 It's a pleasure to be there for many reasons. First, to have a debate shared by you. We are former colleagues coming back to European times in the 80s and 90s. And a main thanks to the Institute because I know that there has been a succession of remarkable speakers. I'm very specialized in covering such subjects since you have had the wider European view recently given by David O'Sullivan. Of course, when I knew I would speak here, I called David and I renewed yesterday. I said I will be following your steps for my corner, but I know you have been giving the wider view for external action service and so on. And he said, well, fine, go on. I will be myself in Ireland speaking on another subject today. So it shows that there is a very sustained flow of messages and contributions coming from Brussels those times. And Claude Françard-Nou, another very good colleague, has been talking about security, procurement, and so on. So I think it's a very good opportunity. And of course, this is done on the occasion of very useful consultations with the forthcoming Presidency chairmanship in office. I use the OSC words. There is EU presidencies. And there is OSC chairmanship in office. So everybody in this coded system understand immediately which organization is at stake and so on, so on. So in order to cover subjects which, yes, maybe less familiar, but has great significance, and I think it will be for Ireland a matter of vigilance during next year. And I will try to give somewhat the picture of the main stakes into this quite fascinating region. It's a region which has been forgotten in a way, and which we have to rediscover. Forgotten, I dare to say for centuries, because it lost its existence after having been a crucial historical link between worlds apart. I mean, as we all know, Rome discovered silk through the Silk Road 2,000 years ago, and so on, and so on. And therefore, this region has a history of its own. But between the development of the Russian Empire, you had the moment of the great game, but then you had the establishment of the Soviet Union. And of course, the whole region has been taken into a very specific system where one didn't speak about Central Asia, but one did speak about Soviet Union. So all of a sudden, this region had to rediscover itself in a way even more, because this country were not aspiring, wanting independence, almost on the contrary. They were scared by the breakup of the Soviet Union. It's well known that President Nazarbayev was very much in favor of maintaining the Soviet Union. And in a way, one can say that the best elite of this past system coming from the region was aspiring in finding its corner into the Soviet system at last, because they had gone through the step-by-step selection of some elites within the system, which would allow to some of them, once again, the best example was President Nazarbayev was more or less already earmarked by President Gorbachev and so on. So it has been kind of upside down transformation for the even political and psychological representation of their relation to the world. But now, I mean, this distant, almost forgotten region is becoming a crucial region, crucial for global security challenges for the future of Afghanistan beyond 2014, very clearly, and even for EU ambitions beyond its eastern neighborhood. I mean, we cannot say Europe engagement stops there. I mean, this is impossible. And even more, we have clear calls from the region to engage and to do more. I think the important to say that the map here should help to have a sense of both the vast array of land and territory, which are covered by this region, to give you an idea, the border of Kazakhstan with Russia is 7,000 kilometers, just to give an idea of it. And this, of course, was not planned. I mean, this was just the outcome of technical administrative divisions in Soviet times. And therefore, by sheer accident of history, now this has to be a state border managed with all the prerequisites of a state border. And we know what it means. It's a complex thing. And so on and so on. You could say the same about the Fogana Valley, where you can see the integration of these three countries where each is encroaching the other in the Fogana Valley, where you have the mix of the three colors. This is the most populated area. This is the historical place where precisely the silk crowd went. This is the Fogana Valley. And so the combination of constraints connected with population of high density there having to live within the three categories with minorities. And so I stopped there about the characterization of the region. I think that these two extreme examples give an idea of the complexities we are confronted to. We have a region where what we call the global security challenges are very much in the center of the concerns. Well, we know them. Terrorism, extremism, drug trafficking is an enormous challenge in the region, because as you know, 92%, 93% of heroin produced in the world is coming from Afghanistan in present context. But also impact of financial crisis, environment, more precisely water. So I mean, you have a good measure of the weight of what we call the global challenges in this region. Add to that the political impact of the Arab Spring, where I will come a bit back to it. I mean, clearly, in view of these presidential regimes, you can be sure that in this region these events since last autumn have been watched with very intense attention, both from leaderships, from political circles, and so on. So all this, in order to add about the problematics, social situation is very serious in many respects. You have won some of the poorest countries in the world with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, because there are two mountainous countries. 