 Question 132 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde, triates on the cardinal virtues, the virtue of fortitude. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde, triates on the cardinal virtues, the virtue of fortitude. By Saint Thomas Aquinas, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 132 of Vainglory in five articles. We must now consider Vainglory, under which head there are five points of inquiry. First, whether desire of glory is a sin. Second, whether it is opposed to magnanimity. Third, whether it is a mortal sin. Fourth, whether it is a capital vice. Fifth, of its daughters. First article, whether the desire of glory is a sin. Objection one, it seems that the desire of glory is not a sin. For no one sins in being likened to God. In fact, we are commanded in Ephesians 5.1, be ye followers of God as most dear children. Now by seeking glory, man seems to imitate God, who seeks glory from men. Wherefore it is written in Isaiah 43 verses 6 and 7, Bring my sons from afar, and my daughters from the ends of the earth. And every one that calleth on my name I have created him for my glory. Therefore the desire for glory is not a sin. Objection two, further. That which incites a man to do good is apparently not a sin. Now the desire of glory incites men to do good. For Tully says that glory inflames every man to strive his utmost. And in holy writ glory is promised for good works according to Romans 2.7. To them indeed who according to patience in good work glory and honour. Therefore the desire for glory is not a sin. Objection three, further. Tully says that glory is consistent good report about a person together with praise. And this comes to the same as what Augustine says, that glory is as it were clear knowledge with praise. Now it is no sin to desire praiseworthy renown. Indeed it seems itself to call for praise according to Ecclesiasticus 41 15. Take care of a good name. And in Romans 12.17. Providing good things not only in the sight of God, but also in the sight of all men. Therefore the desire of vain glory is not a sin. On the contrary Augustine says in On the City of God 5. He is better advised who acknowledges that even the love of praise is sinful. I answer that glory signifies a certain clarity. Therefore Augustine says that to be glorified is the same as to be clarified. Now clarity and comeliness imply a certain display. Wherefore the word glory properly denotes the display of something as regards its seeming comely in the sight of men. Whether it be a bodily or a spiritual good. Since however that which is clear simply can be sinned by many and by those who are far away. It follows that the word glory properly denotes that somebody's good is known and approved by many according to the saying of Sullest. I must not boast while I am addressing one man. But if we take the word glory in a broader sense, it not only consists in the knowledge of many, but also in the knowledge of few, or of one, or of oneself alone, as when one considers one's own good as being worthy of praise. Now it is not a sin to know and approve one's own good, for it is written in 1 Corinthians 2.12. Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but the spirit that is of God that we may know the things that are given us from God. Likewise it is not a sin to be willing to approve one's own good works, for it is written in Matthew 5.16. Let your light shine before men. Hence the desire for glory does not of itself denote a sin, but the desire for empty or vain glory denotes a sin, for it is sinful to desire anything vain according to Psalm 4.3. Why do you love vanity and seek after lying? Now glory may be called vain in three ways. First, on the part of the thing for which one seeks glory is when a man seeks glory for that which is unworthy of glory, for instance when he seeks it for something frail and perishable. Secondly, on the part of him from whom he seeks glory, for instance a man whose judgment is uncertain. Thirdly, on the part of the man himself who seeks glory, for that he does not refer the desire of his own glory to a due end, such as God's honour, or the spiritual welfare of his neighbour. As Augustine says on John 13.13, You call me master and lord and you say well, Self complacency is fraught with danger of one who has to beware of pride. But he who is above all, however much he may praise himself, does not uplift himself. For knowledge of God is our need, not his. Nor does any man know him unless he be taught of him who knows. It is therefore evident that God seeks glory not for his own sake but for ours. In like manner a man may rightly seek his own glory for the good of others, according to Matthew 5.16, that they may see your good works and glorify your Father who is in heaven. Reply to Objection 2. That which we receive from God is not vain but true glory. It is this glory that is promised as a reward for good works and of which it is written in 2 Corinthians 10 verses 17 and 18. He that glorieth let him glory in the Lord for not he who commendeth himself is approved, but he whom God commendeth. It is true that some are heartened to do works of virtue through desire for human glory as though through the desire for other earthly goods. Yet he is not truly virtuous who does virtuous deeds for the sake of human glory as Augustine proves in On the City of God 5. Reply to Objection 3. It is requisite for a man's perfection that he should know himself, but not that he should be known by others, wherefore it is not to be desired in itself. It may, however, be desired as being useful for something, either in order that God may be glorified by men, or that men may become better by reason of the good they know to be in another man, or in order that man knowing the testimony of others' praise, the good of which is in him, may himself strive to persevere therein and to become better. In this sense, it is praiseworthy that a man should take care of his good name and that he should provide good things in the sight of God and men, but not that he should take an empty pleasure in human praise. Second article, whether vain glory is opposed to magnanimity. Objection 1. It seems that vain glory is not opposed to magnanimity. For as stated above in article 1, vain glory consists in glorying and things that are not, which pertains to falsehood, or in earthly and perishable things which pertains to covetousness, or in the testimony of man whose judgment is uncertain, which pertains to imprudence. Now these vices are not contrary to magnanimity. Therefore, vain glory is not opposed to magnanimity. Objection 2 further. Vain glory is not, like, pulsanimity, opposed to magnanimity by way of deficiency, for this seems inconsistent with vain glory. Nor is it opposed to it by way of excess, for in this way presumption and ambition are opposed to magnanimity, as stated above, in question 130 article 2 and question 131 article 2. And these differ from vain glory. Therefore, vain glory is not opposed to magnanimity. Objection 3 further. A glass on Philippians 2.3. Let nothing be done through contention neither by vain glory says, some among them were given to dissension and restlessness, contending with one another for the sake of vain glory. But contention is not opposed to magnanimity. Neither, therefore, is vain glory. On the contrary, Tully says under the heading, magnanimity consists in two things. We should be aware of the desire for glory, since it enslaves the mind, which a magnanimous man should ever strive to keep untrammeled. Therefore, it is opposed to magnanimity. I answer that, as stated above in question 103 article 1, 3 reply, glory is an effect of honour and praise, because from the fact that a man is praised or shown any kind of reverence, he acquires charity in the knowledge of others. And since magnanimity is about honour, as stated above in question 129 articles 1 and 2, it follows that it is also about glory, seeing that as a man uses honour moderately, so too does he use glory in moderation. Therefore, an ordinate desire of glory is directly opposed to magnanimity. Reply to Objection 1. To think so much of little things as to glory on them is itself opposed to magnanimity. Therefore, it is said of the magnanimous man in Ethics 4 that honour is of little account to him. In like manner, he thinks little of other things that are sought for honour's sake, such as power and wealth. Likewise, is inconsistent with magnanimity to glory in things that are not. Therefore, it is said of the magnanimous man that he cares more for truth than for opinion. Again, it is incompatible with magnanimity for a man to glory in the testimony of human praise as though he deemed this something great. Therefore, it is said of the magnanimous man that he cares not to be praised. And so, when a man looks upon little things as though they were great, nothing hinders this from being contrary to magnanimity as well as to other virtues. Reply to Objection 2. He that is desirous of vain glory does in truth fall short of being magnanimous, because he glories in what the magnanimous man thinks little of as stated in the preceding