 Today's lecture is entitled the Arctic Ocean Region and the Future of American Power. Our presenter is Dr. Walter Berwick, who currently serves as an associate professor in the College's Wargaming Department. He is the founding director of the Arctic Studies Group and co-lead scholar of the Newport Arctic Scholars Initiative here at the Naval War College. He established and now teaches the College's area of study for the Arctic Region and is the co-author of the forthcoming book, Newport Manual on Arctic Security. An alumnus of our college, he holds a master's of arts degree from Salve Regina University and earned his doctorate from Northeastern University. He is a former international affairs fellow and current term member of the Highly-Regarded Council on Foreign Relations. Earlier in his career, he served as senior advisor to the special representative for the Arctic Region at the Department of State and served for 10 years in the U.S. Navy. Okay, Walter, zoom us away to the frozen Arctic. Thanks, John. Thanks for the introduction and thank you, Admiral Chapfield, for your leadership during these challenging times and for revitalizing this important lecture series. And a big thank you to everyone on the front lines helping us through this pandemic. And a special thanks to all of you for taking the time out to be with us today. Now, this is one of my favorite events here at the college, not just because we get to learn about pressing national security issues and some of the extraordinary work done here at the college, but because we have the rare opportunity to experience this with our spouses, partners and loved ones. And I wouldn't be speaking to you today without the unyielding support of my spouse, my best friend, the rock of our family, the love of my life, my wife, Lori Burbrick. And if you want to go to slide two, Gary, but lately it seems like all we've been asking each other really is, you know, what's, what's for dinner. But I've also found myself asking lately, how did we get here? Asking the same questions generations have asked. Why weren't we ready for Paul Harbor? Why weren't we ready for 9-11? Why weren't we ready for the coronavirus? What will the next generation ask? If this generation, my generation doesn't wake up to the realities of a thawing ocean to our north, I believe the next generation will ask, why weren't we ready for a blue Arctic? They will ask this question not because of lack of information or lack of funding, but because we failed to learn the lessons of the past, because we failed to imagine and lead today. So I'm going to discuss a part of the world that should be a central focus of the United States, but it still isn't today. But as is often the case, elements of the U.S. military are looking over the horizon as to where the trends of current events are headed. And this talk is over a decade in the making, and in some ways echoes one of America's first strategic thinkers on the topic, Navy Vice Admiral R.H. Cruisin, a Naval War College graduate, who challenged military leaders of his time to think about problems of polar warfare in a 1948 lecture at the Naval War College. In my journey studying, teaching, and writing on Arctic issues here at the college started over a decade ago with my work on the global shipping game and the fleet Arctic operations game, the former of which found that changes in global shipping patterns as a result of an opening Arctic in 2035 will occur gradually, not overnight. The Fleet Arctic operations game examined U.S. Navy capability gaps in the Arctic. And what we found really honestly surprised me and many leaders in our Navy and in the Pentagon. The U.S. Navy, the world's greatest maritime fighting force, is not prepared to conduct sustained maritime operations in the Arctic. And in many ways, even 10 years later, this finding still holds true today. So why is this? Well, two thoughts. First, if we take a step back, Americans really, to no fault of our own, view the world through their mercator of projection, which has become the standard map for navigation. If you walk into any classroom, boardroom, or war room today, there's a good chance you'll see a map of the world, a map that shows North America and South America right there in the center with the Atlantic Pacific oceans right there in the middle. And the Arctic off to the edges, you know, the out of sight and therefore out of mind. The United States, after all, is a Pacific and Atlantic nation, East Coast and West Coast making up over three quarters of America's shoreline. And the wars we fought in the 20th century, World War I, World War II, Korea, Vietnam, all in one way or another were fought in the Atlantic and Pacific. And for the most part, our whole outlook has been confined to these two oceans and more recently the Indian Ocean, as well as land wars in the Middle East. But what I'm here to say this evening is that the United States must center its view of the world on a third ocean opening up to its north, the Arctic, which is quickly thawing and rising in importance. Another barrier to American power in the Arctic is that we've forced ourselves to think and organize in a Cold War mindset. After World War II, the United States divided the world into regions and sub-regions with area experts in Europe, Asia, and Western Hemisphere. Studies and think tanks did this, Congress, the White House, State Department, Pentagon, even our intelligence community all did this. What I'm here to say this evening is that these artificial lines on a map are collapsing and converging, especially in the northern navigable rimlin of Europe, Asia, and North America, stretching from the North Atlantic and North Sea, through the northern sea route in the Northwest Passage, through the Bering Strait, into the North Pacific Ocean, to the southern tip of the Aleutian Island chain. Now as I said earlier, America Sea Services, the Navy Marine Corps Coast Guard, have been on to this for some time. The Tri-Service U.S. Maritime Strategy of 2007 was one of the first documents to acknowledge the potential for competition and conflict over access to new shipping routes and natural resources in the Arctic. In 2009, the Navy