 Ladies and gentlemen, on behalf of the Institute of International European Affairs, I'd like to welcome you to what the institute is calling an armchair-style discussion with Ambassador Bill Burns. My name is David Donahoe. I'm a retired Irish diplomat. Our topic is America's role in the post-pandemic world, but I imagine that we will range far and wide across the landscape of U.S. foreign policy past and present. And there's no better interlocutor and authority on this than Ambassador William Burns. Bill is president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, has been there since he retired from the U.S. Foreign Service in 2014. And in the course of, I can fairly say, an illustrious 30-year career as a professional diplomat, he held critically important posts abroad and at home. Those abroad including Ambassador to Jordan, 1998, 2001, Ambassador to the Russian Federation from 2005 to 2008. He also held top posts in the State Department, including that of Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs from 2001 to 2005 in the immediate aftermath of 9-11. He was also under Secretary for Political Affairs from 2008 to 11, and he was Deputy Secretary of State under Hillary Clinton. He was only the second career diplomat in U.S. history to attain the post of Deputy Secretary of State, a sign of the remarkable prestige which he enjoyed really throughout his career. And it is therefore a very great pleasure that we have Bill with us today. He has, as it happens, Irish roots on both his father and his mother's side, and indeed, his wife Lisa also has Irish roots. So in a sense, we are welcoming one of our own, as well as a foremost authority on U.S. foreign policy. Our conversation follows the usual IIA format. It will last for some 25 minutes and will be followed by question and answer session from the audience. You're all warmly invited to send in questions, and in the time available, we'll try to pass as many as possible to Bill. Before beginning, let me confirm that this conversation and the Q&A session will be on the record. Bill, you're very, very welcome. We haven't literally got the armchair, but hopefully we can make up for that on some future occasion. Last year, you published a monthly account of your career under the title The Backchamber. It has been very warmly received, including in Ireland. In a sense, it's an assessment of American diplomacy over the past 40 years at the highs and the lows, the successes, the mistakes, but as much as a record of your own career. So to kick off our conversation, Bill, could you say really, could you address the point? Why did you decide to write it? What moved you to write The Backchamber? First, it's wonderful to be with you today and to be with all of everyone in the audience as well. We recovering diplomats need to stick together. So it's a pleasure to have the chance to talk with you, even if only virtually this time. I wrote the book The Backchamber, I think, for two reasons. First as a memoir, and second as an argument. The memoir part is pretty straightforward. What I was trying to do is enliven diplomacy for a wider audience. Diplomacy, as you well know, may be one of the world's oldest professions, but also one of the most misunderstood. It does oftentimes operate in back channels out of sight and out of mind. And I was very fortunate over three and a half decades as a professional diplomat to play a modest role in some of the most significant events in American foreign policy as the Cold War was ending and then in the quarter century or so after the end of the Cold War. From working in the first Bush administration for Secretary of State James Baker, from whom I learned a great deal of a very fine diplomat through Russia's evolution from Boris Yeltsin's Russia when it was flat on its back after the end of the Cold War to a much different Russia under Vladimir Putin for most of the last 20 years. Putin's particularly pugnacious combination of ambition and grievance and insecurity. And then, as you mentioned, spent a lot of time, for better or worse, on Middle East issues from high points such as, I think the coalition that President Bush senior as well as Baker and others organized to expel Iraq from Kuwait. In the early 1990s, the Madrid peace conference that Baker masterfully put together, which created a very rare moment of hope on the Israeli-Palestinian issue. And then some much more somber moments, the tragic mistake we made in the war in Iraq in 2003 and the turbulence of the Arab Spring some years later. I led the secret talks with Iranians on the nuclear issue through all of 2013 and beyond and helped create the framework for the comprehensive nuclear deal that's sadly receiving in the history now. And then, especially in the last decade or so of my career, spent a lot of time focused on the rise of Asia, China's rise, US relations within the range of other issues, as well as the great overarching global challenges of our time, whether it's climate change or global health insecurity, which we've been painfully reminded of in recent months as well. So I tried to be honest in the memoir part. There's always a temptation to write what you wish you had said as opposed to what you really did. So I tried to anchor this and declassify documents as well. So you could see words and all things that I got mostly right and things that I got wrong as well over the years. The argument just to add one last brief point is also quite straightforward and it is that over those three and a half decades as a professional American diplomat, I've never seen a moment today when diplomacy mattered more to the pursuit of American interests and the values we share with so many other countries, especially across the Atlantic. And not only mattered more, but been more adrift a moment when in both tangible and intangible ways, my old institution, the State Department and the institution of American diplomacy is being hollowed out, which I think carries with it real risks for the way in which America conducts itself in the world. Yeah, I mean, I think it's obvious to all of us that US diplomacy is a drift. That's a good way of describing it. A drift certainly in the last few years. But I mean, does diplomacy itself as an instrument of international relations, does it still or cannot still command public support, do you think? I mean, it's an issue that we ask ourselves or a question we ask ourselves here as well. We are fortunate in Ireland in that there has been generally a strong volume of