 Today is December 19th, and it is the anniversary of the December Revolution in Sudan. It marks the beginning of protests, which inevitably led to the overthrow of Sudanese dictator Omar al-Bashir in April of 2019. This set off a wave of protests that continued beyond his overthrow, that continued to press for democratic reforms and demands and a democratization of Sudanese society. However, years later Sudan is embroiled in a civil war between two armed forces in the country. To understand what has happened since the December Revolution and how do we get there, I'm happy to be joined by Eugene Perrier, a host of Breakthrough News. Thank you so much for having me. Thanks so much for joining us, Eugene. Well, let's get right into it. I mean, first, again, we're on this momentous anniversary of the December Revolution in Sudan, but before we get into that, what is the situation in the country today? We know there's been months of a very, very bloody civil war, but where does Sudan stand today? Well, right now, Sudan is in an extraordinary crisis, one of the worst humanitarian crises that is existing on the planet today. We've got millions and millions of people have been internally displaced. Many hundreds of thousands have been externally displaced into the surrounding regional countries, in particular Egypt, Chad, also individuals going to Eritrea, to Ethiopia. And it's really running the entire gamut. Hunger is becoming rampant. Disease is starting to sweep through the population in a major way, access to clean water, access to electricity. I mean, these things are at best intermittent and oftentimes unavailable. And of course, it's accompanied by the collapse of many of the critical infrastructure elements that would be able to mitigate this. So the healthcare system in Sudan has been collapsing, and that's due to a number of factors. But principally, the nature of the fighting, all the various economic trades, the cattle industry was one of the biggest exports, gum Arabic, one of the other biggest exports. These industries are collapsing in addition to the problems they had prior to the conflict. And so ultimately, you have the livelihood of millions of people just cannot be carried out. Income is not coming in. The Sudanese currency is collapsing while inflation is continuing to spiral. And then of course, since the country is essentially rent in two more or less, all of the normal flows of commerce have been disrupted. So even to the extent that goods can get into the country, that aid can get into the country, moving it from place to place can be extremely harrowing. And certainly we can see that right now, the city of Wad Medani, which is a Nile River city, it's south of Khartoum. But that is now at the center of the fighting as we speak. But that had been one of the main nodes for aid, people who were leaving Khartoum, Ahmed Amman and Khartoum North going there also from other areas and it had become a place where aid could be both provisioned and shipped out from. And so right now what we are seeing is the division of the country into two broad zones, the RSF, which is one side of it has control of the significant amount of Darfur and some other parts of southern and central Sudan, while the SAF, the armed forces, the so-called internationally recognized government, controls a big chunk of the eastern and the northern part of the country. And really we are entering into almost a Libya-like scenario where you have total state collapse and the division of the country de facto into two separate regimes. And potentially both sides are saying they may try to normalize that reality so it's not in fact de facto. So very difficult situation for Sudan. And it's such a stark contrast to the hope that was brought about in this December revolution, the revolutionary change that was demonstrated by unity of different organizations on the streets. Can you talk a little bit about how really what led to the situation that we're seeing today? How did we get to a situation where the armed forces and the RSF are really at odds from what seemed like a hopeful moment of overcoming a military dictatorship? Well, I think the reality of how we ended up here is very deeply rooted in the collaboration of the United States, the European Union, and the the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, the GCC countries, who all three of which have very significant interest in Sudan. In this case, the Gulf countries, very significant economic interest, as well as regional political interest for the United States and the European Union. There is some economic aspect to it, but also a significant geopolitical interest, in particular from the United States point of view, the fact that whatever its deficiencies, President Bashir's government that was overthrown was a very strong supporter of the Palestinian people, including Hamas, right? So there had been a long running issue between the United States and Sudan. And so what happens in Sudan, what kind of government comes out in Sudan is something that is very important to the countries in the region. And certainly, you know, many of the powerful countries on the international stage as well. So what you saw is that the December Revolution unleashed this massive amount of energy from tens of millions of people organized through resistance committees, neighborhood by neighborhood, by trade unions, by professional associations, and also by radical political parties, the Communist Party, the Arab Socialist Bath Party, and quite frankly, the rank and file of a lot of the major parties at the National Ulma Party and the Democratic Unity Party and others. And so you had really the emergence of this new popular groundswell from the bottom. But what was being demanded by these protests was significantly beyond what international powers and elites wanted to see. And certainly what Sudanese elites wanted to see. So, you know, to fast forward a little bit, the way the issue was resolved and the way Bashir was ultimately deposed is a very significant subset of his own forces just through him overboard. And they decided to essentially cut a deal with powerful countries in the region and internationally to become the anchor of a fake democratization process. And through that process, there was the installation of a so-called civilian government that was 100% committed to the IMF World Bank U.S. imperialist agenda. And when I say that, I mean it actually direct. They did in fact want to pursue IMF World Bank austerity policies inside of Sudan. They did in fact normalize relations with Israel as part of the Abraham Accords in order to gain the favor of these international forces. And the whole, and when you look at what was supposed to be, you know, around the issue of the popular movements, was they were going to establish a legislative council that was going to give voice to those who had been in the streets, you know, surprise, surprise, that in fact never took place. So what you had is after the deposal of Bashir in 2019 was essentially an international imperialist managed process of rearranging the deck chairs in Sudan among elites. And that rearrangement of the deck chairs ultimately meant that some very powerful forces had to be dislodged. So you had something called the Empowerment Removal Committee, for instance, that was set up by these so-called civilians that started trying to dismantle the way the military under Bashir had become key to the economy to unravel that, to shift around different players. So that started to create some issues and some ructions among elites. Then you also had the issue of what was going to happen with the various armed forces, because you had the main armed forces, but then you had these sort of, they're called paramilitaries, but they're really regular militaries like the RSF that were also a part of the security apparatus and had a lot of power, had a lot of influence and certainly had a lot of weapons. So all these various elite figures are like, well, we want to actually be in charge. So first and foremost, the civilian elites, they have no military. So they're just kicked out by these various aspects of these elements of the military who did not want to see the prerogatives of the sort of military industrial complex attacked. And so they launched a coup in 2021 in the fall in order to fully seize power and move out these civilian elites and try to dictate the terms of what the future of Sudan was going to be somewhat unilaterally. But then they had a falling out over who was going to actually be the top dog in Sudan at the end of the transitional period. So the head of the armed forces and the head of the RSF were at odds about who was going to be the top dog. And there's a lot of different attempts to try to bring them together. They did not work. And so they decided to go to war against one another. And that's partially why it's been so bitter, because this is a zero sum game between two elements, the Sudanese elite who are fighting to be the singular head of the country at the end of a transitional process and who are also trying at the same time to heavily suppress the massive grassroots energy so that some of the things that were being demanded free healthcare, free education, significant redistribution of wealth not only from a class perspective, but also from a regional perspective, because most of the wealth in Sudan accrues to the center and not out into the various provinces and into the normalization of Israel, you know, better conditions for rural farmers and so on and so forth. These were the things that the US, the EU, the Gulf countries and all the Sudanese elites did not want. So in sum, they cut a deal in 2019 to prevent that energy from taking over the country. They had a falling out amongst themselves and ultimately launched a coup. That coup led to a further falling out that led to a civil war. And the whole thing is really just because there was no will in the international community to do anything other than to put pressure on the popular movement and prevent them from gaining power. It is unfortunate to see how those setbacks were given to this popular movement, but I think that in order to not end on such a perhaps pessimistic note, I think it would be interesting. Can you just talk a little bit about the significance of this December revolution and this popular movement that you mentioned before, not only these radical demands that people are bringing onto the streets after decades of suppression and repression, but also the new organizational forms. We know that the resistance committees were formed, the Sudanese professional association. We saw so many vibrant and broad alliances built. Can you talk a little bit about what was the hope that was brought forward with the December revolution and what remains of that going forward? I think it's a good question. I think the hope of what took place in December of 2018 and of course over the course of 2019 and 2020 as well was that the Sudanese people would be able to rule themselves. I think sometimes democracy is one of these issues that is incredibly demagogued by the West, but you had a significant number of people in Sudan who recognized the country was very wealthy, that it had a lot to offer to its own people, but it had to be structured in a totally different way. But that was never going to happen as long as there was no process for anyone other than the most elite people to decide what was going on. I think the hope was that this would create the possibility for a new generation of people. It's funny. I remember someone who was against the mass protest movement saying, I think this was in 2021 before the coup, that the biggest problem with Sudan is there are too many people who had gone to college and their hopes were too high. But I think the sort of thing that was sitting behind that is that there was a new generation of youth and young people just all across Africa who wanted to have broad empowerment to actually change the poverty, the deprivation and the marginalization and also one of their country to continue the progressive role it has historically played in the region. And that's certainly as it concerns Palestine without any doubt. I mean, you go back to 1967, the famous three notes from the Khartoum Arab League summit and who I think wanted Sudan to be a beacon for what Africa could be in the 21st century, one that was lifting itself out of poverty, lifting itself up out of neocolonialism. And that was the hope. And it was very hopeful because you had these resistance committees that were building block by block grassroots, but not just building block by block, but bringing people together from all the different political parties. I mean, this is one of the notable factors of it is even the parties whose leaders weren't supporting their rank and file were participating. And so you had this new sort of grassroots bottom up democratic dispensation that was deeply rooted in a vision of social justice, not just sort of pure Western liberal democracy that's devoid of any social content. And that's I think why it was so dangerous. And I don't think that we have seen a total eclipse of that time in that moment. I mean, the resistance committees now have, you know, by and large turned themselves into what I think we would call in the West, quote unquote, mutual aid hubs, and they've become the center of people to people solidarity. You know, what Madonna, which we've already mentioned in this conversation, you know, there, for instance, resistance committees are actually organizing to get gasoline to put in the handful of cars and things that are available for people who want to leave in cartoom and on demand, they're going all across the city and scrounging, you know, every form of medicine they can find, including specialized medicines, you need insulin, you know, you need an inhaler, they're going to go out and try to find one somewhere somehow and bring it back to you. They're actually also engaging in security to try to prevent looting and other things like that, because there's been a collapse in all the state structures. And so even though the political role, of course, has been not only, you know, not just diminished but deliberately suppressed, we still see that they're playing a social role inside of their communities, which I think in of itself, meaning that the resistance committees will be key to regenerating the country at the end of the conflict and, you know, deserve more respect, I think quite frankly, as a political player, which they've been completely denied by almost all of the previous processes that have purported to try to resolve the issue in Sudan. So, you know, I think that there is a lot there. I mean, the Sudanese people are very resilient people. If you look at the history of Sudan, I mean, the people of Sudan are always rising up, you know, and they have a long history of standing up in powerful ways and, you know, really being a leader in Africa and in the Arab world around some of the issues of mass empowerment, anti-imperialism, also socialism and the like, you know, for many years, largest Communist Party in the whole Arab world was in Sudan. So I say all that just to say that I think it's a very difficult time. I think it's a very tricky time. There are many, many very complex divisions in Sudan that are hard to sort through. But I do believe that there is a possibility for a new vision because the old status quo was totally unsustainable. That's what led us here. And the fact that we're in a civil war right now in Sudan is really a sign that trying to reimpose the old status quo is ultimately unsustainable as well. So I think, you know, it's hard to say when the war will end, but I am certainly hopeful that the Sudanese people will be able to chart a course that I think will be very revelatory and very emancipatory, at least in the medium term. Well, thank you for that inspiring and informative update, Eugene, per year of Breakthrough News, co-host of The Freedom Side every Thursday. Thanks so much for joining us, Eugene. Thank you so much for having me.