formed Task Force Climate Change and issued its first-ever Arctic Roadmap. The most recent version aligns the Navy's approach to the Arctic with the 2017 National Defense Strategy issued by the Trump Administration, which acknowledges the re-emergence of long-term strategic competition between nations, and that the U.S. Navy must be ready to secure America's interest in the Arctic. In parallel, the U.S. Coast Guard issued its Arctic Strategy in 2014 and then again in 2019, where it indicated that it would be the most visible and active sea service in the region. So why is this? First of all, the Arctic is undergoing profound physical changes, the likes of which are historic and troubling, with temperatures across the Arctic Ocean region increasing two to four times faster than the global average. And as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change suggests, the enduring effects of rising temperatures are greatly reducing sea ice cover, land ice from glaciers, and a Greenland ice sheet, and permafrost, covering most of the land area in the region. In fact, over the 42-year satellite record, the Arctic has lost over 640,000 square miles of sea ice in March. And if you want to hit play there, and that's an area the size of Alaska. And if this trend persists in the Arctic, may have little to no sea ice in the summertime by the end of this decade, and mostly thin and very unstable ice during its much warmer winters. In a flight I made in December along the coast of Greenland, I observed many large areas of the Arctic Ocean that were entirely ice free. Now, how is this happening? Well, without getting into the science of it all, very simply, Arctic sea ice keeps the polar regions cool and helps moderate the Earth's climate. As sea ice melts, it exposes the dark ocean surface. So rather than reflecting 80% of sunlight from the white ice back into space, the dark ocean absorbs 90% of it. And so as the Arctic Ocean heats up, our temperatures rise further. And that's the vicious cycle we find ourselves in today. And while the Arctic Ocean may be the world's smallest, it's quickly rising as one of the largest in terms of its economic potential. Because of the physical changes I just mentioned, a blue Arctic Ocean is emerging, offering new opportunities to transit and trade over what historically has been frozen waters. Imagine a future ocean, a blue Arctic, where shipping containers and all the oil and gas, the natural gas, the fossil fuels that come primarily from the North Sea, Alaska's North Slope and Russia's Yemal Peninsula are transported by ships across the whole Arctic Ocean. Some 4,000 miles across through the Bering Strait Choke Point, which is between the United States and Russia, to coastal cities in China, India, South Korea, and Japan. In the northern sea route, which is a long Russia's coastline, there to your right, is the most navigable sea route. And cuts off about 40% of distance travel compared to the sea routes used today. The Northwest Passage, which we use through the Davis Strait between Canada and Greenland to the Bering Strait, will likely remain a less viable option for regular commercial shipping in the decades ahead because of its shallow depths, its narrow features, and sparse infrastructure. But the real game changer, and the one often overlooked by sailors and scholars alike, is the Transpolar Route, which is more of a reality toward mid-century. Opening maritime trade and traffic directly over the North Pole, the fastest and shortest east-west trade route of any by far. Now, I emphasize maritime trade because still today, 90% of all trade by volume still travels across the world's oceans, with seaborne trade expected to double over the next 15 years. The Arctic is also home to some of the world's largest oil and gas formations. In fact, the US Geological Survey assesses that 13% of the world's undiscovered oil and 30% of the world's undiscovered natural gas lies above the Arctic Circle. Nearly 85% of which is offshore with heavy concentrations in Alaska, Russia, Greenland, and as you work towards the North Pole. So the Arctic Ocean region is a geographical tool linking political developments in Asia, Europe, and North America, all at the same time. Past generations have realized this, and the quest for sea routes, by way of the Arctic, are filled with stories of courage and endurance, as well as triumph and tragedy. Since the very first wave of indigenous people some 30,000 years ago, people have navigated the high North in search of food, supplies, and settlement. The Vikings sailed North of the Arctic Circle in the nice century when Eric the Red colonized Southern Greenland. Then in the 12th century, Russia began exploring and colonizing parts of Northern Siberia, and by the end of the 17th century, the whole vast territory was part of the Russian Empire. In the 1500s, European explorers traveled further and further north, claiming lands and often kidnapping local natives to take home as proof of possession. British, Dutch, Norwegian, Russian, Danish explorers all set sail over the next four centuries, navigating several thousand miles across the harsh northern longitudes to find an east-west trade route through the seemingly impenetrable ice. All failed. The British Navy made a big push in the 1800s to find the Northwest Passage, culminating in the ill-fated voyage by Sir John Franklin. The ships and crew were lost, and at least 15 rescue expeditions failed to find them. And it was the search for Franklin in the Northwest Passage that brought the United States to the Arctic for the first time. And it was the curiosity and courage of one US Navy were Admiral Robert Perry, who spent the better part of a quarter century exploring the Arctic by steam ships and sled dogs. He was the first to reach the North Pole and helped Americans understand the importance of Greenland. Unlike the many who failed before him, I believe big reason for Admiral Perry's success was because he had a spouse by his side. Literally, his wife Josephine accompanied him to the Arctic on several expeditions, and at one point at eight months pregnant. And it was the ensuing rush for oil oil off the Alaskan coast that