public support for diplomacy. But we're a small and fairly uniform sort of nation and maybe the immediate dividends of our diplomacy are more visible and we were fortunate that we were recently elected to the Security Council. So that gave a good example of a tangible outcome. But it is vastly more complicated and difficult to explain, I presume to an American public, what are the net dividends of diplomacy? So could you elaborate a little? I mean, in your book, you go into that and it's fascinating, but it would be very interesting to hear your thoughts in this conversation. Of course. Well, first, congratulations on Ireland. Election to the Security Council as well. I know how complicated that process is and no one knows it better than you do. So it's an exciting plan, I think, for Irish diplomacy. I guess what I would say is we have to be honest with ourselves in the United States. There is today a significant and growing disconnect between people like me, you know, card carry members of the Washington establishment and lots of American citizens who when we preach the virtues of disciplined American leadership in the world, don't, in my experience anyway, generally need to be persuaded of the significance of American engagement in the world outside our borders. But they're a lot more skeptical about the discipline part because they've seen too many instances, especially in the last 20 years of, you know, administrations of both parties, not matching ends to means of overreaching, of making some pretty significant mistakes. I mentioned Iraq in 2003, but I think the global financial crisis a few years later was a reflection of a different kind of hubris. So there's a huge task ahead. You have to recognize that Donald Trump didn't invent that disconnect in American society. He's taken advantage of it. And in a sense, ridden a lot of those passions with his argument that, you know, American power in the world is best served unilaterally, that allies and coalitions and partners are sort of like Gulliver and the Lillipushans, you know, that American power is tied down by allies and partners and international institutions. And that the best way to exercise it is to throw off those bonds as well. I think that is precisely the wrong prescription for a moment on the international landscape when the United States is no longer the only big kid on the geopolitical block. I would argue, and I don't mean this as a statement of American arrogance, that we still have a better hand to play than any of our major arrivals. Of course that's in part because of our military and economic leverage, but it's also because of our capacity to invest in alliances, draw on coalitions of countries, mobilize other countries to deal with those great overarching challenges, whether it's climate or pandemics, whether revolution and technology. And that's really the challenge of leadership is to help demonstrate to that skeptical American public, which is really right now from the pandemic itself and its economic consequences to demonstrate that while we always tell ourselves that smart foreign policy begins at home in a strong political and economic system, Washington has to do a much better job of reminding people that smart foreign policy ends at home too in more economic opportunities and a healthier environment and more security as we try to create a more inclusive form of economic growth in the United States amidst all the problems we face today of economic inequalities of systemic racism, many of which have been accelerated and exposed during the COVID pandemic as well. So the first step I think is to be honest about how big that disconnect is in our own society. There is a natural in some ways impulse on the part of a lot of Americans to pull back from the world today and to focus on what many people call the challenge of nation building at home. And it's the test of leadership I think to demonstrate to people that domestic renewal can be served effectively by a smart disciplined foreign policy that helps create economic opportunities on the international landscape for the United States that significantly reforms our immigration policy that so we're once again a more open society than we've been before so that we can take advantage of our technological innovativeness and so that we can work with others on those big challenges like climate change that no one country however powerful that it may be can solve on its own. Yeah absolutely. I mean you raise a number of very important points there but I mean the there's no doubt that one can sense that the American public is is retreating from the automatic acceptance of an American kind of global policeman role and it has been happening for a number of years but Donald Trump as you say has has sort of brought it to a new level or he has exploited us fairly bluntly but none of us know what happened in November. Can you foresee a situation which the next administration if it is led by Joe Biden whether it would be able to retrieve some of that lost ground or do we need to think and you hint at this in your book do we need to think that in fact we've moved on to a third position where the US will never again play that dominant role that we traditionally expect but but where it is one of a number, admittedly it's a pivotal one but it is one of a number of of major powers just in proposition. I mean how do you think things could go from November if I could put like that? I'm by nature an optimist you know I'm a believer in what Alexis de Tocqueville the famous French observer of American life said you know more than a century and a half ago that the truly exceptional quality of Americans is their capacity for self-repair. I never thought we'd put that capacity to as serious a test as we've done in the last four years but I still think that we retain that quality but we have to be honest that it's not as if the rest of the world has waited for us to get our act together the international landscape the shifting in some significant ways. I think we have entered into as you well know Dave one of the most complicated periods in international order and that is a period of transition from the old post-cold war order marked by singular American dominance into a transition with the new order you know only dimly visible on the road ahead and I think it's going to be marked by at least three features one is major shifts and the balance of power among states especially with the rise of China. As I argued before I still think the United