 Hello, I'm JJ Joaquin and welcome to Philosophy and What Matters, where we discuss things that matter from a philosophical point of view. Today, we will explore cross-cultural philosophy. Now, philosophical questions and insights are often thought of as universal and culturally invariant. What European philosophers have thought about are something that philosophers from Asia and Africa have also thought about. Our recent work in cross-cultural philosophy, however, suggests that philosophy is more culturally nuanced than that. Now, to discuss cross-cultural philosophy and why it matters, we have Masaharu Mizumoto, associate professor of philosophy at the School of Knowledge and Sciences in the Japan Advanced Institute for Science and Technology. And the co-editor of epistemology for the rest of the world. Hello Masaharu, welcome to Philosophy and What Matters. Hello. Okay, so before we get into our main topic, this first discussion of philosophical background, how did you get into philosophy? Yes, I actually, as an undergraduate, my department was not a philosophy department and there was no philosophy department in university. And therefore, I studied philosophy all by myself. Of course, there were some professors doing continental philosophies, but I didn't know anything about analytic philosophy. So I, yes, I started studying analytic philosophy all by myself. Yeah. Okay, so but where did you study? Sorry, when? Where did you study? In my university, in Hitotsubashi University. And I went to master and doctoral courses in that university. Therefore, yes, even in graduate school, I was not really got any formal training in philosophy. So what's your course in the academe? You're not in the philosophy program. So what's your main course? It's called social science. So it's a general social science course? Yes, very general. So I just focused on my own research and do it by myself. So how did you get into analytic philosophy? Yes, so I knew Wittgenstein when I was undergrad. So I was very interested in Wittgenstein's philosophy. So that was the beginning of my interest in philosophy. So you started with Wittgenstein. Yes. Yeah, but who influenced you to pursue a career in academic philosophy? Who influenced you to pursue a career in academic philosophy? Who? I'm not sure. Because I was just, yes, wanted to continue my study of Wittgenstein's philosophy. And therefore maybe that's Wittgenstein. So Wittgenstein influenced me. Yeah. Wittgenstein. So specifically the tractatus or the philosophical investigations? Basically, in general, Wittgenstein's philosophy. So both early and later Wittgenstein. Okay, so we have that in common because I'm also interested in Wittgenstein's work. That also led me to philosophy. Okay, so most of your work focuses on cross-cultural philosophy. Could you give us a description of what cross-cultural philosophy is? Its main goal and its methods of to arrive at that goal? I actually don't know about whether there is such a genre of philosophy as cross-cultural philosophy. But mainly what I am doing now is cross-linguistic studies in philosophy. And therefore maybe if cross-linguistic investigation is also cross-cultural, then that's maybe also cross-cultural philosophy. But I have been more interested in concepts people have. Even if you have some very diverse cultural diversity, it's not clear how that diversity is related to philosophy. So, of course, moral judgments would be very interesting topic if there is such a cultural diversity. But when we talk about, because we are mostly interested in concepts, philosophical concepts. So, we need some difference in normativity. And in order to have such difference in normativity, we at least have such, yes, maybe linguistic differences. Because at least we have linguistic norms. So, yes, it would be easier to talk about such conceptual difference when we investigate cross-linguistic issues. Okay, so you're talking about cross-linguistic analysis of certain philosophical concepts. Could you give us an example? You talked about moral concepts like good or bad. Are there nuances, cultural nuances or linguistic nuances in using those concepts? Yeah, so for example, intentional action. I have studied some cross-linguistic studies of knob effect. So, there I did find some linguistic differences. And so that's one topic. And of course, that's also related to morality, moral valence. So, yes, that may be one aspect of cross-linguistic philosophy. The typical one is the concept of knowledge. So, I have studied concepts of knowledge or knowledge verbs, the uses of knowledge verbs in Japanese and English. And also the concept of knowledge how, so knowledge how attributions. So, in fact, there is a radical difference between English and Japanese in knowledge how attribution. Okay, so let's go back a bit to your idea of normativity and linguistic structure. So, what does that entail? What do you mean by linguistic normativity in this particular? Yeah, because every language is governed by linguistic norms. Therefore, because concepts is normative concept in general is normative. Normative that they have rules, that they obey rules, structural rules in language. Is that the main idea? Yeah, yes. So, the concepts we use often governed by the words we use, norms governed by linguistic norms of the words we use. So, for example, in Japanese, you have linguistic norms for knowledge, knowledge concepts and knowing how concepts. And English has a different set of norms as well. Is that the idea? Yeah. And you're trying to see what is the difference between those norms and how it leads to some kind of philosophical insight. So, we can't so easily say the difference of norms because basically, most cases we find differences in very difficult borderline cases. And therefore, it's difficult to say that they are, for example, they are following linguistic norms. But still, if there are such radical differences, radical linguistic differences, then we may say they have different concepts. That's interesting. Yes. So, what's going on there? So, you have some methods in determining this one. So, do you use experimental