gave birth to the American Arctic 153 years ago. An extraordinary move made possible by the forward thinking and leadership of one US Secretary of State, William Stewart, and with the stroke of a pen and a whopping $7.2 million check later, the United States came an Arctic nation. Bringing an end to Russia's 125 year Odyssey in Alaska and its expansion across the treacherous Bering Sea. Which at one point extended the Russian Empire as far south as Fort Ross, California, just 90 miles from San Francisco Bay. Just in terms of wealth, the US gained about 370 million acres of mostly pristine wilderness, an area twice the size of Texas and almost a third of the size of the European Union. Hundreds of billions of dollars in fuel, fish, and rare earth minerals have been produced in Alaska over the years. But in all honesty, this wasn't America's brightest moment either. Alaska Natives who already lived on these lands, were neither consulted or informed. They didn't become US citizens until almost 60 years later. In a decade after that, tribal governments formed, finally giving indigenous people greater autonomy and influence. Today, the Arctic is home to 40 different ethnic groups and indigenous communities. You have the Sami people in Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Northwest Russia. You have the Nenets, the Kanti, Ednick, and Chukchi peoples in Russia. And distinct Inuit groups spread across Alaska, Canada, and Greenland. Taken together, indigenous peoples represent 10% of the total population living in the Arctic. A population struggling to survive and thrive as the Arctic opens. From the 11 million gallons of oil spilled in Alaska in 1989 to the deadly viruses and bacteria emerging from permafrost today. An opening Arctic has significant environmental impacts on people and nations, and indigenous communities are most vulnerable. In Alaska alone, there are over 230 towns and villages affected by sea level rise with many forced to relocate. And no matter where you travel across the region, indigenous communities face the same challenges. Economic inequalities resulting from immigration, loss of traditional knowledge, along with high rates of substance abuse, suicide, and domestic violence. Lack of political participation, education, and capital are just few of the major barriers in feeding, growth, and opportunity. And to put this vulnerability in perspective, I want to share a quick story. On a trip to Anchorage, Alaska a few years back, I ran into a gentleman from the Arctic Village, which is the most northern remote village in the Arctic. I asked him, I said, what brings you to Anchorage? He said, I'm looking for work. It's becoming harder and harder every day to put food on the table and take care of my family. And towards the end of our conversation, I asked him, I said, out of curiosity, has anyone from the federal government, the administration visited your college? And he said, no, but we did have a Chinese delegation visit not too long ago. They were interested in learning and helping us with some of the subsistence living challenges that we face in establishing education and culture exchanges. So today, right now, multiple major powers are competing for access and influence in the Arctic. Small states and subnational territories in the region face mounting pressures, as they take on larger roles in this new era of great power competition. Authoritarian governments, like China, are gaining power in sparsely rural communities, like the Arctic Village I just mentioned, is losing strength. And so in this new era of great power competition, what we're seeing is China moving vertically north, and Russia moving horizontally, east and west, across the Arctic. China's northern roots stretched as far back as the Ming dynasty, when the Manchester invaded Beijing from the north. Today, you can even still find some descendants still living in northern China, whose ancestral homelands lived just north in Siberia. China, less constrained by budget and electoral cycles compared to the US and Russia, has the luxury of taking the long view. A view that stretches to the Arctic, out past 2049, the centennial of its revolution. And for the Chinese Communist Party, or CCP, this view is best visualized here on a map developed by a Chinese geophysicist, and used by more than a decade by Chinese scientists and military leaders, showing the Arctic at the center of China's ambitions, and just how seemingly connected this far off part of the world really is. In 2008, China released its first Arctic policy. And despite being more than 4,000 miles away from the Arctic Circle, the CCP declared China to be a near Arctic state, making clear its ambitions to secure access to Arctic sea routes and natural resources. And this policy aligns with the remarks made by President Xi Jinping 40 years earlier, saying for the first time that China would be joining the ranks of the great polar powers. These powers, of course, being the United States and Russia. So what we're seeing is a CCP, China, that's executing a multi-pronged strategy in the Arctic, with heavy doses of science, diplomacy, and economics. A strategy, I believe, aimed at gaining access and influence over Arctic states, as part of its third ocean strategy to control the Eurasian continent and achieve global dominance. And China's ambition to build a polar silk road is already underway. Projects in mining and energy to infrastructure and financial products. China's Arctic investment dwarfs that of many other countries and is in keeping with their ambitions to become a great polar power and a great global power. In the last decade alone, we've seen China become an observer state in the Arctic Council and spearhead the Arctic Circle Assembly, the largest gathering of world leaders on the Arctic. We've seen China take ownership of rare earth minimal deposits in Greenland and Canada and unsuccessfully fund, buy, and build airports and seaports, including an old US naval base in southern Greenland. And while the CCP hasn't openly addressed any ambitions to build a naval base in the Arctic, such a move would be viewed as a threat not only by the United States but by Russia as