 Morning everybody. We've got plenty of seats up here if people want to take one. A lot of people standing back there. I'm Marlene at the Center for Strategic International Studies. I appreciate all of you coming out this morning to hear what I think will be a very interesting discussion of how the strategic land power task force and its conceptual work has evolved over the last couple of years. The effort was launched formally in 2013 and I think there was a fair degree of confusion about what all it entailed, where it would go and so we were very fortunate to be able to get three of the primary folks working it and leading it to come talk about what they've done over the last couple of years and how it's evolved so again I think it'll be a really fascinating discussion. They've got a lot of interesting ideas that are pushing in new directions so we look forward to exploring those with everybody here today. Again we've got two people who have been involved in it basically since inception and then a newer member of the team. Major General Bill Hicks is the deputy director at the Army Capabilities and Integration Center. He has been involved in multiple tours in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last decade in a variety of different positions. I believe are you the senior strategist in the Army? The senior Army strategist who's actually employed those skills multiple times in multiple contexts doing strategy again both downrange and on the Joint Staff at Joint Forces Command he said helped in that regarding a great deal down at ARCIC and TRADOC and has a equally distinguished operational career as a command of staff officer in the 101st and the 82nd. So again a wealth of knowledge and sort of one of the thought leaders that helped contribute to the creation of the effort and has been deeply involved in it ever since. We also have Major General Crisaz who's the director of force management and development at Special Operations Command. He's a career Special Operations Officer. He's just commanded the group and the Command Joint Special Operations Task Force Afghanistan. He's been the commander of Special Operations Command in Africa and the Combined Joint Forces Special Operations Component Command in Afghanistan as well. So he's experienced a number of different iterations of how Special Operations Command's get integrated into larger operations and has done those types of operations around the globe. He also has served in staffs not just at SOCOM but at the Joint Staff and at CENTCOM and elsewhere. So and then finally Brigadier General Kalea who has many hats as many Marine Generalists do. He's the director of the Futures Directorate. He's the Vice Chief of Naval Research and he's also the commanding general of the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab. He's a career aviator also with both Squadron and Group Command and multiple staff positions throughout his career including at Hickor's Marine Corps and in the Office of Secretary of Defense. So a wealth of experience and operational experience at pretty much everywhere across the defense enterprise that I think has probably played a large role in informing how you all think about what's missing in how we currently conceive of future operations and how the work of the task force and now the two approved concepts that have come out of that effort will evolve and whether there might be future concepts and the like. So I think I'm going to ask General Hicks to talk briefly about the evolution of the task force and its work and then I believe General Haas is going to talk about the human aspects of military operations concept that is being developed and then General Kalea will talk about the joint concept for integrated campaigning which has now also been approved for further development. So and then we'll open it up to all of your questions. So again thanks to all of you. Okay. So first you can tell I'm a little bit impaired today. You do things when you can not when you want to. So as you bear with me the good news is I'll be brief. Okay. I see several people here that understand that. So our four charge directed us to take this task on to look at four things which are laid out in the handout you have. We have to get the lesson to the last decade of work. We have to understand better the human aspects of military operations. We have to understand very importantly why our operational dominance has not delivered in the way that we expected. And then looking to the future we have to understand how to raise land power as an instrument that allows our policy makers to achieve those objectives. Okay. The first product of this effort was a white paper. That white paper is also summarized on your handout. Three key points I want to point out. First these ideas are not well documented and joint doctrine or policy or our strategy. Secondly we have to think differently about how we run operations and we have to focus them on human objectives. Those are the behaviors of our adversaries and others that we wish to change to influence. And then finally you can see where we talk about the intersection of land cyber and human and how those feed a velocity of human interaction which is a trend that's driving events today as we speak. In fact as I was driving in I heard a commentator on the radio say exactly that. That this connection is making things very different than the way they used to be. So from that we have developed two joint concepts that we are in the process of working with the wider community on. The human aspect of military operations and this concept for integrated campaign. And with that I'll let my partners take over. Thanks Phil. So Dr. Lee thanks you for hosting this forum. I know you've been working hard trying to get us all together and everyone has pretty busy schedules. So I know the real substance and importance of this forum is the question and answer session. So again like Bill I'll try to be brief and concise in my opening comments so we can get to the Q&A. I'll briefly discuss the and review and you have the handout. What is the human aspects of military operation concept. And then I'll talk a little bit about why it's important. But right up front I'd like to talk about why we see value in this current concept. And it's our belief in our opinion as General Hicks mentioned that our dominance in the traditional domains land sea air space and you know hopefully soon to be in cyber has not achieved the strategic results that we desired or anticipated. And the Hamo concept provides value and that it arranges for joint operations a different approach really founded and centered on the criticality and the centrality of humans in warfare. And we're going to do this by a unique process of consistently analyzing what we see as the elements that affect human behavior. So the social cultural physical psychological and informational elements that affect human behavior and continually analyze those before during and after operations so that we're better positioned to achieve our operational and strategic objectives. So right up front that's where we see the value of this concept. So what it is right now is that it's going to attempt to describe for the joint