 This session, which I'm very happy to welcome you to, is a not only academic session, as we have most sessions here, but it's actually also about a very applied work using research and using modeling to inform policy debates. It's so to say the second arm of the South Mod project, and it's a big reason why we build these models, of course, and why we maintain them with all our partners in so many countries in Africa, but also in Latin America and Asia. So today, I'm very happy to say that we have contributions from three different countries in Africa, from Uganda, from Zambia, and from Mozambique. And they have three very different questions that they ask in each. But I think a lot of commonalities as well, and there's a lot of common challenges as well. So we'll talk about what the projects did, but also what were the challenges. And that's also something for the questions that we hope to have a discussion on in the end. With that enough from myself, I would now hand it over to Mbeve. Mbeve, if you can unmute yourself, share the video and share your screen. And Mbeve, I would ask Ronald to be ready to follow right after Mbeve with his presentation. The time is 10 minutes per presentation, so that we have time to discuss in the end. So with that, Mbeve, over to you. All right. Thank you, everyone, and thank you colleagues for joining through this conference. So my presentation basically is looking at a simulation on the cash plus using the micro Xamod. And this work has been supported by colleagues, Catherine, David, and Maria, and of course my other colleague from Zipa, who's not with us, he's in another meeting. So I'll be the one that's going to run through this presentation. So to start my presentation, I'll just basically introduce the cash plus or just to basically put everyone up to speed in understanding what this cash plus is. So according to the household survey of 2015, which is the living conditions monitoring survey in Zambia, it states that poverty remains as high as 54.4% of the entire population. So in this regard, the Zambian government tried to intervene to improve the social and economic situation in the Zambian economy, and they introduced what is known as the social cash transfer. So what they do with the social cash transfer is basically they just give these poor and vulnerable households cash payments to supplement their day to day living. So that's the concept of the social cash transfer. But with time, it's been seen that this social cash transfer as much as it is helping the poor and the vulnerable, it's not so effective to actually bring these people out of poverty or to get to the target that reached the government once. So what they did in 2019 is they introduced a cash plus reform, where we use the social cash transfer as a flow benefit. So that means you give the household a cash amount, then you add a complementary benefit, which aims actually just to remove these people out of that poverty bracket. So this is how the cash plus works. So it works on the social cash transfer, and then introduced a complementary benefit. So the cash plus itself as the study was initiated in August of 2020 at a technical meeting where we had due any wider was present, we had ILO, we had SASPRI and other cooperating partners that have been supporting the project from inception up to now. And then the main the main aim of this study was just to analyze the coverage and impacts of the current social protection policy. So the current social protection system, how is it operating? And then also to try and simulate this cash plus or the reforms or the scenarios that we are trying to see if we add this complementary benefits. What are the effects on poverty and the like? So like I've mentioned earlier, this is a study which is a collaborative project between ZIPA, SASPRI, UNWIDE, we've also got support from ILO, International ZIPA Organization, and also, of course, the Biden Ministry, which is Minister of Community Development and Social Services, and of course, other ministries, including FAO, Food and Culture Organization. So this cash plus has been implemented in two phases. So in phase one, like I mentioned earlier, we just do an analysis of the social protection system to see how is it operating, what is impact on poverty? Is there any gaps in the coverage? And then we look at, so basically as a whole, we just look at how is the current social protection system working? Then in phase two is now where we introduce the cash policy reforms to say if we add a benefit to the social cash transfer, what are to be the effect on poverty, what are to be the effect on equality? So that's what we basically do in phase two. Then in terms of the programs that we're simulating for this project or that we were simulating for this project. So firstly, we had the social cash transfer, like I mentioned, which is the flow program. And the main target group is vulnerable households in urban and rural areas. And then the amount per year, because it's a monthly transfer. So in a year, they get 1,080 quarcha. So quarcha is exempt in currency. And if you divide this by 12, so each household or wherever qualifies to be sitting on this program gets 90 quarcha per month. So if you multiply that by 12, it gives you the 1,080 quarcha. And this program is wrote out nationwide. Then we've got the Electronic Farmer Input Support Program. So this also just supports small scale farming households, which actually graduate from the Food Security Park, which I explain just now. And then they're given inputs with 1,700 quarcha per year. And it's also wrote out nationwide. Then we've got the Food Security Park, which is something similar to