role in power is aborted by walls and barriers established over the decades. The resulting framework, while it serves us well, is complex even to those of us who live in it every day. For the public it can be downright confusing. For example, when the average person learns that a radioactive material called tritium is leaking from a nuclear power plant into the groundwater, she probably expects the NRC to take immediate action to stop it and to punish those responsible. So she goes to a public meeting. And then she learns that NRC is a safety regulator, or non-environmental regulator. Further, she learns that the leak is not indication that this is a problem to safety systems of the plant, and also this leak is not a hazard to human health. Therefore, NRC has no basis for action. In other cases, members of the public ask the NRC to weigh in regarding one technology or the other. Fuel cycle technology is prominently. Storage systems. And we even are questioning whether it's necessary for utility to even build a nuclear power plant if, say, wind power is a viable alternative. In such interactions, the bright line we at NRC see between our roles as a safety regulator and the role of national energy policy decisions can appear murky and inexplicable to those outside the agencies. These limitations sometimes appear frustrating even to many people inside the agency itself, but they serve an important principle. Vince LaParty once said, success demands the sickness of purpose. We take action only once relevant to our imperative to protect human health. We leave to Congress the decision whether to restrict or encourage particular technologies. Our singleness of purpose focuses our regulatory scope and it separates regulatory decisions from policy decisions. Another area that causes consternation is an attribute for which NRC is often lauded internationally, and that's our rigorous discipline process from making regulatory decisions. When a proposal is made to change our requirements, we first consider whether that change is needed to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety or to assure accord with the common defense and security. With this has occurred in the past, and we have taken action along those lines, such as with the terrorist attacks of 2001. But these developments are thankfully quite rare and unusual. It's far more common to propose changes that do not address matters that challenge our adequate protection definition. Instead, it's far more common to propose such changes to provide work and real benefits. It's a proposed change is not in response to an issue of adequate protection or it does not raise uninterested issues of common defense and security. NRC engages in what we call a back-fit analysis. We look at these issues in terms of how the safety benefits are compared to the resources required to implement them. We do this quantitatively as correct as we can, but there's considerable judgment and debate in this process as well. We saw this most recently as a commission considered of staff or polls regarding the filtering of containment fence. There are many observers who feel quite strongly that matters like these should not be decided by cost benefit analysis. Few other countries apply such an approach and it's been argued that back-fit analyses put the financial interests of industry ahead of the safety of the public. In my view, this is an uninformed opinion. The organizational and legal traditions in the United States are very different from many of our overseas partners. In many countries, for example, the nuclear industries are owned or controlled by national governments. In the US, nuclear power plants are almost entirely a privately owned business. In our legal tradition, private companies have rights that are in many cases very similar to those of individuals. Commercial companies have an expectation that requirements will not be imposed on them unless there's good cause and due process. Our processes are in line with this tradition. But more to the point, the discipline approach allows us to focus both NRC and licensee resources on issues of safety significance. When everything is significant, nothing is significant. Management attention, engineering talent, and yes, financial resources can be spread too thin. And when this occurs, safety is not enhanced, it is weakened. Our quantitative discipline approach reflects this understanding. I'm not sympathetic to those who believe that the back-fit rule makes it too hard to put new requirements in place. It should be hard. It forces us to question ourselves about what's truly needed for safety and avoid taking steps just because it may be popular or politic at the time. At the end of the day, if there is a matter that appears to be needed for safety but doesn't survive a cost-benefit analysis, the commission itself has the authority to use this judgment to propose any requirements it finds necessary. I think the order we placed in 2012 to enhance the instrumentation spent fuel poles is a good example. Now, the commission itself is a vital pillar in our safety infrastructure. I'm sure some people hate it. Five people, not in a direct thrall of the usual executive branch control, independent at very inconvenient times, sometimes a bit deliberate, we admit that, occasionally disagreeing with the staff, occasionally disagreeing with itself. You know, commission is kind of like a close, weird family, slightly dysfunctional. But if you live in one, you come to understand and appreciate it. There's probably about 10 people in this room today that understand it, including in addition to my colleagues, we've been lucky to have a former chairman Diaz and deserve with us. I see chairman Diaz right there. Former commissioner of the Lions and Maryfield have also been here. And I thank all of them for continued participation, supporting the agency and giving us a benefit of their wisdom and experience. Now, as I've known in the past, that commission structure, which involves intensive informed debate among five individuals with very different backgrounds, as example, university professors, nuclear submarine commanders, congressional committee staff, sages. This structure provides an excellent mechanism reflects society's evolving view as to what constitutes adequate protection. After four years at the center of this process, I think it's far better to use a commission to make important complex decisions and leaving those matters to a single political pointee. Nevertheless, I'm sure there are many people who think we get it wrong. I've been, since I've been on the commission, we've had vigorous debates about work at those standards and most recently spent fuel pool safety. It's very rare that everyone is satisfied with the judgments that commission makes on such issues. But the process we apply is a disciplined one and one that ensures consideration and evaluation of all relevant information. And in my opinion is that we've gotten just about right every time. That's not to say we're perfect. Humility, even for sages, is a core attribute of a good nuclear safety culture. As such, we must be able to change and revise our fundamental pillars should experience knowledge or the availability of new methods, tools, and technologies compels us to do so. Ignoring the call for fundamental change is as bad as leaping to change for the sake of change or the vicissitudes of fashion. As a regulatory organization, we value stability. Our licensees value stability. Yet one of the most