force and help comprehend for the joint force help comprehend and ultimately influence or leverage the behavior of the local populations the groups the tribes the key and relevant actors that occupy our operational space our operational area. So that right up front is what it attempts to help inform and to help leverage. So currently we are working on a review of current doctrine that addresses some aspects some human aspects of military operations while also focusing on where are the critical gaps that exist in the human aspects of military operations. And then as we move forward you know our intent is to get this concept approved and then once that's approved then what you'll see is a concept that informs the employment of existing and emerging capabilities across our services and our combat commands as well as identify the new capabilities competencies and disciplines that are required to operate inside what SOCOM is describing that the human domain in order to increases increase our chances of tactical operational and strategic success. So why why is this important well we've learned over recent operations that our dominance in the other domains hasn't achieved those effects that we've desired. So we look at our unfamiliarity with the societies and cultures that we're operating in and with and we discover that we aren't anticipating the challenges we aren't anticipating the reactions or actions of the local populations to our military operations and activities. And that this all leads unfortunately to our inability to affect really important partnerships and also leads to our inability to garner the support of local populations key leaders tribes. Ultimately we end up wasting time and resources during our operations and campaigns because this lack of familiarity with the culture and the societies that we're working in and amongst. So again this concept will move towards helping the joint force understand what is required and what needs to be institutionalized across all of our services to address these specific aspects to increase our chances of strategic success. So I'll leave it at that. Okay thanks so generally I think if the human aspect of military operations concept is designed to help address a conceptual and an operational shortcoming that integrated campaigning one is I think more focused on changing the nature of how we conduct campaigns that are at a broad level. So if you could talk a little bit about that concept. Well certainly thank you for the introduction again hosting us. It has been a long time coming. They're definitely connected. As for background December of last year the Joint Concept General Officer Steering Committee endorsed the joint concept for an integrated campaigning or what I call JCIC. Some people call it a kick. Call it what you want. It's acronym. The concept will transition the conceptual research that the Strategic Land Power Task Force has done into joint development as has been discussed and the membership up here are the co-sponsors for the concept and obviously are endorsing or you know highly endorse its intellectual development which is where we're at right now in the beginnings of that. The premise of the concept is to provide a more comprehensive approach to campaign planning. So what does that mean. I think we look back at the lessons learned from the last 15 years or so of conflict and we recognize that our adversaries are pursuing advantages at the tactical operational even strategic level in the areas of the range of military operations that are peaceful, non-kinetic, left of the boom if you will. And so this concept that recognizes that looks to take a better approach of campaign planning which has traditionally been very focused on the kinetic side of the spectrum and looked at the left side of the spectrum in my opinion as just a means to get to that next phase. Not so much a detailed view or analysis of it and so in that sense HMO is a good part of that as General Haas just talked about. So what the concept will do is it will provide the joint force a new approach to campaign planning that will link operations simultaneously and in depth across all domains functions and really across the entire range of military operations. It'll seek to mitigate and even prevent conflict by now focusing as much on phase one, two operations, phase zero, phase one, two operations as it has in the past with the kinetic operations that everyone is familiar with phase three and beyond. I think it's because of the adversaries new approach to trying to gain advantages and leverage that area that's left of the bang we'd be ill informed and we wouldn't be preparing ourselves properly in the action of campaign planning if we didn't address that but it's not to say that it's a shift in focus to that area only it's important to understand that the other side of the ROMO is just as important to be involved in the campaign planning as it has in the past but now we're just opening the scope and it's a new awareness of what we've been overlooking if you will in those earlier phases of warfare if you will left of the boom as I said. So in summary and we'll get to questions on this because I think it's important to talk through it. Joint concept for integrated campaigning really looks to leverage all of the capabilities of the joint force to address those areas of the range of military operations that we haven't looked at in detail enough in campaign planning and we see a lot of opportunity in those earlier phases of the range of military operations to fold into detail planning so that we can prevent conflict and we see that that opportunity exists to do that long before kinetic operations even begin so I hope that makes sense to you and I look forward to talking through that with you and with answering your questions. Okay well I will exercise the prerogative of the chair and start with a couple questions but then open it up to you as quickly as possible I was remiss in failing to mention if people could turn off the ringers on their phones I'd appreciate it and then when we get to questions we'll have folks come around with microphones if you could briefly identify yourself and then ask your question I'd appreciate it. So let me start with a question about the JCIC and whether there's the potential as you develop it further you know there's long been a conversation about the phases and whether the phases reflect reality and all the rest of that is there the potential in the future that that this might lead to a reconceptualization of phases is the phase construct still helpful? Yes. Yes it will change. It will change. Okay. What we've seen is phases have been you know sequential right linear and you know as we looked at OIF we saw that the phases were kind of inclined and you could cut through two or three of them at a time when you look at Yemen you look at Russian operations in Crimea you look at how China is operating in the South China Sea the phases are vertical and they are taking action in all phases in the same space we are not currently aligned that way intellectually and we have to change that. So to I want to pull the thread a little bit on the the human aspects concept and and ask is the fundamental issue because in theory you know we've all been you've all been taught throughout your careers that it's all about about affecting the behavior of people and decision makers at the end of at the that's the strategic objective always is it is it a change in the theory or a change in our failure to actually behave in a way consistent with that objective has the objective changed or as or we just haven't realized it? Well you know obviously it's not a bold new idea warfare being a clash of wills and wanting to influence the action and behavior not only of your adversary deter him defeat him but also the local population but what we see is across all our entire enterprise a different approach no set doctrine that addresses how we will uh address the elements that affect human behavior and then incorporate that into our planning processes each one of the services essentially has a different approach to this and so this this effort is to you know more broadly institutionalize a comprehensive approach you know by phases if necessary this the elements that affect human behavior so commanders are addressing this throughout their operations and the hope is that we're you know while we're in the shape phase if we're addressing these these elements correctly and incorporated them into our planning process and our activities is that we we can potentially stem the tide from moving into later phases the operations. I think from the Marine Corps perspective it's it's not new as well the human endeavor has been part of our doctrine since 1989 and I I think the way General Haas puts it is is important to pull out here is that while it's been recognized I don't think it's been appropriately emphasized especially in the lower ends of the of the spectrum I think a lot of times we react to the human aspect or the human endeavor as it pertains to military conflict rather than being proactive and folding it in to the detailed planning that needs to come up front. I mean we would just take for example General Wallace's comment after we went into Iraq this was not the enemy that we war-ganked or templated against so within this this concept would be kind of addressing some of those areas that we missed in those initial campaigns. Two examples uh Kosovo okay lots of physical action bombing tanks no effect we did a crony network analysis so those of which is you know his human network we started hitting things that they care about behavior change convert for you in Iraq a textbook physical operation hit every target hit every objective 19 days on Baghdad and then we're there for seven years why because we did not understand the human aspect um let me ask it just to add also we you know we see that the the Hamo concept being you know I think really key to achieving some synergy across all the domains you know with the humans being the centrality of warfare and conflict that as we work on doctrine to further refine what the cyber domain is and and SOCOM is working on our own doctrine regarding the human domain to more broadly you know expand on on that concept is that this this concept will will provide synergy and threads and connectivity between all the domains as we go which I think leads in and and assists in the further development of our integrated campaigning concept so it's ideas it's mindset it's the the noun to our strategic land power task force and the integrated concept is kind of the verb to our strategic land power task force uh let me ask one last question before opening it up about um the role that uh that other players are going to have in the evolution of in particular the Hamo concept because clearly intelligence capabilities are implicated in that as as as our diplomatic and others so so what role are those communities playing in the evolution of your concept well I certainly think that it's a platform is a vehicle it's a it's a key entry way for us to expand our planning and consideration within the interagency intergovernmental and so as we as we move forward and further refine this concept you know we will see opportunities and I think our our partners within the State Department and other agencies will see this review of the elements that affect human behavior and identify with them and say hey we can we can join and and cooperate here on the way ahead you know the the current existing doctrine on on this room really remains a kind of the humanitarian assistance and psychological operations and that's only addressing some aspects of it so this this broadens the scope I think and expands the invitation out to our our partners in the interagency so that what's important is both concepts will have a wide range of contributors okay so this is not being developed just like us we've we've got a very wide tent these committees will be represented at the across dod and I think that's why it was critical for both of these concepts to be endorsed by the joint staff and to get that prospectus and fold the well now the j7 into our efforts to flush out these concepts and to implement and and when that happens you will see all the the other players as you put it come in and reshape it refine it and truly truly make it a an effective joint concept okay we've got lots of questions so here and then here and then up here and then over here let's get started jeff done with sage guilt thank you for being here today and I'm excited about the haimo concept and the task force my question is two part one is what academic research dod is being brought in 40 or 50 years of crisis decision making literature led by march and others sense making and sense giving carol white catherine sutcliffe high reliability organizations high velocity organizations or are we just dusting off claus witz and sun sue and and writing a new concept and if those are already being incorporated where's the evidence-based research there and if not where does somebody like ourselves go to participate in the process and and be helpful so i would tell you that within the limits of our staff we have cast a wide net including leveraging some very old bookings work on conflict a very similar state and if you want to participate stand up here's your guy and tim raise your hand in the back there as well so we have a team here in washington that we'll be happy to take your name and make you part of the team thank you for not quoting claus witz jeff good morning colonel scott sandborn i'm the army fellow at the center for new american security i think it ties into the the first question it goes to general haas's comment about wars a clash of wills and my question is whether the effort is going to try and develop metrics to measure well whether that be our adversaries different actors on the battlefield our coalition partners and even the american people to be able to see the conflict out and whether that ties into the integrated campaign plan thank you so the question is will it develop metrics for success for success to measure the will uh the concept is right now and you know in its development so we haven't clearly developed any you know additional metrics once we get the concept approved through the our our joint staff process then we'll look at all the dotmo pf potential changes that are required in order to institutionalize and inculcate this into our enterprise so i think at that stage of the actual development process of the of the joint concept will we be looking at no metrics measures of effectiveness how you know how do we evaluate and and gauge how we're influencing and and leveraging the populations groups tribes etc and i think sir right i think i think as it pertains to integrated campaigning what i alluded to earlier in my opening remarks i think the best metric is going to be preventing that conflict is understanding those early phases and and doing the detailed planning that mitigates or prevents uh the kinetic piece to the range of military operations the success ultimately will be showing up in an in an environment and not being surprised at what you encounter as was alluded to earlier as well sir yeah the key thing i would say is in in our initial war gaming we did consider the issue of will you know do we have an answer no have we engage people who have done work yes will we continue that yes the key thing with the concepts excuse me the key thing is we have to get as i said this is not what represented in doctrine okay policy or strategy so the first thing we have to do is get all the players around the table so they begin to start thinking about it and becomes their idea so we'll get there but not tomorrow okay i think up here and then we'll come back around good morning mary crinnell army science board many before you have have looked at this issue so and you all have seen what's worked and what hasn't worked what do you see is the major obstacles to being successful in integrating this concept and into the system well i think initially the certainly for the hamo concept that we originally entitled you know working more towards the human domain was the concern particularly now in a fiscally constrained environment that our concept would lead to material solutions that would cost the services a lot of money that or that it would potentially change you know the professional military education of our office that you know and and we see these as low-cost solutions right now within the hamo concept but initially that was really in wake of the creation or the establishment of the cyber domain where there was now the establishment of a cyber command all the services contributing to that so there was some reluctance and concern that oh we establish a human domain now there's going to be a human domain command and new organizations associated with it and a myriad of material solutions that would have to be applied so i think we're moving beyond that and certainly the fact that it was approved by the joint staff and moving forward is recognition that that's that's not where we're going with it with the concept but it but it's still a concern and it's still out there yeah i i think culture is your is your hurl your challenge um and so this process which will be very adenizing and slow uh is key to getting it past that point and so when we say that the steering committee approved it that's all the combatant commands all the services which is important and then they and others will contribute to development of these two concepts so at the end of the day they own it and then we can transition to doctrine and and know it okay so i think that's an important point the culture piece um look we all the services are different they all have different perspectives i have a different perspective on the human endeavor as a marine i have a different perspective on land power as a marine but an aviator and as an aviator but but the point is you have to get past that and look at the the higher goal of what we're accomplishing here and what we alluded to earlier about changing the phases of i mean if you don't get through the cultural barriers that'll never happen i mean never happen understanding what the goodness is that comes out of the back end seeing what we've been deficient in deficient in in the past in addressing and being reactive to how to put your perspectives aside and and go after it as a joint force and there might have been some misunderstandings regarding the the nature of this strategic land power task force and then the development of these concepts that it was somehow a counter to air sea battle or you know our alternative or a different approach that which it is not it's certainly the hamel concept would absolutely complement and enhance air sea battle so right in fact i would add on the integrated campaign one of our strongest allies has been the navy because when you think about i mentioned south china sea and you talk to them about that they're like you're exaggerating we're you know we're we're playing checkers okay sorry and they're playing chess chess okay so that's the issue yeah dave ralston cgi thanks first for your service it's greatly appreciated um about 10 years ago in general hicks said with the services in the geographic combat combatant commander representatives sitting around the team in these joint development teams we're we're addressing those right now but obviously our our goal in in state is it it moved much much beyond just a hey here's your here's your checklist for this phase of the operation the mindset change hi good morning mega next time with defense daily uh the documents that you provided for us kind of drive home the point that you know warfare is about personal interactions and not just the massing weapons but we do obviously bring a lot of equipment into the battlefield so i wonder if it's clear yet um you know if there's anything we're doing either with the equipment that we're bringing in or how we use it that might be detrimental to these early phases um and if there's anything that we should be doing differently or any way that you might research how to kind of use the equipment better to achieve the um results that you want so i would give you an example an action we did take that was detrimental because of the mindset so when we did the target risk for iraq and that campaign was you know from a physical standpoint executed very well we hit a bridge out in ambar province that bridge connected a phosphate fertilizer plant to nano one the bread bastard of iraq so as we went into the planting planting season no fertilizer that bridge was of no military significance was irrelevant more over it had no effect on baguette the government the army so down is your orbit but we hit because that's what we do we have to change that idea okay now i i think that the heymo concept will attempt to address okay so what is the the impact how how is this going to motivate or alienate not only the local population but certainly our adversaries so i'll give you another example for in afghanistan so our partners from united arab emirates early on in their introduction and support to to our campaign wanted to bring in armored vehicles and heavy tanks particularly when we partnered with them and they moved with us into the helman region and our lack of understanding or miscalculation of oh my gosh we're bringing in tanks you know the afghans will think that's a soviet union all over again and what we try to describe for at that time was well these are these are muslim tanks these are ua e tanks these are us tanks i mean these will be welcome i mean the local population will see this as a as a force for protection these are infidel tanks that are arriving on the battlefield these are you know they're fellow muslims that are working very hard to defend and protect them and we just you know we we couldn't kind of get beyond or get down to the real keen in-depth understanding of how this would be perceived by the local populations and how it'd be perceived by obviously that the taliban are ever adversaries which was whoa there's you know the coalition just introduced a new firepower in the battlefield we got to relook our tactics maybe we're going to change where we're going to be so we're always consider that but i think the hamel concept will help contribute to those decisions that's a tough question megan and i'll tell you what the example that general haas just talked about with armored vehicles the the ied threat is global it's not just in afghanistan and iraq ask the french about their endeavors in mali and it and it's not one that you can react to the ied threat you have to be prepared for that when you go into an area so there's going to be a balance and hopefully with an awareness and an education of early on planning for that through the hamel concept and jcic we'll have better solutions going forward work my way back around the room some more back on this side thank you very much i am dr nissar choudhury with the pakistan american league you mentioned about human behavior and culture one single element is not enough one needs to know the history of that group that nation those tribes their traditions their values their thought process their attitude and their approach and what are their perceptions about the western world that's very important to understand because we look at them through the lens of american lands we need to also look at them how they look at us so like in iraq when the forces went in they went in as liberating forces actually but not it did not take a long time before the local population started perceiving them as an occupying forces and for the first time i enjoyed this term also i had heard before the islamic bomb but i never heard before the muslim tank that was a good term that you so my question is that since this extremism militancy fanatism and terrorism it's a common enemy of mankind humanity and every religion is there a strategy where the western democracies and industrial nations can incorporate oic as well since it's a common enemy and come up with giant forces to deal with this across the globe because this enemy is a faceless enemy doesn't draw better lines and is there any special strategy to deal with them or will the world be just working as firefighters and reacting to what they're doing thank you very much so if i can abstract that and rephrase it a little bit i think essentially would application of the haimo concept affect how we conduct counterterrorism and and deal with the threat of islamic extremism so is that fair i would i would say it will affect how we do all operations and enjoy the two concepts together as we engage and build partnerships we will develop a network of armies and other forces particularly those that special ops work with who are more capable of dealing with problems at the local and regional level and that will allow us to do a better job collectively of managing this problem but to take a step further if you think about again iraq we spent ten years looking at iraq after there's a storm and we counted everything on the battlefield but we didn't understand iraq and importantly we did not understand saddam there is a book iraqi perspectives that's out you can get off the internet and if you read that you understand saddam's number one problem is iran his number two problem is israel his number three problem was the era of war his number four problem was controlling his own uh leaders and country and so we were number five on the list we were not number one so when you think about why did he deceive us about weapons of mass destruction it's because he was worried about keeping a riot day israel at day maintaining his position in the era of war and being seen by his leaders as a top dog he would not have done that if he had said oh i don't have weapons of mass destruction but we did not understand that and the rest as they say is history but over there and then over there and then back there so thank you leandra bernstein sputnik international news um i had a question first of all very simple what exactly is the timeline for implementing this concept and then uh in the near term the united states is going to have an increased rotational presence in eastern europe uh with the with the nato rapid response forces and i'd just like like it if the panel could sort of troubleshoot how uh how this how your concept could play into uh the us us operations with nato in the the current conflict with russia she's talking specifically about haymo or integrated campaign i think both concepts is your question refer to both concepts or or or just in particular the human aspects so the time line i also think it is okay so you can answer it with both integrated campaigning as well but the timeline the implementation timeline is is not been set yeah so as long as it takes historically we're looking at you know what another year two years to and then now since this has got to be ingrained in the service and gcc culture it's going to take some time so we we see these things these concepts maturing and being fully adopted over essentially a fight it so about five years i think it absolutely will will contribute to to our contributions to nato and we have many arrangements and many institutions that exist between our doctrinal and school houses and nato where we can also share these these ideas and this mindset and this concept with our nato partners and allies so i think it goes beyond nato obviously the concepts my i see great value in both concepts and and how it will affect our theater security cooperation efforts globally we have forward deployed forces all over the place trying to prevent conflict trying to get that upper hand in the phase zero operations and by enhancing and informing their actions i think it'll have an impact on on those efforts do you think that if we were to fast forward five years to the full implementation of the concepts would it affect would it affect would it would it imply changes to how we might be approaching the rest of problem today yeah i think it's informing how we're approaching it right now at least the work and the study and the research that the strategic land power task force has done thus far is right now contributing to ideas concepts as we look at what's going on in Ukraine Crimea and the rest of the region and other regions and we'll bring that certainly so common in our participation and upcoming planning events that address this will bring these ideas these concepts to the table for consideration so it's already being implemented to some degree yeah we're not gonna and forming your inputs formal in different right yeah we've exposed the idea to a wide range of people in wargames seminars concept development uh engagement with the folks in in the dc area so there are many people who have been exposed and we hope infected both ideas cameo in the idea of centrality of the human aspects and the requirement to change how we plan and execute campaigns okay i neglected to mention to you for people who are watching us on the internet if you want to email questions you can email them to me at mlead at csis.org and i will inject them so here and then there and then we'll go over here so right here up there we go yeah uh tom oakley representing myself um so how are you careful not to position the military at solving problems that a it shouldn't solve and then b staying out of sort of the development defense uh kind of concept that that hasn't really worked and that sort of leads a little bit into coin so just trying to make sure that this is not sort of rehashing of the past and putting the military in a position where it becomes a tool to try to solve problems that eventually it can't solve especially in the development world but yeah certainly how the how we're employed is made at the highest levels you know in the white house and by senior policy makers so these efforts are about being able to provide more informed options to our policy makers and the way if if we do this right and we adopt you know some of the the real gems uh of both hamo and integrated campaigning then the military that uniformed service would be in a much better position to provide options for our policy makers and and how they employ us and provide them you know our best again best military advice on what's the best way to utilize this the other thing i would say is we don't get to choose what we do okay and over you know 300 years we have been uh successful and unsuccessful in a variety of different uh conflicts right so we have to broaden the options for for uh policy makers and i would note that you can use a military instrument in a variety of different ways and if you think about latin america and the general change and the attitude of that military in each of those countries a lot has to do with the fact that we have been engaged with them for now we're about four years in very uh small but important ways okay so i i'm i'm not one to dismiss or or to diminish the role that we can play in what is a wider civil issue like changing the political dynamics of a country where the military you know may be a junta and over time you can change that i think uh but it takes a long view you know columbia is a great example of long-term uh very focused military effort as part of a wire campaign and i think that you are called that win right i i think it's a big one small effort yeah small effort but the people you're using there are the product of a big army and a big marine corps i mean it's not you know those folks are current you know senior leaders i'm sorry they they are uh products of an army development process when they are you know 05s and 06s that come in and they got i have credibility and i'm i'm here to help you and over time you see that change and that's what's important okay i would just tag onto a general house said and it's about providing options to senior leaders providing those options earlier and providing those options in a manner that's less focused on kinetic options and more to mitigate and prevent having to talk to those kinetic options that we are our current campaign planning so focused on it so it's an oversimplific case say we're just a big bad hammer in the toolbox of national strategy we can be much more than that as as general hicks was saying and you know how we present those options of being more than just the phase three hammer that that comes in and does things is what this endeavor of the strategic lampire task force has been all about sorry i'm sorry but there's a bunch of people in front of us so now i'm we had a whole bunch of simultaneous hands i work my way through this now we're going sequential so Doug morris and defense consultant here in dc i i gotta pull on this strategic thread again especially maybe general hicks and general haus because of your comments that you just made and i understand the options and i'm glad that we've put the clash of wills on the table and the fact that wars is politics by another means but my experience over the last 15 years or so the three of you have been pretty hard on yourselves about how effective you've not been and i heard a senior leader and this is not meant to be political so it cuts across the spectrum i heard one political leader say in 2003 that i'm really not interested in providing the municipal water supply of los angeles or chicago to iraq uh i'm not interested in uh rebuilding x you know again the perception of of what the human population in iraq required or the fact that we uh on one hand wanted to keep the iraqi army employed and potentially deployed and then dismissed them all a political decision raised the discussion to the strategic and political level how is the concept going to help educate those non-uniform members so that you don't take options off the table on public television and tell an adversary what you're not going to do uh or uh believe that a foreign leader uh crimea does not see that the world environment has completely changed and that actions or inaction have consequences across the entire campaign and the military tool is only one part of the toolbox because if we're truly going to execute these two concepts it's it's not just the military element of power it's a lot bigger than that and the concepts if we're going to be successful with them in my view are going to have to educate those those senior civilian leaders potentially and i'd be interested in your thoughts on that well when i'm the chairman of the joint chiefs i'll answer that question on influencing the national policy makers but to get your point about hey i'm not interested in waste treatment or the uh iraq well we are actually working on through our institute of military support to governance a capability that exists within our civil affairs reserve national guard community that will identify those experts that we can tap into and actually bring forward to to bring true expertise in what are not our traditional military activities to enhance the activities of our of the state department or us a i e etc so we are working on that even though we may not potentially like to apply a lot of energy and resources to it we recognize that that's that we might be called upon to do it so within the special operations community and certainly within the army special operations community we're working on on just that that area so i think the the haimo concept again helps contribute to and and provides you know real justification of why we need to apply going back to resources more resources and and some funding to these efforts so that we have an ability when we talk about options to our to the national command authority that they're they're backed up with capabilities policy is not our space options not ultimatums is military advice is the development of these concepts will as i said involve a wide range of people so from an education and exposure standpoint i think over time you know we hope to see more people think more thoughtfully about these