the Farmer Input Support Program. But this one gives it to vulnerable but viable small scale farming households. So they've got a criteria in which you fit in this food security park. And it gives inputs with 5,100 quarcha, and it's also wrote out nationwide. Then we also have the Supporting Women's Livelihood. And it's the main target group, it's women that are living in this social cash transfer households. And the amount pay or the support that they're given is 2,900. And it's only wrote out in 64 districts. So it's not a nationwide program, but only in 64 districts. Then we've also got the Keeping Girls in School, which supports girls. That supports girls that are in secondary school. And it provides a certain amount as a school fee. And it's only wrote out in 29 districts. Then we've got the Homegrown School Feeding Program, which provides food to school children in public and community schools. And the amount pay that they get is 264. Of course, this is converted to monetary terms, but it's more like it's food that is given, but in monetary terms it comes to 264 quarcha. And it's only in 25 districts. And we've got the Community Skills Development and Training, Vulnerable Youths, amount pay is 3,000. And it's only wrote out in 11 districts. So based on, like I explained, we had phase one, which was just looking at the current social protection system. So the results that we got from phase one, it says that the current social protection system only provides support to 76% of the extremely poor population. And then our main interest was to see how much or what's the proportion of this extremely poor population that is covered by the social cash transfer, because that's the flow program. And then we discovered that only 34% of the extremely poor population receive the social cash transfer. Then 66% are not covered by the cash flow benefit. Further, the current social protection system reduces poverty by 4 percentage points and by 6 percentage points in those districts where additional programs have been rolled out. So if, for instance, we've got districts where there's not so much high support, probably where you just have a social cash transfer program, that's where poverty is being reduced by about 4 percentage points. And then those were the additional programs, then poverty is being reduced by 6 percentage points. Then if you remember my previous slide, where I was looking at the monetary amounts, we found that those benefits with high monetary amounts, for instance, maybe if I just go back, for instance, we got the food security part. It's got the monetary amount of 5,900. So those monetary amounts have got a greater impact on poverty, but they're only available to a small share of the extremely poor. So you could see that these programs, for instance, have been rolled out maybe in 64 districts, like for instance, Securities and Skills Development. It's only 11 districts. So as much as they've got a greater impact on poverty, but they're only being given to a very small share of the extremely poor population. Then moving to phase two, this is now where we introduced the cash plus scenarios. So we introduced three scenarios. So in the first scenario, we allow for multiple support where we say, what would be the impact on coverage, and the impact on poverty? If we give all recipients multiple support, that means we introduce benefits to all the recipients. Then in scenario two, we align or we extend the social cash transfer criteria to all other programs. And then in scenario three, we just adjust the number of beneficiaries to the budgeted number. So basically you find that the government will provide to say, and this year we need to give a certain benefit to this amount of people, but then maybe in practice, that doesn't happen. So what we just do in scenario three is we say, okay, based on the budgeted number, let's see if we can roll out all the programs or all the benefits to the budgeted number. So what we found in the phase two of our findings is that the coverage of the extremely poor remains largely unaffected by the cash plus reforms. Reason being is, if you remember, I said only 34% of the extremely poor receive the social cash transfer, which is the flow program. So therefore, even if you introduce more benefits because very few or a small number of the population is receiving the social cash transfer, the impact on poverty really remains unaffected or it doesn't change significantly. Then secondly, poverty also remains stable across the cash plus reforms. Reason being is that, like I mentioned earlier to say, those benefits with a high monetary amount have got a greater impact on poverty, but the thing is that they're only being distributed to a small share of the population. So therefore, poverty just remains stable across the cash plus reform. So in conclusion, the Zamen government have a targeting to reduce poverty by 20%, which approximately is 8 percentage points, but from the results or from the scenarios, we find that in the current configuration of the cash plus reform will not be able to achieve the additional poverty reduction needed to reach this target. Therefore, we provide the following recommendations to the government. So firstly, we advise the government to say, they should expand the social cash transfer coverage beyond its current coverage, because like I mentioned, only 34% of the extremely poor are receiving this flow benefit in which want to incorporate the cash plus. So therefore, if only a small population is receiving, then the impact on poverty, even if you are at the cash plus, won't be so significant. Then secondly, government should commit to providing high level of