well. We've seen China complete its ninth research expedition in the Arctic and increasingly fish in Arctic waters. We've also seen China build its first domestic icebreaker and polar expedition cruise ship. And by the end of this decade, China's population is set to swell to one and a half billion, which will likely solidify its place as the world's top consumer of energy and seafood. And that's a big reason why the state of Alaska is the top US trading partner with China. With over a quarter of all the exports headed to the mainland. And China's 100 years of natural gas demand and Alaska's 100 years of supply along its north slope were met last year when President Trump inked a $43 billion deal to export LNG to China. And for China, a navigable northern sea route along Russia's coastline it lies at the heart of its Arctic strategy and allows the Chinese to avoid the geopolitically tense Suez Canal and US Navy ships in the Straits of Malacca. And if one of these sea routes goes down for any reason, China can bypass it and increase its flow through the Arctic. Some studies have projected that China could divert over half of its commercial transits through the northern sea route. And if melted straight over the North Pole by mid-century, which would cut transit times by more than half and save China close to a half a trillion dollars a year. So that's why we've seen the Chinese state-owned Costco shipping group ramp up production on a new fleet of ice strength and container ships to sail from ports from Asia to Europe by way of the Arctic. It's also a big reason why Costco has established footholds in Europe by investing in port terminals that were previously neglected by private European operators. In 2018, the world's largest port infrastructure developer from China visited the northern Norwegian town of Krakens, situated just 14 kilometers from NATO's northern land border with Russia. And they did that to build a megaport, which would be the first and last stop in the European economic area along the Northeast Passage, linked with rail connections throughout Finland, even across the Baltic to Estonia. And a year later, Chinese workers finished building the longest suspension bridge above the Arctic Circle near the northern port city of Norfolk. And so as China moves vertical north towards the Arctic, Russia is moving horizontally east and west across the Arctic. And a prominent figure in Russia's past is reemerging in the form of President Vladimir Putin, who, like Peter the Great, has high hopes for the Arctic and has devoted much of his life trying to make Russia a great maritime power. In many ways, the Arctic will define Putin's legacy. So he's personally involved with building out an Arctic fleet, a string of ports along its northern coastline, and ambitious energy exploration projects, like the world's largest LNG project in the Northwestern Siberia's Yomal Peninsula. And Russia, by far, remains the biggest player in the Arctic, both in terms of territory and resources. With 50% of the total Arctic coastline, the Russian Arctic already makes up about 20% of Russia's GDP. And in the years ahead, it's only expected to grow. But Russia's golden ticket, like China, is an increasingly navigable northern seru. And it views this passage as its own Suez Canal. It has seen steady increases in cargo transit, mainly between Russian ports. This 3,000-mile route connecting the Atlantic and Pacific oceans crosses five marginal seas in three straits, including the global maritime choke point of the Bering Strait in between Russia and the United States. But here's the issue. Russia considers this passage as internal historical waters, its own territorial waters, a view that actually Canada shares with regarding the Northwest Passage. The US, however, disagrees, citing that these waters are international, because they connect two bodies of water along the high seas. And while Nordic states have remained silent on how to define these passages, that hasn't stopped Russia from imposing further controls over the route, like requiring advanced notification of passage, reporting ship characteristics, and requiring Russian pilots. As recently as last year, November of last year, Putin imposed new regulations, allowing only Russian flag vessels to carry and store hydrocarbons along the northern seru. And just last week, the Russian government approved plans to build out the northern sea route to the Bering Sea all the way in the west to Kamchatka in the east. And I believe in the decades ahead, an increasingly navigable northern sea will emerge as a nexus of competition and friction between Russia and any state that challenges its control over these waters, whether that be the United States, China, or some other country. However, no nation or navy to date has challenged Russia here. And doing so brings great risk, likely triggering an aggressive Russian naval response. So what's happening is that China's fear of influence and Russia's fear of influence is overlapping in the north. Other than issues surrounding the Russian-Chinese border, Russia and China do not have a difficult history. In fact, before 1640, they had very little contact. That was until Chinese armies drove Russian settlers out of Siberia. But after 1689, China and Russia made peace in established trade agreements. In 1869, however, Chinese troops ambushed and killed a group of Soviet border guards on Zambol Island, which is one of the many disputed islands on the Ussary River. In fact, this year, 2020 marks 70 years since the Soviet Union, and China ended their formal alliance. Since then, scholars and diplomats have described their relationship as a mutually beneficial partnership. But I think that's a little gracious. I'd say it's more like a marriage of convenience, a limited partnership solely when it benefits both. A marriage rooted in historical grievances, geopolitical competition, and structural factors. These two giants, at least today, do not share a common vision for the Arctic, nor do they have a common understanding of their respective roles in it. In many ways, the China-Russia relationship in the decades ahead, I believe, resembles what first emerged in the 17th