important pillars of NRC's success to date has been our ability to evolve. South gave way to the ROP. Part 50 yielded to part 52. It's my belief the next major step in our evolution is the adoption of a strategy based upon risk-informed site-specific regulation. We've learned nothing else over the years. It's that each nuclear power plant's a unique creature. In the United States in particular, most plants are unique in design. They have wide variances in operating history and modifications over the years. American Manifest Destiny has bestowed upon us a country of swamps and deserts, plains and mountains, forests and tropics, and we have nuclear power plants in almost all of these environments. Each site has unique characteristics and hazards that must be understood and addressed by plant design and operation. As Commissioner Postal Alka said yesterday, risk contributors are plant-specific even for assistive units. See, I was listening. I was just resting my eyes yesterday. Now the staff does a good job in recognizing these different issues as it seeks to implement regulations. But the fact exists that the agency issues and prioritizes regulatory actions on an industry-wide basis. It's not quite one-size-fits-all, but it's a close relative. We've barely scratched the surface of the benefits that can be obtained by designing regulatory agendas on a plant-by-plant basis and using to the extent practical quantitative understanding of risk. Adopting session approach would allow the resources of each plant to be focused on the issues of highest safety significance for that plant and to get them done quickly and efficiently. Staff is working on the risk prioritization initiative and I think that's moving us in the right direction. And I congratulate the staff's creative efforts for developing this path. However, it's vital that we never lose the perspective that plant operators are responsible for safety, not the NRC. There's no legislation that states it, but operators must take the principal responsibility for the safety of their plants. This understanding informs all that we do as both regulator and regulator. Now, a licensed operator wants to ask me an interesting question. Would nuclear power plants be safe if NRC didn't exist? That's a question we should all ask ourselves. The answer should be yes, but I'm doubt that there's very many people in this room today that would hesitate to say yes without hesitation. Just as plants differ, so do the companies that own and operate them. Some are quite frankly stronger than others. If that were not the case, we would not have and need an input. Now that's not to suggest that any operator would lift his own devices with a run-up plant in an irresponsible manner. But without a regulator, what pressure would plant marriages be filled from boards of financial staffs? Would maintenance cycles be stretched? Would training be cut back? What would be the safety goal? How much risk would be acceptable? The reality is quite clearly that industry needs the NRC. Where would public confidence be without a strong regulator? NRC provides a common expectation for safety across the country that all operators' understanding must meet. This provides a coherent standard by which decisions recording plant operations and investments can be measured. But this yardstick should not become a shepher's crook, and plant management should not be pushing to the role of sheep led about by the NRC staff. We must not create an environment in which plant decisions are made or not made with solely compliance in mind rather than plant safety. When owners refuse to make safety-beneficial investments in a plant, unless a NRC requires them, we have all failed. When plant managers forgo the installation of equipment they believe will increase the safety of their plants because NRC staff gives them little or no credit for their installation, we need to take a long look in a mirror. Are these the outcomes we expect and want? I don't think they are. Now think about the practice that evolved over the decades and the cultures we've established, both good and bad. For many people, for many of the people who regularly operate plants today, the current balance between regular and licensees viewed in the context of post-TMI era. They had the perspective born of experience to know how to draw the lines between regulation and regulated. But with a new generation gaining in prominence in the industry and in the NRC, this experience is fragmented into snippets of the past. I'm proud of the important role of the federal government and journal, and NRC in particular, have played in supporting nuclear technology education in this country. What we have accomplished has helped prepare us for the changing of the guard and assured that the most important pill of our nuclear safety infrastructure, highly trained people, will remain strong for many years to come. That's a success story. But this new generation of engineers and scientists as quick and bright as they are, lack the experience of the days when dozens of new plants came online and plant transients were all too common. The experience of those who managed the NRC in industry during those times is fading from the scene, never to be replaced. Even with the NRC's excellent training programs, this is a reality that cannot be evaded. However, these young people also bring new ideas, new energy, and new approaches as they grow into positions of increasing responsibility. Even now, in plants across the country and in the halls of the NRC, this new generation pushes us into the future. At the same time, I know that there are those of you, Janelle, who are sometimes frustrated by the structures and practices of the ruling generation. As T.E. Lawrence wrote in his murmur, seven pillars of wisdom, a triumph, youth can win, but had not learned to keep and was pitably weak against age. But be patient, your time is coming. And soon, you'll have the responsibility for nuclear safety, and your challenge will be to be ready to accept that responsibility when it comes. You know, one of the great aspects of the RIC is the participation of so many of our friends and colleagues from around the world. We welcome all of you and thank you for attending this year's conference. Your presence today, however, is no longer just a luxury or a convenience, it's a vital necessity. I've often reflected on that moment during the signing of the Declaration of Independence from Benjamin Franklin, famously remarked, we must all hang together or assuredly we'll all hang separately. This comment appears to apply so many things in life, but even Franklin, another sage, could never have forecast how well it applies to a group like the 3,100 people in this hall today. Nuclear power is a global undertaking and we're in this together. We are married to each other. We are held hostage by each other. We are each other's best friends and worst enemies. We are at once buyers and suppliers. We're teachers one day and students the next. The relationships and cooperation we all share are part of the modern foundation of nuclear safety in all our countries and we should seek to expand and extend them. When atomic energy act became law 60 years ago, no one could have imagined the breadth and diversity of nuclear power and nuclear generation regulation as it exists across the world today. Our challenge is to find a way to make that diversity a strength and we should build a brighter, safer future for the publics that we all serve. Thank you very much.