92% of Tajik territory is mountainous. So what it leads to for normal agriculture and normal ways of communication is very little. This is Tajikistan is the violence part. This is Pamir, part where you have Tajikistan. I mean, it's between 4,000 and 7,000 meters high. This is the core of the Pamir. Also, one has to take into account the ethnic dimension. So all this means that we have a very complex situation and leaderships, which have been more or less the same in the last 20 years, and through just change. And precisely, that's why Harald Spring has the impact, is now a very much a question of today. Final introductory conservation. We are in tough financial times. Why should we care for this region? And so at a time where we have to do, I mean, of course, the constraints are quite serious for the EU and for all member states. And still, we have to do. So we have started already. My first point, the EU strategy for Central Asia. First, the EU started with the establishment of recognition in the logic of the Maastricht Treaty and follow-up to identify Central Asia as a region where EU should be active. And then you have this one on formula of common action decided by the Council, appointment of a special envoy, a special representative in charge of this mandate. And this started in 2005 with Jan Kubisch, then left after one year becoming Foreign Minister of Slovakia. And I took over into 2006. Interesting to note, it was after the events in Andijan, exactly in Falkenavalle, Uzbek revolt, which was crushed in a way which created strong EU reaction with sanctions, which have been overcome now, but have weighed very much on the kind of growing interest on Central Asia from the European Union and difficult times in our relations with Uzbekistan. Interesting to note, this was done in 2005. It was not done in 2001 after 9-11. So the awakening, I would say, of European interest was not so quick and so fast and so securely centered. I mean, Andijan was the spark which launched the process. Then it took a real move forward thanks to German presidency in 2007, first half of 2007. And it was one of the ambitions of German presidency to establish a strategy for Central Asia. This has been prepared during this month and adopted by the European Council, that is the top level. What is the EU strategy for Central Asia? I will not enter into detail now. I'm ready to answer two more questions from you. But let's characterize and we'll leave some booklets, describing it in detail. This is available on the net anyway. But the initial document of strategy is attached within this booklet with the sequential documents developing the key items. It is a global long-term approach. The purpose is to establish a long-term partnership with Central Asian countries. This is not a five-year plan. This is not a three-year initiative. The idea is to work on the long term because of the amplitude of the challenges, of the dimension of the region and because of the potential complementarity. We can bring very important factors for this opening of this landlocked area. This are the most remote states from any sea. When you look at the landmass, you understand, indeed, it's Central Asia or Eurasia, whatever you have different qualifications. But so here there's really something to do together, indeed, a long-term approach because you have just burgeoning, starting countries where they will need steps to develop. We have identified priorities. They are very simple and stark, but it has been a careful work of selection. I call them quickly. One is rule of law, human rights and democratization. Second is education. Three is trade and investment. Four is energy. Five is environment and water. And six is common threats, which is quite bold qualification of these remote regions, EU and Central Asia, you can argue. But this is exactly what I describe global challenges, global threats. And therefore, I mean, it covers some key priorities in order to organize our commitment, our work. And we have tried to have a calibrated action not to expand everywhere. We were working a bit piecemeal before with TASSIS programs, which are known for knowledgeable public like yours because it has been the framework of the projects of the EU precisely of the record of Russia in the whole CIS. But we moved to a more practical and global encompassing approach. And also with the purpose of establish on the ground delegations. When we started the strategy in 2007, we had only one delegation present. Now we have three well established and the EU delegation, it means 30 to 40 to 50 people covering all the aspects and now including politics, political situation after the Lisbon Treaty. And we are going to open soon another one in the key place, which is Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan after having gone to this difficult process I mentioned to you. And we have to complete in Ashkabad, Turkmenistan. So this has been the, let's say the dynamic of this strategy. We are going to review it next year after five years with another report to the European Council to have an assessment where we are, what are lessons learned, how to adjust further development. Of course, this doesn't mean that European Union is working there in spite or beyond or forgetting about member states. European Union member states, some of them have been committed and very committed to Central Asia, depending on historical links, interests, special fields of interest. To give you an idea, Kazakhstan is the first world's wide producer of uranium, together, well, more or less on power with Australia, beyond Canada, and has established 30 years' contracts of delivery from Japan to China and to other countries. So, real stakes in terms of resources, and not only gas and oil, and of course, this means a lot for great economic opportunities. Therefore, this presence of EU as such is, of course, taking stock and looking for some kind of cross-fertilization from the experience of member states on the ground with, one must say, limited diplomatic presence. Well, most you have 12 to 15 European countries present in Kazakhstan or in Uzbekistan, the big two countries, but only two in Kyrgyzstan, three in Tajikistan, and four, five in Turkmenistan. So, more or less, there are some assets from member states, but the idea of coming together in a structured way does make sense because things are moving quickly. I would add to describe this strategy that is not acting alone. We fully recognize that other international organizations have been very much involved, and especially United Nations and OSCE. And once again, this is why, I mean, this good understanding of who is doing what in Central Asia does make sense for especially the relations between OSCE and European Union, the crisis in Kyrgyzstan, the border management, counter-terrorism have been already a field where we are working closely. My second point would be to say that we are now, and this is part of this need for closer attention, we are in transition. Things are moving in the field of security or evolution of this Central Asian, these five Central Asian countries, and therefore we must also adapt our way to act