reply. But if we consider his estimate, he is opposed to the magnanimous man by way of excess because the glory which he seeks is something great in his estimation and he tends there to in excess of his desserts. Reply to Objections 3. As stated above in Question 127 Article 2 Second reply, the opposition of vices does not depend on their effects. Nevertheless, contention, if done intentionally, is opposed to magnanimity, since no one contends save for what he deems great. Wherefore, the philosopher says in Ethics 4.3 that the magnanimous man is not contentious because nothing is great in his estimation. Third article Whether vain glory is a mortal sin? Objection 1. It seems that vain glory is a mortal sin for nothing precludes the eternal reward except a mortal sin. Now vain glory precludes the eternal reward for it is written in Matthew 6.1 Take heed that you do not give justice before men to be seen by them, otherwise you shall not have a reward of your father who is in heaven. Therefore vain glory is a mortal sin. Objection 2 further Whoever appropriates to himself that which is proper to God sins mortally. Now by desiring vain glory, a man appropriates to himself that which is proper to God, for it is written in Isaiah 42.8 I will not give my glory to another. And in 1 Timothy 1.17 To the only God be honour and glory. Therefore vain glory is a mortal sin. Objection 3 further Apparently a sin is mortal if it be most dangerous and harmful. Now vain glory is a sin in this kind because a gloss of Augustine on 1 Thessalonians 2.4 God who proveeth our hearts says Unless a man war against the love of human glory he does not perceive its baneful power for though it be easy for anyone not to desire praise as long as one does not get it it is difficult not to take pleasure in it when it is given. Chrysostom also says in his 19th homily on the Gospel of Matthew that vain glory enters secretly and robs us insensibly of all our inward possessions. Therefore vain glory is a mortal sin. On the contrary, Chrysostom says that while other vices find their abode in the servants of the devil vain glory finds a place even in the servants of Christ. Yet in the latter there is no mortal sin. Therefore vain glory is not a mortal sin. I answer that as stated above in question 24 article 12 question 110 article 4 and question 112 article 2 A sin is mortal through being contrary to charity. Now the sin of vain glory considered in itself does not seem to be contrary to charity as regards the love of one's neighbour yet as regards the love of God it may be contrary to charity in two ways. In one way by reason of the matter about which one glories for instance when one glories in something false that is opposed to the reverence we owe to God according to Ezekiel 28 2 thy heart is lifted up and thou hast said I am God and in first Corinthians 4 7 what hast thou that thou hast not received and if thou hast received why dost thou glory as if thou hattest not received it or again when a man prefers to God the temporal good in which he glories for this is forbidden for example in Jeremiah 9 verses 23 and 24 let not the wise man glory in his wisdom and let not the strong man glory in his strength and let not the rich man glory in his riches but let him that glorious glory in this that he understandeth and knoweth me or again when a man prefers the testimony of man to God's thus it is written in reproval of certain people in John 12 43 for they love the glory of man more than the glory of God in another way vain glory may be contrary to charity on the part of the one who glories in that he refers his intention to glory as his last end so that he directs even virtuous deeds there too and in order to obtain it for bears not from doing even that which is against God in this way it is a mortal sin where for Augustine says and on the city of God 514 that this vice namely the love of human praise is so hostile to a godly faith if the heart desires glory more than it fears or loves God that our Lord said how can you believe you who receive glory from one another and the glory which is from God alone you do not seek John 5 44 if however the love of human glory though it be vain be not inconsistent with charity neither as regards the matter gloried in nor as to the intention of him that seeks glory it is not a mortal but a venial sin reply to Objection 1 no man by sinning merits eternal life where for a virtuous deed loses its power to merit eternal life even if it be done for the sake of vain glory even though that vain glory be not a mortal sin on the other hand when a man loses the eternal reward simply through vain glory and not merely in respect of one act vain glory is a mortal sin reply to Objection 2 not every man that is desirous of vain glory desires the excellence which belongs to God alone for the glory due to God alone differs from the glory due to a virtuous or rich man reply to Objection 3 vain glory is stated to be a dangerous sin not only on account of its gravity but also because it is a disposition to grave sins insofar as it renders man presumptuous and too self-confident and so it gradually disposes a man to lose his inward goods 4th article whether vain glory is a capital vice Objection 1 it seems that vain glory is not a capital vice for a vice that always arises from another vice is seemingly not capital but vain glory always arises from pride therefore vain glory is not a capital vice Objection 2 further honor would seem to take precedence of glory but for this is its effect now ambition which is inordinate desire of honor is not a capital vice neither therefore is the desire of vain glory Objection 3 further a capital vice as a certain prominence but vain glory seems to have no prominence neither as a sin because it is not always a mortal sin nor considered as an appetable good since human glory is apparently a frail thing and is something outside man himself therefore vain glory is not a capital vice on the contrary Gregory in his commentary on Job 31 numbers vain glory among the seven capital vices I answer that the capital vices are enumerated in two ways for some reckon pride as one of their number and these do not place vain glory among the capital vices Gregory however reckons pride to be the queen of all the vices and vain glory which is the immediate offspring of pride he reckons to be a capital vice and not without reason for pride as we shall state further on in question 152 articles 1 and 2 denotes inordinate desire of excellence but whatever good one may desire one desires a certain perfection and excellence therefrom where for the end of every vice is directed to the end of pride so that this vice seems to exercise a kind of causality over the other vices and ought not to be reckoned among the special sources of vice known as the capital vices now among the goods that are the means whereby man acquires honor glory seems to be the most conducive to that effect in as much as it denotes the manifestation of a man's goodness since good is naturally loved and honored by all where for just as by the glory which is in God's sight man acquires honor in dividing things so too by the glory which is in the sight of man he acquires excellence in human things hence on account of its close connection with excellence which men desire above all it follows that it is most desirable and since many vices arise from the inordinate desire thereof it follows that vain glory is a capital vice reply to objection one it is not impossible for a capital vice to arise from pride since as stated above in the body of the article and in the par's primus akundi question 84 article 2 pride is the queen and mother of all the vices reply to objection two praise and honor as stated above in article 2 stand in relation to glory as the causes from which it proceeds so that glory is compared to them as their end for the reason why a man loves to be honored and praised is that he thinks thereby to acquire a certain renown in the knowledge of others reply to objection three vain glory stands prominent under the aspect of desirability for the reason given above and this suffices for it to be reckoned a capital vice nor is it always necessary for a capital vice to be a mortal sin for mortal sin can arise from venial sin in as much as venial sin can dispose man there too fifth article whether the daughters of vain glory are suitably reckoned to be disobedience boastfulness hypocrisy contention obstinacy discord and love of novelties objection one it seems that the daughters of vain glory are unsuitably reckoned to be disobedience boastfulness hypocrisy contention obstinacy discord and eccentricity translators note presumptio novitatum literally presumption of novelties for according to Gregory in his commentary on Job 23 boastfulness is numbered among the species of pride now pride does not arise from vain glory rather it is the other way about as Gregory says in his commentary on Job therefore boastfulness should not be reckoned among the daughters of vain glory objection to further contention and discord seem to be the outcome chiefly of anger but anger is a capital vice