 Question 88, Part 2 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secundae, Triatis on the Cardinal Virtues, The Virtue of Justice. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secundae, Triatis on the Cardinal Virtues, The Virtue of Justice by St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 88 of Vows in 12 Articles. Part 2, Articles 7-12 7th Article Whether a vow is solemnized by the Reception of Holy Orders and by the Profession of a Certain Rule, Objection 1, you would seem that a vow is not solemnized by the Reception of Holy Orders and by the Profession of a Certain Rule. As stated above in Article 1, a vow is a promise made to God. Now external actions pertaining to a solemnity seem to be directed not to God, but to men. Therefore they are related to vows accidentally, and consequently a solemnization of this kind is not proper to circumstance a vow. Question 2 further, whatever belongs to the condition of a thing would seem to be applicable to all in which that thing is found. Now many things may be the subject of a vow which have no connection, either with the Holy Orders or to any particular rule, as when a vow is a pilgrimage or something of the kind. Therefore, the solemnizing that takes place in the Reception of Holy Orders or in the Profession of a Certain Rule does not belong to the condition of a vow. Objection 3 further, a solemn vow seems to be the same as a public vow. Now many other vows may be made in public, besides that which is pronounced in receiving Holy Orders or in professing a certain rule, which latter, moreover, may be made in private. Therefore, not only these vows are solemn. On the contrary, those vows alone are an impediment to the contract of marriage and a null marriage if it be contracted, which is the effect of a solemn vow, as we shall state further on in the third part of this work. Confer the Supplementum, Question 53, Article 2. I answer that, the manner in which a thing is solemnized depends on its nature, condizio. Thus when a man takes up arms, he solemnizes the fact that one way, namely with a certain display of horses and arms and a concourse of soldiers, while a marriage is solemnized in another way, namely the array of the bridegroom and bride and the gathering of their kindred. Now a vow is a promise made to God, wherefore the solemnization of a vow consists in something spiritual pertaining to God. That is, in some spiritual blessing or consecration which, in accordance with the institution of the apostles, is given when a man makes profession of observing a certain rule, in the second degree after the reception of Holy Orders, as Dionysius states in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy 6. The reason of this is that the solemnization is not want to be employed, save when a man gives himself up entirely to some particular thing. For the nuptial solemnization takes place only when the marriage is celebrated, and when the bride and bridegroom mutually deliver the power over their bodies to one another. In like manner, a vow is solemnized when a man devotes himself to the Divine Ministry by receiving Holy Orders, or embraces the state of perfection by renouncing the world and his own will by the profession of a certain rule. Reply to Objection 1. This kind of solemnization regards not only men, but also God, insofar as it is accompanied by a spiritual consecration or blessing, of which God is the author, though man is the minister, according to Numbers 6, verse 27. They shall invoke my name upon the children of Israel, and I will bless them. Hence a solemn vow is more binding with God than a simple vow, and he who breaks a solemn vow sins more grievously. When it is said that a simple vow is no less binding than a solemn vow, this refers to the fact that the transgressor of either commits a mortal sin. Reply to Objection 2. It is not customary to solemnize particular acts, but the embracing of a new state, as we have said above. Since when a man vows particular deeds, such as a pilgrimage or some special fast, such a vow is not competent to be solemnized, but only such a vow whereby a man entirely devotes himself to the divine ministry or service, and yet many particular works are included under this vow as under a universal. Reply to Objection 3. Through being pronounced in public, vows may have a certain human solemnity, but not a spiritual and divine solemnity, as the aforesaid vows have, even when they are pronounced before a few persons. Hence, the publicity of a vow differs from its solemnization. 8. Whether those who are subject to another's power are hindered from taking vows. Objection 1. You would seem that those who are subject to another's power are not hindered from taking vows. The lesser bond is surpassed by the greater. Now, the obligation of one man subject to another is a lesser bond than a vow whereby one is under an obligation to God. Therefore, those who are subject to another's power are not hindered from taking vows. Objection 2. Children are under their parents' power, yet children may make religious profession even without the consent of their parents. Therefore, one is not hindered from taking vows through being subject to another's power. Objection 3. To do is more than to promise, but religious who are under the power of their superiors can do certain things, such as to say some psalms or abstain from certain things. Much more therefore, seemingly, can they promise such things to God by means of vows. Objection 4 further. Whoever does what he cannot do lawfully, sins. But subjects do not sin by taking vows, since nowhere do we find this forbidden. Therefore, it would seem that they can lawfully take vows. On the contrary, it is commanded in Numbers 30, Verses 4 and 6 that, if a woman vow anything, being in her father's house, and yet but a girl in age, she is not bound by the vow, unless her father consent, and the same is said there in Numbers 30, Verses 7 and 9, of the woman that has a husband. Therefore, in like manner of other persons that are subject to another's power, cannot bind themselves by a vow. I answer that, as stated above in Article 1, a vow is a promise made to God. Now, no man can firmly bind himself by a promise to do what is in another's power, but only to that which is entirely in his own power. Now, whoever is subject to another, as to the matter wherein he is subject to him, it does not lie in his power to do as he will, but it depends on the will of the other. And therefore, without the consent of his superior, he cannot bind himself firmly by a vow in those matters wherein he is subject to another. Reply to Objection 1, Nothing but what is virtuous can be the subject of a promise made to God, as stated above in Article 2. Now, it is contrary to virtue for a man to offer to God that which belongs to another, as stated above in Question 86, Article 3. Hence, the conditions necessary for a vow are not altogether ensured when a man who is under another's power vows that which is in that other's power, except under the condition that he whose power it concerns does not gain say it. Reply to Objection 2, As soon as a man comes of age, if he be a freeman, he is in his own power in all matters concerning his person, for instance with regard to binding himself by vow to enter religion, or with regard to contracting marriage. But he is not in his own power as regards the arrangements of the household, so that in these matters he cannot vow anything that shall be valid without the consent of his father. A slave, through being in his master's power, even as regards his personal deeds, cannot bind himself by vow to enter religion, since this would withdraw him from his master's service. Reply to Objection 3, A religious is subject to his superior as to his actions connected with his profession of his rule, wherefor even though one may be able to do something now and then, when one is not being occupied with other things by one's superior, yet since there is no time when his superior cannot occupy him with something, no vow of a religious stands without the consent of his superior, as neither does the vow of a girl while in her father's house without his consent, nor of a wife without the consent of her husband. Reply to Objection 4, Although the vow of one who is subject to another's power does not stand without the consent of the one to whom he is subject, he does not sin by vowing, because his vow is understood to contain the requisite condition, providing, namely, that his superior approve or do not gainsay it. 9. Article Whether children can bind themselves by vow to enter religion Objection 1 You would seem that children cannot bind themselves by vow to enter religion, since a vow requires deliberation of the mind. It is fitting that those alone should vow who have the use of reason. But this is lacking in children just as in imbeciles and madmen. Therefore, just as imbeciles and madmen cannot bind themselves to anything by vow, soon either seemingly can children bind themselves by vow to enter religion. Objection 2 further That which can be validly done by one cannot be annulled by another. Now a vow to enter religion, made by a boy or girl before the age of puberty, can be revoked by the parents or guardian. Therefore, it seems that a boy or girl cannot validly make a vow before the age of 14. Objection 3 further According to the rule of Blessed Benedict in chapter 58, and a statute of Innocent IV, a year's probation is granted to those who enter religion, so that probation may precede the obligation of the vow. Therefore, it seems unlawful before the year of probation for children to be bound by vow to enter religion. On the contrary, that which is not done aright is invalid without being annulled by anyone. But the vow pronounced by a maiden, even before attaining the age of puberty, is valid, unless it be annulled by her parents within a year. Therefore, even before attaining to puberty, children can lawfully and validly be bound by a vow to enter religion. I answer that, as may be gathered from what has been said above in article 7, Vows are of two kinds, simple and solemn. And since, as stated in the same article, the solemnization of a vow consists in a spiritual blessing and consecration bestowed through the ministry of the church, it follows that it comes under the church's dispensation. Now a simple vow takes its efficacy from the deliberation of the mind, whereby one intends to put oneself under an obligation. That such an obligation be of no force may happen in two ways. First, through defective reason, as in madmen and imbeciles, who cannot bind themselves by vow