 Wel, hi allan, a'r cymdeithas yn amlifio gweld gwneud, dwi'n cael ei wneud yn fwy o'r bwysig o ein bod yn cael ei chynig fath, yn gweithio'r pan gyda'r gyffredin ac yn ymddangos fel y pan. A'n mynd i'n gweithio'r pan gyffredin y cyffredin, fel yr Rhon. Dwi'n rhiwnau ymddydd, wrth gwrs, mae'n gweithio'n gweithio'n gyffredin, So, let's try and make this a really fun session. We want audience participation, we want some good questions, we want a disagreement, we don't want just another staged, earnest debate. Secondly, this is a really interesting topic because I would bet that most people who come to Davos from the corporate world do so because they have to go back to their colleagues and essentially say, and by the way, someone might want to give me a handheld because this is not a very good mic, they want to know basically, is growth going to be good or bad this year, up or down, should we be optimistic or pessimistic? And in fact, the World Economic Forum put out a great report which is Chief Economist Outlook, those of you behind me can see that too, which basically is really pretty darn gloomy. Two thirds of respondents consider a global recession to be likely in 2023, including 18% who consider it extremely likely more than twice as many as in the previous survey in September 2022. But what we're going to be talking about today is actually getting beyond the short-term outlook and trying to understand what's happening in terms of the bigger structural trends and asking the really critical question, is high growth essentially a thing of the past, is it unachievable, is there any way for us to kickstart the type of post-war boom we saw in the West and actually have serious growth in the coming years? We have an amazing panel of people to talk about it. Tom and Sean McGrathenam has taken me years to practice saying his name, years for me to practice saying his name smoothly, who's a senior minister, government of Singapore, but also someone who has done remarkable work trying to knit together different perspectives around the world through various international forums and get a wider vision and view of where the world's going. Next to him is Mary Callan-Urddor, chief executive officer of the Asset Management and Wealth Division of JPMorgan in the US. On my left is Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance in Neverlands, who I believe is celebrating your first year in office, you made it, congratulations. You're clearly doing something right, whatever the growth outlook. And at the end is Larry Summers, who is professor of economics at Harvard Kennedy School of Government and a man who has been a luminary on the economic stage for many years and has a lot to say about secular stagnation. So great panel, let's start with you, Taman. Do you think that rapid growth is a thing of the past? And how would you frame where we are today? Mackenzie came out with a very interesting report early this week, which I wrote a column about, which basically argued that there have been three main phases of the political economy since 1945. There was the post-war boom, which stopped in 1979, the age of contention that stopped in 1971, 89, and then the era of markets, which they think stopped in 2019, the end of the neoliberal order. Do you think we're in a new phase now? I think we know we are in a new phase and we've got to have some clarity to frame economic policy. Fundamentally, I think we are no longer at a phase where the principal preoccupation of economic policy makers is to manage a business cycle and a business cycle that's just laid over some sort of secular growth path that's reasonably predictable. I think we are now in a world that has to be framed around shocks that are not just random or stochastic, but shocks that are systematically part of the landscape and that are intensifying in frequency and scale and impact. The reasons we understand have to do with the breaching of the planetary boundaries and the fact that pandemics are now baked into the system. So it's a world of shocks, and if you think of it that way, which is very different from 70 years of very sensible Keynesian thinking about the tasks of economic policy, it's fundamentally, especially about fiscal policy more than monetary, but how do we not just respond to shocks when they happen because you run out of money very quickly, you can't keep doing what we did in COVID. How do we invest ahead of time to anticipate, pre-empt, prevent where possible, but usually try to just mitigate shocks? How do we do it? What are the public goods that we now need to refocus on? And that in a context of an era of normal interest rates, possibly high for a while, but does mean you have to think very hard about prioritisation within fiscal policy. What is the role of fiscal policy? Just go back to basics now in a world of shocks where we need to invest, to anticipate and prevent, and how much buffer do you need in normal times because crises will happen? So that is quite a different vision of the role of policymakers from what we had 20, 30 years ago. It's suggesting in some ways government is now essentially a firefighter much of the time and having to prepare for that. More than a firefighter because that implies you just wait for crises to happen, how do you anticipate? Because these aren't random events. We may not know exactly when the next pandemic comes, we may not know when the next extreme weather event comes, but we know it's coming and we know it will intensify and it will get more frequent. So that's a new world. So