in Central Asia. First and foremost, let's look at what happens in Central Asia itself. First, Central Asia specific problem, the internal evolution. I told that basically these countries have started with founding presidents, and so the transition of generation in the leadership is going to take place. After 20 years of quite remarkable political stability, which has been called presidentialism, hyper-presidentialism together with a constitution which are quite recognizable, because we have to remember these five countries are member of OSCE. And that's why we have put in our priorities in first rank, rule of law, human rights, democratic reform, because we do share this commitment with five OSCE countries, which are young and new countries and still in the making in a way, but at the same time we cannot forget about these common values and this commitment, and this is part of our dialogue with them. But the transition means, of course, time of potential political tension, turmoil, upheavals, and we have seen that at the very beginning in Tajikistan, with the civil war, which was horrible six months, 100,000 victims, but then stabilization, national reconciliation. And by the way, here OSCE has been working a lot, and that's why OSCE is very present, almost one team of 100 people, because they are everywhere as a follow-up of this national reconciliation. But you have had also changed in Turkmenistan a smooth change from President Niazov, who died in December 2006, with President Badi Mohamedov. But we have seen turmoil in Kyrgyzstan. First time in 2005, departure of President Bakiav, Akayev, rather peaceful, almost no victim, than President Bakiav, but things beginning to worsen in the last years, and with a sudden shock of the 7th of April, with departure of the President Bakiav, and the beginning of a transition with a new constitution, aspiration to parliamentary democracy, and at the same time, ethnic confrontation, 10th to 14th of June last year, two months after the events, 500 dead in the Vergana Valley in Orsh and Jalabad, 400,000 refugees on the roads. Well, then they returned to their home, most of them, but this was a deep shock, and we are still working on that all together. So this is a real challenge from inside. But there is also, I mentioned, the Arab Spring as another signal that the question of change of leadership and potential risk, because if you look at Kyrgyzstan, you can argue that it was a kind of pre-Tunisia, that is the feeling of a locked political situation, a frustrated generation, the impression of a glass ceiling, if you are not the son of a general or cousin of a minister, even for the best elite, there is no future, and with the President with a kind of satrapic position, and frustration leading to the main square, demonstrations, shooting from the presidential guard, people not fearing bullets, lots of victims, and at the end of the day, the President left. So this was 10th of April, 7th of April to 10th, and what we have seen since in the Arab world, well, with differences, show that, well, what we see is a very complex process of change, full of risk, and we can measure that after the initial aspiration, where does it go is a big question mark. So this kind of reflection of how to proceed, how to understand is very important. You have translational factors I've already mentioned, I come back quickly to the main problems, very quickly. Afghanistan, 2014 has been set as a turning point for transition, transfer of responsibility, and this we always repeat, but in these countries, you have the feeling of a black hole, and the idea that you have to prepare for the unknown, which we are deeply convinced is not the case, because I mean, this has been a long-term investment, and you have the security dimension, and you have the cooperation dimension. I always give the example to my Central Asian telecutors. We plan already operations beyond 2014 in the finances of the EU, so we'll be there. And now you have 13,000 Europeans engaged into Afghanistan, not only on the military, but also on the development side. So this is not as caricatural as described, but there is a sense of uncertainty, and therefore, I mean, this fear that there could be either a spillover or growing problems for Central Asia after 2014 is a matter we have to cope with very carefully, and therefore we welcome the growing renewal interest for neighborhood of Afghanistan as part of the solution and the work to be done for Afghanistan, and especially Central Asia. Of course, Pakistan is very important, but Northern neighborhood of Afghanistan is also very important, and especially in context with the drug trafficking, which is the curse of the region. There's no need to have long development of this, just read the reports of United Nations organization against drug and crime in Vienna. They keep perfect picture of the reality, and if you want to know more about the routes, you look at the map of HIV developments in Central Asia, and you have the roots of what is taking place. So, I mean, this is a real challenge. The other I already mentioned are the problem of manager of borders, and then we have energy. I've not mentioned up to now in a way deliberately. Of course, this is one of the main reason of our interest, but I always try to react to the kind of caricatural description which says, well, you Europeans discover Central Asia because you need gas and oil. Sorry, I mean, we have 30,000, I said, European citizen engaged in Afghanistan, risking daily their life, bit on civilian side as well as on the military side. So we do care for security of this region, and we do care about extremism, terrorism, and we know what it means in our cities, and as well as for drug trafficking. So security, stability is the first reason of our commitment and the challenge we have there. But of course, energy is also matter of interest for us and for them because they are landlocked far away from the big roots. And so you have to develop this potential and then you have to transport it. And here the interesting development of last year's has been the fact that thanks to a pipeline to China, December 209, the established quasi monopoly of gas problem in transportation of gas in Central Asia has been opened into a new energy paradigm which will emerge step by step in the region. I will not enter into detail now, I just wanted to mention that because I didn't before for the reason I just told you. So in view of