methods? Yeah. So, I'm basically just doing surveys using, for example, true temp cases and, for example, getier cases, using such standard cases and asking ordinary people to judge whether that agent knows or not. Yeah. So, you're using experimental philosophy, X5. Yes, experimental philosophy, yes. Okay, that's interesting. So, in your co-edited book, Epistemology for the Rest of the World, a book that you've edited with Stephen Stitch, the founder, quote and unquote, of experimental philosophy. Eric McCready, which was published in 2018, it's a rather intriguing book. So, since its aim is to let non-native anglophone philosophers from different parts of the world to speak about epistemic concept. But what inspired you to work on this project? Basically, I have been doing experimental philosophy first. So, but I met Stephen Stitch. Basically, the idea was Stephen Stitch suggested to hold the conference. And so, I organized and held the conference Epistemology for the Rest of the World with Stephen Stitch and others. So, it's a conference in early 2000s, I heard, or sorry, early 2010s. I was supposed to be there. Oh, yes. Okay, so what were the findings of the project? I think the findings, there is no single findings, but I think this is posing problems for epistemologists in general, in the world, whether in anglophone philosophy or Rest of the World, yes. So, is specific traditional epistemological problems at stake here in this project? Yes, so whether the concept of knowledge is universal or not. That's the main issue here, and I presented many examples that count against such assumption of the universality, but some other contributors argued for the universality. Okay, so I'm interested in the debate here. So there's a kind of universalist about philosophical concepts or epistemological concepts, and you have the culturally pluralist idea of the concepts. Yes. Where are you heading there in that debate? Because I presented the radical difference of uses within Japanese, so that's the inter-linguistic diversity. In Japanese, there are two knowledge verbs for propositional knowledge, that is, shitteiru and wakatteiru, and they are used very differently when, for example, in the cases of the two-temp case, and what I called a name case where the agent forgot about the name, but yes, and cannot recall someone's name, but still Japanese attributed knowledge to that person with shitteiru, but not wakatteiru. So what's the difference between shitteiru and wakatteiru? Let's see the other one, wakatteiru. Wakatteiru, so they are both knowledge verbs, but usually in its basic form, wakatteiru is used, its basic form of wakatteiru is wakaru, which means basically understanding. So it's a derivative derived from the word for understanding. But it's when used for expressing propositional content, then that can be usually interchangeable with freely interchangeable with shitteiru. Shitteiru is something like knowledge in the Anglophone sense. Yeah, so you can translate English you know into both shitteiru and wakatteiru as long as it is used for expressing propositional knowledge. Therefore, there is almost no difference in such context between these two verbs. But still in some epistemologically interesting cases, the use is the use diverge. So that's a very interesting point. Well, that's an interesting point really because in your case, you're saying that if you have forgotten the name of someone, you still have some understanding. I'm sorry. But according to your findings. Not understanding, but so they attribute it, Japanese attribute knowledge, shitteiru, that person, yes. Yeah, so there's a kind of knowledge, goat in and goat, but there's no understanding. Yeah, in that case. But the pattern is opposite in the case of true temp case. What's the other case? True temp case is where the agent suddenly got the ability to tell the temperature of the room one is in. And therefore, but he's not aware of that ability yet. So that person, the question is whether that person knows the temperature or not. And Japanese, most of the Japanese denied knowledge in the sense of shitteiru to that person. But attributed wakatteiru to that person. Interesting. So people might not know about temperature in the shitteiru sense. Yes. Understand what it means. Okay, so how does it affect traditional epistemic questions? Yeah, so usually if you assume one single knowledge bird, you will debate over whether. That person knows or not. But that debate. Maybe just, maybe just depend on the concept you have. And these different concepts are encoded in different, uh, lexical items in other languages. Therefore, if so, then there will be no right or wrong in that debate. So maybe it's just a matter of different concepts and they are both legitimate. And, yeah, so that will really, I think, affect the, uh, yes, debate over the nature of the debate. What epistemologists are doing. Yeah. So that's one consequence of pluralism is lexical pluralism of this thought. It's interesting because, uh, in non English concepts, like in German, you have a distinction between knowing how and knowing that in German. Same as in the Philippines, we have that kind of notion as well that distinction, but it's only in English that that distinction is not really that fine grain. The distinction between knowing that or the proposition of knowledge and knowing how or practical knowledge. Are we equating, uh, what the new in, in terms of practical knowledge here. Yeah, I actually have a radical difference in, uh, English and in knowledge how attribution between English and Japanese. And that difference occurs in both ways. Again, that means in relation to ability. Those, uh, the to the agent who lacks the relevant ability. Most English speakers denies knowledge how, but most Japanese speakers attribute to knowledge how to that agent is such. There is such a case, and I had already got such a result. That's interesting. So some, some philosophers, English philosophers, English speaking philosophers are saying that, well, we could reduce knowing how to knowing that. So I think you already saw this counter to that kind of idea. I'm not