States has a relatively better hand to play than anyone else if we play it with discipline and play it effectively. Second is you know as we discussed before those major transformations and challenges that go beyond the reach of any one state climate global health the revolution of technology. And third are major uncertainties about the role of the United States my own country you know the main driver of the post-cold war international order now seen by too many people around the world as having a president who's drunk at the wheel. Now the notion that we can protect our interests further our interests by a rapid rush to retrenchment I think is a mistake. I think it's equally illusory to think that restoration of that period of American dominance is possible but you can just click a switch with the election of a new administration and restore the world as Americans saw it you know a decade ago or two decades ago that's not possible either. What is possible and this is the optimist in me is to reinvent I think the way in which Americans look at the world to recognize that we magnify we multiply our influence by working with allies and partners by reforming helping to reform international institutions as you know from your own experience many of them desperately in need of serious reform but to actively engage in those issues in a way that you know we haven't in recent years so it's it's that task of reinvention I think which is the main one you know before any new administration and and for several administrations to come but the damage has been quite corrosive in recent years as I said not just to my old institution the state department where you've seen a systematic sidelining of career expertise a pernicious practice of going after individual career diplomats as we saw during the Ukraine impeachment saga simply because they were doing their jobs and upholding their oaths to the constitution and then there are the intangible factors you know when President Trump was asked a couple years ago whether he was worried about all the vacancies at senior levels in the state department he said not really because I'm the only one who matters well that's diplomacy as an exercise in narcissism not the diplomacy I learned many years ago from people like Secretary of State Baker absolutely I mean you mentioned a couple of times alliances and from a European perspective it's it has been disconcerting to see how Trump has basically uh closed down one alliance or partnership in Europe after another and um well with with the possible exception of our nearest neighbor but um I mean there would be a lot of ground to make up there's no doubt that for the for the next let's assume it's uh it's it's not a Trump led administration um it is difficult to see that there can be an overnight change in in in the attitude in the US attitudes towards parties now I sincerely hope there will be but um in a way we've seen an erosion over the last four years and um there's a there is a a lot of dismay I think at the way in which American leadership has has retreated so again I suppose one has to rely on your optimism bill that that we will get back to something resembling that um I I was myself an ambassador to Germany for a few years and and others know Germany well and I am particularly dismayed at how that relationship which has stood the test of time really that that that relationship has been left with him on the vine then let's turn perhaps to um other to some areas of the world in inside the more detail be you're a great Russia expert you were there on several occasions and in a way Putin as you say in your book is one of the big disruptors I mean Russia itself may be a declining power but it is capable of of causing a lot of trouble how I mean you've seen uh Russia in the in the 90s the early 90s you were then a bastard in 2005 to age I think um how do you see uh Russia right now I mean at one level Putin's power is in fact uh his internal power should be diminishing because of the state of the economy and lower energy prices but do you think he has the capacity to retain his leverage within Russia until 2035 as I think he has in mind yeah well most of my gray hair I think came from my service in Russia in the 90s and then as ambassador a little more than a decade ago and it's certainly a country that you know very well Dave um I guess I would say the following well let me start with a story I remember vividly my first meeting with Vladimir Putin as the newly arrived U.S. ambassador in Moscow and you remember this very well the meeting took place in the Kremlin which is built on a scale that's meant to intimidate visitors especially newly arrived American ambassadors so as you recall very well you walked down these very long corridors through huge ornate halls you come to the end of one huge ornate hall and they're these two story bronze doors you're kept waiting in front of the doors for a few minutes just to let all this sink in then the door cracks open a little bit and out comes for the American president of the Russian Federation now you know Putin despite his bare-chested persona is not all that intimidating in the flesh she's about five foot six even with lifts and shoes but he carries himself with great self-assurance so he comes walking through the doors and before I got a word out of my mouth says in Russian you Americans need to listen more you can't have everything your own way anymore we can have effective relations but not just on your terms in my experience that was vintage for the American it was not subtle it was almost defiantly charmless but it carried with it a very clear message and you know I think Putin in his worldview in recent years as he looks at the United States these two purposes one is that the best way to create space for Russia is a major power on the international landscape you know even even as it's defining as you mentioned before is to chip away at an American by order and second I think which is convenient for a very repressive regime at home this could be able to point to enemies at the gate the United States in particular in Putin's worldview determined to keep Russia down and try to undermine his regime as well so where does that leave us in US-Russian relations I think we're going to be operating no matter who's selected in Washington and the United States in November within a pretty narrow band of possibilities from the sharply competitive to the nastily adversarial but I would add that even in that difficult kind of a major