condivided with vain glory therefore it seems that they are not daughters of vain glory objection three further Chrysostom says in his nineteenth homily on the Gospel of Matthew that vain glory is always evil but especially in philanthropy that is mercy and yet this is nothing new for it is an established custom among men therefore eccentricity should not be specially reckoned as a daughter of vain glory on the contrary stands the authority of Gregory who there assigns in his commentary on Job the above daughters to vain glory I answer that as stated above in question 34 article 5 question 35 article 4 as well as in the powers prima secunde question 84 articles 3 and 4 the vices which by their very nature are such as to be directed to the end of a certain capital vice are called its daughters now the end of vain glory is the manifestation of one's own excellence as stated above in articles 1 and 4 and to this end a man may tend in two ways in one way directly either by words and this is boasting or by deeds and then if they be true and call for astonishment it is love of novelties which men are want to wonder at most but if they be false it is hypocrisy in another way a man strives to make known his excellence by showing that he is not inferior to another and this in four ways first as regards the intellect and thus we have obstinacy by which a man is too much attached to his own opinion being unwilling to believe one that is better secondly as regards the will and then we have discord whereby a man is unwilling to give up his own will and agree with others thirdly as regards speech then we have contention whereby a man quarrels noisily with another fourthly as regards deeds and this is disobedience whereby a man refuses to carry out the command of his superiors reply to objection one as stated above boasting is reckoned a kind of pride as regards its interior cause which is arrogance but outward boasting according to ethics four is directed sometimes to gain but more often to glory and honor and thus it is the result of in glory reply to objection two anger is not the cause of discord and contention except in conjunction with vain glory in that a man thinks it is a glorious thing for him not to yield to the will and words of others reply to objection three vain glory is reproved in connection with alms deeds on account of the lack of charity a parent in one who prefers vain glory to the good of his neighbor seeing that he does the latter for the sake of the former but a man is not reproved for presuming to give alms as though this were something novel end of question 132 read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert LC question 133 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of fortitude this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of fortitude by St. Thomas Aquinas translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican province question 133 of Pusil animiti in two articles we must now consider Pusil animiti under this head there are two points of inquiry first whether Pusil animiti is a sin second to what virtue is it opposed first article whether Pusil animiti is a sin objection one it seems that Pusil animiti is not a sin for every sin makes a man evil just as every virtue makes a man good but a faint-hearted man is not evil as the philosopher says in Ethics 4.3 therefore Pusil animiti is not a sin objection two further the philosopher says in Ethics 4.3 that a faint-hearted man is especially one who is worthy of great goods yet does not deem himself worthy of them now no one is worthy of great goods except the virtuous since as the philosopher again says none but the virtuous are truly worthy of honour therefore the faint-hearted are virtuous and consequently Pusil animiti is not a sin objection three further pride is the beginning of all sin according to Ecclesiasticus 10.15 but Pusil animiti does not proceed from pride since the proud man sets himself above what he is while the faint-hearted man withdraws from the things he is worthy of therefore Pusil animiti is not a sin objection four further the philosopher says in Ethics 4.3 that he who deems himself less worthy than he is is said to be faint-hearted now sometimes holy men deem themselves less worthy than they are for instance Moses and Jeremiah who were worthy of the office God chose them for which they both humbly declined in Exodus 3.11 and Jeremiah 1.6 therefore Pusil animiti is not a sin on the contrary nothing in human conduct is to be avoided save sin now Pusil animiti is to be avoided for it is written in Colossians 3.21 fathers provoke not your children to indignation lest they be discouraged therefore Pusil animiti is a sin I answer that whatever is contrary to a natural inclination is a sin because it is contrary to a law of nature now everything has a natural inclination to accomplish an action that is commensurate with its power as is evident in all natural things whether animate or inanimate now just as presumption makes a man exceed what is proportionate to his power by striving to do more than he can so Pusil animiti makes a man fall short of what is proportionate to his power by refusing to tend to that which is commensurate there too therefore as presumption is a sin so is Pusil animiti hence it is that the servant who buried in the earth money he had received from his master and did not trade with it through faint-hearted fear was punished by his master Confer Matthew 25 and Luke 19 Reply to Objection 1 The philosopher calls those evil who injure their neighbour and accordingly the faint-hearted is said not to be evil because he injures no one save accidentally by omitting to do what might be profitable to others for Gregory says in his pastoral rule one that if they who demur to do good to their neighbour in preaching be judged strictly without doubt their guilt is proportionate to the good they might have done had they been less retiring Reply to Objection 2 Nothing hinders a person who has a virtuous habit from sinning venially and without losing the habit or mortally and with loss of the habit of gratuitous virtue hence it is possible for a man by reason of the virtue which he has to be worthy of doing certain great things that are worthy of great honour and yet through not trying to make use of his virtue he sends sometimes venially sometimes mortally again it may be replied that the faint-hearted is worthy of great things in proportion to his ability for virtue ability which he derives either from a good natural disposition or from science or from external fortune and if he fails to use those things for virtue he becomes guilty of pulsel animity Reply to Objection 3 Even pulsel animity may in some way be the result of pride when to which a man clings too much to his own opinion whereby he thinks himself incompetent for those things for which he is competent hence it is written in Proverbs 2616 the sluggered is wiser in his own conceit than seven men that speak sentences for nothing hinders him from depreciating himself in some things and having a high opinion of himself in others where for Gregory says of Moses that perchance he would have been proud had he undertaken the leadership of a numerous people without misgiving and again he would have been proud had he refused to obey the command of his creator reply to Objection 4 Moses and Jeremiah were worthy of the office to which they were appointed by God but their worthiness was of divine grace yet they considering the insufficiency of their own weakness demurred though not obstinately less they should fall into pride Second article whether pulsel animity is opposed to magnanimity Objection 1 it seems that pulsel animity is not opposed to magnanimity for the philosopher says in Ethics 3 that the faint-hearted man knows not himself for he would desire the good things of which he is worthy if he knew himself now ignorance of self seems opposed to prudence therefore pulsel animity is opposed to prudence Objection 2 further our Lord calls the servant wicked and slothful who through pulsel animity refused to make use of the money moreover the philosopher says in Ethics 4 3 that the faint-hearted seem to be slothful now sloth is opposed to solicitude which is an act of prudence as stated above in question 47 article 9 therefore pulsel animity is not opposed to magnanimity Objection 3 further pulsel animity seems to proceed from inordinate fear hence it is written in Isaiah 35 4 say to the faint-hearted take courage and fear not it also seems to proceed from inordinate anger according to Colossians 3 21 fathers provoke not your children to indignation lest they be discouraged now inordinate fear is opposed to fortitude and inordinate anger to meekness therefore pulsel animity is not opposed to magnanimity Objection 4 further the vice that is in opposition to a particular virtue is the most grievous according as it is more unlike that virtue now pulsel animity is more unlike magnanimity than presumption is therefore if pulsel animity is opposed to magnanimity it follows that it is a more grievous sin than presumption yet this is contrary to the saying