sure. So that's the topic of the intellectualism and anti intellectualism and whether this kind of results support anti intellectualism or support intellectualism. That would be also interesting question. And I personally, I, I personally think that that Japanese results, the Japanese concept of knowledge how seems to be intellectualists one. Okay. Propositional component proposition knowledge component. Yeah, is that because that kind of knowledge can easily be reduced to propositional knowledge. I also have had the completely opposite results. That means that means to the agent who has the relevant ability. Most English speakers attributed knowledge how that most Japanese speakers denied knowledge how again. Japanese speakers, you know the relevant ability. So there is a gap. Or even there isn't. We may say there is no relationship between knowledge how and ability in Japanese. They're independent concepts. Right. They are different. Okay, that's interesting. That's another interesting result. Okay, so what's the other findings of this book epistemology for the rest of the world so you talked about the Japanese concepts of knowledge how about the other languages. Because Jonathan Garnerley, who is a philosopher of Sanskrit philosophy reported reported the similar pluralism about the knowledge verbs in Sanskrit philosophy. And therefore, yes, that's the same. The same, the same kind of interlinguistic diversity of knowledge verbs. And But still, Lingist, Anna Wiertsbicker, who is the founder of the NSM approach, natural semantics, semantic metal language, which is focusing on the lexical semantics about around the world languages of around the natural language in general. And therefore, she she argued for the the existence of semantic prime of no semantic prime is the concept which cannot be reduced to other concepts and therefore no is semantic universal that can be found in all the languages. And basically, she says, seems to be arguing for monism about the concept of knowledge. I'm familiar with Anna Wiertsbicker's work. She's a universalist about certain concepts like knowledge concepts in lexicals as well. Yes. That's interesting. What's the argument for that kind of monism? I think that this kind of monism, for example, also, John Turi argued for the human universality of the concept of knowledge. That's much more evolutionary approach. And that kind of concepts, universal concepts, is maybe compatible with my pluralism. Because there may be such a core concept. And the problem is that because that's a small core. The core itself is very thin. But the concept of knowledge we we have, ordinary concepts of knowledge captured in ordinary languages are much more thick. In a sense, epistemologists are more interested in very subtle details of the concepts of knowledge. And therefore, the core, the common core of the concept of knowledge is not by itself. It's not so epistemologically interesting. Yeah, of course, the existence of such a core may be very significant. But for almost all epistemologists, they are concerned with much more thick concepts of knowledge. I like the idea of thick concepts here because here the normativity comes in. Are you using thick concepts in Bernard Williams' sense that you have some normative norms present in the concept? Yeah. Yeah, that's interesting. So where do you think is cross-cultural philosophy or linguistic heading? Yeah, I think there will be very fruitful collaboration between philosophers and linguists and also anthropologists. And we will be doing such collaborative work in future, which will be very fruitful and which will be focusing on very specific aspect of philosophical interesting concepts. So this one will be a kind of interdisciplinary work? Yes, yes. More interdisciplinary than what's happening right now. Yeah. And also what I am thinking is that there will be even relevance to artificial intelligence because, for example, neural machine translation is now developing very fast and the quality is sometimes amazing. But because if, for example, given the radical differences between radical differences in knowledge how attribution between Japanese and English. So you translate the English sentence, knowledge how sentence, in particular context, into Japanese, then the truth values of these sentences will be different. And how can you admit it as a correct translation if truth values are different? Yeah, that's interesting. I'm thinking about its application in Google Translate. Google Translate and DeepL, which is a demon-based translation. Yeah, machine learning as well and big data, of course. Yeah. So, but also the cross-linguistic diversity poses such specific problems like the notion of truth and proposition and the relation between them. And also the notion of equivalence of meaning and of course the notion of translation. Yeah, so those are really interesting stuff in philosophy of language as well. Yes. And you need philosophers especially tuned with cross-cultural linguistics to work on this. Yeah. On a more personal note, what's your advice for those who want to get into professional academic philosophy? Yeah, so I think that's a very difficult problem. Given that if, given the shrinking posts of philosophy, professional philosophy. So, even now in Japan, there are only few philosophy departments. And so, it's, I'm not very, I'm usually reluctant to recommend to pursue philosophy, professional philosophy, but I recommend my students to do some experimental philosophy. Then you may find some posts in somewhere, somewhere other than philosophy. Alright, because you can do social science work. Yes, yes. Experimental psychology work. Yeah. But is a career in philosophy worth it? Yeah, of course, I think, yeah, I hope. And yes, as long as you have a job. Would you say that your career is worth it? Yeah, I hope so. Yes, I believe so. Okay, so on that note, thanks again. Okay, on that note, thanks again, Massa, for sharing your time with us. Yeah, thank you. For you guys, join me again for another episode of philosophy and what matters where we discuss things that matter from a philosophical point of view. Cheers.