power relationship you need to preserve guardrails like the new START agreement which is about to expire in just a few months but which reduces regulates verifies and monitors the strategic nuclear arsenals of both the United States and Russia I think it's critically important notwithstanding my sober view of what's possible in US-Russia relations especially in Putin's time to try to preserve and sustain those guardrails as well yes um you by the way you have a wonderful anecdote in your book about Putin sort of affecting a kind of sour like grandeur when you had some when you and I think was it's Condi Rice arrived on a visit and again there's one open ship and there was a reminder me of a one open ship anecdotes about Hilary Clinton I think she also if you're probably not in your time but where she was summoned to a birthday party that he was holding ashen day in the Serbini border I think outside Moscow and again it was Putin's deliberate attempt to wrong for her in various in various ways um the I was with that was with Condi Rice as well the birthday party yeah but um then what do you make of the of the particular holds which Putin appears to have over Donald Trump I mean is it just two people two leaders who have a strictly transactional approach of those hard to see what Trump is getting out of us very hard to see what is getting out of us um but how do you how do you assess or explain the strange mystique that Putin appears to hold for Trump yeah it's a very good question I'm not sure we've yet plumbed the depths of that relationship and what the the you know the core of the transactionalism really is I think President Trump has a bad case of autocrat envy I think in his view of the world you know events should be shaped by big guys and he does mean big guys because he's also a misogynist I think and and he envies in a lot of ways the way in which autocrats like Putin or Xi Jinping managed to conduct their affairs I think he also has a sense of insecurity about the perception on the part of many Americans including the 17 U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies that Putin's Washington feared in our election in 2016 in an effort to boost Trump's chances and undermine Hillary Clinton's as well and so his insecurity about that issue which you hear often in his public statements you know reflects a concern about the legitimacy of his election I think you'll remember the scene on the stage in Helsinki in the summer of 2018 when Putin and Trump were conducting a press conference after their summit meeting and at one point President Trump essentially through those 17 intelligence and law enforcement agencies under the bus and said that in effect he trusted Putin's words he was denying that he interfered in our elections against the judgment of his own experts and that was an effort apparently on his part to ingratiate himself with Putin but I think if you could have seen the the thought bubble or the cartoon balloon coming out of Putin's head on that stage it would have read what an easy mark because from his point of view that attempt to ingratiate was a sign of weakness and manipulability and I think you know in many ways Donald Trump has been the gift that keeps on giving for authoritarian leaders around the world they're adept many of them at manipulating leaders who try to ingratiate themselves with them absolutely then moving to China briefly I mean what strategy do you think best serves U.S. interests with the present Chinese leadership Trump has obviously gone for one of confrontation one could also imagine that containment might might have been more effective or in some way coexistence but what's your what is your own recipe for U.S. Chinese relations at the moment I think competition between the United States and China just to show you that recovering diplomats still have a capacity to restate the glaringly obvious that that competition is going to be the central geopolitical challenge as far out into the 21st century as I can see and in a way that's always the test of statecraft is how do you manage that kind of intense competition so that it stops short of actual collisions and where you can pursue your interests this is in the case of the United States you know in in ways that don't run unnecessary risks I think all of us in Washington over the last 30 or 40 years have probably been guilty of some lazy assumptions about the benefits of engagement with China in other words that as China modernized economically and grew economically it was going to evolve into a more open political system which has not turned out to be the case but I think we need to be careful these days in Washington about a different kind of lazy assumptions the lazy assumptions that we can somehow prevent China's rise or that we can decouple our economies entirely and I think they're far too entangled for them the challenge I think is not so much preventing China's rise it's shaping the environment into which China rises and they're coming back to my earlier point about allies and coalitions and rules I think the United States today notwithstanding all the damage that Donald Trump has done to our our strategies still retains the capacity across Asia from rising powers like India all the way across to our traditional treaty allies in Japan and South Korea and Australia to play a significant role in shaping the incentives and disincentives of the Chinese leadership and I think what that's going to mean is much easier said than done it's amazing how much smarter all of us get after we leave government service but you know it's going to require I think diversifying supply chains so that in certain sensitive areas for national security you know whether it's in 5g technology or you know an over dependence on one particular link in a supply chain for pharmaceuticals and health products as we've discovered during the pandemic to diversify and make more durable of those supply chains and this is not just true for the United States but I think it's true for the European Union as well without disrupting the wider swath of global supply chains which benefit American consumers and which have enormous benefit for emerging markets and developing countries around the world who are about to be hit I think even harder by the pandemic in both human and economic terms as well so managing that relationship is going to be enormously complicated it's going to take a much more serious effort than we've seen in the Trump era to work with allies and partners not