support for the social cash transfer. Like I said earlier, those benefits with high monetary amounts have got a greater impact on poverty, but in its current configuration, the amount that's been provided the social cash transfer is very little. And then also the government should employ the multi support strategy. So that means government should continue giving multiple benefits to these beneficiaries that qualify to sit on these programs. And fourthly, is just to improve administrative oversight. This basically has to do with people that administering the programs because they've been a lot of my practices, funds being misused as these programs have been rolled out. So it's just government to add an extra length in rolling out of these programs. So as I come to the end of my presentation, I just want to give the way forward. So as it is, our project has come to an end. I think Pia is just actually going through the final report and we are scheduled to disseminate this report to government and all cooperating partners on the 14th of this month. And this event will be a physical event. So for the people that have been Zambia, most likely in Osaka, will be able to be in the same room. And then secondly, those people that are outside and want to follow the event, there will be a link that will be shared and people can also look in. So on top of the recommendations that we've provided, as ZIPA, because ZIPA is a government wing or government institution, we still want to continue engaging the government to implement the findings, a recommendation that have been provided. Further also, we engage various ministries, also go to parliament and relevant stakeholders and see how the findings of the project can be incorporated in the upcoming eight national development plan, which is currently being crafted. Our seventh national development plan has come to an end. So government is in the process of crafting the eight national development plan and we're trying to see ways and means in which we can actually fit into the eight national development plan. Thank you. And Bever, for also making more less than time, which is given the amount of work that is a challenge. I'm now waiting for Ronald to pull up his slides and while Ronald does so, I also wanted to highlight what Bever has been showing also shows the difficulty of course into the size of the challenge that the country is facing and at the same time also working on another project that looks at the cultural substance with this slide by Yorca, there's no time to present that here. Both these projects are also talking to each other so that we make sure that they are aligned. With that, I see that Ronald is ready to set go. So over to you, Ronald. So thank you so much, Pierre. And because I have 10 minutes, I'll start. I will go to the presentation. So the presentation is about how we are using yoga mode for evidence policy making in Uganda. And in this presentation, I'm going to discuss one case where we have used our model yoga mode to assess presumptive tax policy in Uganda. So this has been a project, a collaborative project between the tax authority, URA, UNewider, our colleagues from Susprey in South Africa, the Ugandan Minister of Finance and Makere University. They are representatives that I'm presenting on behalf of. So it's a bigger team. So a little bit about the project. In July 2020, the government of Uganda reformed the presumptive tax regime for the fourth time since its introduction in 1997. The change in 2020 was driven by three justifications. One, they found that the old regime, which was working up 2019, was regressive and fair, especially to women who are more engaged in small businesses. That was mainly funded by CSOs, the civil society organizations. And then two, it was perceived to be complex because it had over 80 different tax rates. So it was perceived complex, especially in the region, by usage under the domestic revenue mobilization review. But also the widespread concerns of high tax rates that placed a large financial burden on small companies. So with those justifications, they decided to change it. So the new regime, however, for 2020, proposed threats to revenue mobilization as the rates were significantly low, especially for those that keep records, as I will show in the next slides. Now, presumptive tax in Uganda is based on whether you can keep records or not. Now, the rates for those that can keep records are significantly low, which is a threat to revenue mobilization. So as you are, we first of all intended to assess the revenue implications of the new reform, the inequality, the implications of the reform in terms of increasing or reducing inequality, in terms of poverty. And if indeed, the new reform is progressive. And therefore, Uganda became in handy, it provided a useful platform to conduct this kind of analysis. So the 2020 presumptive reform looks like this. So the rates were significantly revised backwards. Maybe when you get our technical note on this, you'll know the different rates for since 1997. So these are the rates. And now we see that if someone has records, space significantly lower, as you can see here. These are the different rates. And so what we did was to model different scenarios. One, we modeled the old regime, which we are calling the 2019 regime, based on the 20, so we may, we modeled the 2020 scenario based on the old regime to set as our baseline. And then we then modeled the 2020 system with the 2020 rules, which are the new rules where records are not kept. Like I said, presumptive is based on whether you have records or not. And we then modeled the implications of the 2020 system when taxpayers say