century, a rivalry for access and influence to control the Eurasian continent. But like the old Chinese proverb says, two tigers cannot live on one mountain. And what has renewed this China-Russia rivalry, and I call it a rivalry, is the opening Arctic. You have Chinese troops on the Russian land border. You have Chinese drilling platforms and fishing trawlers currently in Russian waters, as well as Chinese port facilities on Russian territory. And I should also mention here that Western sanctions have driven Russia and China closer together, where Chinese companies and government agencies are now major stakeholders in energy and port infrastructure projects. If we look out towards the east, China convinced Russia to build Zorobino into the biggest port northeast Asia, which is just southwest of Russia-specific fleet in Vladivostok and close to the Chinese border, linking railways to inland regions of China. You also have Russia and China competing for access and influence over the most northernly ice-free port in Asia, the port of Rajin, located on the border of North Korea and Russia. Close to the mouth of the Tumen River Basin and the Sea of Japan. China also signed a statement of intent to build a deep water port in Ark Helngalsk, which is Russia's largest northern coastal city in Finland. Now, in Russia's sparsely populated far east, you have Chinese investors, workers and migrants moving farther and farther north to access timber, minerals and oil. But Russia can't stand idle and watch a third of Russia become a Chinese province or allow China to expand its influence into this region closer to the Arctic towards the Bering Strait region. And that's why, it's one of the reasons, one of the main reasons why the Russian government is offering its citizens its own modern-day version of the 1862 Homestead Act in the United States, handing out free land to its citizens to reverse its declining population. So these two tigers show that their influence, their spheres of influence are overlapping in the Arctic. China's population is about 10 times that of Russia. The Chinese economy is growing almost 7% a year while Russia has just gotten over a recession is unlikely to grow more than 2% a year in the coming years. And China, so China in many ways is more on par economically and as a result militarily with the United States than they are with Russia. And as my good friend in Naval War College colleague, Admiral Lars Sonnis often says, the Arctic is a geopolitical earthquake and the aftershocks will be felt for decades to come and rising military powers, converging at the top of the world is a big reason why. During World War II, the Arctic became a strategic location for transporting weapons and supplies and pockets of fighting as the Germans attempted to sabotage Allied operations, bases, airstrips, radio links, completely transformed communications across the region. And as the Cold War took hold in the 1950s, the Arctic became a critical theater in the standoff between superpowers. Radar stations and pockets of military personnel were permanently scattered across the region. After the Soviet Union collapsed, both Russia and the United States turned their attention elsewhere. But this changed in 2007 when Russian submarines planted a Russian flag on the seabed of the North Pole, catching the world and the White House by surprise. Over the past decade, we've seen significant Russian military buildup in the region, not Cold War numbers, but we're on our way there. There we go, there on the right slide, yeah. So we've seen modernization of Soviet air bases and new air defense missile systems along North Russia's Northern archipelago, including France, Joseph Island and Rudolph Island, both located just 600 miles north, 600 miles from the North Pole. We've seen Russia build new polar ice breakers and submarines for its Northern fleet, located off the Barents Sea on the European side. In October, 2019, at any one point, you could see 10 active Russian submarines operating in the Arctic in North Atlantic. At the same time, we're also seeing larger and more frequent NATO deployments north of the Arctic Circle, including the 50,000 personnel from 31 countries that took part in the Triad Juncture Lecture, exercise of 2018. And earlier this month, the US Navy sent ships to the Barents Sea for the first time in a decade. And China doesn't wanna leave it up to the United States and, for that matter, Russia to secure its sea lines of communication. And that's why we're seeing longer out-of-area deployments in the Indian Ocean, Pacific Ocean and Atlantic Ocean. And I believe over the next decade, this trend will continue in the Arctic Ocean as well, where we'll likely see Chinese submarines making annual transits to the North Pole and ice-capable Chinese surface combatants making frequent patrols north of the Barents Strait, perhaps even going into the Northern Sea route. In 2015, during President Obama's visit to Alaska, we saw a glimpse of this when the Chinese Navy surveyed America's Aleutian island holdings, sending a five-ship amphibious squadron near Adu to eye America's communications and surveillance resources at the Undefended Ericsson Air Station. And so geography matters. And when looking at a map with the Arctic at the center of the world, several places rise to the top as likely flash points for competition and friction among people and nations. This includes conflicting views and control over navigation in the Northern Sea route and access to resources around the Norwegian Island, a small board, overlapping claims between Russia, Canada and Denmark at the North Pole and underdeveloped far East in Russia as well as an underdeveloped Greenland and the emergence of what could very well become the world's most important strategic choke point to Barents Strait. Needless to say, the vacuum America and for that matter, Russia has left in the Arctic region since the end of the Cold War is in many ways being filled by China, whose interests differ dramatically from ours. That's why contrary to popular belief, I believe China, not Russia, poses the broadest, most complicated and long-term threat to U.S. interest in the Arctic and many