 In mid-December 1965, the Christmas spirit assumed a tangible form at Tonsonut Air Base, South Vietnam. Here Operation Christmas Star reached a climax as thousands of pounds of Christmas gifts donated by communities and organizations throughout the United States were unloaded from aircraft for distribution to all U.S. forces in South Vietnam. Plains and personnel of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve from states across the nation provided the cargo space for the special airlift. These boxes of Christmas gifts were flown to Vietnam by the C-97 of the California Air National Guard, one of the 82 aircraft which took part in the operation. More than a million pounds of gifts were collected in the United States, with collection and shipment under operational control of the Continental Air Command. Tonnage which could not be accommodated by the 82 programmed flights was scheduled for surface transportation. In Saigon on December 24th, as Christmas Eve approached, there was another expression of the holiday spirit. The scene was the Tong Tin Hock Orphanage and other Saigon children not residents of the orphanage were interested and somewhat wistful spectators. The party officially began as Santa Claus and the person of a U.S. master sergeant arrived carrying a large bundle of toys. He was followed by a cake almost as large. The orphanage had been in existence only two months. Its residents ranged in age from birth to three and one half years, and this was the first Christmas party any of them had ever attended. The hosts were men of a U.S. Army replacement battalion stationed near Saigon. Members of the battalion were voluntarily sponsoring and financing the orphanage with funds collected by payday donations and strategically placed cookie jars. Even the spectators derived a vicarious enjoyment. The party itself was sponsored by the replacement battalion with many of its members acting as volunteer hosts, and they seemed to enjoy it as much as the youngsters. Toys were purchased by men of the battalion who had previously bought the orphanage a stove and refrigerator and were paying the nurses salaries. The battalion chaplain joined in the festivities. This little girl was spoon fed her first taste of ice cream. The party's climax drew near as the chaplain prepared to cut the cake. The cake and the cookies as well were baked by the battalion cooks on their own time. For these tiny guests at their first Christmas party, the payoff would come in the eating. For their hosts, the reward perhaps was even greater. A few days before Christmas at Schofield Barracks in Hawaii, a conference was held by Major General Fred C. Wayand commanding General 25th Infantry Division, Brigadier General Glenn D. Walker, Assistant Division Commander Maneuvers on the left, and Brigadier General Edwin H. DeSaucier, Assistant Division Commander Support on the right. Ted, I get the impression from reading some of this informational traffic that we're getting, as well as the news reports that we may be very close to receiving a deployment order here. And I think we've got a good SOP. We've been through this many times in training exercises, one thing and another. But I believe we ought to review that SOP for deployment. And particularly, get the staff to give us a up-to-minute evaluation of our tactical readiness and our material readiness. I'd like to pay particular attention to these lessons learned in Vietnam. Glenn, what do you think from the tactical side? Are we pretty well up on this? Well, as you know, we placed a great deal of emphasis on lessons learned in Vietnam. So actually, from an operational point of view, I think we're ready. However, we continue to have a small input of replacement, which I think requires that we emphasize small unit tactical frame, the squad and the platoon echelon. Now, this, of course, should include night firing, fire control, and emphasis on the chain of command. Well, I sure agree with that. I think we only have two or three weeks left. There's a tremendous amount that we can do on this story that you're talking about, particularly at that squad and platoon echelon. I'm wondering about the logistics side, Ted. How do you think we can incorporate these things, or are we incorporating them in our plan? I think we are. We've been, as you know, cataloging all the experience that we can lay our hands on by letters and messages from Vietnam. We've been cataloging the things we need, both in the TO&E category, where we need increases on those scores and on the non-TO&E items. Examples of increased lumber requirements, nails, such things as extra hand tools and things like that, and we have been cataloging and making up our requirements. In accordance with the decisions of their commanders and in anticipation of possible deployment to South Vietnam, men of the 25th Infantry Division, the U.S. Army's Reserve Force in the Pacific, were sent through a stepped up training program designed to prepare them for the type of combat they could expect in Vietnam. These men undergoing tactical training in all phases of the 4.2 mortar illustrate the type of refresher training they received, including such basics as setting the proper charges. Setting charges and giving fire commands might prove a little different once they got to Vietnam, but U.S. infantrymen who had preceded them there were in agreement on one basic fact. Mortars have been found to be of great value from the Mekong Delta to the jungles to the central highlands. Training and setting charges was especially important for new men assigned to the division. As the refresher training was accelerated, the infantrymen of the Tropic Lightning Division came increasingly proficient in their mortar drill. If and when the time came for the move to Vietnam, these crews would be ready. Also found to be effective in the jungles, swamps, and highlands of South Vietnam is the 105mm Howitzer. It has proved especially valuable because of its capability of being airlifted by helicopter across impassable terrain. Here, a member of a 105 crew laid on the target when the weapon was fired. The crew fired several rounds in what was both training and a demonstration of their rapid fire capability. Virtually all tactical training would be repeated at night to prepare the crews for night