so long as they remain in a state of madness or imbecility. Secondly, through the maker of a vow being subject to another's power, as stated above in article 8. Now these two circumstances concur in children before the age of puberty, because in most instances they are lacking in reason, and besides are naturally under the care of their parents or guardians in place of their parents. Wherefore in both events their vows are without force. It happens, however, through a natural disposition, which is not subject to human laws, that the use of reason is accelerated in some, albeit few, who on this account are said to be capable of guile, and yet they are not, for this reason, exempt in any way from the care of their parents. For this care is subject to human law, which takes into account that which is of most frequent occurrence. Accordingly, we must say that boys or girls who have not reached the years of puberty, and have not obtained the use of reason, can no wise bind themselves to anything by vow. If, however, they attain the use of reason before reaching the years of puberty, they can, for their own part, bind themselves by vow, but their vows can be annulled by their parents under whose care they are still subject. Yet no matter how much they be capable of guile before the years of puberty, they cannot be bound by a solemn religious vow on account of the church's decree, which considers the majority of cases. But after the years of puberty have been reached, they can bind themselves by religious vows, simple or solemn, without the consent of their parents. Reply to Objection 1. This argument avails in the case of children who have not yet reached the use of reason, for their vows are then invalid, as stated above. Reply to Objection 2. The vows of persons subject to another's power contain an implied condition, namely, that they not be annulled by the superior. This condition renders them licent and valid if it is fulfilled, as stated above. Reply to Objection 3. This argument avails in the case of solemn vows which are taken in profession. 10. Whether vows admit of dispensation. Objection 1. It would seem that vows are not subject to dispensation. It is less to have a vow commuted than to be dispensed from keeping it. But a vow cannot be commuted according to Leviticus 27, verses 9 and 10. A beast that may be sacrificed to the Lord, if any one shall vow, shall be holy and cannot be changed, neither a better for a worse, nor a worse for a better. Much less, therefore, do vows admit of dispensation. Objection 2 further. No man can grant to dispensation in matters concerning the natural law and in the divine precepts, especially those of the first table, since these aim directly at the love of God, which is the last end of the precepts. Now the fulfillment of a vow is a matter of the natural law, and is commanded by the divine law as shown above in Article 3, and belongs to the precepts of the first table, since it is an act of religion. Therefore vows do not admit of dispensation. Objection 3 further. The obligation of a vow is based on the fidelity which a man owes to God, as stated above in Article 3. But no man can dispense in such matter as this. Neither, therefore, can anyone grant dispensation from a vow. On the contrary, that which proceeds from the common will of many has apparently greater stability than that which proceeds from the individual will of some one person. Now the law which derives its force from the common will admits of dispensation by a man. Therefore, it seems that vows also admit of dispensation by a man. I answer that. The dispensation from a vow is to be taken in the same sense as the dispensation given in the observance of a law, because as stated above in the Pars Prima Secundae, Question 96, Article 6, and Question 97, Article 4, a law is made with an eye to that which is good in the majority of instances. But since in certain cases this is not good, there is need for someone to decide that in that particular case the law is not to be observed. This is properly speaking to dispense in the law, for a dispensation would seem to denote a comm-measuret distribution or application of some common thing to those that are contained under it, in the same way as a person is said to dispense food to a household. In like manner, a person who takes a vow makes a law for himself as it were, and binds himself to do something which in itself and in the majority of cases is a good. But it may happen that in some particular case this is simply evil or useless, or a hindrance to a greater good. And this is essentially contrary to that which is the matter of a vow, as is clear from what has been said above in Article 2. Therefore it is necessary in such a case to decide that the vow is not to be observed. And if it be decided absolutely that a particular vow is not to be observed, this is called a dispensation from that vow. But if some other obligation be imposed in lieu of that which was to have been observed, the vow is said to be commuted. Hence it is less to commute a vow than to dispense from a vow, both however are in the power of the church. Reply to Objection 1. An animal that could be lawfully sacrificed was deemed holy from the very moment that it was the subject of a vow, being as it were dedicated to the worship of God. And for this reason it cannot be changed. Even so, neither may one now exchange for something better or worse that which one has vowed if it already be consecrated, for example a chalice or a house. On the other hand, an animal that could not be sacrificed, though not being the lawful matter of a sacrifice, could and had to be bought back, as the law requires. Even so, vows can be commuted now if no consecration has intervened. Reply to Objection 2. Even as man is bound by natural law and divine precept to fulfill his vow, so too is he bound under the same heads to obey the laws or commands of his superiors. And yet when he is dispensed from keeping a human law, this does not involve disobedience to that human law, for this would be contrary to the natural law and the divine command. But it amounts to this, that what was law is not law in this particular case. Even so, when a superior grants a dispensation, that which was contained under a vow is by his authority no longer so contained, insofar as he decides that in this case such and such a thing is not fitting matter for a vow. Consequently, when an ecclesiastical superior dispenses someone from a vow, he does not dispense him from keeping a precept of the natural or of the divine law, but he pronounces a decision on a matter to which a man had bound himself of his own accord, and of which he was unable to consider every circumstance. Reply to Objection 3. The fidelity we owe to God does not require that we fulfill that which it would be wrong or useless to vow, or which would be an obstacle to the greater good whereunto the dispensation from that vow would conduce. Hence, the dispensation from a vow is not contrary to the fidelity due to God. Eleventh Article Whether it is possible to be dispensed from a solemn vow of continency Objection 1 It would seem that it is possible to be dispensed from a solemn vow of continency. As stated above, one reason for granting a dispensation from a vow is if it be an obstacle to a greater good. But a vow of continency, even though it be solemn, may be an obstacle to a greater good, since the common good is more God-like than the good of an individual. Now one man's continency may be an obstacle to the good of the whole community, for instance in the case where if certain persons who have vowed continency were to marry, the peace of their country might be procured. Therefore, it seems that it is possible to be dispensed, even from a solemn vow of continency. Objection 2 Further Religion is a more excellent virtue than chastity. Now if a man vows an act of religion, for example, to offer sacrifice to God, he can be dispensed from that vow. Much more therefore can he be dispensed from the vow of continency, which is about an act of chastity. Objection 3 Further Just as the observance of a vow of abstinence may be a source of danger to the person, so too may be the observance of a vow of continency. Now one who takes a vow of abstinence can be dispensed from that vow if it prove a source of danger to his body. Therefore, for the same reason, one may be dispensed from a vow of continency. Objection 4 Further Just as the vow of continency is a part of the religious profession, whereby the vow is solemnized, so also are the vows of poverty and obedience. But it is possible to be dispensed from the vows of poverty and obedience, as in the case of those who are appointed bishops after making profession. Therefore, it seems that it is possible to be dispensed from a solemn vow of continency. On the contrary, it is written in Ecclesiasticus 26 verse 20, No price is worthy of a continent's soul. Further, at the end of the Decretal, Cum ad monasterium, it is stated that the renouncing of property and the keeping of chastity is so bound up with the monastic rule that not even the sovereign pontiff can dispense from its observance. I answer that three things may be considered in a solemn vow of continency. First, the matter of the vow, namely continency. Secondly, the perpetuity of the vow, namely when a person binds himself by vow to the perpetual observance of chastity. Thirdly, the solemnity of the vow. Accordingly, some, such as William of Auxaire, say that the solemn vow cannot be a matter of dispensation on account of the continency itself for which no worthy price can be found, as is stated by the authority quoted above. The reason for this is assigned by some to the fact that by continency man overcomes a foe within himself, or to the fact that by continency man is perfectly conformed to Christ in respect of purity, both of body and soul. But this reason does not seem to be cogent since the goods of the soul, such as contemplation and prayer, far surpass the goods of the body and still more conform us to God, and yet one may be dispensed from a vow of prayer or contemplation. Therefore, continency itself absolutely considered seems no reason why the solemn vow thereof cannot be the matter of dispensation, especially seeing that the apostle in 1 Corinthians 734 exhorts us to be continent on account of contemplation when he says that the unmarried woman thinketh on the things of God, and since the end is of more account than the means. Consequently others, like Albert the Great, find the reason for this in the perpetuity and universality of this vow, for they assert that the vow of continency cannot be cancelled saved by something altogether contrary thereto, which is never lawful in any vow. But this is evidently false, because just as the practice of carnal intercourse is contrary to continency, so is eating flesh or drinking wine contrary to abstinence from such things, and yet these latter vows may be a matter for dispensation. For this reason others, like Innocent IV on the above decretal, maintain that one may be dispensed even from a solemn vow of continency for the sake of some common good or common need, as in the case of the example given above, in Objection I, of a country being restored to peace through a certain marriage to be contracted. Yet since the decretal quoted says explicitly that not even the sovereign pontiff can dispense a monk from keeping chastity, it follows seemingly that we must maintain that, as stated above in Article X I reply, conferring Leviticus 27, verses 9 and following. Whatsoever has once been sanctified to the Lord cannot be put to any other use. For no ecclesiastical prelate can make that which is sanctified to lose its consecration, not even though it be something inanimate, for instance a consecrated chalice to not be consecrated, so long as it remains entire. Much less therefore can a prelate make a man that is consecrated to God cease to be consecrated, so long as he lives. Now the solemnity of a vow consists in a kind of consecration or blessing of the person who takes the vow, as stated above in Article VII. Hence no prelate of the church can make a man who has pronounced a solemn vow to be quit of that to which he was consecrated, for example one who is a priest to be a priest no more, although a prelate may for some particular reason inhibit him from exercising his order. In like manner the pope cannot make a man who has made his religious profession cease to be religious although certain jurists have ignorantly held the contrary. We must therefore consider whether continency is essentially bound up with the purpose for which the vow is solemnized, because if not the solemnity of the consecration can remain without the obligation of continency, but not if continency is essentially bound up with that for which the vow is solemnized. Now the obligation of observing continency is connected with holy orders not essentially but by the institution of the church, wherefore it seems that the church can grant a dispensation from the vow of continency solemnized by the reception of holy orders. On the other hand the obligation of observing continency is an essential condition of the religious state whereby a man renounces the world and binds himself wholly to God's service. For this is incompatible with matrimony, in which state a man is under obligation of taking himself to a wife, of begetting children, of looking after his household, and of procuring whatever is necessary for these purposes. Wherefore the apostle says in 1 Corinthians 733 that he that is with a wife is solicitous for the things of the world, how he may please his wife and he is divided. Hence the monk takes his name from unity in contrast with his division. Translators note, monk derives from the Greek word monos, meaning one. For this reason the church cannot dispense from a vow solemnized by the religious profession, and the reason assigned by the decreedle is because chastity is bound up with the monastic rule. Reply to Objection 1. Perils occasioned by human affairs should be obviated by human means, not by turning divine things to a human use. Now a professed religious is dead to the world and lives to God, so that he must not be called back to the human life on the pretext of any human contingency. Reply to Objection 2. A vow of temporal contingency can be a matter of dispensation, as also a vow of temporal prayer or of temporal abstinence. But the fact that no dispensation can be granted from a vow of contingency solemnized by a profession is due not to its being an act of chastity, but because through the religious profession it is already an act of religion. Reply to Objection 3. Food is directly ordered to the upkeep of the person, therefore abstinence from food may be a direct source of danger to the person, and so on this count a vow of abstinence is a matter of dispensation. On the other hand, sexual intercourse is directly ordered to the upkeep not of the person but of the species, wherefore to abstain from such intercourse by contingency does not endanger the person. And if indeed accidentally it prove a source of danger to the person, this danger may be obviated by some other means, for instance by abstinence or other corporal remedies. Reply to Objection 4. A religious who has made a bishop is no more absolved from his vow of poverty than from his vow of contingency, since he must have nothing of his own and must hold himself as being the dispenser of the common goods of the church. In like manner neither is he dispensed from his vow of obedience. It is an accident that he is not bound to obey if he have no superior, just as the abbot of a monastery who nevertheless is not dispensed from his vow of obedience. The passage of Ecclesiasticus, which is put forward in the contrary sense, should be taken as meaning that neither fruitfulness of the flesh nor any bodily good is to be compared with continency which is reckoned one of the goods of the soul, as Augustine declares in Onholy Virginity 8. Wherefore it is said pointedly of a continent soul, not of a continent body. 12. Whether the authority of a prelate is required for the commutation or dispensation of a vow, objection one, you would seem that the authority of a prelate is not required for the commutation or dispensation of a vow. A person may enter religion without the authority of a superior prelate. Now by entering religion one is absolved from the vow he has made in the world, even from the vow of making a pilgrimage to the Holy Land. Therefore the commutation or dispensation of a vow is possible without the authority of a superior prelate. Objection two further, to dispense anyone from a vow seems to consist in deciding in what circumstances he need not keep that vow. But if the prelate is at fault in his decision, the person who took the vow does not seem to be absolved from his vow, since no prelate can grant a dispensation contrary to the divine precept about keeping one's vows, as stated above in article 10, second reply, as well as in article 11. Likewise when anyone rightly determines of his own authority that in his case a vow is not to be kept, he would seem not to be bound, since a vow need not be kept if it have an evil result, as was stated in article 2, second reply. Therefore the authority of a prelate is not required that one may be dispensed from a vow. Objection three further, if it belongs to a prelate's power to grant dispensations from vows, on the same count it is competent to all prelates, but it does not belong to all the dispense from every vow. Therefore it does not belong to the power of a prelate to dispense from vows. On the contrary, a vow binds one to do something even as a law does. Now the superior's authority is requisite for a dispensation from a precept of the law, as stated above, in the parts Prima Secunde, question 96, article 6, and in question 97, article 4. Therefore it is likewise required in a dispensation from a vow. I answer that as stated above in articles 1 and 2, a vow is a promise made to God about something acceptable to him. Now if you promise something to anyone, it depends on his decision whether he accept what you promise. Again, in the church, a prelate stands in God's place. Therefore a commutation or dispensation of vows requires the authority of a prelate who in God's stead declares what is acceptable to God, according to 2 Corinthians 2.10, according to 2 Corinthians 2.10, for I have pardoned for your sakes in the person of Christ. And he says significantly, for your sakes, since whenever we ask a prelate for a dispensation, we should do so to honor Christ in whose person he dispenses, or to promote the interests of the church which is his body. Reply to Objection 1. All other vows are about some particular works, whereas by the religious life a man consecrates his whole life to God's service. Now the particular is included in the universal, wherefor a decreta on the vows says that, man is not deemed a vow breaker if he exchange a temporal service for the perpetual service of religion, and yet a man who enters religion is not bound to fulfill the vows whether of fasting or of praying and the like which he made when in the world. Because by entering religion, he dies to his former life, and it is unsuitable to the religious life that each one should have his own observances, and because the burden of religion is onerous enough without requiring the addition of other burdens. Reply to Objection 2. Some have held that prelates can dispense from vows at their will for the reason that every vow supposes as a condition that the superior prelate be willing. Thus it was stated above in Article 8 that the vow of a subject, for example, of a slave or a son, supposes this condition. If the father or master consent, or does not dissent, and thus a subject might break his vow without any remorse of conscience whenever his superior tells him to. But this opinion is based on a false supposition. Because a spiritual prelate being not a master but a dispenser, his power is given unto edification not for destruction, according to 2 Corinthians 10 8. And consequently, just as he cannot command that which is in itself displeasing to God, namely sin, so neither can he forbid what is in itself pleasing to God, namely works of virtue. Therefore, absolutely speaking, man can vow them. But it does not belong to a prelate to decide what is the more virtuous and the more acceptable to God. Consequently, in matters presenting no difficulty, the prelate's dispensation would not excuse one from sin, for instance, if a prelate were to dispense a person from a vow to enter the religious life without any apparent cause to prevent him from fulfilling his vow. But if some cause were to appear, giving rise at least to doubt, he could hold to the prelate's decision whether of commutation or of dispensation. He could not, however, follow his own judgment in the matter, because he does not stand in the place of God, except perhaps in the case when the thing he has vowed is clearly unlawful, and he is unable to have recourse to the prelate. Reply to Objection 3 Since the sovereign Pontiff holds the place of Christ throughout the whole church, he exercises absolute power of dispensing from all vows that admit of dispensation. To other and inferior prelates is the power committed of dispensing from those vows that are commonly made and frequently required dispensation in order that men may easily have recourse to someone. Such are the vows of pilgrimage, fasting and the like, and of pilgrimage to the Holy Land are reserved to the sovereign pontiff. End of Question 88 Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC Question 89 Part 1 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Treaties on the Cardinal Virtues The Virtue of Justice This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Treaties on the Cardinal Virtues The Virtue of Justice by St. Thomas Aquinas Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province Question 89 Of Oaths In 10 Articles Part 1 Articles 1-5 We must now consider those external acts of religion, whereby something divine is taken by man. And this is either a sacrament or the name of God. The place for treating of the taking of a sacrament will be in the third part of this work. Of the taking of God's name, we shall treat now. The name of God is taken by man in three ways. First, by way of oath in order to confirm one's own assertion. Secondly, by way of adoration as an inducement to others. Thirdly, by way of invocation for the purpose of prayer or praise. Accordingly, we must first treat of oaths. And under this head there are ten points of inquiry. First, what is an oath? Second, whether it is lawful. Third, what are the accompanying conditions of an oath? Fourth, of what virtue is it an act? Fifth, whether oaths are desirable and to be employed frequently as something useful and good. Sixth, whether it is lawful to swear by a creature? Seventh, whether an oath is binding? Eighth, which is more binding, an oath or a vow? Ninth, whether an oath is subject to dispensation? Tenth, who may lawfully swear and when? First article, whether to swear is to call God to witness? Objection one, it would seem that to swear is not to call God to witness. Whoever invokes the authority of Holy Rit calls God to witness, since it is his word that Holy Rit contains. Therefore, if to swear is to call God to witness, whoever invoked the authority of Holy Rit would swear, but this is false. Therefore, the antecedent is false also. Objection two, further, one does not pay anything to a person by calling him to witness, but he who swears by God pays something to him, for it is written in Matthew 5.33, Thou shalt pay thy oaths to thy Lord. And Augustine says that to swear, Yorare, is to pay the right use readily of truth to God. Therefore, to swear is not to call God to witness. Objection three, further, the duties of a judge differ from the duties of a witness, as shown above in questions 67 and 70. No, sometimes a man by swearing implores the divine judgment according to Psalm 7 verse 5. If I have rendered to them that repaid me evils, let me deservedly fall empty before my enemies. Therefore, to swear is not to call God to witness. On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon on perjury. When a man says, by God, what else does he mean that God is his witness? I answer that, as the Apostle says in Hebrews 6.16, oaths are taken for the purpose of confirmation. Now speculative propositions receive confirmation from reason, which proceeds from principles known naturally and infallibly true. But particular contingent facts regarding man cannot be confirmed by a necessary reason, wherefore propositions regarding such things are want to be confirmed by witnesses. Now a human witness does not suffice to confirm such matters for two reasons. First, on account of man's lack of truth, for many give way to lying according to Psalm 16 verse 10, their mouth has spoken lies. Secondly, on account of his lack of knowledge, since he can know neither the future nor secret thoughts nor distant things, yet men speak about such things, and our everyday life requires that we should have some certitude about them. Hence the need to have recourse to a divine witness, for neither can God lie, nor is anything hidden from him. Now to call God to witness is named Yorare, to swear, because it is established as though it were a principle of law, yure, that what a man asserts under the invocation of God as his witness should be accepted as true. Now sometimes God is called to witness as when we assert present or past events, and this is termed a declaratory oath. While sometimes God is called to witness in confirmation of something future, and this is termed a promissory oath. But oaths are not employed in order to substantiate necessary matters, and such as come under the investigation of reason, for it would seem absurd in a scientific discussion to wish to prove one's point by an oath. Reply to Objection 1. It is one thing to employ a divine witness already given, as when one adduces the authority of holy scripture. And another to implore God to bear witness as in an oath. Reply to Objection 2. A man is said to pay his oaths to God because he performs what he swears to do, or because, from the very fact that he calls upon God to witness, he recognizes him as possessing universal knowledge and unerring truth. Reply to Objection 3. A person is called to give witness in order that he may make known the truth about what is alleged. Now there are two ways in which God makes known whether the alleged facts are true or not. In one way, he reveals the truth simply, either by inward inspiration, or by unveiling the facts, namely, by making public what was hitherto secret. In another way, by punishing the lying witness, and then he is at once judge and witness, since by punishing the liar, he makes known his lie. Hence oaths are of two kinds. One is a simple contestation of God as when man says, God is my witness, or I speak before God, or by God, which has the same meaning as Augustine states in the citation of the On the Contrary. The other is by cursing, and consists in a man biding himself or something of his to punishment, if what is alleged be not true. Second article, whether it is lawful to swear. Objection 1. You would seem that it is not lawful to swear. Nothing forbidden in the Divine Law is lawful. Now swearing is forbidden, according to Matthew 5.34, but I say to you not to swear at all. And in James 5.12, above all things my brethren swear not. Therefore swearing is unlawful. Objection 2 further. Whatever comes from an evil seems to be unlawful, because according to Matthew 7.18, neither can an evil tree bring forth good fruit. Now swearing comes from an evil, for it is written in Matthew 5.37, but let your speech be, yea, yea, no, no. And that which is over and above these is of evil. Therefore swearing is apparently unlawful. Objection 3 further. To seek a sign of divine providence is to tempt God, and this is altogether unlawful. According to Deuteronomy 6.16, thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God. Now he that swears seems to seek a sign of divine providence, since he asks God to bear witness, and this must be by some evident effect. Therefore it seems that swearing is altogether unlawful. On the contrary, it is written in Deuteronomy 6.13, thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, and shalt swear by his name. I answer that nothing prevents a thing being good in itself, and yet becoming a source of evil to one who makes use thereof unbecomingly. Thus to receive the Eucharist is good, and yet he that receives it unworthily, eateth and drinketh judgment to himself, as is stated in 1 Corinthians 11.29. Accordingly, in answer to the question in point, it must be stated that an oath is in itself lawful and commendable. This is proved from its origin and from its end. From its origin, because swearing owes its introduction to the faith whereby man believes that God possesses unerring truth and universal knowledge and foresight of all things. And from its end, since oaths are employed in order to justify men, and to put an end to controversy, confer Hebrews 6.16. Yet an oath becomes a source of evil to him that makes evil use of it, that is, who employs it without necessity and due caution. For if a man calls God as witness for some trifling reason, it would seemingly prove him to have but little reverence for God, since he would not treat even a good man in this manner. Moreover, he is in danger of committing perjury, because man easily offends in words, according to James 3.2. If any man offend not in word, the same is a perfect man. Wherefore it is written, and Ecclesiastic is 23 verse 9, let not thy mouth be accustomed to swearing, for in it there are many falls. Reply to Objection 1. Jerome, commenting on Matthew 5.34 says, Observe that our Savior forbade us to swear, not by God, but by heaven and earth, for it is known that the Jews have this most evil custom of swearing by the elements. Yet this answer does not suffice, because James adds, nor by any other oath. Wherefore we must reply that, as Augustine states in Online 15, When the apostle employs an oath in his epistles, he shows us how we are to understand the saying, I say to you not to swear at all. Lest to wit, swearing lead us to swear easily, and from swearing easily we contract the habit, and from swearing habitually we fall into perjury. Hence we find that he swore only when writing, because thought brings caution and avoids hasty words. Reply to Objection 2. According to Augustine, in his commentary on the Sermon on the Mount 117, if you have to swear, note that the necessity arises from the infirmity of those whom you convince, which infirmity is indeed an evil. Accordingly he did not say, that which is over and above is evil, but is of evil. For you do no evil, since you make good use of swearing by persuading another to a useful purpose. Yet it comes of evil of the person by whose infirmity you are forced to swear. Reply to Objection 3. He who swears tempts not God, because it is not without usefulness a necessity that he implores the divine assistance. Moreover, he does not expose himself to danger if God be unwilling to bear witness there and then, for he certainly will bear witness at some future time when he will bring to light the hidden things of darkness and will make manifest the councils of hearts, as stated in 1 Corinthians 4.5. And this witness will be lacking to none who swears neither for nor against him. 3. Whether three accompanying conditions of an oath are suitably assigned, namely justice, judgment, and truth. Objection 1. He would seem that justice, judgment, and truth are unsuitably assigned as the conditions accompanying an oath. Things should not be enumerated as diverse if one of them includes the other. Now of these three one includes another, since truth is a part of justice according to Tully in Rhetoric 253. And judgment is an act of justice, as stated above in Question 60 Article 1. Therefore the three accompanying conditions of an oath are unsuitably assigned. Objection 2 Further. Many other things are required for an oath namely devotion and faith, whereby we believe that God knows all things and cannot lie. Therefore the accompanying conditions of an oath are insufficiently enumerated. Objection 3 Further. These three are requisite in man's every deed. Since he ought to do nothing contrary to justice and truth, or without judgment, according to 1 Timothy 521, do nothing without prejudice, that is, without previous judgment. Therefore these three should not be associated with an oath any more than with other human actions. On the contrary it is written in Jeremiah 4-2, Thou shalt swear, as the Lord liveth in truth and in judgment and in justice. Objection 4 Which words Jerome expounds saying, Observe that an oath must be accompanied by these three conditions, truth, judgment, and justice. I answer that, as stated above in Article 2, an oath is not good except for one who makes good use of it. Now two conditions are required for the good use of an oath. First, that one swear, not for frivolous but for urgent reasons, and with discretion, and this requires judgment or discretion on the part of the person who swears. Secondly, as regards the point to be confirmed by oath, that it be neither false nor unlawful, and this requires both truth, so that one employ an oath in order to confirm what is true and justice so that one confirm what is lawful. A rash oath lacks judgment, a false oath lacks truth, and a wicked or unlawful oath lacks justice. Reply to Objection 1. Judgment does not signify here the execution of justice, but the judgment of discretion as stated above. Notice truth here to be taken for the part of justice, but for a condition of speech. Reply to Objection 2. Devotion, faith, and like conditions requisite for the right manner of swearing are implied by judgment, for the other two regard things sworn to as stated above. We might also reply that justice regards the reason for swearing. Reply to Objection 3. There is great danger in swearing, both on account of the greatness of God who is called upon to bear witness, and on account of the frailty of the human tongue, the words of which are confirmed by oath. Hence these conditions are more requisite for an oath than for other human actions. Fourth article. Whether an oath is an act of religion or Latria. Objection 1. It would seem that an oath is not an act of religion or Latria. Acts of religion are about holy and divine things, but oaths are employed in connection with human disputes as the apostle declares in Hebrews 616. Therefore swearing is not an act of religion or Latria. Objection 2 further. It belongs to religion to give worship to God, as Tully says in his rhetoric 253. But he who swears offers nothing to God, but calls God to be his witness. Therefore swearing is not an act of religion or Latria. Objection 3 further. The end of religion or Latria is to show reverence to God. But the end of an oath is not this, but rather the confirmation of some assertion. Objection 4 further. Therefore swearing is not an act of religion. On the contrary, it is written in Deuteronomy 6 verse 13. Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, and shalt serve him only, and thou shalt swear by his name. Now he speaks there of the servitude of religion. Therefore swearing is an act of religion. I answer that as appears from what has been said above in article 1. He that swears calls God to witness in confirmation of what he says. Now nothing is confirmed saved by what is more certain and more powerful. Therefore in the very fact that a man swears by God, he acknowledges God to be more powerful by reason of his unfailing truth and his universal knowledge, and thus in a way he shows reverence to God. For this reason the apostle says in Hebrews 6.16 that men swear by one greater than ourselves, and Jerome commenting on Matthew 5.34 says that he who swears either reveres or loves the person by whom he swears. The philosopher 2 states in metaphysics 1.3 that to swear is to give very great honor. Now to show reverence to God belongs to religion or latria. Therefore it is evident that an oath is an act of religion or latria. Reply to Objection 1. Two things may be observed in an oath. The witness adduced, and this is divine, and the thing witness to, or that which makes it necessary to call the witness, and this is human. Accordingly an oath belongs to religion by reason of the former and not of the latter. Reply to Objection 2. In the very fact that a man takes God as his witness by way of an oath, he acknowledges him to be greater, and this pertains to the reverence and honor of God, so that he offers something to God namely reverence and honor. Reply to Objection 3. Whatsoever we do we should do it in honor of God, wherefore there is no hindrance if by intending to assure a man we show reverence to God. For we ought so to perform our actions in God's honor that they may conduce to our neighbor's good, since God also works for his own glory and for our good. Fifth article. Whether oaths are desirable and to be used frequently as something useful and good. Objection 1. It would seem that oaths are desirable and to be used frequently as something useful and good. Just as a vow is an act of religion so is an oath. Now it is commendable and more meritorious to do a thing by vow, because a vow is an act of religion as stated above in Question 88 Article 5. Therefore for the same reason to do or say a thing with an oath is more commendable, and consequently oaths are desirable as being good essentially. Objection 2 further. Jerome commenting on Matthew 5.34 says that he who swears either reveres or loves the person by whom he swears. Now reverence and love of God are desirable as something good essentially. Therefore swearing is also. Objection 3 further. Swearing is directed to the purpose of confirming or assuring, but it is a good thing for a man to confirm his assertion. Therefore an oath is desirable as a good thing. On the contrary it is written in Ecclesiasticus 23 verse 12. A man that swereth much shall be filled with iniquity. And Augustine says in On Lying 15 that the Lord forbade swearing in order that for your own part you might not be fond of it and take pleasure in seeking occasions of swearing as though it were a good thing. I answer that whatever is required merely as a remedy for an infirmity or a defect is not reckoned among those things that are desirable for their own sake, but among those that are necessary. This is clear in the case of medicine, which is required as a remedy for sickness. Now an oath is required as a remedy to a defect, namely some man's lack of belief in another man. Wherefore an oath is not to be reckoned among those things that are desirable for their own sake, but among those that are necessary for this life, and such things are used unduly whenever they are used outside the bounds of necessity. For this reason Augustine says in his commentary on the Sermon on the Mount 117, he who understands that swearing is not to be held as a good thing, that is desirable for its own sake, restrains himself as far as he can from uttering oaths unless there be urgent need. Reply to Objection 1. There is no parity between a vow and an oath, because by a vow we direct something to the honor of God, so that for this very reason a vow is an act of religion. On the other hand, in an oath reverence for the name of God is taken in confirmation of a promise. Hence what is confirmed by oath does not, for this reason, become an act of religion, since moral acts take their species from the end. Reply to Objection 2. He who swears does indeed make use of his reverence or love for the person by whom he swears. He does not however direct his oath to the reverence or love of that person, but to something else that is necessary for the present life. Reply to Objection 3. Even as a medicine is useful for healing, and yet the stronger it is, the greater harm it does, if it be taken unduly. So to an oath is useful indeed as a means of confirmation, yet the greater the reverence it demands, the more dangerous it is, unless it be employed a right, for as it is written in Ecclesiasticis 23 verse 13, If he make it void, that is, if he deceive his brother, his sin shall be upon him, and if he disemble it, by swearing falsely and with dissimulation, he offendeth double. Because to wit, pretended equity is a twofold iniquity, as Augustine declares, and if he swear in vain, that is, without due cause and necessity, he shall not be justified. End of Question 89, Part 1, read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC. Question 89, Part 2, of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde, Triaties on the Cardinal Virtues, The Virtue of Justice. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde, Triaties on the Cardinal Virtues, The Virtue of Justice, by St. Thomas Aquinas, Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 89, of Oaths, in 10 Articles, Part 2, Article 6-10, 6th Article, Whether it is Lawful to Swear by Creatures Objection 1, It would seem that it is not lawful to swear by creatures. It is written in Matthew 5, Verses 34 and 36, I say to you, Swear not at all, neither by heaven, nor by earth, nor by Jerusalem, nor by thy head. And Jerome, expounding these words, says, Observe that the Savior does not forbid swearing by God, but by heaven and earth, etc. Objection 2, Further, Punishment is not due, save for a fault. Now a punishment is appointed for one who swears by creatures, for it is written, In the canon, clericum, if a cleric swears by creatures, he must be very severely rebuked, and if he shall persist in this vicious habit, we wish that he be excommunicated. Therefore it is unlawful to swear by creatures. Objection 3, Further, An oath is an act of religion, as stated above in Article 4, But religious worship is not due to any creature, according to Romans 1, Verses 23 and 25. Therefore it is not lawful to swear by a creature. On the contrary, Joseph swore, By the health of Pharaoh, confer Genesis 42, 16. Moreover, it is customary to swear by the gospel, by relics, and by the saints. I answer that, as stated above in Article 1, Third Reply, There are two kinds of oath. One is uttered as a simple contestation, or calling God as witness, and this kind of oath, like faith, is based on God's truth. Now faith is essentially and chiefly about God, who is the very truth, and secondarily about creatures in which God's truth is reflected, as stated above in Article 1. In like manner, an oath is chiefly referred to God, whose testimony is invoked, and secondarily an appeal by oath is made to certain creatures considered, not in themselves, but as reflecting the divine truth. Thus we swear by the gospel, that is, by God whose truth is made known in the gospel, and by the saints who believed this truth and kept it. The other way of swearing is by cursing, and in this kind of oath a creature is adduced, that the judgment of God may be wrought therein. Thus a man is wont to swear by his head, or by his son, or by some other thing that he loves, even as the Apostles' War in 2 Corinthians 1.23 saying, I call God to witness upon my soul. As to Joseph's oath by the health of Pharaoh, this may be understood in both ways, either by way of a curse, as though he pledged Pharaoh's health to God, or by way of contestation, as though he appealed to the truth of God's justice, which the princes of the earth are appointed to execute. Reply to Objection 1, Our Lord forbade us to swear by creatures, so as to give them the reverence due to God. Hence Jerome adds that the Jews, through swearing by the angels and the like, worshiped creatures with a divine honor. In the same sense a cleric is punished according to the cannons, for swearing by a creature, for this savers of the blasphemy of unbelief. Hence in the next chapter it is said, If anyone swears by God's hair or head, or otherwise utter blasphemy against God, and he be in ecclesiastical orders, let him be degraded. This suffices for the reply to the second objection. Reply to Objection 3, Religious worship is shown to one whose testimony is invoked by oath. Hence the Prohibition, in Exodus 23 verse 13, By the name of strange gods you shall not swear. But religious worship is not given to creatures employed in an oath in the ways mentioned above. Seventh article Whether an oath has a binding force Objection 1 It would seem that an oath has no binding force. An oath is employed in order to confirm the truth of an assertion. But when a person makes an assertion about the future, his assertion is true, though it may not be verified. Thus Paul lied not in 2 Corinthians 1.15 and following, though he went not to Corinth, as he had said he would in 1 Corinthians 16.5. Therefore it seems that an oath is not binding. Objection 2 Further Virtue is not contrary to virtue according to Categories 822. Now an oath is an act of virtuous stated above an article 4. But it would sometimes be contrary to virtue or an obstacle there too if one were to fulfill what one has sworn to do. For instance, if one were to swear to commit a sin or to desist from some virtuous action. Therefore an oath is not always binding. Objection 3 Further Sometimes a man is compelled against his will to promise something under oath. Now such a person is loosed by the Roman pontiffs from the bond of his oath. Therefore an oath is not always binding. Objection 4 Further No person can be under two opposite obligations. Yet sometimes the person who squares and the person to whom he swears have opposite intentions. Therefore an oath cannot always be binding. On the contrary it is written in Matthew 5 verse 33. Thou shalt perform thy oaths to the Lord. I answer that an obligation implies something to be done or omitted. So that apparently it regards neither the declaratory oath which is about something present or past, nor such oaths as are about something to be affected by some other cause as for example if one were to swear that it would reign tomorrow. But only such as are about things to be done by the person who swears. Now just as a declaratory oath which is about the future or the present should contain the truth, so to ought the oath which is about something to be done by us in the future. Yet there is a difference. Since in the oath that is about the past or present this obligation affects not the thing that already has been or is but the action of the swearer in the point of his swearing to what is or was already true. Whereas on the contrary in the oath that is made about something to be done by us the obligation falls on the thing guaranteed by oath. For a man is bound to make true what he has sworn else his oath lacks truth. Now if this thing be such as not to be in his power his oath is lacking in judgment of discretion unless perchance what was possible when he swore become impossible to him through some mishap as when a man swore to pay a sum of money which is subsequently taken from him by force or theft. For then he would seem to be excused from fulfilling his oath although he is bound to do what he can as in fact we have already stated with regard to the obligation of a vow. Confer question 88 article 3 second reply. If on the other hand it be something that he can do but ought not to either because it is essentially evil or because it is in hindrance to a good and his oath is lacking injustice where for an oath must not be kept when it involves a sin or a hindrance to good for in either case its result is evil. Accordingly we must conclude that whoever swears to do something is bound to do what he can for the fulfillment of truth provided always that the other two accompanying conditions be present namely judgment and justice. Reply to objection one. It is not the same with a simple assertion and with an oath wherein God is called to witness because it suffices for the truth of an assertion that a person say what he proposes to do since it is already true in its cause namely the purpose of the doer. But an oath should not be employed save in a matter about which one is firmly certain and consequently if a man employ an oath he is bound as far as he can to make true what he has sworn through reverence of the divine witness invoked unless it leads to an evil result as stated. Reply to objection two. An oath may lead to an evil result in two ways. First, because from the very outset it has an evil result either through being evil of its very nature as if a man were to swear to commit adultery or through being a hindrance to a greater good as if a man were to swear not to enter religion or not to become a cleric or that he would not accept a prelacy supposing it would be expedient for him to accept or in similar cases. For oaths of this kind for oaths of this kind are unlawful from the outset yet with a difference because if a man were to swear to commit a sin he sinned in swearing and sins in keeping his oath whereas if a man swear not to perform a greater good which he is not bound to do with all he sins indeed in swearing through placing an obstacle to the Holy Ghost who is the inspirer of good purposes yet he does not sin in keeping his oath though he does much better if he does not keep it. Secondly an oath leads to an evil result through some new and unforeseen emergency an instance is the oath of Herod who swore to the damsel who danced before him that he would give her what she would ask of him for this oath could be lawful from the outset supposing it to have the requisite conditions namely that the damsel asked what it was right to grant but the fulfillment of the oath was unlawful hence Ambrose says in On the Duties of the Clergy 150 sometimes it is wrong to fulfill a promise and to keep an oath as Herod who granted the slaying of John rather than refuse what he had promised reply to Objection 3 there is a twofold obligation in the oath which a man takes under compulsion one whereby he is beholden to the person to whom he promises something and this obligation is canceled by the compulsion because he that used force deserves that the promise made to him should not be kept the other is an obligation whereby a man is beholden to God in virtue of which he is bound to fulfill what he has promised in his name this obligation is not removed in the Tribunal of Conscience because that man ought rather to suffer temporal loss than violate his oath he can however seek in a court of justice to recover what he has paid or denounce the matter to his superior even if he has swore to the contrary because such an oath would lead to evil results since it would be contrary to public justice the Roman Pontiffs in absolving men from oaths of this kind did not pronounce such oaths to be unbinding but relaxed the obligation for some just cause reply to Objection 4 when the intention of the swearer is not the same as the intention of the person to whom he swears if this be due to the swearer's guile he must keep his oath in accordance with the sound understanding of the person to whom the oath is made hence Isidor says in On the Supreme Good 231 however artful a man may be in wording his oath God who witnesses his conscience accepts his oath as understood by the person to whom it is made and that this refers to the deceitful oath is clear from what follows he is doubly guilty who both takes God's name in vain and tricks his neighbor by guile if however the swearer uses no guile he is bound in accordance with his own intention where for Gregory says in his commentary on Job 267 the human ear takes such like words in their natural outward sense but the divine judgment interprets them according to our inward intention eighth article whether an oath is more binding than a vow Objection 1 it would seem that an oath is more binding than a vow a vow is a simple promise whereas an oath includes besides a promise an appeal to God as witness therefore an oath is more binding than a vow Objection 2 further the weaker is want to be confirmed by the stronger now a vow is sometimes confirmed by an oath therefore an oath is stronger than a vow Objection 3 further the obligation of a vow arises from the deliberation of the mind as stated above in question 88 article 1 while the obligation of an oath results from the truth of God whose testimony is invoked since therefore God's truth is something greater than human deliberation it seems that the obligation of an oath is greater than that of a vow on the contrary a vow binds one to God while an oath sometimes binds one to man now one is more bound to God than to man therefore a vow is more binding than an oath I answer that the obligation both of vow and of an oath arises from something divine but in different ways for the obligation of a vow arises from the fidelity we owe God which binds us to fulfill our promises to him on the other hand the obligation of an oath arises from the reverence we owe him which binds us to make true what we promise in his name now every act of infidelity includes an irreverence but not conversely because the infidelity of a subject to his Lord would seem to be the greatest irreverence hence a vow by its very nature is more binding than an oath reply to objection one a vow is not any kind of promise but a promise made to God and to be unfaithful to God is most grievous reply to objection two an oath is added to a vow not because it is more stable but because greater stability results from two immutable things confer Hebrews 618 reply to objection three deliberation of the mind gives a vow its stability on the part of the person who takes the vow but it has a greater cause of stability on the part of God to whom the vow is offered 9th article whether anyone can dispense from an oath objection one you would seem that no one can dispense from an oath just as truth is required for a declaratory oath which is about the past or the present so too is it required for a promissory oath which is about the future now no one can dispense a man from swearing to the truth about present or past things therefore neither can anyone dispense a man from making truth that which he promised by oath to do in the future objection two further a promissory oath is used for the benefit of the person to whom the promise is made but apparently he cannot release the other from his oath since it would be contrary to the reverence of God much less therefore can a dispensation from this oath be granted by anyone objection three further any bishop can grant a dispensation from a vow except certain vows reserve to the pope alone as stated above in question 88 article 12 third reply therefore in like manner if an oath admits of dispensation any bishop can dispense from an oath and yet seemingly this is to be against the law therefore it would seem that an oath does not admit of dispensation on the contrary a vow is more binding than an oath as stated above in article 8 but a vow admits of dispensation and therefore an oath does also I answer that as stated above in question 88 article 10 the necessity of a dispensation both from the law and from a vow arises from the fact that something which is useful and morally good in itself and considered in general may be morally evil and hurtful in respect of some particular emergency and such a case comes under neither law nor vow now anything morally evil or hurtful is incompatible with the matter of an oath for if it be morally evil it is opposed to justice and if it be hurtful it is contrary to judgment therefore an oath likewise admits of dispensation reply to objection one a dispensation from an oath does not imply a permission to do anything against the oath for this is impossible since the keeping of an oath comes under a divine precept which does not admit of dispensation but it implies that what hitherto came under an oath no longer comes under it as not being due matter for an oath just as we have said with regard to vows in question 88 article 10 second reply now the matter of a declaratory oath which is about something past or present has already acquired a certain necessity and has become unchangeable therefore the dispensation will regard not the matter but the act itself of the oath so that such a dispensation would be directly contrary to the divine precept on the other hand the matter of a promissory oath is something future which admits of change so that to it in certain emergencies it may be unlawful or hurtful and consequently undo matter for an oath therefore a promissory oath admits of dispensation since such a dispensation regards the matter of an oath and is not contrary to the divine precept about keeping of oaths reply to objection two one man may promise something under an oath to another in two ways first when he promises something for his benefit for instance if he promised to serve him or to give him money and from such a promise he can be released by the person to whom he made it for he is understood to have already kept his promise to him when he acts toward him according to his will secondly one man promises another something pertaining to God's honor or to the benefit of others for instance if a man promise another under oath that he will enter religion or perform some act of kindness in this case the person to whom the promise is made cannot release him that made the promise because it was made principally not to him but to God unless per chance it included some condition for instance provided he give his consent or some such like condition reply to objection three sometimes that which is made the matter of a promissory oath is manifestly opposed to justice either because it is a sin as when a man swears to commit a murder or because it is an obstacle to a greater good as when a man swears not to enter religion and such an oath requires no dispensation but in the former case a man is bound not to keep such an oath while in the latter it is unlawful for him to keep or not to keep an oath as stated above in article seven second reply sometimes what is promised an oath is doubtfully right or wrong useful or harmful either in itself or under the circumstance in this case any bishop can dispense sometimes however that which is promised under oath is manifestly lawful and beneficial an oath of this kind seemingly admits not of dispensation but of commutation when there occurs something better to be done for the common good in which case the matter would seem to belong chiefly to the power of the pope who has charge over the whole church and even of absolute relaxation for this too belongs in general to the pope and all matters regarding the administration of things ecclesiastical thus it is competent to any man to cancel an oath made by one of his subjects in matters that come under his authority for instance a father may annul his daughter's oath and a husband his wife's confer numbers verse 30 and following as stated above with regard to vows in question 88 articles 8 and 9 10th article whether an oath is voided by a condition of person or time objection one you would seem that an oath is not voided by a condition of person or time an oath according to the apostle in hebrew 6 16 is employed for the purpose of confirmation now it is competent to anyone to confirm his assertion and at any time therefore you would seem that an oath is not voided by a condition of person or time objection to further to swear by God is more than to swear by the gospels where for chris ostum says if there is a reason for swearing it seems a small thing to swear by God but a great thing to swear by the gospels to those who think thus it must be said nonsense the scriptures were made for God's sake not God for the sake of the scriptures now men of all conditions and at all times are want to swear by God much more therefore is it lawful to swear by the gospels objection three further the same effect does not proceed from contrary causes since contrary causes produce contrary effects now some are debarred from swearing on account of some personal defect children for instance before the age of 14 and persons who have already committed perjury therefore it would seem that a person ought not to be debarred from swearing either on account of his dignity as clerics or on account of the solemnity of the time objection four further in this world no living man is equal in dignity to an angel for it is written in Matthew 11 11 that he that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he namely than John the Baptist while yet living now an angel is competent to swear for it is written in apocalypse 1016 that the angel swore by him that liveth forever and ever therefore no man ought to be excused from swearing on account of his dignity on the contrary it is stated in the canon see queese presbyter let a priest be examined by his sacred consecration instead of being put on his oath and again in the canon nulus let no one in ecclesiastical orders dare to swear on the holy gospels to a layman i answer that two things are to be considered in an oath one is on the part of god whose testimony is invoked and in this respect we should hold an oath in its greatest reverence for this reason children before the age of puberty are debarred from taking oaths and are not called upon to swear because they have not yet attained the perfect use of reason so as to be able to take an oath with due reverence perjurers are also debarred from taking an oath because it is presumed from their antecedents that they will not treat an oath with the reverence due to it for this reason in order that oaths might be treated with due reverence the law says in the canon onestum it is becoming that he who ventures to swear on holy things should do so fasting with all propriety and fear of god the other thing to be considered is on the part of the man whose assertion is confirmed by oath for a man's assertion needs no confirmation save because there is a doubt about it now it derogates from a person's dignity that one should doubt about the truth of what he says wherefore it becomes not persons of great dignity to swear for this reason the law says in canon that priest should not swear for trifling reasons nevertheless it is lawful for them to swear if there be need for it or of great good may result therefrom especially is this the case in spiritual affairs when moreover it is becoming that they should take an oath on days of solemnity since they ought then to devote themselves to spiritual matters nor should they on such occasions take oaths for temporal matters except perhaps in cases of grave necessity reply to objection one some are unable to confirm their own assertions on account of their own defect and some there are whose words should be so certain that they need no confirmation reply to objection two the greater the thing sworn by the holier and the more binding is the oath considered in itself as augustan states and accordingly it is a graver matter to swear by god than by the gospels yet the contrary may be the case on account of the manner of swearing for instance an oath by the gospels might be taken with deliberation and solemnity and an oath by god frivolously and without deliberation reply to objection three nothing prevents the same thing from a rising out of contrary causes by way of superabundance and defect it is in this way that some are debarred from swearing through being of so great authority that it is unbecoming for them to swear while others are of such little authority that their oaths have no standing reply to objection four the angels oath is adduced not on account of any defect in the angel as though one ought not to credit his mere word but in order to show that the statement made issues from god's infallible disposition thus too god is sometimes spoken of by scripture as swearing in order to express the immutability of his word as the apostle declares in hebrus 6 17 end of question 89 read by michael shane greg lambart lc question 90 of summa theologica secunda secunde triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of justice this is a libravox recording all libravox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit libravox.org summa theologica secunda secunde triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of justice by saint thomas equinas translated by the fathers of the english dominican province question 90 of the taking of god's name by way of adoration in three articles we must now consider the taking of god's name by way of adoration under which head there are three points of inquiry first whether it is lawful to adjure a man second whether it is lawful to adjure the demons third whether it is lawful to adjure irrational creatures first article whether it is lawful to adjure a man objection one it would seem that it is not lawful to adjure a man origin says in his commentary on matthew i deem that a man who wishes to live according to the gospel should not adjure another man for if according to the gospel mandate of christ it be unlawful to swear it is evident that neither is it lawful to adjure and consequently it is manifest that the high priest unlawfully adjured jesus by the living god objection to further whoever adjures a man compels him after a fashion but it is unlawful to compel a man against his will therefore seemingly it is also unlawful to adjure a man objection three further to adjure is to induce a person to swear now it belongs to man's superior to induce him to swear for the superior imposes an oath on his subject therefore subjects cannot adjure their superiors on the contrary even when we pray god we implore him by certain holy things and the apostle to besought the faithful by the mercy of god according to romans 12 one and this seems to be a kind of adjuration therefore it is lawful to adjure i answer that a man who utters a promissory oath swearing by his reverence for the divine name which he invokes in confirmation of his promise binds himself to do what he has undertaken and so orders himself unchangeably to do a certain thing now just as a man can order himself to do a certain thing so too can he order others by beseeching his superiors or by commanding his inferiors as stated above in question 83 article one accordingly when either of these orderings is confirmed by something divine it is an adjuration yet there is this difference between them that man is master of his own actions but not of those of others therefore he can put himself under an obligation by invoking the divine name whereas he cannot put others under such obligation unless they be his subjects whom he can compel on the strength of the oath they have taken therefore if a man by invoking the name of god or any holy thing intends by this adjuration to put one who is not his subject under an obligation to do a certain thing in the same way as he would bind himself by oath such an adjuration is unlawful because he usurps over another a power which he has not but superiors may bind their inferiors by this kind of adjuration if there be need for it if however he merely intend through reverence of the divine name or of some holy thing to obtain something from the other man without putting him under any obligation such an adjuration may be lawfully employed in respect of anyone reply to objection one origin is speaking of an adjuration whereby a man intends to put another under an obligation in the same way as he would bind himself by oath for thus did the high priest presume to adjure our lord jesus christ as is related in matthew 26 verse 63 reply to objection two this argument considers the adjuration which imposes an obligation reply to objection three to adjure is not to induce a man to swear but to employ terms resembling an oath in order to provoke another to do a certain thing moreover we adjure god in one way and man in another because when we adjure a man we intend to alter his will by appealing to his reverence for a holy thing and we cannot have such an intention in respect of god whose will is immutable if we obtain something from god through his eternal will it is due not to our merits but to his goodness second article whether it is lawful to adjure the demons objection one you would seem unlawful to adjure the demons origin says in his commentary on matthew to adjure the demons is not an accordance with the power given by our savior for this is a jewish practice this now rather than imitate the rights of the jews we should use the power given by christ therefore it is not lawful to adjure the demons objection two further many make use of necromantic incantations when invoking the demons by something divine and this is an adjuration therefore if it be lawful to adjure the demons it is lawful to make use of necromantic incantations which is evidently false therefore the antecedent is false also objection three further whoever adjures a person by that very fact associates himself with him now it is not lawful to have fellowship with the demons according to first Corinthians 10 20 i would not that you should be made partakers with devils therefore it is not lawful to adjure the demons on the contrary it is written in mark 16 verse 17 in my name they shall cast out devils now to induce anyone to do a certain thing for the sake of god's name is to adjure therefore it is lawful to adjure the demons i answer that as stated in the preceding article there are two ways of adjuring one by way of prayer or inducement through reverence of some holy thing the other by way of compulsion in the first way it is not lawful to adjure the demons because such a way seems to savor of benevolence or friendship which it is unlawful to bear toward the demons as to the second kind of adjuration which is by compulsion we may lawfully use it for some purposes and not for others for during the course of this life the demons are our adversaries and their actions are not subject to our disposal but to that of god and the holy angels because as Augustine says in on the trinity three four the rebel spirit is ruled by the just spirit accordingly we may repulse the demons as being our enemies by adjuring them through the power of god's name lest they do us harm of soul or body in accord with the divine power given by christ as recorded by luke 10 19 behold i have given you power to tread upon serpents and scorpions and upon all the power of the enemy and nothing shall hurt you it is not however lawful to adjure them for the purpose of learning something from them or of obtaining something through them for this would amount to holding fellowship with them except perhaps when certain holy men by special instinct or divine revelation make use of the demons actions in order to obtain certain results thus we read of the blessed james that he caused hermogenes to be brought to him by the instrumentality of the demons reply to objection one origin is speaking of adjuration made not authoritatively by way of compulsion but rather by a way of friendly appeal reply to objection two necromancers adjure and invoke the demons in order to obtain or learn something from them and this is unlawful as stated above where for chris hostam commenting on our lord's words to the unclean spirit in mark 125 speak no more and go out of the man says a salutary teaching is given us here lest we believe the demons however much they speak the truth reply to objection three this argument considers the adjuration whereby the demons help is besought in doing or learning something for this savers of fellowship with them on the other hand to repulse the demons by adjuring them is to sever oneself from their fellowship third article whether it is lawful to adjure an irrational creature objection one it would seem unlawful to adjure an irrational creature an adjuration consists of spoken words but it is useless to speak to one that understands not such as an irrational creature therefore it is vain and unlawful to adjure an irrational creature objection to further seemingly wherever adjuration is admissible swearing is also admissible but swearing is not consistent with an irrational creature therefore it would seem unlawful to employ adjuration towards one objection three further there are two ways of adjuring as explained above in articles one and two one is by way of appeal and this cannot be employed towards irrational creatures since they are not masters of their own actions the other kind of adjuration is by way of compulsion and seemingly neither is it lawful to use this towards them because we have not the power to command irrational creatures but only he of whom it was said in matthew 827 for the winds and the sea obey him therefore in no way apparently is it lawful to adjure irrational creatures on the contrary simon and jude are related to have adjured dragons and to have commanded them to withdraw into the desert translators note this reference comes from apocryphal writings i answer that irrational creatures are directed to their own actions by some other agent now the action of what is directed and moved is also the action of the director and mover thus the movement of the arrow is an operation of the archer where for the operation of the irrational creature is ascribed not only to it but also and chiefly to god who disposes the movements of all things it is also ascribed to the devil who by god's permission makes use of irrational creatures in order to inflict harm on man accordingly the adjuration of an irrational creature may be of two kinds first so that the adjuration is referred to the irrational creature in itself and in this way it would be vain to adjure an irrational creature secondly so that it be referred to the director and mover of the irrational creature and in this sense a creature of this kind may be adjured in two ways first by way of appeal made to god and this relates to those who work miracles by calling on god secondly by way of compulsion which relates to the devil who uses the irrational creature for our harm this is the kind of adjuration used in the exorcisms of the church whereby the power of the demons is expelled from an irrational creature but it is not lawful to adjure the demons by beseeching them to help us this suffices for the replies to the objections end of question 90 read by michael shane greg lambert lc