ways that holds true for Russia as well. Chief among these challenges is the deconstruction of the system of states that has emerged as a result of the Ottawa Declaration and has been held in place by the Arctic Council over the last 20 years. And that system has been held in place by the United States and Russia who have formed the bedrock of it. Now, what does all this mean for the future of American power? Well, I'll work here at the Naval War College through the Newport Arctic Scholars Initiative or NAZI for short, found that greater access and maritime activity, especially military activity in the Arctic, increases the risks of accidents, miscalculations and conflict, risks that can be mitigated by building awareness, confidence-building measures and capabilities between nations and navies. And this starts with Arctic nations and navies and more specifically between Russia and the United States. This new ocean provides Russia and the United States a real opportunity and a rare opportunity to reset relations and redefine its relationship in the decades ahead. And managing China's rise in a blue Arctic should be front and center. Russia should be the starting point for a renewed American Arctic policy. And any policy that attempts to sidestep, marginalize or even contain Russia in the Arctic is unrealistic, it's harmful and it would be doomed to fail. Such a position would not only poison our historically cooperative relationship in the Arctic, but would also hinder America's ability to strengthen cooperation with other Arctic neighbors. That's why this year, our work through the Newport Arctic Scholars Initiative recommends the creation of a high-level political military forum that brings together Arctic heads of state to address regional economic development issues as well as security issues. It's also why we're calling for Arctic navies to come together to create an Arctic Ocean Naval Symposium modeled off the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium as well as the creation of a cues-like framework similar to the one implemented in the Western Pacific. Now, what does all this mean for the US Navy and for future force structure? Rather than simply asking how many ice breakers we need, we should be asking ourselves and one another, what capabilities do we need to deter and if necessary, rapidly respond to military advances or some undue influence by any nation or Navy? What forces do we need to assure allies and partners in the Arctic? How do we posture our forces to keep Arctic sea lines of communication free and open? What kind of naval power should we project from the Arctic to gain an advantage in other places like the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans? And in all honesty, our Navy isn't designed and postured to do any of that. It's built for high and war fighting in warm waters in the Pacific and in the Atlantic Oceans primarily. In about three quarters of our surface fleet, operating around the world, including ships in service and under construction are very expensive, large surface combatants with large air and missile defense radars and none, not one US Navy ship in our inventory today or surface ship is ice strengthened, ice hardened or ice capable. So the US Navy, more specifically our surface Navy isn't designed for day-to-day operations in the Arctic. Surely the US Coast Guard has ice breakers and cutters that can fit into this gap. But as we know, white hauls don't have the same capability and influence as gray hauls. And at $1 billion a ship, it's only gonna get harder and harder to get ice breakers through Congress. And if anything were to happen in the Arctic today, whether that be a large-scale cruise disaster or if the Navy decided to close or restrict maritime access in the Varing Strait or somewhere else, it would take days, even weeks, for a US Navy fleet to respond. And the last time I checked that the peers at San Diego, Naples, Norfolk, Yucusco, Hawaii aren't getting any closer to the Arctic Circle. Not to mention three fleets. Second, third, and sixth all claim responsibility in the Arctic. Very simply, the Navy faces a time-space force problem in the Arctic. And we can't overcome this problem by ignoring it or through periodic deployments and ice-free waters or by simply taking an existing fleet away from somewhere else in the world. To truly secure America's interest in the Arctic in the decades ahead, I contend that the US Navy must build a new fleet, an Arctic fleet. The Navy already wants to build a fleet of about 355 ships by 2030 up from the 293 that it has today. However, when fully accounting for an opening Arctic and a blue Arctic, the Navy should strive more towards 400 ships. This accounts for a new Arctic fleet equipped with new multi-mission ice-strengthened surface vessels, ice breakers, and submarines. An Arctic fleet permanently stationed and spread across the region, from the several underutilized small boat harbors and the Aleutians to a deep water port in Port Clarence to modernizing World War II-era US Naval bases in Greenland. A future Arctic fleet designed and postured for everyday operations, equipped with manned and unmanned platforms that can operate on, below, and above this new ocean. And this new fleet commander would have the time in region to build relationships and trust with Arctic navies, especially Russia. Now make no mistake, this is an ambitious vision. And the cost of a robust naval presence in the Arctic may seem high. But as the United States learned after the Falkland Wars and as we're relearning today in the South China Sea, the cost of maintaining sovereignty over territory is a lot less than trying to get it back after someone either rents it, buys it, or simply reaches out and grabs it by force. And if we're gonna do all this and do it right and do it by the end of this decade, then surely we must imagine and lead today. Thank you very much, everybody, and I look forward to our discussion. Back to you, John. Thank you very much, Walter. I'll tell you of all the lectures we've done. I think you probably brought up more information that a few of us know than any other subject because I think many of us just, it stops at the top of that map and we don't know much about it. So a couple of questions. You say we don't wanna just count numbers of ice breakers, but in fact, how many ice breakers do we have and what's our building plan, both Navy and Coast Guard, to increase that number? Yeah, we currently have two operational ice breakers, the Polar Sea and the, geez, Healy, thank you. And the Coast Guard is actually moving forward with a plan to build a six, three medium, three heavy. And that plan really extends out over the next decade, if you will. And so, but the costs are increasing more and more, but right now the U.S. Coast Guard is the primary service that operates and manages our U.S. ice breaker fleet. And so really it's incumbent upon the two services to coordinate and manage operations so that in a sense where an Navy needed to be escorted the Coast Guard was there to do that form. And you compare that right now with some of the others. I mean, China currently is working on a fourth and Russia has dozens of them, right? So we're certainly far behind, but again, it's not all about the ice breakers. As much as important as an asset they are, I think we need to be asking different questions or more holistic questions that help us understand what types of capabilities we really need and be able to maximize the value and be good stewards of good taxpayers' dollars to maximize the capabilities of these platforms. Thank you. You mentioned that we don't see a lot of surface operation. How about submarine operations in the Arctic? Is that anything you can speak to in an unclassified form? Yeah, I think the biggest thing for submarine operations and the thing that's most open out there is the Navy's ice ex, their exercise they do. In the last few times the Navy has gone up to the North Pole to do these operations and set up ice camps. They've actually had to close up shop a little quicker than anticipated due to cracks in the ice. And so that I think is one of the highlights for the Navy but under the sea and in the air, our capabilities are proficient and that's been the focus. That's been the focus, but I think the focus moving forward is on the surface and that's where we're most efficient. I've seen reports of the potential for a new Navy base in the Arctic area in Alaska. Is there a possibility that that might happen? Yeah, you know, the Army Corps of Engineers has done a couple of studies and looking at Nome and Port Clarence. You know, I think we have to think a little differently about our port systems and more specifically how they're used between the Navy and the Coast Guard because if you look, again on a map and look at the importance and the emerging importance of the Bering Strait, to me Port Clarence seems like a pretty optimal spot has the depth and everything you would want and the protection. And so I think Port Clarence to me makes pretty good sense which is right there at the mouth of the Bering Strait. So those two are really are the two probably most likely options and the two options that have been looked at the most. You showed an interesting slide there since I'm the drone guy here at the college and whatnot. You talked about unmanned systems. What role do you see for unmanned systems both on the surface, below the surface and above the surface? Huge, I think that is an area that has so much potential and as we try to increase our awareness both on below and above this new ocean opening up I think unmanned platforms that operate in each of these domains really should be one of the first areas and that we put most of our R&D into and allow us to better understand and mitigate some of the risks that are involved with primarily with surface operations. So I think unmanned platforms and the Artic Council did a little bit of work in the last few years to establish an agreement that would mitigate the likelihood of friction or potential bumps if you will between platforms of states. But I think that to me is a growing opportunity not only for Arctic states, but non-artic states that are looking to attempt to both gain access and influence in, but also to try to gain visibility of what's going on in the region from an environmental perspective. That leads directly into a question that we just got that said that there was a discussion at a conference last week about COVID-19 and that it was having problems and slowing us down from gathering the information, the data that we need in lots of areas including the Arctic. Is that a concern for you considering where we are today? Yeah, and I admittedly wish I had the chance to tune in for that entire event, which was phenomenal. You know, one of the hardest things is in the biggest, again, vulnerability or concern in focus area for policy makers is engaging with indigenous communities and indigenous peoples. And the spread of this type of virus only puts them, those who are on the front lines in a more vulnerable position. And so I think with everything going on right now, to a certain extent, so much travel is restricted and paused. So yeah, it does prevent us from trying to engage and learn more about them. But yeah, it's certainly an issue that it's just a little too early to tell what the long-term impacts are on the coastal communities. You showed a picture of a Russian flag at the bottom of the ocean. What has been the result of that? Was that a statement on the part of the Russians that they own that territory? And did our State Department object to that? Or what was the significance of that flag planting? Yeah, that's a good question. So it was actually done by, it was a scientific mission and the mission was actually, the flag, if you look at the location was an extension off of the Russia's continental shelf. And so it technically wasn't directly over, at the top of the North Pole, it was still within Russia's continental shelf, if you will. But in all honesty, I think the media in many ways and what it does with Arctic affairs quite often is just it hypes things up. So, but that doesn't, I think, depreciate the situation. And it really jump-started, especially here in the United States at the time, really jump-started our focus of the Arctic. In fact, it was that