Larry, would you agree and how would you see that meshing or not meshing with your vision of secular stagnation? I'd say three things. First, I've devoted much of my life, Governor Corotah has devoted much of his life to there being better fiscal and monetary policies. And it's hugely important to get those policies right. And if you get them wrong, there can be catastrophic consequences that we've seen at many intervals. But no matter how brilliantly fiscal and monetary policy are gauged, that is not enough to make the world prosperous and successful. And so there are things that are ultimately more important. And I think that you can make a long list or you can make a short list. I'd make two, and those are my other two points. One is the global system needs to do much better at global security. And that's what Tarman emphasized. We need to be proactive, not reactive. The odds that there will be another COVID within the next 15 years are, I believe, better than 50%. And I believe the world is currently woefully underprepared. My overwhelming reaction to the IMF World Bank meetings last fall was that fires were burning in many different directions and that the fire department was still in the station. And so can we achieve a set of international institutions that are fit for purpose with respect to these global security challenges? That's one major challenge on which I think history will judge the statesmen of this era. I think the second major challenge on which history will judge the statesmen of this era is did we respond to the information technology revolution well? You know, there's a broad reading of history that we went from agriculture to industry in the 60 years between, choose it, 1880 and 1940. And there are two ways of reading that history. But I think the right way to read that history is ultimately there were jobs for everyone, ultimately the world got to be a vastly better place. But because we responded slowly, there were two world wars and a depression. And so it drove enormous progress, but not without enormous dislocation and pain. I am convinced that what's happening with information technology, what's happening with data science, what's happening with artificial intelligence is as profoundly as important. As the industrial revolution. And the question is, are we going to adapt the ways in which governments make public investments, the ways in which governments prepare their citizen race, the ways in which governments support the necessary transitions? And how quickly are we going to do that? To what extent are we going to be ahead and to what extent are we going to be behind? I think the lesson, the broad lesson of history is that there's no engine of progress comparable to the combination of science and markets, science technology and markets. But also that if those are not managed well by governments, the consequences, the dislocations, the catastrophes can be epic. And what history will judge the next generation of policymakers on is do they manage that well within countries and across countries? And of course success in the one endeavor will very much affect the success of the other endeavor. Right. Well, that's certainly throwing down the gauntlet to the policymakers. We have one on the platform, the podium with us. I mean, from your perspective, would you agree with Taman that the role of governments is changing in this new era that essentially you're having to prepare to manage series of rolling shocks? And do you think you can rise to the kind of challenge that Larry laid out of trying to create the framework that can let the intersection of science and private sector energy actually flourish or not? I mean, can the Netherlands grow rapidly? Ha ha. Well, that's three questions. I'll count. I would tend to agree with Thurman in terms of the perception and the sensation that we will be faced with a number of shocks, whether it is a new order. I'm not quite sure because we have a role and that brings straight away to the point of what kind of government and what type of governance would we like to see in order to anticipate, as Thurman says, in order to manage or to help channel at best. And how can governments go back to a role of being catalytic agents as opposed to respondents, almost consumers and at best reactive participants? And so I think in the Netherlands we are calibrating and recalibrating the role of government. We've gone from fairly large civil service government. Incidentally, we still keep recruiting, but that's because of labour shortages. To having a recalibration and a re-appreciation of the importance of government taking on public goods and anticipating and investing. We've also done that through the investment choices on climate 10, 15 years ahead, regardless whom we empower. Same of a nitrogen crisis of our own making over the decades. And so I think, yes, shocks, but globally. And of course the asymmetry of shocks and the impact of shocks is what concerns me more. A well-endowed country such as the Netherlands can probably ride the tide most of the time. Except of course we are certain meters below sea level. But other countries cannot and we will be impacted by that as well. So we have a duty of political care more globally as a smaller actor. Now when it comes indeed to the fact, will we be fit for purpose as a government? To be honest, I was thinking, I thought, oh my God. We hardly have the capability and the knowledge in house within government in order to manage the information flow that the level of technology required to