just in Asia but also in Europe again not on the assumption that you're going to see identical EU policies toward China but I think it is possible to achieve an approach to China across the Atlantic which is complementary and inconsistent and where we're able to coordinate a little more effectively on a lot of these big overarching issues that's going to be a big challenge I think in transatlantic relations as well I mean just to add one last point I've never taken issue with President Trump's effort to push back against predatory Chinese trade and investment practices where I've been critical is the way in which he's gone about doing that to embark almost entirely unilaterally on a set of tariff conflicts rather than make common cause with the European Union or with Japan with other major players who share many of those same concerns and instead what we've done is started second and third front tariff conflicts with them as well thank you very much for that we might just cover two other issues very briefly then open up the the Q&A session and the Middle East bill on which you are also very very very well versed we follow in Ireland we follow developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict and peace efforts with great interest it's a major priority for the for the Irish government thank you there has been dismay here at the plans for Israeli annexation of further Palestinian territory and then the steady treat on Washington's part from a two-state settlement what's your take on that is that something which we can regard as an aberration on the part of the Trump administration which may be overtaken by a future one or is there a sort of a might a future administration be a little bit more ambiguous I'm just just trying to get a sense of how permanent is the shift in Washington's attitude on on a two-state settlement I think the responsibility for the deep corrosion of the possibilities of a two-state solution between Israelis and Palestinians can be widely shared over recent decades in U.S. administration so I think the you know the so-called you know deal of the century that President Trump and his son-in-law have promoted is is likely to bury a two-state solution and in a sense what we've done is indulge in Israeli government's interest in annexation and the West Bank and taking further unilateral steps which really could be the last nail in the coffin of a two-state solution I think that so-called deal of the century is based on a set of false assumptions the false assumption first that you can make progress toward peace between Israelis and Palestinians and more widely between Arabs and Israelis by working over or around Palestinians second the notion that you know you can substitute economic incentives for people's political dignity if that were the case the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would have been solved a long time ago and third I think the false assumption that time is on our side and the reality is that if you look at demographic changes moving inexorably in the land that Israel controls from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Arabs are going to be in a majority whether it's a decade from now or two decades from now in that area and I don't see how you can sustain Israel as a Jewish democratic society you know given those demographic changes and when occupation begins to seem like a permanent condition as well that's not in the interest of Palestinians nor in my view as someone who has supported the US-Israeli relationship for many years is it in the interests of Israel and its long-term future as well not to mention you know the significant negative consequences for small but important neighboring countries like Jordan as well so I'm so I'm undecided on that issue I'm deeply concerned I think about you know the drift and things and what may maybe still to come what may come and Bill at one point in your book you mentioned that there is a case we made for renewed Atlanticism and we as as Europeans and indeed as Europeans who in Ireland have strong infinities to the US we would greatly welcome that but do you do you think that that will be a priority of a future administration I don't mean to suggest that you in any way are or can be a spokesman for an administration that hasn't yet happened but we I think on this side of the Atlantic would sincerely hope that there are grounds for a renewal of traditional Atlantic links oh I do too I mean I share that belief passionately I certainly can't as you said speak for Vice President Biden on this issue but I think in many of the things that he said and even more importantly you know everything he stood for in his more than four decades in public service he's attached very high priority to a strong transatlantic partnership but a strong transatlantic alliance now obviously given everything else that we've been discussing today that alliance is going to have to shift I mean the realities we've been having political nervous breakdowns on both sides of the Atlantic in recent years on both sides of the Atlantic there's a huge and immediate challenge of domestic renewal the European Union as an institution faces a lot of those challenges especially post Brexit as well so so we both have to understand the significance of domestic renewal but I think the transatlantic relationship but I don't say this out of naivete I think it's going to be as important as ever as you look out into that world that we've been discussing even with the increasing attention with the United States based on China and Asia partnership with Europe with Europe is going to be enormously important but like any other alliance it's going to have to evolve as well from the point of view of Washington I think it's going to be important to actually encourage some things that we've been a little skeptical about in the past like the European Union focusing more on its security identity so that we're focused of course on the importance of NATO and its health and vibrancy but also on ways in which we can strengthen partnership with the European Union so that Americans I think in what sometimes seems like an unnatural act in Washington are going to need to listen a little bit more but at the same time I think you'll see Americans if there's a new administration expecting more as well out of European partners and here I'm not talking just about issues like defense spending or security cooperations as important as they are but also a greater willingness to take initiative you know