of Ecclesiasticus 37 3 O wicked presumption whence chemist thou therefore pulsel animity is not opposed to magnanimity on the contrary pulsel animity and magnanimity differ as greatness and littleness of soul as their very names denote now great and little are opposites therefore pulsel animity is opposed to magnanimity I answer that pulsel animity may be considered in three ways first in itself and thus it is evident that by its very nature it is opposed to magnanimity from which it differs as great and little differ in connection with the same subject for just as the magnanimous man tends to great things out of greatness of soul so the pulsel ananimous man shrinks from great things out of littleness of soul secondly it may be considered in reference to its cause which on the part of the intellect is ignorance of one's own qualification and on the part of the appetite is the fear of failure in what one falsely deems to exceed one's ability thirdly it may be considered in reference to its effect which is to shrink from the great things of which one is worthy but as stated above in question 132 article 2 third reply opposition between vice and virtue depends rather on their respective species than on their cause or effect hence pulsel animity is directly opposed to magnanimity reply to objection one this argument considers pulsel animity as proceeding from a cause in the intellect yet it cannot be said properly that it is opposed to prudence even in respect of its cause because ignorance of this kind does not proceed from indiscretion but from laziness in considering one's own ability according to ethics 43 or in accomplishing what is within one's power reply to objection 2 this argument considers pulsel animity from the point of view of its effect reply to objection 3 this argument considers the point of view of cause nor is the fear that causes pulsel animity always a fear of the danger of death where for it does not follow from this standpoint that pulsel animity is opposed to fortitude as regards anger if we consider it under the aspect of its proper movement whereby a man is roused to take vengeance it does not cause pulsel animity which disheartens the soul on the contrary it takes it away if however we consider the causes of anger which are injuries inflicted whereby the soul of the man who suffers them is disheartened it conduces to pulsel animity reply to objection 4 according to its proper species pulsel animity is a graver sin than presumption since thereby a man withdraws from good things which is a very great evil according to ethics 4 presumption however is stated to be wicked on account of pride whence it proceeds End of question 133 Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC Question 134 Assume a theologica secunda secunde triates on the cardinal virtues The Virtue of Fortitude This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Summa theologica secunda secunde triates on the cardinal virtues The Virtue of Fortitude by St. Thomas Aquinas Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province Question 134 of magnificence in four articles We must now consider magnificence and the vices opposed to it With regard to magnificence there are four points of inquiry First, whether magnificence is a virtue Second, whether it is a special virtue Third, what is its matter? Fourth, whether it is a part of fortitude First article, whether magnificence is a virtue Objection 1 It seems that magnificence is not a virtue For whoever has one virtue has all the virtues as stated above in the Pares primis secunde question 65 article 1 But one may have the other virtues without having magnificence The philosopher says in Ethics 4-2 that not every liberal man is magnificent Therefore, magnificence is not a virtue Objection 2 further Moral virtue observes the mean according to Ethics 2-6 But magnificence does not seemingly observe the mean for it exceeds liberality in greatness Now great and little are opposed to one another as extremes, the mean of which is equal as stated in Metaphysics 10 Hence magnificence observes not the mean but the extreme Therefore it is not a virtue Objection 3 further No virtue is opposed to a natural inclination but on the contrary perfects it as stated above in question 108 article 2 and in question 117 article 1 First Objection Now according to the philosopher in Ethics 4-2 the magnificent man is not lavish towards himself and this is opposed to the natural inclination one has to look after oneself Therefore, magnificence is not a virtue Objection 4 further According to the philosopher in Ethics 6-4 Act is right reason about things to be made Now magnificence is about things to be made as it is very named in notes Translator's note Magnificence is formed from mania fatture that is to make great things Therefore it is an act rather than a virtue On the contrary human virtue is a participation of divine power but magnificence, virtuities belongs to the divine power according to Psalm 4735 his magnificence and his power is in the clouds therefore magnificence is a virtue I answer that according to on the heavens 116 we speak a virtue in relation to the extreme limit of a thing's power not as regards the limit of deficiency but as regards the limit of excess the very nature of which denotes something great therefore to do something great whence magnificence takes its name belongs properly to the very notion of virtue hence magnificence denotes a virtue Reply to Objection 1 Not every liberal man is magnificent as regards his actions because he lacks the wherewithal to perform magnificent deeds Nevertheless every liberal man has the habit of magnificence either actually or in respect of approximate disposition there too as also in the paris primis akundi question 65 article 1 when we were treating of the connection of virtues Reply to Objection 2 it is true that magnificence observes the extreme if we consider the quantity of the thing done yet it observes the mean if we consider the rule of reason which it neither falls short of nor exceeds as we have also said of magnanimity in question 129 article 3 first reply Reply to Objection 3 it belongs to magnificence to do something great but that which regards a man's person is little in comparison with that which regards divine things or even the affairs of the community at large wherefore the magnificent man does not intend principally to be lavish towards himself not that he does not seek his own good but because to do so is not something great yet if anything regarding himself admits of greatness the magnificent man accomplishes it magnificently for instance things that are done once such as a wedding or the like or things that are of a lasting nature thus it belongs to a magnificent man to provide himself with a suitable dwelling as stated in ethics 4 reply to Objection 4 as the philosopher says in ethics 65 there must needs be a virtue of act that is a moral virtue whereby the appetite is inclined to make good use of the rule of act and this is what magnificence does hence it is not an act but a virtue second article whether magnificence is a special virtue Objection 1 it seems that magnificence is not a special virtue magnificence would seem to consist in doing something great but it may belong to any virtue to do something great if the virtue be great as in the case of one who has a great virtue of temperance for he does a great work of temperance therefore magnificence is not a special virtue but denotes a perfect degree of any virtue Objection 2 further seemingly that which tends to a thing is the same as that which does it but it belongs to magnanimity to tend to something great as stated above in question 129 articles 1 and 2 therefore it belongs to magnanimity likewise to do something great therefore magnificence is not a special virtue distinct from magnanimity Objection 3 further Magnificence seems to belong to holiness for it is written in Exodus 15 11 Magnificent in holiness and in Psalm 95 verse 6 holiness and magnificence in his sanctuary now holiness is the same as religion as stated above in question 81 article 8 therefore magnificence is apparently the same as religion therefore it is not a special virtue distinct from the others on the contrary the philosopher reckons it with the other special virtues in ethics 2 7 and in ethics 4 2 I answer that it belongs to magnificence to do facere something great as its name implies translators note magnificence comes from mania facere that is to make great things now facere may be taken in two ways in a strict sense and in a broad sense strictly facere means to work something in external matter for instance to make a house or something of the kind in a broad sense facere is employed to denote any action whether it passes into external matter as to burn or cut or remain in the agent as to understand or will accordingly if magnificence be taken to denote the doing of something great the doing facts you being understood in the strict sense it is then a special virtue for the work done is produced by act in the use of which it is possible to consider a special aspect of goodness namely