that, because of our limitation of resources, we have in this transition to think of pulling of resources in order to cope with this rather challenging transition. We all have capacities, EU through its strategy is panicking its presence, not in a dramatic way, but methodical because we have a long-term logic. But here we have to really work together. The key problem and the additional reason for us to commit ourselves there is that you have a lack of regional coordination. There is almost no regional organization taking these five countries. They are just emerging, they want to be themselves first before then entering into what we know as integration and so on and so on. And therefore, other organizations, super national, regional organization, international organization have a role to play. Maybe we are too many to do that. Let's precisely find a good distribution of work. And this can be a good cooperation to the benefit of Central Asia. And precisely, it's already what I mentioned between EU, UN and OSCE. In the end, we can have a good work sharing pattern and the dimensions of the challenges. I mean, water is a huge problem. Nobody has a solution for water. Only well-coordinated contributions will help to improve the rather dismal management of water in the present condition. I take this example. I would finish in a quick description of the other partners because we have in late commerce and others have been there for a very long time or in a very substantial proportion. Let's start with Russia, of course, because it has been the historical master of the region for centuries, not just 20th century. It started in the 7th century. So the question now in this post-Soviet period is Russia a contender of EU engagement or partner for EU engagement? We have opened immediately, when we started this consultation, open dialogue with Russia and we exchange regularly on the subject in rather methodical way and we have adopted from the beginning the idea of transparency. We have nothing to hide from the European Union. We have no hidden agenda and we look to the region in the logic of cooperative security. For precisely the reason I mentioned, who has a solution for water? Is there a Russian or Chinese and American solution or European? No. The only way to cope with it is precisely to combine efforts. So there is a lot of work to do together for all interested partners in Central Asia in view of the dimensional problem from poverty to drug trafficking. And we see, for example, Russia very much the first victim of this drug trafficking now wanting more coordination and we do welcome that. And therefore, we may have a competition of course, but this is not confrontation. This is a normal mix of cooperation and competition bit on energy on other matters. So we start from the idea that the commonality of interest will emerge more and more when the challenges on this country will emerge. This is not a naive. This is just resting on evidence. We could see that in the past year in Kyrgyzstan, in the end. We have been consulting constantly with the Russians even if they are their old preferences or their own options. But it's a rule for us. And when I visit Kyrgyzstan and I've been on a monthly basis for the last year and a half, I always meet with the Russian ambassador. And if there's a Moscow special envoy, I will meet with him. So this is our line of conduct. Second, United States. We are in this logic of this growing commitment. It shows that in this region we have not been saying, well, let's have the United States do the pull, the heavy weight for us on the country. We have our own logic which is related to OSCE. And to this need to take seriously the fact that we have common references even if these countries are just at the beginning of a long democratization process. And that's why we feel committed. Of course, United States have had a special attention for security interests. And this is where we have been working closely with them. You have the Manas air base. Point has key transfer to Afghanistan. You have had the Northern distribution network which is now more and more a key point for ISAF in Afghanistan because of the threats on the normal route through Pakistan. For instance, you know, quickly China has been more and more involved economically and seems now to measure because of these new challenges that it would have to look for security. And therefore the Shanghai Cooperation Organization which is more some kind of political framework than the real organization and which should have been more economic in the view of the Chinese is now looking more at security. I would like also to mention Turkey because Turkey has historical links, four of the five countries are Turkish language family. The exception is Tajikistan which where they speak Dari, that is the Persian family. And so they are strongly interested. We share priorities with them between human rights democratization on energy because of the fourth corridor we are beginning to shape from Turkmenistan through Caspian, Azerbaijan, Turkey and the Southeast Europe. We can have of course because of historical dimensions different views into the logic of Turkey's neighborhood compared to our own approach to Central Asia. In conclusion, one can argue that Central Asia is not a priority for the UN will never be but this is not the problem. After political oblivion and piecemeal operations we have now more and more common perception by all member states thanks to this mobilization of the strategy and we built overall diplomatic presence calling for contributions from all sides. Central Asia is a long-term incremental investment with two regions, EU and Central Asia getting closer on both sides in terms of interaction. We need to take a continent-wide approach because this is really the only way to cope with this vast region. We offer and we are in a long historical cycle which in fact started to involve Central Asia with Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This is where historically I mean there was the beginning of the process and we are still I think in this cycle. We bring our capacities, we offer markets, technologies, competence, finances. We learn to have a wider vision of our environment and we have to and what we bring I think basically to Central Asia is alternative options, other perspectives. They have strong neighbors, we are not a strong neighbor. We can become a very substantial partner. Thank you very much.