assess. Because in order to take on the advice someone provides you, you need to somehow be at an equal par with them. So I think we need to bring in significantly more knowledge from the external community, both business as well as academia. And we need to focus on the investments in research and development. You had an anecdote about the tax offices I think in the US just now. And I was thinking about our tax office. It's no secret in the Netherlands too. Until 26, 27, we cannot introduce changes that are much needed. And that will set us back in order to do just the simple affairs of taxation, deliver a service as well as collect the monies that are owed. So we are all facing, we're in the last century, but we need to leapfrog to the next one. So I think we need to find smarter ways in order to govern more appropriately. Your last question, can we still grow? We have low productivity, but we've got the will, the innovation side by our side. And we of course need to make sure we have the manpower. Now the political question is, would you like to secure it through migration? Do you team up differently or do you apply technology in a smarter manner? But we are also a country which is known to be a part-timing nation. So we have a big ask of bringing people back to the workforce. We are an advanced economy, but I think we will also face a shock of our own making. Sorry, a longer answer, but you gave me three questions. Mary, we talked a lot about government. You are representing the private sector on this panel. And I'm curious, I mean, how do you see the prospects for growth looking forward when you talk to your clients, when you see what your clients are doing? I mean, do you think we are entering a world of stagnation, say in the US? Or is it possible to actually have rapid US growth again? First of all, I think it's great that we're one of the ending panels here. Where we can talk about these things. No, but I mean, it's a very exciting time and it's a very exciting time for all of us to be here. The whole point of Davos is to come together with business and government and philanthropic thoughts so that all the different constituents can come and figure out where's the world going and can any of us make a difference to be able to make it a better place. And so you think about fabulous governments like Singapore that have been the model of how you would start a new government if you were doing that. You think about applying that to places that may have new governments come into place when they escape from war-torn regions, et cetera. I mean, this is a really exciting time. And we look back at what Larry walked us through in terms of the growth of the world. If you take just the US, you think about the 20th century. I mean, it was one of the greatest times for the world in terms of innovation. We had antibiotics. We had the combustion engine. We had electricity. We had computers. We had software. We started global trade towards the end of it. And now we're in the benefits of those things. And the question is what happens from here and how do we continue to do that? Generally speaking, nations are more productive when they are export nations, not import nations. And so it's the benefit of success you get when you become such a successful country. And then we have globalization. You start importing lower cost of labor and parts from other parts of the world. And all of a sudden you've seen places like the United States stabilize, I would say, in terms of productivity. So there's new exciting things you need to do and you need to lean into it. If you just look across all the panels that have been out there for the past several days, climate tech, exciting ways to make the world a better place. These are all fabulous areas to innovate, to invest, and I think we can do it. If we're relying on the governments to be able to prevent or think about what's going to happen with the next pandemic or the next crisis that happens, I don't think we should rely on government or business or philanthropies to do it on their own. I think that's why we all have to come together to be able to think about this. What was being referred to back in the Green Room was a discussion we were having about the inefficiencies of some governments like the United States, where we have areas of lack of investment in terms of just even computer cloud-based systems to be able to be working in a modernized world. But when you bring business together with it, all of a sudden you get better outcomes and you can figure out how to do that. So I think that's the most important thing. But when we think about productivity, what are we trying to answer? There's always the question that I have, which is we have a quarter of a million people that work for us at JPMorgan Chase. So I care about the employees inside the company. When you think about wage growth across just the United States of America, real wage growth over the past 40 years is 12%. That's real wage growth. Real S&P growth over that same 40 years is 2700%. So together we have to think about what kind of growth are we looking for. We need to grow the ability for people to live better lives and then it gets into this collective nature of what you're referring to, which is the wealthy nations of the world can afford lots of things. How do we collectively come together to help the whole world get to a better place? A lot of people would say that's down to too much financialization and capital having too much power at the expense of labour, which is another whole debate. Taman, when you look at the issue of technology, does that give you any more optimism about where we're heading? I think to latch on to Larry's long sweep, ultimately economic development and growth is about how labour and citizens are deployed in an economy. I always like looking at the advanced countries all developing through an economic development lens. Arthur Lewis got his Nobel Prize for a simple but profound insight, which is that economic development starts when you take surplus labour or underemployed labour from what at that time was a non-capitalist sector, but basically it was low value agriculture, shifts them into manufacturing, and increasingly it was about export manufacturing. That's what happened. But Arthur Lewis's point was that it doesn't last forever. At some point you run out of surplus labour and underemployed labour and you reach a turning point, which we call the Lewisian turning point. I think the world as a whole is now at a Lewisian turning point because the US, Europe and East Asia, China being the largest new component of that surplus labour, have already entered the workforce, are already now deployed in more urban and semi-urban settings in manufacturing and modern services, and we've reached the turning point. This has two fundamental implications. First, the deflation impetus of being able to tap on that large reservoir of labour globally is more or less over. It's still there in India, it's still there in Sub-Saharan Africa, and they still have to go through a Lewisian movement of sorts, but globally we've reached a turning point. Then the real question therefore is, how do you grow through productivity growth within sectors, not just by allocating labour differently across sectors, how do you grow productivity within sectors? But Larry's point is how do you do it in a way that also creates jobs across the spectrum of your citizenry? That's a real challenge because what we're really seeing now is a bit of a reverse Lewisian movement where instead of labour moving on to something that's higher productivity for better jobs, you're getting a displacement of labour from what are becoming extraordinarily productive industries. The whole issue of distributing jobs around an economy that matches the way in which value is being created in manufacturing and services is now a whole new policy issue. But Lewis did not live in a world of chat GBT. I mean that quite seriously because in some ways if you're running out of human workers there is no limit to the robots or not when you have all those Silicon Valley geeks and Chinese geeks involved. So I'm curious, does that change the equation? I mean because a country like Japan, with Corona-san sitting behind me, hovering over my back, but a country like Japan fascinates me because it has in many ways, it's the leading edge of the kind of demographic shock that we're going to have across the Western world and yet Japan's also one of the few countries in the world that really loves robots. You do not get workers complaining about robots because they know they need them. And I'm curious, is that going to change the paradigm? Larry, are you going to learn to love your robots? I try. Look, there are two different views and I don't think anybody can know what's right about all of this. One view is that we're going to be a labor short world and robots are going to replace and robots are going to help and it's all going to be immensely positive. The other view is that the people in this room are going to be vastly enabled by robots and information technology that we're going to have far more leverage that JP Morgan is still going to need Mary but that robots are going to do a large amount of what middle managers and low grade accountants and white collar workers do. And so the shareholders of JP Morgan and Mary are going to be enormous beneficiaries of it but the vast majority of our fellow citizens are going to be losers from it and that they're going to get mad and create political strain. In many ways, that's the way to understand the plus and the minus of the industrial revolution and the dislocations that took place. I don't think we know yet what the answer is going to be with respect to a lot of what's happening in information technology. I like to think about the optimistic examples. I have a wonderful, extraordinarily intelligent and capable assistant who's not that great at spelling. That is in your relevance now. It would not have been in your relevance 30 years ago in terms of her capacity to do that. I heard one of the leading AI scientists said at dinner last night, not that many things that stick with you from each Davos but this one will stick with me for quite a while. He said, basically, AI is going to replace a lot of what doctors do because you're going to get all the test results, you report on all the symptoms, you integrate it and you do a diagnosis and the AI will replace what the doctor does long before it will replace what the nurse does holding the patient's hand when the patient is terrified. That's going to be a profound kind of change. Another example is, even at a lower level of skill, it used to be that if you wanted to operate a cash register, you had to be proficient in arithmetic. That's not true anymore because of what technology makes possible. I think the question is going to be to what extent are we going to be able to mobilize these technologies in their positive dimension and to what extent are they going to be things for taking costs out. The other question is going to be how does all this integrate with the service, with the fact that it's kind of over for manufacturing employment. In the United States right now, only 4% of workers are production workers in manufacturing. It used to be 20%. It's most of the way down. Isn't that what we need to fix? Isn't that what the IRA act of the U.S. and now of Europe? Aren't we trying to fix infrastructure because we haven't invested in it, because the average bridge in the United States of America is over 40 years old, because the average dam is 56 years old, because we waste 2 trillion gallons of water every year because of water main breaks that should have been nice drinking water. Now you've got Europe and the U.S. saying, hang on a second, let's fix the infrastructure. Let's do that so that we still invest in the jobs the governments are trying to do that. I showed this chart, which I can't really show because we're not in a chart thing. This is the great country that I live in, the United States of America, high speed rail. All you have to know is that the red is the bottom. That's the United States of America. We have 54 kilometers, it must be millions of kilometers of lines in operation and 192 under construction. That pales in comparison to Poland, Uzbekistan, Turkey and lots of other places that are just like so far in advance. So you can't even get anywhere in the United States of America in a very fast way. So there's lots of things we can do if we actually put our mind to it. Isn't that where government and business come together, which is they're not the right incentives. Now there are, now we've got governments leaning into these things, both in Europe just as recently, I think that was this week if I'm not mistaken. And the U.S. and that's exciting, right? Because then you can get jobs and then you can invest in the A.I. to be able to use it for medicine and healthcare and telemedicine and getting the right answers for the right outcomes in a healthcare situation, which at this point we don't have everywhere in the world as fair as we would like it to be. From a government point of view, when you look at what's happening in, say, A.I. and technology, does that make you think you can boost growth? Or do you see that as something that's simply going to hollow out jobs and actually end up increasing productivity perhaps, but suppressing overall growth? I think there's an opportunity first. There's a duty to sort of expand and enable the space for research development and innovation. We pride ourselves as well in the Netherlands. We do well in all these indices and we have a number of top-notch companies. I mean, ASML is a prominent one, of course, globally known, but there are many others and we need that. We need to be a driver of that and I also think if we look at the future of economic development and change over decades for the Netherlands, that's an area of focus, a sort of truly knowledge and cutting edge economy. But the displacement of jobs, certainly for certain categories of jobs, is probably as old as mankind, but it happens faster, people are ill-prepared, they're certainly more vocal and they feel displaced in more than an economic sense, so social unrest and with that polarisation and growth of certain extreme right-wing parties in particular is also part and parcel of that. So we've also inadvertently created the distance or a gap often between government and its citizens, particularly the ones that feel that this is not my country anymore, whereas my job, whereas my future, how do I fit in is the big question and that's something we need to be able to tailor responses to now and try to bring them along. It's impossible to say to people, wonderful outcomes of AI and technology, but sorry, you're not only part of the working poor because actually capital is always the winner and will still work inequalities on the rise and your job will never provide. And because of productivity gains, we don't see a future for all these areas of jobs where you would have had a natural career progression in. So we need to bring them along and also then change our education system. That's, I think, a big leap. It needs to go hand in hand, but that requires better planning and indeed a government that's on top of it that can actually, I think, outlive the electoral cycles and that's the tough part in democracies where we're often dealt a blow of our own hand that our cycles can be, let's say, at best four years. If you get to be elected, great, but if not, someone else may come along with other priorities. So our planning cycle needs to be multi-multi-year irrespective of which government or political outcomes and that's, I think, a new challenge for many countries in Europe or liberal democracies, I think. Because we're not the type to be centrally planning. Right. Well, I don't think anyone on this panel wants to go back to central planning. Exactly. But we've got a few moments of questions and we have a lot of brain power in the room. It's very hard for me to see who would like to ask questions, but do you want to wave your hand? I believe there are roving microphones. Do we have those? Yeah. Anyone want to jump in with a comment or question? Yes, since you're directly ahead of me, why don't you start? And then, would anyone like to check? Can I, maybe I'll persuade Korodysan to say a few words from a Japanese perspective. Hi, I'm Dr Rai, author of The Value's Compass and from the BBC, and this has been a really brilliant panel, so thank you all. I would say if there's one primary priority, if you were