that the work produced factum by the act is something great namely in quantity value or dignity and this is what magnificence does hence this way magnificence is a special virtue if on the other hand magnificence take its name from doing something great the doing facere being understood in a broad sense is not a special virtue reply to objection one it belongs to every perfect virtue to do something great in the genus of that virtue if doing facere be taken in the broad sense but not if it be taken strictly for this is proper to magnificence reply to objection two it belongs to magnanimity not only to tend to something great but also to do great works in all the virtues either by making facendo or by any kind of action as stated in ethics four three yet so that magnanimity in this respect regards the sole aspect of great while the other virtues which if they be perfect do something great direct their principle intention not to something great but to that which is proper to each virtue and the greatness of the thing done is sometimes consequent upon the greatness of the virtue on the other hand it belongs to magnificence not only to do something great but to the doing facere being taken in the strict sense but also to tend with the mind to the doing of great things and still he says that magnificence is the discussing and administering of great and lofty undertakings with a certain broad and noble purpose of mind discussion referring to the inward intention administration to the outward accomplishment where for just as magnanimity intends something great in every matter it follows that magnificence does the same in every work that can be produced in external matter fact to be the reply to objection three the intention of magnificence is the production of a great work now works done by man are directed to an end and no end of human works is so great as the honor of God where for magnificence does a great work especially in reference to the divine honor where for the philosopher says in ethics 4 to that the most commendable expenditure is that which is directed to divine sacrifices and this is the chief object of magnificence for this reason magnificence is connected with holiness since its chief effect is directed to religion or holiness third article whether the matter of magnificence is great expenditure objection one it seems that the matter of magnificence is not great expenditure for there are not two virtues about the same matter but liberality is about expenditure as stated above in question 117 article 2 therefore magnificence is not about expenditure objection two further every magnificent man is liberal according to ethics 4 to but liberality is about gifts rather than about expenditure therefore magnificence also is not chiefly about expenditure but about gifts objection three further it belongs to magnificence to produce an external work but not even great expenditure is always the means of producing an external work for instance when one spends much in sending presents therefore expenditure is not the proper matter of magnificence objection four further only the rich are capable of great expenditure but the poor are able to possess all the virtues since the virtues do not necessarily require external fortune but are sufficient for themselves as Seneca says in on anger one and on the blessed life sixteen therefore magnificence is not about great expenditure on the contrary the philosopher says in ethics 4 to that magnificence does not extend like liberality to all transactions in money but only to expensive ones wherein it exceeds liberality in scale therefore it is only about great expenditure I answer that as stated above in article 2 it belongs to magnificence to intend doing some great work now for the doing of a great work proportionate expenditure is necessary for great works cannot be produced without great expenditure hence it belongs to magnificence to spend much in order that some great work may be accomplished in becoming manner where for the philosopher says in ethics 4 to that a magnificent man will produce a more magnificent work with equal that is proportionate expenditure now expenditure is the outlay of a sum of money and a man may be hindered from making that outlay if you love money too much hence the matter of magnificence may be said to be both this expenditure itself which the magnificent man uses to produce a great work and also the very money which he employs in going to great expense and as well as the love of money which love the magnificent man moderates lest he be hindered from spending much reply to objection 1 as stated above in question 129 article 2 those virtues that are about external things experience a certain difficulty arising from the genus itself of the thing about which the virtue is concerned and another difficulty besides arising from the greatness of that same thing hence the need for two virtues concerned about money and its use namely liberality which regards the use of money in general and magnificence which regards that which is great in the use of money reply to objection 2 the use of money regards the liberal man in one way and the magnificent man in another for it regards the liberal man in as much as it proceeds from an ordinate affection in respect of money where for all due use of money such as gifts and expenditure the obstacles to which are removed by a moderate love of money belongs to liberality the use of money regards the magnificent man in relation to some great work which has to be produced and this use is impossible without expenditure or outlay reply to objection 3 the magnificent man also makes gifts of presence as stated in ethics 4, 2 but not under the aspect of gift but rather under the aspect of expenditure directed to the production of some work for instance in order to honour someone or in order to do something which will reflect honour on the whole state as when he brings to effect what the whole state is striving for reply to objection 4 the chief actor virtue is the inward choice and a virtue may have this without outward fortune so that even a poor man may be magnificent but goods of fortune are requisite as instruments to the external acts of virtue and in this way a poor man cannot accomplish the outward act of magnificence in things that are great simply perhaps however he may be able to do so in things that are great by comparison to some particular work which though little in itself can nevertheless be done magnificently in proportion to its genus for little and great are relative terms as the philosopher says 4 article whether magnificence is a part of fortitude objection 1 it seems that magnificence is not a part of fortitude for magnificence agrees in matter with liberality as stated above in article 3 but liberality is a part not afforded to but of justice therefore magnificence is not a part of fortitude objection 2 further fortitude is about fear and daring but magnificence seems to have nothing to do with fear but only with expenditure which is a kind of action therefore magnificence seems to pertain to justice which is about actions rather than to fortitude objection 3 further the philosopher says in ethics 4 to that the magnificence man is like the man of science now science has more in common with prudence than with fortitude therefore magnificence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude on the contrary Tully and Macrobius and Andronicus reckon magnificence to be a part of fortitude I answer that magnificence in so far as it is a special virtue cannot be reckoned a subjective part of fortitude since it does not agree with this virtue in the point of matter but it is reckoned a part thereof as being annexed to it as a secondary to principal virtue in order for a virtue to be annexed to a principal virtue two things are necessary as stated above in question 80 the one is that the secondary virtue agree with the principal and that the other is that in some respect it be exceeded thereby now magnificence agrees with fortitude in the point that as fortitude tends to something arduous and difficult so also does magnificence where for seemingly it is seated like fortitude in the irrational yet magnificence falls short of fortitude in that the arduous thing to which fortitude tends derives its difficulty from a danger that threatens the person whereas the arduous thing to which magnificence tends derives its difficulty from the dispossession of one's property which is of much less account than danger to one's person where for magnificence is accounted a part of fortitude reply to objection one justice regards operations in themselves as viewed under the aspect of something do but liberality and magnificence regard sumptuary operations as related to the passions of the soul in different ways for liberality regards expenditure in reference to the love and desire of money which are passions of the concupisable faculty and do not hinder the liberal man from giving and spending so that this virtue is in the concupisable on the other hand magnificence regards expenditure in reference to hope by attaining to the difficulty not