flag planting in I think January of 2007 that really jump-started our US policy initiative, if you will. And at the end of the Bush administration in 2009, we finally released our Arctic policy. But that was one of the driving forces behind it. And it increased folks' interest and awareness of the region. Tough question. You advocate building another fleet, building more ships. Any idea where the funding for that kind of initiative might come from? And if we do that, what don't we do? Yeah, that's the wrong question. I think, if you look across in how our fleets are organized and constructed today, geographically speaking, like I mentioned, one, we can't ignore it. Two, we can't just push on a periodic basis, surface ships and ice-free waters and expect to have a presence and influence on a permanent basis. And so, and we can't take away a fleet from somewhere else in the world because we have too many problems and issues and interests. And so, I think, who's gonna make the decision to take a fleet away from South America to move it to the Arctic and ice-strengthen it, right? And so, that's why I believe we need a new fleet and an Arctic fleet. And I know there's reemergence of second fleet, but they've got their hands full with the Atlantic. And so, third fleet on the West Coast and they're coming farther from San Diego. And you got sixth fleet out of Naples, who has a dog in the fight. So, and so, we have to be smarter about where we position these ships and what types of ships that we need. And in terms of funding, that's, again, that's a question that we have to tackle. How much, first, what do we need and how much is it gonna cost? But it's gonna eventually come, be appropriated through Congress. Well, we've had a number of questions about allies and our friends in the region, is there any substantial effort to have a consortium of some sort that would help represent the ally's interest in that area against the Chinese, the Russians, whichever the case might be? Sure. So, there's a number of forms, right? There's NATO is, as I mentioned, having a more, as increasing their presence and is trying to grapple with what type of role it assumes in the Arctic in the decades ahead. But in all honesty, that the Arctic, the NATO, I don't think is necessarily the right form to, especially to bring in Russia and to establish communications and dialogue and potentially security cooperation across the region. And I talk about the Arctic region, but it is very much divided into subregions, the North American Arctic, the Russian Arctic, the European Arctic, and there's cooperation right now through the Arctic Coast Guard Forum primarily, but again, that's just limited to the Coast Guards, the Arctic Council, which is the primary intergovernmental forum for cooperation in the region, but that's just limited to environmental protection and stewardship and sustainable development. And so today, to date, there really isn't, with the exception of the Northern Chods, Chiefs of Defense, Arctic Security Forces, Roundtable, but these are all limited in dormant in many ways. So and through our research through the NASI program, what we found is at a very high level, we need a new form, a new political military form that brings leaders together to talk about some of these pressing military security issues in the region, something that can bring the US and Russia at the table, assuming that folks don't wanna change the mandate and charter of the Arctic Council and there's disadvantages of doing that. But I think the disadvantages outweigh the advantages in changing what the Arctic Council is and what it could be. And so when you look at future forms that bring together allies and partners, and that can bring Russia and the United States and just the region in general closer together to increase dialogue, increase cooperation on security defense issues, I think something new is needed and that's what we're pushing for both in terms at a high level, but also between navies, because as I mentioned, you got the Coast Guard Forum, but there's nothing that brings together the navies. And so recognizing this, we're advocating, we're suggesting that Arctic navies come together and develop and create an Arctic Ocean Naval Symposium like the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium. Now at one point, I believe we had an ambassador to the Arctic or a similar term. Does that position still exist and how does the State Department look at that region? Yeah, and so right now the Arctic issues are covered in the Russia-European office. At one point, under the Obama administration, we, the White House had the Arctic Executive Steering Committee, which brought together, coordinated, integrated and synchronized Arctic issues across our government. And that was at the White House and that was led by Ambassador Brzezinski. Similarly, in the State Department, we also had the special representative for the Arctic. And so that was our chief diplomat in the region, if you will, and that was Admiral Papp, Robert Papp, the former common on the Coast Guard. And so today, both of those forum, which were very, very influential, very important and productive, don't exist today. And so that is one of the issues, right, is our national security institutions aren't organized in a way that allows us to build those synergies from the different regions when looking at the Arctic. And so whether that's whether we're looking at the Pentagon, the State Department, or the White House, or any other government institution or agency, we need, as well as the Intel community, we need people and organizations and leaders who are Arctic specialists, who understand the region as defined by bringing North America, Europe and Asia and looking at the Rimblin. Absolutely. Do you have any final wrap up remarks you'd like to make, Walter? I do, just thank you very much for everyone tuning in. We really appreciate it. And again, thanks to everyone on the front lines, holding it down and helping us through this pandemic. And we'll, now's the time to really be there for one another as neighbors, as co-workers and as spouses. And so thank you very much, everyone. We really appreciate it.