than sometimes been the case in the past and act resolutely on the international landscape that's something that Americans have you know rhetorically encouraged sometimes in the past but been a little bit uncomfortable about in our you know characteristic paternalistic view of the relationship and so we're going to have to be more flexible too so it'll be it seems to me anyway an alliance that is as important as ever on this new international landscape but it'll be different as well in terms of the the kind of rebalancing that needs to take place across the Atlantic. Bill thank you very much we'll just move into the Q&A session now and I have a question from Peter Gunning who's a member of the Institute former Ambassador of Ireland to various countries Peter greatly enjoyed your book by the way and but he he notes that at the back of it there is a memo from 2008 on regaining the strategic initiative on Iran including the possibility of opening some kind of office in Tehran so 12 years on how do you see the situation in Iran and are there any prospects at this juncture for diplomatic engagement and I suppose I would hang on to that as well Bill your take on the on the the receding nuclear deal on the JCPOA. I mean I think it was a foolish mistake for President Trump a couple of years ago to pull the United States out of the JCPOA the comprehensive agreement with Iran which as you well know was not just a bilateral arrangement between the United States and Iran but involved many of the world's major powers as well was it a perfect agreement of course not you know as you know perfect is rarely on the menu in diplomacy it was the best in my view the best of the available alternatives for preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon by being short of war and Lord knows the Middle East has had more than a share of military conflicts it was meant to be the beginning of diplomacy not the end of it in the sense that had you had a different administration elected in Washington in 2016 you would have seen an effort to build on that nuclear agreement to address issues like the timelines that were laid out in that agreement to address you know remaining significant tensions between the United States and Iran and Iran in the international community over ballistic missile development over efforts to disrupt and undermine other states in the Middle East but what that requires is hard-nosed diplomacy and instead what we've seen I think under the guise of the so-called maximum pressure strategy has been a form of coercive diplomacy that's all coercion and no diplomacy a diplomacy that's tethered to unrealistic games to the assumption that this Iranian regime is going to either capitulate and run up the white flag and say that you know we're going to become like Sweden or it's going to collapse or implode and I don't think I don't need anyone to persuade me of the depth of problems that we in the United States have had with this Iranian regime over more than 40 years and that we continue to have but I think that kind of hard-nosed diplomacy engagement and working with allies and partners around the world which was embodied in the approach to the nuclear negotiations is a far more effective way of dealing with those threats and risks and challenges than you know what we've seen on offer in this administration over the last four years and I do worry about the dangers of collisions even as we look at the rest of 2020 you know when you have hardliners in a sense in both Tehran and Washington posed combatively at the foot of a very shaky escalatory ladder. Yeah Bill there's a question in a way which touches on what we've just been discussing a question from Majid Gulpur who's a senior policy advisor at the Université Libre de Bruxelles and Majid asks really whether the strategic differences between the EU and US are present on the JCPOA and on what to do next whether that has to do with a divergence of interests or simply a divergence of analysis I mean in a sense you've touched on it but if you could take that up and maybe give us your thoughts on what the next stage will have to be. Well I think it's I think just to answer the question directly I think it's a divergence at least in the current US administration in both analysis and interests in a lot of ways. I don't think that that's a lethal combination in a sense as we demonstrated in the comprehensive clear negotiations even though we're not always going to see eye to eye on every aspect of dealing with Iran I think it's possible to resuscitate a broadly shared sense of purpose. On the nuclear issue a lot's going to depend on what's left you know if you have a new administration elected what's left of the nuclear agreement. Vice President Biden for example has indicated publicly that he would seek to resume American participation in nuclear agreement if Iran was living up to its obligations as well and then I think the challenge would be to simultaneously enter into a set of negotiations on all of those other challenges that separate Iran from much of the rest of the world whether it's in ballistic missile development in attempting to end you know catastrophic conflicts like the war in Yemen today for which you know Iran not alone but Iran along with Saudi Arabia and some of our countries in the Gulf share a responsibility but that not to be an impossible task for diplomacy either so a lot depends on what the inheritance is on you know what if anything is left of the nuclear agreement but I think that broad approach would reveal you know if not an identical set of interests between the United States and Europe at least a broadly shared sense of purpose on those issues. I have a question here which in a way goes back to our discussion a moment ago about the need for the U.S. to reinvest in partnerships and alliances so this touches on this goes back to the recent announcements that Secretary of State Pompeo and Borrell I think will be engaging in a transatlantic dialogue on China which will begin shortly I suppose that in principle that is something to be welcomed but because both the U.S. and the EU fear a loss of competitiveness vis-a-vis China I suppose that that is at the basis and they want to establish shared values or recognize shared values but do you think that that particular initiative has much prospect of success in other words an EU-U.S. front in relation to China? Well I think it's a very healthy instinct to begin that dialogue between the EU high rep and Secretary of State Pompeo I think there's a lot to be gained through an honest discussion of such a complex issue with China's rise and the challenges it poses to both of us on either side of the Atlantic I think you have to be realistic about it as I said before there are going to be areas in which we differ in how we approach those challenges but I think you know you've seen on the continent of Europe as well as in the recent decision the UK government has announced about 5G and Huawei you know an increasing concern in Europe not as a favor to the United States or the Trump administration but out of its own self-interest and concern about its you know most sensitive technologies as well so that I think it's it's possible notwithstanding some significant tactical differences to build and coordinate I think an approach that's much more complementary than it is today I think the same is true with regard to deeply important human rights issues for example in Hong Kong given you know recent steps by Xi Jinping and the Chinese leadership as well you know that's an area as well where given the affinity of values across the Atlantic I think it's very important for us to coordinate and speak with as strong and as consistent a voice as as we possibly can that's what's going to have the most impact on the behavior of this Chinese leadership I think you know Xi Jinping as he looks at the world I think sees you know a kind of target rich environment of opportunities created by fissures whether it's in the transatlantic relationship or in America's relationships with partners and allies in Asia as well um but a question from Mary Cross who's a member of the Institute of Board Member and a former colleague a former senior Irish diplomat Mary asks is Eastern Ukraine going to become just another frozen conflict or is there any chance of an advance in the Minsk process what's your take on that well I hate to be a pessimist on that issue in the short run because I think it's it's absolutely in the interests of Europe as well as the United States to do everything we can to support a healthy sovereign Ukraine I worry that from Putin's point of view again as you know from your own experience in Moscow your first prize from his point of view was a deferential government in Kiev second prize is a dysfunctional Ukraine and I think that's what he's tried to do in Eastern Ukraine following the annexation of Crimea is to create leverage that plays on the dysfunctions you know within Ukrainian society as well so I don't think he's in any rush to try to resolve that situation that is not an argument against continuing and trying to renew the Minsk process it's not an argument against the United States in a new administration being much more actively engaged in that effort I think this is a case where the United States and Europe need to work very closely together if we're going to have any impact on Putin's calculations but I think from his point of view you know he's a past master at frozen conflicts and manipulating other societies and I think that's what he's been doing right now. I have a question Bill in relation to the future of multilateralism obviously there are concerns about this against the background of rising populism and nationalism in various parts of the world COVID crisis that the case for multilateral action for collective decision-making is stronger than ever what's your own view of that I mean the book does make a strong case for a renewal of multilateralism but and is one to which we in Ireland would be very sympathetic but overall can you see again a future US administration immediately taking up the immediately joining the forces on that? Yeah no I think you would see a very strong instinct if you have a new administration in terms of working with our key allies especially in Europe to develop what is in effect a new multilateralism in other words which recognizes that there are a number of international institutions including in the UN system which are deeply in need of reform I just think it's a colossal mistake for the United States and this administration as it looks for example at the World Health Organization to in effect take its marbles and go home and suspend participation in the WHO at a moment when you have a raging fire in the COVID pandemic you know running out of control around the world especially in my own society as well that's not the time when you try to reform the fire brigade but we are going to need I think to try to work together if there's a new administration I think the United States and Europe to try to reform some of those institutions that work with others but also look at less formal coalitions of countries I mean that's that's been part the challenge of climate change I'm sure if you have a new administration it'll move immediately to rejoin the Paris Climate Agreement but progress is going to depend how you build on that as well same is going to be true in kind of managing maximizing the benefits of the revolution and technology and minimizing the dislocations here again you're not likely to see some overarching UN convention that's going to set out the rules of the road given the differences between authoritarian leaderships like China and Russia and those of us in more open and democratic systems but I do think that you can notwithstanding all the differences across the Atlantic on some of those technology issues on regulation on the geopolitics of data it's possible to bridge a lot of those differences I think and begin to develop a more of a shared sense of purpose through those kind of coalitions of the willing in a sense and that's how you begin to shape those new rules of the road I think in technology rather than through one overarching international institution anytime soon so it'll be I think a kind of that new multilateralism will be a patchwork of reformed international institutions in some cases new institutions emerging that reflect the realities of the 21st century but you know also those informal coalitions of countries especially transatlantically that share a broad sense of purpose and of values as well and but could you see reform of UN institutions extending to the security council I mean this has been a long standing theme but you know the security council arguably is one of the institutions which most needs updating in terms of breadth of membership and also procedures and visuals and so on I'm sure you've been asked this question many times before but do you see much prospect for movement in our security council