simply as magnanimity does but in a determinate matter namely expenditure where for magnificence like magnanimity is apparently in the irascible part reply to objection two although magnificence does not agree with fortitude in matter it agrees with it as the condition of its matter since it tends to something difficult in the matter of expenditure even as fortitude tends to something difficult in the matter of fear reply to objection three magnificence directs the use of art to something great as stated above and in the preceding article now art is in the reason where for it belongs to the magnificent man to use his reason by observing proportion of expenditure to the work he has in hand this is especially necessary on account of the greatness of both those things since even if he did not take careful thought he would incur the risk of great loss end of question 134 read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert LC question 135 triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of fortitude all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of fortitude by Saint Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question 135 of meanness translators note or doing mean things just as is doing great things we must now consider the vices opposed to magnificence under which had there are two points of inquiry first whether meanness is a vice second of the vice opposed to it first article whether meanness is a vice objection one it seems that meanness is not a vice for justice vice moderates great things so does it moderate little things where for both the liberal and the magnificent do little things but magnificence is a virtue therefore likewise meanness is a virtue rather than a vice objection to further the philosopher says in ethics 42 that careful reckoning is a mean but careful reckoning is apparently praiseworthy since man's good is to be in accordance with reason is Dionysius states in On the Divine Names 44 therefore meanness is not a vice objection three further philosopher says in ethics 4 to that a mean man is loth to spend money but this belongs to covetousness or illiberality therefore meanness is not a distinct vice from the others I answer that as stated above in the parts prima secunde question one article three and question 18 article six moral acts take their species from their end therefore in many cases they are dominated from that end accordingly a man is said to be mean because he intends to do something little now according to the philosopher great and little are relative terms and when we say that a mean man intends to do something little this must be understood in relation to the kind of work he does this may be little or great in two ways in one way as regards the work itself to be done in another as regards the expense accordingly the magnificent man intends principally the greatness of his work and secondarily he intends the greatness of the expense which he does not shirk so that he may produce a great work as the philosopher says in ethics 4 for that the magnificent man with equal expenditure will produce a more magnificent result on the other hand the mean man intends principally to spend little where for the philosopher says in ethics 4 to that he seeks how he may spend least as a result of this he intends to produce a little work he does not shrink from producing a little work so long as he spends little where for the philosopher says that the mean man after going to great expense forfeits the good of the magnificent work for the trifle that he is unwilling to spend therefore it is evident that the mean man fails to observe the proportion that reason demands between expenditure and work now the essence of vice is that it consists in failing to do what is in accordance with reason hence it is manifest that meanness is a vice reply to objection one virtue moderates little things according to the rule of reason from which rule the mean man declines as stated in the article for he is called mean not for moderating little things but for declining from the rule of reason in moderating great or little things hence meanness is a vice reply to objection 2 as the philosopher says in rhetoric 2 5 fear makes us take counsel where for a mean man is careful in his reckonings because he has an inordinate fear of spending his goods even in things of the least account hence this is not praiseworthy but sinful and reprehensible because then a man does not regulate his affections according to reason but on the contrary makes use of his reason in pursuance of his inordinate affections reply to objection 3 just as the magnificent man has this in common with the liberal man and with pleasure so to the mean man in common with the illiberal or covetous man is loth and slow to spend yet they differ in this that illiberality regards ordinary expenditure while meanness regards great expenditure which is a more difficult accomplishment where for meanness is less sinful than illiberality hence the philosopher says in ethics 4 2 that although meanness and its contrary vice are sinful they do not bring shame on a man since neither do they harm one's neighbor nor are they very disgraceful second article whether there is a vice opposed to meanness objection 1 it seems that there is no vice opposed to meanness for great meanness is opposed to little now magnificence is not a vice but a virtue therefore no vice is opposed to meanness objection 2 further since meanness is a vice by deficiency as stated above in article 1 it seems that if any vice is opposed to meanness you would merely consist in excessive spending but those who spend much where they ought to spend little spend little where they ought to spend much according to ethics 4 2 and thus they have something of meanness therefore there is not a vice opposed to meanness objection 3 further moral acts take their species from their end as stated above in article 1 now those who spend excessively do so in order to make a show of their wealth as stated in ethics 4 2 but this belongs to vain glory which is opposed to magnanimity as stated above in question 131 article 2 therefore no vice is opposed to meanness on the contrary stands the authority of the philosopher who in ethics 2 8 and 4 2 places magnificence as a mean between two opposite vices I answer that great is opposed to little also little and great are relative terms as stated above in article 1 now just as expenditure may be little in comparison with the work so may it be great in comparison with the work in that it exceeds the proportion which reason requires to exist between expenditure and work hence it is manifest but the vice of meanness whereby a man intends to spend less than his work is worth and thus fails to observe due proportion between his expenditure and his work has a vice opposed to it whereby a man exceeds the same proportion by spending more than is proportionate to his work this vice is called in Greek so called from the Greek Baunos because like the fire in the furnace it consumes everything it is also called apirocalia that is lacking good fire since like fire it consumes all but not for a good purpose hence in Latin it may be called consumptio waste reply to objection 1 magnificence is so called from the great work done by expenditure being in excess of the work for this belongs to the vice which is opposed to meanness reply to objection 2 to the one same vice there is opposed the virtue which observes the mean and a contrary vice accordingly then the vice of waste is opposed to meanness in that it exceeds in expenditure the value of the work by spending much where it be hooved to spend little but it is opposed to magnificence on the part of the great work which the magnificent man intends principally insofar as when it be hooves to spend much it spends little or nothing reply to objection 3 wastefulness is opposed to meanness by the very species of its act since it exceeds the rule of reason whereas meanness falls short of it yet nothing hinders this from being directed to the end of another vice such as vain glory or any other End of question 135 Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert LC Question 136 of summa theologica Triates on the cardinal virtues This is a LibriVox recording Recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Summa theologica Secunda Secunde Triates on the Cardinal Virtues The Virtue of Fortitude by St. Thomas Aquinas Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province Question 136 of patience in five articles We must now consider patience under this head there are five points of inquiry First, whether patience is a virtue Second, whether it is the greatest of the virtues Third, whether it can be had without grace Fourth, whether it is a part of fortitude Whether it is the same as longanimity First article, whether patience is a virtue Objection 1 It seems that patience is not a virtue For the virtues are most perfect in heaven as Augustine says in on the Trinity 14 Yet patience is not there since no evils have to be born there Isaiah 49.10 and Apocalypse 7.16 They shall not hunger nor thirst nor shall the heat nor the