to talk about rapid growth, where would you put your money first? You spoke about infrastructure. All of you have had different priorities, but if there's one that you were collectively to choose, where would you put your money? Thank you. And if you're all going to speak in 30 seconds each. So, I think if you look at the green transition, energy transition and also the greening of entire economies, it's often viewed as a burden and a cost and you pay the cost now and eventually you avoid a much larger cost down the road. It's actually a huge opportunity for growth. So just do a back of the envelope calculation. Let's say we need to invest about 2% of GDP more globally, right? And that's roughly what the estimates are, about 2% of GDP for a long period of time, well beyond 2030. If you use an old workhorse, Harold O'Mar model, let's say an incremental capital output ratio, sorry to use the technical language, or say 4%, you get about 0.5% GDP growth over a long period of time. That's remarkable and in the context of that fiscal policy challenge we have, right? Limited fiscal resources. If we can deploy our energies nationally and collectively to investing in green infrastructure, it has a huge fillip to growth for a long time, but importantly, it also allows for a different distribution of rewards. Think of it within individual countries. It so happens that renewables production is outside of the main cities in Britain and somewhere in the north. In most large countries, it's in the boondocks because that's where the resources are. That's where you have the sunlight, the water, the wind, right? It wasn't suitable for manufacturing. That's why it's so important to live. It gets dark too early in the year. Right. So it has very different distributional implications. And to take the point that was made, just made by Mary, it allows for different types of jobs to be created. Right. So, go green. Yeah. Larry, you got one wish. Institutional innovation costs nothing. I don't know what corporation generally accepted accounting principles. The double blind controlled trial, randomized experiment in development, I could proliferate examples, better institutions that incentivize resources more efficiently is better and more profoundly important than allocating more resources to any particular priority. It would be my example. I actually totally agree with him. Larry's one of the few people that sits at the intersection of having spent so much of his life in government and then in education with Harvard. So he understands that probably better than anyone else. And those businesses are byproduct of getting those two right, just like you said. Do you have a suggestion? No. I would say we have to fix... I would say that's a multiplier effect if you get that right. Okay, Sigur, what would you do? Imagine you had no voters to worry about. No elections. You have one wish. My viewpoint is anyway, if you want to do the right thing in politics, you should not worry about the polls. Otherwise, you'll never get it right. But actually, maybe it's a sort of a Dutch coalition style. Our ambitions already are to go green, to invest heavily on that, because as the future creates jobs, it forces innovation and we need smarter government. But we need an enabling environment, including through legislation, in order to allow us to take quicker decisions. And I think that's also a challenge for all of us. Right. Any more questions or comments from... Right, one over there. Hi, Joe Kenner, presidency of Grayston Bakery and Grayston Foundation in New York. This is probably a question for Mary and Larry. I'm trying to close the gap between this low unemployment rate we have in the U.S., yet we have 10 to 11 million unfilled jobs, two unfilled jobs for every officially unemployed person. How do we close that gap and do you see a challenge and an opportunity cost that we're having here as a country? Larry will know the deeper meaning to what's happened, given that he actually used to create the statistics that give us unemployment reports. So I think that we have a problem with the denominator that he will more eloquently speak about. Let me just give you the real stats on the chase consumer. That's half the consumers in the United States of America. If you start pouring money into their account, okay, the average cash buffer that sits in an account is about 19 days. It is like stubbornly 19 days, year in and year out, good times and bad times. You pour money in post COVID, it went up to 35 days. That's great. Do I need that extra job? Do I need the second job? Do I need a gig job? Not sure. That buffer has come down from 34-ish to 24-ish. It's still above 19. Until you get back to 19, which seems to just be this magical number, you've got people that don't feel like they need to have that extra job or that extra income and so they're not going back into the workforce. The real question is what happens when you get to 19, because we're going to get there this summer at the rate that we're going, and then what happens? Because if you don't have people that want to employ people and these layoffs that we're reading about, which are really just on the edges, start to be real in not only the U.S. economy, but in the global economy, now you run into a problem. All right. Do you want to say something? The real problem, I think, is there's a set of problems with matching the unemployed with the vacancies. The real problem in the United States is not the people who are unemployed. It's the fact that one in eight men between the ages of 25 and 55 professes not to be looking for work. And that is the root of all kinds of problems with families, all kinds of problems with deaths of despair and that problem of alienation is a profound social problem. And the fact that right now, or certainly three months ago, when basically anybody who wanted to get a job could find one, given all the vacancies, the fact that one in eight people were still not working is a profound problem. And just to be clear, I choose men because it's harder to understand why, in most cases, they wouldn't want to be working. But that's just a tip of a broad problem of people who are alienated from a successful society. And truly tragic in every sense. Cwydorosan, I'd love to get some Japanese perspective on this because... Thank you. I'm more interested in medium-term growth perspective. As you may know, Japan had a long deflationary period from 1998 through 2012. During that time, there was no growth, zero growth. But since 2013, deflation has been overcome and growth has come back, but only 1% per annum. The current government intends to raise medium-term potential growth rate to 2% through substantial investment in digital transformation and green transformation. Whether this effort would succeed or not, I don't know. But one concern I have is global fragmentation. Of course, this started particularly since Russia invaded Ukraine. But now the US-China economic relationship is quite critical. And I would like to know, Minister Thamon, on the view about the medium-term future of US-China economic relationship. Of course I know the answer to that. I'm glad he asked that, not me. I will say something as an opener on the topic. I think on the current trajectory of that relationship, particularly with regard to the types of restrictions on economic interdependence and the scale of those restrictions, we are going to end up with not just a zero-sum situation but a negative-sum situation. I think both the US and China will be hurt, which doesn't just mean national entities, it means workforces, people will be hurt. I say that with some confidence. I think a way will have to be found where legitimate national security considerations, given that technology now plays a different role in military capabilities, those considerations can be met in a very confined way without undermining another national security consideration, which is that interdependence creates a more secure world. You just have to imagine what the world would be like if it was decoupled, not just on trips but payments, data, finance, everything. It's a very dangerous world because we're not talking about the Soviet Union of the past. We're talking about China, which one way or another, even if it is hampered and impeded in its progress, is going to be at least the second largest economy. It's already the second largest economy. Maybe it won't overtake the US, no one knows, but it will be the second largest economy in the world. It already has a hundred countries which have it as its largest trading partner. That's not going to change fundamentally. It's going to be a large and influential player. Now, do we want those two largest economies and superpowers to be at fundamental odds with each other? Or do we want them to be able to co-operate in their national interests and the global interests and then to negotiate over thawning issues and to be very tough with each other where issues have to do with unfairness in trade and investment? That's the fundamental national security question, not just an economic prosperity question. I think we don't go on that. You have about ten seconds because we're almost out of time. I think Tarmin is broadly right with respect to the US and China. I think that it would be an enormous and staggering error for the United States to decide that it was its policy to try to suppress Chinese economic growth in the name of our national security. An enormous and staggering error to decide that. I think it is a very difficult problem because I think two things are true with respect to semiconductors and the combination is very painful. Thing one that is true is I don't think we're restricting the export of anything whether it's not a reasonable argument to make that it can contribute substantially to a weapon system. Thing two that is true is only 5% of what we're restricting is actually going to have anything to do with weapon systems. So I think those two facts together say that this problem of export controls is much more difficult than it used to be when we were restricting things that were for guidance systems that didn't also have use in a wide variety of other things. I think most people in the room would thoroughly agree and since we are at a time I would just say very briefly we've not answered the question of whether there is going to be rapid growth in the future but we have laid down a wish list of what we'd like to see which includes green infrastructure, preparation for shocks and a realisation that shocks are going to be frequent and inevitable in the new age, better institutions, smart institutions, a way to use AI and technology that's going to be essentially benefiting all, not just the wealthy, a way to create multi-year planning in democracies with regular elections I don't know how you fix that and last but not least the one we can all agree on what we really need for growth right now is peace. So thank you all very much indeed for a very thought provoking discussion and best of luck to all of you in trying to fight for that. Thank you.