we have records. In this, we then also had to come up with around four alternative reforms in this presentation I present to. One, a simplified regime with around four months and we are removing the requirement of keeping records because we realize that from discussions with you and the compliance officer, it's not practical what business records are. And then we also suggest another option, which is a flat rate of just 1%. So the yoga mode, all the scenarios that we have modeled are based on the UNHS 2016-17 dataset, but we operate it using the CPI of 2020. Okay, so in terms of the implications, this is what we found out that if we apply the old regime on the 2020 system, the potential from presumptive is about 320 billion Uganda shillings. However, the new regime, as you can see here, it has significant implications on revenue. For instance, when we model the new regime on the 2020 system, where taxpayers declare that they don't have records, we only collect it is compared to 2020. And if taxpayers say we keep records, we collect actually much less, only 90 billion, compared to the potential of 320. Now, our reform scenarios, scenario one, which is we come up with five rates, and scenario two is a scenario where we are assuming that what if we charge a uniform rate of 1% of turnover? So this, the first scenario give us a little more revenue, which is about 252, of course still less than the 2019, but at least much more than what the current system is likely to give us. And then scenario two, the reform two, which is system three, gives us much less, but again still much more than we would have expected, we are likely to get if we implement the current regime. So the alternative reforms would have generated more revenue, albeit less than that of 2019, but at least better than what the current scenario is likely to be with a new reform. Now, when you look at this, for instance, we see that direct tax revenue fall by 5.6% with records. If all presumptive taxpayers kept records, direct taxes would fall by over 8%. You can see here, direct taxes. So we see that when you look at the implications of poverty, it is just 0.2, reduction of 0.2. So there is very little impact on poverty of that old, of the new reform, and then also small increments in inequality. And that applies also with our model scenarios. We see that they will also not affect poverty much and they will also not affect inequality that much, but at least they protect revenue mobilization to some extent. And then when we try to assess the progressivity of the 2020 rules, the new rules, indeed we found that while the option of whether taxpayers have records or not is progressive as you can see here, that the red line is the effective tax rate of presumptive, it is increasing with increase in turnover. In this case, where people don't have tax records, the rates are actually regressive. So for instance, have a taxpayer who does not keep record with annual turnover 10 million being taxed at 0.8, yet one with annual turnover 150 is taxed at 0.6. So the rates are still progressive for those that have no records. So our scenarios, these are the scenarios that we are modeling. These are very simple. Effective tax rates and tax liability increase gradually with higher turnover and we seek to increase taxpayer morale and attract a larger number of small taxpayers to pay at least some tax. So these are the two scenarios we're modeling. And when we put these two scenarios, we see that more revenue compared to the 2020 reforms, 0.8 you can see here compared to 0.8 to 1.5, compared to 1.72.76 decrease in actual, if we use the 2020 reform. So the results are very similar using adjusted systems and administrative data, not assuming compliance. And alternative forms also have smaller impacts on poverty as you can see here, 0.3 and 0.3% reductions. So they still have small impacts on poverty and inequality. Our reforms, all of them are progressive as you can see here that the effective tax rate increases with increase in turnover. So using the results for policy reform, so what we have so far done, one is we have presented results to various stakeholders, including URA, the Minister of Finance, Civil Society and academia. And our alternative proposals are submitted to the tax amendment committee, which is URA and Minister of Finance. And also in this tax amendment committee, it will go through URA. So after passing through URA, it will be sent to Minister of Finance. And once it goes through Minister of Finance, it goes to the last level, which is the parliament. Now, the beauty we have seen is that at least for the first time, we have conducted a comprehensive analysis of tax policy reforms, especially this presumptive tax and proposed effective alternative reforms. Previously, the focus was mainly on revenue. Now with the support of Yogamon, we are empowered to look beyond the revenue implications. At least we assess the implications in terms of inequality, poverty and progressivity. Okay. So that is my presentation. Thank you. Thank you, Ronald. I realize there's an issue with my hand. I'm gonna work now. If it doesn't, it will take over. So I would at this point, if the sound is fine, if anyone can give me a thumb up, if you can hear me fine. I think your sound is a bit breaking still, but maybe you can try to continue. And if not, then I can take over, for example, but maybe you can try to go ahead. Thank you, Anna. Then what I would like to try now, it seems that a colleague from Mozambique is really having very large technical problems out of Maputo and doesn't get internet. That, therefore, the bit of surprise, but if possible, Gemma, you kindly just tell a little bit about that project verbally. Where it came from, what was simulated and where it's at the curious stage. Just to learn about the project before we open up for questions and answers. Gemma, if you wouldn't mind, I can also do it, but you've been more involved in that process, so I think you'd better ask me. For speaking, you would need to click the button on the top on the right to share, and then your video will be available. Okay. Gemma is joining. Good morning, everybody. And you have caught me completely by surprise, so I'm going to show you a picture of my wall rather than myself, but I will share with you my voice. Also, I'm not aware of the title of the presentation by the Mozambique colleagues, so which particular activity would you like me to discuss here? I think it's a bit of a benefit and how it's situated. And I think that would be interesting. Please, could you put it in the chat, because I'm not hearing your answer. Gemma, we sent you a private message, but it's a shame the private messages are not... All the 12-hundred projects. Okay, thank you so much. That's wonderful. Okay, well, good morning, everybody. And what I will attempt to do completely off the cuff is tell you about the work that we have undertaken with the Ministry of Finance in Mozambique, working also with colleagues from NS and UNICEF, Mozambique, to explore the possibility of rolling out a universal child benefit across Mozambique. This stems from so-called retreats that took place within Mozambique a few weeks ago that was also supported by the ILO, where different members of government came together and worked with our colleagues at the country team to explore particular policy questions. And one of them was the question of the roll-out of the child benefit, which is currently being piloted in a small number of districts in Mozambique by UNICEF at the moment. The exact design of the study was firmed up during that retreat. And then the team who worked on this particular policy brief went away and modelled a number of different scenarios, exploring different options, and then looking at the distributional impact of those benefits. And what was very interesting for me is that there was a big discussion about whether to explore, whether to target the benefits or to consider universal provision. And the group felt very strongly that given high levels of child poverty across the country, and only universal options should be explored. And so the study itself explored a number of different levels of benefit payments and then the impact of that on poverty and as one would expect, the larger the benefits, the more effective it was in reducing poverty in households containing children. But what I found most rewarding about the activity was that there were people involved from the Ministry of Social Affairs, that's in us, and the Ministry of Finance and UNICEF all working together with the model and getting to know the ins and outs of how the model operates and how changes that are made to a particular policy might have a ripple effect on other parts of the model. And so that hands-on experience for the group of having a few days of working together in the retreat and then pursuing it with a leadership and coordination of Rodrigo from the UNIWIDER was a true team effort. And the plan is that this will now be released during the Social Protection Week and there will be policy briefs produced in collaboration with the ILO. And then UNICEF will use it in its engagements with governments to promote discussion and consideration of options for providing for deprived children and also exploring possible sources of finances and fiscal space for such an exciting initiative. So I hope that that impromptu summary gives a bit of an overview but I would happily answer questions. Thank you, Temma. Maybe I will talk on behalf of Pia now. And Pia just sent a message to Jukka if Jukka would be able to chair the rest of the discussion, if that's possible. Jukka Pirtila. And you can ask so that I can take you on stage. You have the blue button there. And so that for the Q&A. And I see there are for now no questions at Q&A so I encourage everyone to write their questions there in case you have. Okay, Jukka is joining now. Hello, everyone. Hello. All right. So we won't be able to get the presentation from Mozambique, right? That's right. Okay, so are there comments or feedback for the two presentations on the cash plus in Zambia or the presumptive in Uganda? So feel free to write to the Q&A box or to the chat. Gemma gave a small introduction of the Mozambique one also. So I'm sure Gemma can answer. That's true. Yes, of course. Yes, I mean, questions are welcome also for the Mozambique regarding the Mozambique study. So while you think about your questions, so let me start off with asking the cash plus team about the role of financing all this. So, I mean, can you give us some pointers about the discussions in the country about, I mean, what you had about the financing side, namely, I mean, covering the additional costs via taxis? And why those were not considered when you considered the expansion of the programs? Maybe maybe you can chip in? Thanks, Jukka. We did actually do a bit of simulations on the impact of the financing side. What would be the impact on revenue? But of course, looking at the tight fiscal space, it's quite difficult to actually ask, for instance, government to pull up money from the treasury. But then most of these programs are actually donor funded. So our lobbying side is that government can lobby with the donors so that they can increase the monetary amounts or the support. OK, I see. I see. Thanks for that. So I see Kvabenam in the chat had a very similar question regarding the possibilities of scaling up because of the resource constraints. So I think that was more or less covered here. And also, previously, Pia had a question on all the presenters asking you to elaborate on what were the main challenges in the work that you did using the models. OK, I can go first on that one as well. Please do. Yeah, so for us, the cash plus team, I think our biggest challenge was the data constraint because of modeling of different programs that are sitting in different ministries. It was quite hard to get all program managers together and give us the data that we required at any given point in time. So this significantly dropped the project because this project, I think, was supposed to be done in the first quarter of this year, but it's been dragging because even on a request for data, you find some program managers are not able to avail us with the correct data. So we find that we kept on moving the project forward. So our biggest challenge was the data constraint. OK, maybe I can also say something. Of course. I don't think of any challenges that we really faced in this particular one. I think it was easy, maybe issues to deal with the team co-insured availability of teams because now this team was a little bit diverse. So you had to make sure that people from different teams are available and at times people were so engaged in other activities. But generally in terms of the modeling and the writing, I think we did not find any significant challenges. Other challenges I can think of beyond our control, those are institutional bureaucracies, especially when it comes to organizing some of these events, where it has its institutional policies. Even these institutions have their institutional policies. So you get into those problems. But really, there is really nothing much that we faced. Thank you. Thank you, Boz. Gemma, would you like to go next? It was a pleasure working on this policy with not just because of the importance of trying to reduce and even eliminate child poverty, but also because modeling child benefits is a relatively straightforward thing to do on the model, on the south model. And so technically it wasn't burdensome, but it has potential high policy impact. My greatest frustration is that I don't speak Portuguese. And of course, that's the main language of government in Mozambique, and it's the language of the policy brief. But I think that is also an important feature of modeling to ensure that it can be expressed in different languages and that the same meanings are attained and commonly understood. And I think that's potentially something that we could explore more in south mode. We don't have any models that use French. And so what we have with the Mozambique model is that it is, in fact, in English. Well, it's in Euro mode ease, the software language. That's essentially in English. But in the comments column, it is written, it's been translated by Vanda into Portuguese to aid people's understanding. I think it's very exciting that the policy briefest time is being written in the first instance in the language of government and communications. And happily, for me, I've discovered that words can instantly translate things pretty effectively from Portuguese into English with a click of a button. So it was much more straightforward than I feared. Thank you, everybody. So maybe just one final comment before our time is one final question, rather, before our time is up. How would you describe the response among policymakers, the interest on this, and is there a follow-up work ongoing or upcoming regarding similar simulations or something else? Medbeve? Yeah, thanks, Yuga. In terms of our project, I think there's been support from the ministry that's actually trying to administer this. That's the Ministry of Community Development. They've been very supportive. We've had Mr. Mukupa, who's more like in charge of this project, who's actually even been the one that was pushing these program managers in terms that we needed the data. So I think there's a lot of buying from the ministry. And they are actually looking forward to give them the final product. And then I think, after that, there should be room for expansion or, yeah, there should be room for more work to be done on this. Yeah. And I think, from my side, what I can say is, first of all, right from the start of the project, we engaged stakeholders right from Ministry of Finance and then URA. But also, too, this is part of our work. And they keep asking us, have we analyzed these policies? And like I say, this has been one of the most comprehensive analysis on the tax policy we have ever done. So definitely, they like it. It went beyond just looking at them. And for the part of the most ambiguous study, I think it's important to say that this was undertaken at the express request of NS and UNICEF. They could see the potential of using MOSMOD to explore these issues. They had a number of different evaluations of the pilot that has been implemented at the moment, but wanted to have some information on the costs using the model. And so it was in response to their requests that this activity was undertaken. And it will be used widely by the Ministry of Finance and UNICEF once it's all been finalized. It will be just the next week or so. Excellent, excellent. I'm pleased to hear. So now our time is up. Thank you for excellent presentations. Thank you for the work you have done with respect with the models. And thank you, Gemma, for chipping in without any warning. That's good question. See you in the other sessions. Bye-bye. Yes, good stuff, bye-bye. Great, thank you. Thank you, bye.