sun strike them Therefore, patience is not a virtue Objection 2 further No virtue can be found in the wicked since virtue it is that makes its possessor good Yet patience is sometimes found in wicked men For instance, in the covetous who bear many evils patiently that they may amass money according to Ecclesiastes 5.16 All the days of his life he eateth in darkness and in many cares and in misery and in sorrow Therefore patience is not a virtue Objection 3 further The fruits differ The virtues as stated above in the Parse Prima Secundae Question 70 article 1 third reply But patience is reckoned among the fruits according to Galatians 5.22 Therefore patience is not a virtue On the contrary, Augustine says in on patience 1 The virtue of the soul that is called patience is so great that we even preach the patience of him who bestows it upon us I answer that as stated above in question 123 article 1 The moral virtues are directed to the good in as much as they safeguard the good of reason against the impulse of the passions Now among the passions sorrow is strong to hinder the good of reason according to 2 Corinthians 7.10 The sorrow of the world worketh death and Ecclesiasticus 30.25 Sadness hath killed many and there is no profit in it Hence the necessity for a virtue to safeguard the good of reason against sorrow lest reason give way to sorrow and this patience does Wherefore Augustine says in on patience 2 A man's patience it is whereby he bears evil with an equal mind that is without being disturbed by sorrow lest he abandon with an unequal mind the goods whereby he may advance to better things It is therefore evident that patience is a virtue reply to Objection 1 The moral virtues do not remain in heaven as regards the same act that they have on the way in relation namely to the goods of the present life which will not remain in heaven but they will remain in the relation to the end which will be in heaven Thus justice will not be in heaven in relation to buying and selling and other matters pertaining to the present life but it will remain in the point of being subject to God and like manner the act of patience in heaven will not consist in bearing things but in enjoying the goods to which we had aspired by suffering Hence Augustine says in on the city of God 14 that patience itself will not be in heaven since there is no need for it except where evils have to be born yet that which we shall obtain by patience will be eternal Reply to Objection 2 on Patience 2 and 5 Properly speaking those are patient who would rather bear evils without inflicting them than inflict them without bearing them as for those who bear evils that they may inflict evil their patience is neither marvellous nor praiseworthy for it is no patience at all We may marvel at their hardness of heart but we must refuse to call them patient. Reply to Objection 3 As stated above in the Paris Prima Secunde question 11 article 1 The very notion of fruit denotes pleasure and works a virtue afford pleasure in themselves as stated in Ethics 1.8 Now the names of the virtues are want to be applied to their acts where for patience as a habit is a virtue pleasure which its act affords it is reckoned a fruit especially in this that patience safeguards the mind from being overcome by sorrow. 2nd article Whether patience is the greatest of the virtues Objection 1 it seems that patience is the greatest of the virtues for in every genus that which is perfect is the greatest patience hath a perfect work according to James 1.4 Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues. Objection 2 further All the virtues are directed to the good of the soul Now this seems to belong chiefly to patience for it is written in Luke 21 19 In your patience you shall possess your souls patience is the greatest of the virtues Objection 3 further seemingly that which is the safeguard and cause of other things is greater than they are but according to Gregory in his homily 35 on the Gospel patience is the root and safeguard of all the virtues. Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues It is not reckoned among the four virtues which Gregory in his commentary on Job 22 and Augustine in of the morals of the Catholic Church and on the morals of the Manichaeans 15 call principle I answer that virtues by their very nature are directed to good for it is virtue that makes its possessor good and renders the latter's work good according to ethics 26 Hence it follows that a virtues superiority and preponderance over other virtues is the greater according as it inclines man to good more effectively and directly Now those virtues which are effective of good incline a man more directly to good than those which are a check on the things which lead man away from good and just as among those that are effective of good the greater is that which establishes man in a greater good thus faith hope and charity are greater than prudence and justice so too among those that are a check on things that withdraw man from good the greater virtue is the one which is a check on a greater obstacle to good but dangers of death about which is fortitude and pleasures of touch with which temperance is concerned with draw man from good more than fortitude and pleasures of touch with draw man from good more than any kind of hardship which is the object of patience therefore patience is not the greatest of the virtues but false short not only of the theological virtues and of prudence and justice which directly establish man in good but also of fortitude and temperance which withdraw him from greater obstacles to good reply to objection one patience is said to have a perfect work in bearing hardships for these give rise first to sorrow which is moderated by patience secondly to anger which is moderated by meekness thirdly to hatred which charity removes to unjust injury which justice forbids now that which removes the principle is the most perfect yet it does not follow if patience be more perfect in this respect that it is more perfect simply reply to objection two possession denotes undisturbed ownership where for man is said to possess his soul by patience insofar as it removes by the root the passions that are evoked by hardships and disturb the soul reply to objection three patience is said to be the root and safeguard of all the virtues not as though it caused and preserved them directly but merely because it removes their obstacles third article whether it is possible to have patience without grace objection one it seems that it is possible to have patience without grace for the more his reason inclines to a thing the more is it possible for the rational creature to accomplish it now it is more reasonable to suffer evil for the sake of good than for the sake of evil yet some suffer evil for evil's sake by their own issue and without the help of grace for Augustin says in on patience three that men endure many toils and sorrows for the sake of the things they love sinfully much more therefore is it possible for man without the help of grace to bear evil for the sake of good and this is to be truly patient objection to further some who are not in a state of grace have more abhorrence for sinful evils than for bodily evils hence some heathens are related to have endured many hardships rather than betray their country or commit some other misdeed now this is to be truly patient therefore it seems that it is possible to have patience without the help of grace objection three further it is quite evident that some go through much trouble and pain in order to regain health of the body now the health of the soul is not less desirable than bodily health therefore in like manner one may without the help of grace endure many evils for the health of the soul and this is to be truly patient on the contrary it is written in Psalm 61 verse six from him that is from God is my patience I answer that as Augustine says in on patience four the strength of desire helps a man to bear toil and pain and no one willingly undertakes to bear what is painful save for the sake of that which gives pleasure the reason of this is because sorrow and pain are of themselves displeasing to the soul never choose to suffer them for their own sake but only for the sake of an end hence it follows that the good for the sake of which one is willing to endure evils is more desired and loved than the good the privation of which causes the sorrow that we bear patiently now the fact that a man prefers the good of grace to all natural goods the loss of which may cause sorrow is to be referred to charity which loves God above all things hence it is evident that patience as a virtue is caused by charity according to first Corinthians 13 4 charity is patient but it is manifest that it is impossible to have charity saved through grace according to Romans 5 5 the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost who is given to us therefore it is clearly impossible to have patience without the help of grace reply to objection one the inclination of reason would prevail in human nature in the state of integrity but in corrupt nature the inclination of