 I just want to tell you this yesterday in a little press conference I made a remark that I was puzzled by this statement that Ambassador Goldberg had made about the refusal to go ahead with the fight on the news question. Now this afternoon Ambassador came up to see me and I just wanted to tell you that he gave me the whole background of the darn thing. I think it was a very great depth and I was quite satisfied that he, I told him that I would not only, if questioned again on this thing, would not only say that I had no criticism to make, but that I believe that under the circumstances that there probably was no other course to take. So I just want to tell you that Mike looked at that for the moment. It was nothing in my part, nothing but the lack of understanding and he made it very clear to me. Well, I appreciate that. They want to get us in the fight and they're not going to do it as far as I'm here. They came in this morning and said that you said that at some one time when I referred to some letter that you had written expressing our views on helping people to help themselves, that that didn't include military and therefore I was trying to kind of play it shady or something. And I asked Bill Moyer and I just told him to reply to it this way and he did because I know how you feel about your country and I know how I do and the only body I like as much as I do is your brother. And here's what he says. Bill, there seems to be a difference developing between the president, Mr. Eisenhower, about the nature of our commitments. As you know, the president cites the letter that General Eisenhower wrote. Mr. Eisenhower says today that his letter was mostly in terms of aid, not military aid. See, Mr. Moyer, that's Press Secretary Jim Hage. Incidentally, he's been down here and he's been of a great deal of help to us. I think trying to be loyal to you and trying to help me. Here's what Moyer says. The president doesn't feel that there's any difference between former president Eisenhower and himself. He thinks that his purpose and the purpose of administration is the same as the purpose of President Eisenhower and the Eisenhower administration in regard to Southeast Asia. And that is to preserve the peace and to present to the world a face of unity and a policy of harmony as far as this nation is concerned. The president has often quoted letters that President Eisenhower has written and he's done so by a matter of historical reference. He has quoted, for example, a letter which the president wrote to Sir Winston Churchill. Let me see where it is. Well, as a matter of fact, that message itself is absolutely correct. The only thing they asked me, they said, did you read it? They're only trying to say, you know, that the military plans, people that don't know a damn thing about the military business, think that the military plan has to start somewhere and of course it does. But they wanted to say that I started a military plan. I said, now, let's make those mistakes here. The conditions of today are vastly different from those from 55. But if you will look up my record, I constantly said, we are going to support Vietnam. Now, in those days, when we just recently signed, and we didn't sign the order, the treaty, but all the rest of the nation did except South Vietnam and ourselves. That treaty had certain measures that precluded real military positioning of troops there, except in terms of advisors. And then we did that. Now, when I left, when I was in my last year there, we had about 365 advisors. I think we rolled up to about 600 because of the size of the country. But I did say constantly, we are going to support Vietnam. But at that time, it has not come to a military. That's exactly right. By reasons beyond your control and mine, the damn thing did become military. That's right. In fact, during the two or three years before you came in. That's exactly right. Now, I've constantly said, in the condition that it is today, I support the current president, consistently. Here's what Maurice says further. The president has quoted Mr. Eisenhower as a historical indication of the commitment of the systems by the Eisenhower administration, which is the kind of commitment that the Kennedy administration and the Johnson administration believes is necessary to preserve peace. The president was not an executive branch. The government was not responsible for the policies that preceded his coming into office. But he does assume, and the only man who assumes the ultimate responsibility for our present policy in Vietnam is the president president. He believes very firmly, as president and commander-in-chief, the responsibility for our policy there is his. On a slightly different note, the president personally has had the highest regard for President Eisenhower's advice, as considered since he assumed office on November 22nd, 1963. President Eisenhower has been a tower of strength to him personally, a very helpful advisor on more than one occasion. That he, the president, does not intend that any division come between himself and President Eisenhower. And in fact, so far as the White House is concerned, and employees of the White House are concerned, anyone who tries to provoke a reflection on General Eisenhower will definitely not be around here very long. The president sees no division between himself and the form of President Eisenhower, and I repeat, and he doesn't consider any effort by anyone else to get General Eisenhower to provoke such a division as serving the national interest. Well, that's a very flattering, very strong statement. Actually, this is just the newspaper man that he thinks he can get something. Now, he really asked me the question. I didn't think of it at that time as one that was trying to show that I was differing from anybody else. He just asked me what my commitment was. I said, well, there wasn't no military problem at all. My God, we just signed, everybody else has signed a treaty. We were suspicious of the treaty, and we would not sign it. But I did say, time and again, both in support of the MSA appropriations, but in two or three other states, it's in matter of the record, the statement of the public papers, that we were going to support South Vietnam. Well, General Wheeler said in the letter the other day that you wrote 54 to Churchill, and the letter that you wrote to Jim, that 10 years later, 11 years later, that he hoped his documents looked that good. And I do too, and I just pray mine won't look at good 11 weeks, much less 11 years. We're doing the best we can. They're not, they're not, they're not. And I had my share of it, I assure you. I told him, yes, I said one reason that I support the bipartisan approach, and so gladly we'll give that to my experience, but as a president, whenever he wants it, whatever it counts like, is because I learned the hard way about how difficult it is to keep this signed. And if you read the New York Times or something back there about 1955, we're going to go, I'll tell you. He hadn't been born in Texas and hadn't had Sam Waverland and Lyndon Johnson, old Bill Nolan, might have run over all others. No, not Nolan. He had his limitations. Yes, yes, yes. Well, I just wanted to tell you that I was very, what I say, what I think is that the reasons given are very cogent, and they're ones that probably can't be talked about, at least just not all of them. But I can still, I honestly can say, as I see it now, as nothing else could have been done. Well, I appreciate very much, and I appreciate your calling, man. I'm going to lean on you in the days ahead. When you feel like eating the dinner, let me know, and I'll get some of these rough-necked friends of ours together. I'll do that. Okay. Waiting.