ideas and particularly those in civilian life tank tanks and elsewhere who come in our government that they take that on board but at the end of the day elected and appointed officials make policy so our job is to give them as many options as possible i think uh we had right here that he was he's at his end of for a while Andrew Davies right there hi morning abuma smith from noetic corporation uh just turning to general collier's comments about how phase zero may actually be the the time when we can really make some traction with this this concept we've already acknowledged that some of the most effective levers that might be pulled in phase zero and not actually military ones but the ones that are commanded by other elements of government first question we started to deal with this have we started to engage the rest of government on this concept to bring them on board with it is the first one and the second point is the best military lever that might be pulled at an early phase might not be an american one might be an international one or a partner who has better access in a particular area how do you internationalize the concept potentially well uh okay so the first part of your question was have we opened this up to other parts of the government in our agency i don't think that either concept really addresses a change to the current relationships that we have in the interagency and how we work i think it's more for within the department of defense and the joint forces to have a better understanding about the effectiveness of operating on the left side of the bank better than we do today um and i think that there'll be a natural growth to the effectiveness of that coordination with the interagency and the second part of your question was oh international um it's going to translate uh to to international cooperation just the same we we have been doing joint war games with the international community on this idea for for some time now uh with the international community with partners with allies um certainly the relationships that are established from my perspective would allow that certain partner or ally to take the lead and have a coalition come together to effectively address situations in that manner so yeah i i would say you know one example is the fact that our theater commands now army commands all have multinational officers as a deputy that's a deliberate uh decision in fact in the paycom we have a uh us army africa's deputy is an australian so we're starting to do that right now to make those connections and to have our actions reinforce and enable non-military elements of our government okay we can we provide a carpet for them to move on and that's part of what we have to do particularly as an army with this part of our responsibility well said uh so right back there in the middle thank you um richard figure off student uh you said earlier or you said earlier that the military is no longer just a hammer i was wondering where the role of something like the peace corps would be in uh informing our uh perception of other countries or other countries and communities perceptions of americans in general before uh we go to the ground with troops or anything like that in the future things a valuable tool and resource prior to going into afghanistan in 2001 you know we sent out kind of a blanket all called find anyone that's ever operated worked with uh luja hadine not just obviously inside our our central intelligence agency but but elsewhere to come in to certainly my organization at at the time the the face special forces group to give us a better understanding of what we're going to see on the ground the what are you know some of the key tenants that we don't want to be violating right up front and so no there was a remember the and we did the same thing before we went into iraq and there was our multinational partners some from uh nato some from uh non nato countries that were able to come in and some were former ngos that had worked and provide us a unique perspective on what what we could expect culturally and from specific groups that we would be working with so i see that you know absolutely a tapping in it into the peace corps and other experts with they're really culturally attuned or cultural experts and again the hamel concept should be you know addressing that i would just say peace corps and military are not in competition they're complimentary especially in in the you know kind of gray or white space of of peace as it exists today and what the peace corps tries to do and others usa id et cetera is more effective in countries where there is stability and rural war so you know and unfortunately in some countries that's provided by the military more than civil police and extortion and there's not it's not a competition okay and there's been multiple examples where peace corps and a id and other experts in cultures came back to us particularly in east africa and said you know all those wells that you're digging out there you know the what you missed was the fact that you didn't go to the local tribal chief and get his overall approval or blessing for it and that's why the locals aren't utilizing it or that's why it was destroyed last night so hey guys you know you need to get tuned into who the relevant actors are out there and work these projects and activities through the the cultural systems that are in place here in east africa i think that organizations like the peace corps are absolute great inroads for us to establish relationships in places where we don't have them right now and i can think of some examples in indonesia where marine corps trying to broaden its theater security cooperation efforts and that and the relationships with those countries just don't exist and you just don't walk in there in a uniform and and knock on somebody's door and start having a conversation so in that area it's it's it's a great benefit and truly complimentary back here and then up here yes carol brookens i was u.s executive director on the board of the world bank from 2001 to 2005 had the privilege of being in iraq several times during that period and thank you for your service yeah many of the fine men and women who served with you so thank you very much um what i wanted to follow up with we've had several discussions under haymo about the development agenda i think what you all know what we all know is many of these conflicts occur in countries that are not particularly well governed and not particularly thriving economically so i kind of post my time at the bank classified countries has emerged as emerged emerging yet to emerge and submerged but in my own private conversations but i think there is a lot of metrics that you may wish to use and tap into as you develop your strategies from governance indicators not just mci here but governance indicators investment climate indicators and changes and what's been happening and who are the leaders poverty surveys household poverty surveys and then the bank itself and out of the other development if he's go through not always accurately but they go through what's called evaluation analysis of projects why they failed why they succeeded so i think there's a lot of work that can inform you in these early pre-planning stages to understand better some of the challenges that the development community has not even been able to solve because there's no local ownership the stakeholders aren't really committed to improving the lives of their people or the elites don't care or i could go on and on but thank you again yes ma'am i think the introduction of or the inclusion of the treasury department at the geographic and bank commands those representatives has contributed to this understanding and certainly what i was the sock africa commander and we would work with different country teams they would they would bring in also the the other experts the those from the banking interest industry that were calculating the risk to investments in in certain african countries had an incredible understanding of what was going on politically socially within the within the country that informed the the africa command as to how much resources you know how much engagement you know would we be able to achieve some of the theater security cooperation objectives that the combat command had for us and so i there's obviously more work that needs to be done there and a much more sharing but i think it's occurring and you know my my haimo teams back there taking notes to make sure we continue to incorporate that into our concept hi jen jensen with politico um there was a report that the pentagon was late delivering to congress a few months ago on whether it was feasible or smart to train every uniformed officer in a foreign language so i'm wondering what your thoughts may be on that particular concept whether you know that just sort of scratches the surface whether it's feasible that that's service questions i took german in high school is that count maybe wow so every uniform i i'm not familiar with the report i think it goes without saying that that skill set is just such a huge benefit it's to everything that we've been talking about here about shaping operations early preventing conflict potentially or at least mitigating it we at least in the marine corps that's that is a a core skill that we want to make sure we have enough linguists and not just on where we've been and i think what we're seeing a lot of that now um in the pacific and in and and additionally more emphasis in africa some areas the challenge i'm not familiar with the report either so but the challenge the challenge is not their fault it's late the scale you know the army trains about the marine corps every year okay in terms of induction right and we train educate about 400 000 people every year so when you think about organization of a million people could be going down we'll see that's a challenge so i come back to my point about the benefit of wrath okay and being aware and i'm gonna try to say this cultural rise okay vice culturally expert okay i grew up in asia i used to speak time i may be speaking it today i'm not sure but i would you know so i did not speak pashtun and i did not speak arabic but my comfort living in foreign countries and dealing with foreign people made me much more effective in working with my partners in both of those countries okay and i think for the majority of our military if we can achieve that that will be good enough not perfect but good enough yeah just to dovetail off general hicks's comments about scale so socom invests millions of dollars into language training because we recognize that in order to be culturally truly culturally tuned and experts you got to be able to communicate in that culture and that society and so we we look across all our components of where we're investing language and resources to ensure that we're you know utilizing this as best we can and predominantly it's within the the army special forces community where this is an absolute requirement for for our operators to to speak a foreign language and but it's still a challenge for us on scale and then the other challenges go to you know how do how do you continually reinforce their language expertise if they're not continually immersed in the language and utilizing it then it's you know that that's that skill and that ability begins to erode and so that that's a continued challenge with for us because all of the other things that we ask our operators to to do and be qualified and and experts in so we continue to work very hard on that where we we focus on our our language labs but it would be a and i'm not familiar with the point but it would be a significant and tremendous investment in order to try to train and then get the you know be able to sustain that over an extended period of time for the officers but we add that we do track our officers and others who speak languages not just in special forces i'm i'm sending a artilleryman to molly right now and he's one of two that speaks french so it's his turn if i could ask a question about what happens next with the strategic land power task force as a as a task force i mean you've now sort of evolved these two concepts those are going to go off and be developed as is the sltf's work done uh does it what's its continued role what how does the evolution continue well we're that's what we're going to go talk about oh okay when we leave here for the next hour okay so um i'm going to hold my cards too much i'm kidding i'm kidding uh look there's great and from my perspective there's great benefit in the task force it's done fantastic work uh we we discussed the white paper earlier there's a terms of reference that uh was agreed to by the the service chiefs to get this task force going there's still some outliers in that terms of reference we're going to go talk about um but uh i i see you know just fantastic results from what it's done with the with the inception of these two concepts and the fact that they've both been accepted as a joint prospect this is is a a big big touchdown in the overall game that sltf is playing and building a wider understanding here in the uh in the capital was the the team we had here uh you know just your move uh alone is a you know significant uh evidence of progress absolutely so so co so calm wants it to continue and the the benefits are tremendous for us to be able to partner with with two services as a functional command command so with some service like authorities it it brings a tremendous weight to the to the table when we're moving concepts forward when we have the army and marine corps right there alongside us so we obviously the the strategic land power task force will needs to mature and relook what the the terms of references are and so we're going to have a meeting shortly after this to to discuss your what is the way i didn't know the answer to that question i wasn't sure there is of course um okay so i guess my final question is for you general um i'm sure you've recognized have you not that working on this thinking about this too long makes your hair fall out not that i want that to affect it it's a meeting that comes next but uh i'm still trying to accept the gray i don't worry about being bald sometimes to cut this off before it gets too far down there now all right well thank you all very much for coming this morning thank you for coming to talk with us we really appreciate you