concupiscence prevails because it is dominant in man hence man is more prone to bear evils for the sake of the goods in which the concupiscence delights here and now than to endure evils for the sake of goods to come which are desired in accordance with reason and yet it is this that pertains to true patience reply to objection two the good of a social virtue is commensurate with human nature and consequently the human will contend without the help of sanctifying grace yet not without the help of God's grace on the other hand the good of grace is supernatural where for man cannot tend there too by a natural virtue hence the comparison fails reply to objection three even the endurance of those evils which a man bears for the sake of his body's health proceeds from the love a man naturally has for his own flesh hence there is no comparison between this endurance and patience which proceeds from a supernatural love fourth article whether patience is a part of fortitude objection one it seems that patience is not a part of fortitude for a thing is not a part of itself now patience is apparently the same as fortitude because as stated above in question 123 article 6 the proper act of fortitude is to endure and this belongs also to patience for it is stated in st. Gregory homily 35 that patience consists in enduring evils inflicted by others therefore patience is not a part of fortitude objection to further fortitude is about fear and daring as stated above in question 123 article 3 and thus it is in the irascible but patience seems to be about sorrow and consequently would seem to be in the concupisable therefore patience is not a part of fortitude but of temperance objection three further the whole cannot be without its part therefore if patience is a part of fortitude there can be no fortitude without patience yet sometimes a brave man does not endure evils patiently but even attacks the person who inflicts the evil therefore patience is not a part of fortitude on the contrary tully in on the art of rhetoric to reckon zits a part of fortitude I answer that patience is a casy potential part of fortitude because it is a next there too as secondary to principle virtue for it belongs to patience to suffer with an equal mind the evils inflicted by others as Gregory says in a homily now of those evils that are inflicted by others foremost and most difficult to endure are those that are connected with the danger of death and about these evils fortitude is concerned and it is clear that in this matter fortitude has the principal place and that it lays claim to that which is principal in this matter where for patience is a next to fortitude as secondary to principle virtue for which reason prosper calls patience brave in his sentences 811 reply to objection one not anything indeed but that which is most difficult to endure namely dangers of death whereas it may pertain to patience to endure any kind of evil reply to objection two the act of fortitude consists not only in holding fast to good against the fear of future dangers but also in not failing through sorrow or pain occasioned by things present and it is in the latter respect that patience is akin to fortitude yet fortitude is chiefly about fear which of itself evokes flight which fortitude avoids while patience is chiefly about sorrow for a man is said to be patient not because he does not fly but because he behaves in a praiseworthy manner by suffering patiendo things which hurt him here and now in such a way as not to be inordinately saddened by them hence fortitude is properly in the irascible while patience is in the concupisable faculty nor does this hinder patience from being part of fortitude because the annexing of virtue to virtue does not regard the subject but the matter or the form nevertheless patience is not to be reckoned a part of temperance although both are in the concupisable because temperance is only about those sorrows that are opposed to pleasures of touch such as a rise through abstinence from pleasures of food and sex whereas patience is chiefly about sorrows inflicted by other persons moreover it belongs to temperance to control these sorrows besides their contrary pleasures whereas it belongs to patience that a man forsake not the good of virtue on account of such like sorrows however great they be reply to Objection 3 he granted that patience in a certain respect is an integral part of justice if we consider the fact that a man may patiently endure evils pertaining to dangers of death and it is from this point of view that the Objection argues nor is it inconsistent with patience that a man should when necessary rise up against the man who inflicts evils on him for Chrysostom says on p. 2410 be gone Satan that it is praiseworthy to be patient under our wrongs but to endure God's wrongs patiently is most wicked and Augustine says in a letter to Marcellinus is letter 138 that the precepts of patience are not opposed to the good of the commonwealth since in order to endure that good we fight against our enemies but in so far as patience regards all kinds of evils it is annexed to fortitude as secondary to principle virtue 5th article whether patience is the same as long anonymity translators note long suffering it is necessary to preserve the Latin word on account of the comparison with magnanimity Objection 1 it seems that patience is the same as long anonymity for Augustine says on patience 1 that we speak of patience in God not as though any evil made him suffer but because he awaits the wicked that they may be converted where for it is written in Ecclesiasticus 5 4 the most high is a patient rewarder therefore it seems that patience is the same as long anonymity Objection 2 further the same thing is not contrary to two things but in patience is contrary to long anonymity whereby one awaits a delay for one is said to be impatient of delay as of other evils therefore it seems that patience is the same as long anonymity Objection 3 further just as time is a circumstance of wrongs endured so is place but no virtue is distinct from patience on the score of place therefore in like manner long anonymity which takes count of time in so far as a person waits for a long time is not distinct from patience on the contrary a gloss on Romans 2.4 or despisest thou the riches of his goodness and patience and long suffering says it seems that long anonymity differs from patience because those who offend from weakness rather than of said purpose are said to be born with long anonymity while those who take a deliberate delight in their crimes patiently I answer that just as by magnanimity a man has a mind to tend to great things so by long anonymity a man has a mind to tend to something a long way off wherefore as magnanimity regards hope which tends to good rather than daring fear or sorrow which have evil as their object so also does long anonymity hence long anonymity has more in common with magnanimity than with patience nevertheless it may have something in common with patience for two reasons first because patience like fortitude injures certain evils for the sake of good and if this good is awaited shortly endurance is easier whereas if it be delayed a long time it is more difficult secondly because the very delay of the good we hope for is of a nature to cause sorrow according to Proverbs 1312 hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul hence there may be patience in bearing this trial as in enduring any other sorrows accordingly long anonymity and constancy are both comprised under patience in so far as both the delay of the hope for good which regards long anonymity and the toil which man endures in persistently accomplishing a good work which regards constancy may be considered under the one aspect of grievous evil for this reason Tully in on the art of rhetoric in defining patience says that patience is the voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous and difficult things for the sake of virtue or profit by saying arduous he refers to constancy in good when he says difficult he refers to the grievousness of evil which is the proper object of patience when he says continued or long lasting he refers to long anonymity in so far as it has something in common with patience this suffices for the replies to the first and second objections reply to objection three that which is a long way off as to place though distant from us is not simply distant from things in nature it is a long time hence the comparison fails moreover what is remote as to place offers no difficulty save in the point of time since what is placed a long way from us is a long time coming to us we grant the fourth argument we must observe however that the reason for the difference assigned by this gloss is that it is hard to bear with those who sin through weakness merely because they persist for a long time in evil therefore it is said that they are born with long anonymity whereas the very fact that sinning through pride seems to be unendurable for which reason those who sin through pride are stated to be born with patience Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC