 Hi, my name is Colonel Jim Modlin, I'm an Army officer and currently serving as a military fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace for this year. I've deployed to Iraq four times. My first deployment was in 2003 to 2004 and then I came back in 2006 to 2007. Again, 2008 and 2009 and then my last deployment was in 2015. So it definitely evolved from my first deployment to really my third. My first deployment was right after the invasion in the summer of 2003 and I served between Ramadi and Fallujah in a small town called Habania. During that time, the insurgency was just beginning. We faced former regime elements initially and then over the course of the fall of 2003 into the spring of 2004, the insurgency really began. We started seeing foreign fighters and I was present for the first battle of Fallujah, the first major combat operations in Ramadi and then spent the summer of 2004 in Baghdad conducting combat operations. That deployment was very kinetic. It was very focused on the enemy. We had initial partnerships with the fledgling Iraqi security forces but it was very enemy focused. I came back in 2006 deployed to Nineveh province in northwestern Iraq and that was more population based. It was on the heels of significant combat operations in the town of Talifar, west of Mosul and during that deployment I found myself partnered more closely with Iraqi security forces. I was a brand new captain at the time and my job was to build relationships with the Iraqi army and Iraqi police. During that deployment I spent a significant amount of time in Sinjar, in Sinjar mountain with the Zedid people and that was at the beginning of the surge. During that deployment as well is when we saw the beginning of significant sectarian violence. My formation was pretty lucky. We had a great relationship with the sheikhs and the local populace and we were able to prevent significant sectarian violence in that area. When I redeployed in 2008 and 2009 that was very different. Iraqi security forces were quite capable in our area. I was in Saladin province at that point and we oversaw the provincial elections and the ultimate removal of American forces from the cities in 2009. When I left in the fall of 2009 I was very confident in the Iraqi security forces. I thought the Iraqi governance was moving in the right direction and frankly I was hopeful. Looking back 20 years now I regret not having more interaction with Iraqi people during my first deployment. Like I mentioned we were very enemy focused and though we did our best to minimize collateral damage I didn't have a lot of interaction on a personal level with Iraqis. My second deployment that completely changed. I was working closely with local leaders. I was working closely with the Iraqi security forces and I got to know the people, understand the culture and really start building trust in a partnership and I think that comes with shared hardship, shared experience facing danger together and that really grew my appreciation of the Iraqi people. I was able to put that into practice during my third deployment as a company commander. At this point I had almost three years deployed to Iraq when I came back from my third tour and being able to put those tools that I had learned in my previous two deployments together helped my partnership and really helped me immediately establish bonds of trust with both the populace and my Iraqi security force partners. The big lesson that I've taken from Iraq is that peace building is hard. It's hard work and it takes time and it requires trust, trust amongst all parties. A example that stands out in my mind is taken from my second deployment to northwestern Iraq and Innova province, Talfar in particular. I came on the heels of significant combat operations by the third armored cavalry regiment and the Iraqi security forces to root out an insurgency inside of the city. When we came in about six months after that, a peace process was just beginning where the shakes, the local leaders from various tribes and ethnicities were coming together to discuss problems and to have a solution that was beneficial for everybody. That easily could have died if it wasn't for some significant efforts of both American military and Iraqi security force officers that took the time to foster conversation and defined where there was commonality as opposed to differences.