combat in Vietnam. As the training mission continued, the battery's executive officer gave a fire order and a member of the crew recorded the fire data. The divisions 105 and mortar crews gave only two examples of the tactical training the men of the 25th would undergo. Up to the day, they received orders to deploy to Vietnam. To deploy major elements of a division from its home base, in this instance, Hawaii's Scofield Barracks, to an area of operations thousands of miles across the sea, is a huge and complex undertaking involving thousands of men and vehicles as well as tons of equipment and materials of war. In the other military unit, the 25th Infantry Division had a carefully worked out SOP to cover such a deployment. However, with a move to Vietnam becoming more and more probable, the division's commander decided to conduct a comprehensive readiness exercise. Specific objective was to evaluate and improve the division's readiness to deploy its units anywhere in the Pacific at a moment's notice. However, it was an exercise that for the division's third brigade would become an actual deployment to Vietnam. Every unit in the division had its SOP. One duty of medical personnel was to check the health records of every man involved in the deployment. Records of men to be deployed had to be separated from those who would remain. As part of the exercise, special jungle fatigues, gas masks and manuals were packed, just as if they were being shipped to Vietnam. An example of the many logistic problems involved was the attention given to specially designed tent frame kits. Civilian employees cut lumber exactly to measure and assembled in enlarged piles for shipment. Division officers helped supervise. General De Saussure and the civilian foreman were also on hand to check and supervise. The task of cutting, assembling and packing the lumber for the tent frame kits was finally completed. This is how a tent frame would look when assembled after deployment. Studying blueprints that would serve as guidelines in erecting thousands of tent frames was only one of the many painstaking details required to substantiate the 25th motto, ready to strike anywhere, anytime. Looking at the piles of lumber to be shipped for tent frames, it appeared that not only would they be ready to strike anywhere, anytime, they would also have reasonably comfortable quarters once they arrived there. Stoneman Field at Schofield Barracks is normally an athletic field. However, during the exercise, it was used as a marshaling area for the division's vehicles. Here, too, the men and their equipment were assembled. Boxes of sea rations were given a final check, and so were the men's weapons. At least one infantryman devoted special attention to an M79 grenade launcher. By now, the vehicles were checked, gassed, and loaded with equipment. The infantrymen were as ready as they ever would be. Some wondered if the exercise could possibly turn into an actual deployment, and if it didn't, they were sufficiently abreast of the news to realize that in a few days a real move could take place. The exercise was realistic enough to include an actual movement from Schofield Barracks to the Army's docks in Honolulu Harbor. To the Tropic Lightning Division, this was not really a new experience, nor could it be for any outfit which had long served as the U.S. Army's major reserve force in the Pacific. In 1962, elements of the division had left Schofield and deployed by air to Thailand, and it was no training exercise. Rather, it was a show of force designed to halt a stepped-up communist offensive in Laos, which saw red troops advance to the Thailand border. However, many of its personnel had joined the 25th since 1962, and to many, a realistic deployment was new. Over the years, these pineapple fields on Oahu had seen many a 25th convoy roll by. As the convoy approached Honolulu, commanders remained alert, as they had been throughout all phases of the exercise, for any signs of unit weaknesses, which might hinder Tropic Lightning's rapid deployment. Finally, they reached the U.S. Army Transportation Terminal. The APCs were among the first vehicles to be assembled for loading. The ships were waiting, and the vehicles and equipment were ready. The entire scene gave full meaning to the code name for the exercise. Holokai, an Hawaiian word meaning to the sea. The 105-millimeter howitzers, fired during a training mission only a few days ago, were fully prepared and lined up for loading. The heavy vehicles, too, were fully prepared for a long sea voyage. The entire exercise has reflected an accurate picture of what actually happens when an infantry division moves out for deployment to another area within a theater of operations. Now the loading began. First, the vehicles were hoisted on board. Then came boxes and crates of rations, ammunition and other supplies and equipment. Connex containers also were loaded on board. Helicopters were weather-proofed since they would make the voyage on deck. A few days later, at Hawaii's Hikamera Force Base, C-141 stood ready for the long flight to Vietnam. Palates of duffel bags were loaded aboard, and exercise holokai was no longer an exercise. It was an actual air deployment of men and equipment to South Vietnam. Deploying to join the fight against the Viet Cong were approximately 4,000 men of the 25th Division's 3rd Brigade. These men were fulfilling the 25th's role as the major immediate reaction force of the United States Army Pacific. Once in Vietnam, it was expected that they would be positioned in the central highlands near Placou, about 250 miles north of Saigon. Colonel Everett A. Stoutner, commanding officer of the 3rd Brigade, held a final plain-side conference with General Disassure. General Weihen spoke informally with a departing infantryman. As men of the 3rd Brigade boarded the aircraft, which would take them to the battlefields of South Vietnam, many were aware of the precise wording of the 25th Infantry Division's official mission to be ready for rapid deployment by air or sea anywhere in the Pacific Command. Upon arrival in the objective area, be prepared for immediate conduct of ground operations, ranging from civic actions to sustained ground combat operations against hostile forces. It was a mission they were fully prepared to implement.