reform thank you again you know the united nation system and a security council far better than I do Dave but I think the short answer is yes like any other institution the UN security council is going to have to evolve including the issue of permanent membership the United States has kind of incrementally pointed in that direction that our own policies by providing you know support for the the possibility of Japanese permanent membership in the security council as well as most recently India always emphasizing you know those changes in permanent membership in the context of a reformed security council so that you're making other changes that you know open it up to changing power realities in the world and hopefully make it a once again even though oftentimes this has been a rarity in history the security council an effective institution right now again as you know very well it's paralyzed by conflict between major powers now the dirty little secret over the years is that while many of the current prominent members talk about their support for changing membership deep down many if not all of them are quite content with you know the limits to prominent membership now so it would take you know a real diplomatic effort I think to make progress in that direction but it's going to be essential I think if the United Nations is going to regain the role that it needs to play I think in a variety of areas but so much of that again as you know from your own experience in New York depends on the role of major powers yeah um I have a question from Michael Sanford who's the first secretary with the Department of Foreign Affairs here in Dublin Bill who notes that there has been increase in the in left-wing protest activity recently in the U.S. I mean too do you see that becoming a significant factor in terms of future foreign policy development or is it just a transient moment linked perhaps to black lives matters no I don't think there's anything transient about the challenges we face at home today whether it's systemic racism whether it's you know various forms of inequalities whether it's of income or of opportunity I think one of the deep lessons of the covid pandemic is the way in which it's accelerated and exposed a lot of those domestic dysfunctions and fissures alongside political polarization which has made it very very difficult to recover an art of compromise in American politics as well none of that is going to go away anytime soon but I'm encouraged by the fact that not just through you know widespread demonstrations over a black lives matter and people's understandable depth of frustration and anger and concern over the need for reform finally in our own society I'm encouraged by the way in which Americans seem to be recognizing the need for fundamental reforms in those areas in a way which you know has tended to be episodic in the past there was a great wave more than a half century ago in the 1960s of civil rights reforms and I can only hope that in in that broad area of encouraging inclusive economic growth at a time when we need to focus much more on climate and clean and renewable energy technologies as well it will be able to focus on racial injustice in a variety of you know the challenges and self-inflicted ruins in our own society you know which have crippled us in a lot of ways I think to come back to my point about self-repair at the beginning I still think there is that capacity in American society but what we've been reminded of in recent years is that it takes good courageous leadership to pull that off not the sort that you know we're enjoying today yes indeed but I think we've time for two more questions one one relates to I suppose emerging powers which are the powers which are the emerging powers that the U.S. that a future U.S. administration should focus on I mean obviously we've dealt with China and Russia in their particular context but more generally India is an obvious partner of great economic and political ways in the world but would you like to say give us your thoughts about who the next administration should be looking to to deepen its alliances I mean I think there are a range of parts of the world that historically suffer from benign or not so benign neglect in American foreign policy India has not been one of them I mean there has been a rare kind of bipartisan support over the last 20 years or more in the United States for an increasingly strong U.S. Indian partnership as India rises and I think that will be true if there's a new administration as well not only because of the concerns about China that we were talking about before but just as India's economic growth continues and as it wrestles with some very deep political challenges at home especially the you know the temptation toward Hindu majoritarianism in recent years which I think you know can do damage to Indian democracy as well but I think that relationship is going to be increasingly important one I think Southeast Asia is another area where we saw particularly the Obama administration a lot of focus there and I think that's going to continue to be a focus Africa is an area a part of the world that's again as you know very well going to be hugely important for demographic reasons among many others as the population of Africa doubles by the middle of the century from a billion to probably about two billion people so its significance is going to grow and finally I'd say you know Americans often neglect the reality that our strategic home base in a sense ought to be in North America here in the Trump administration we've accomplished the rare diplomatic feat of alienating the Canadians so I think it's important for us also to look closer to home at countries whether it's Canada or Mexico that matter enormously to the American economy and the health of our society that's very interesting on Africa bill in fact we have given priority in terms of Irish foreign policy to African recent years we've pushed at EU level for a much stronger EU commitment there it's clearly it's perhaps the major partner for the European Union over the over the coming years and so I relate very much to what you said Bill the last question really relates to how diplomacy is conducted nowadays or right now in fact in the COVID context I mean we have denied ourselves the armchair but in a way it should be interesting to have your reflections on whether digital diplomacy is the way that we will increasingly have to go in future because meetings are no longer possible physically and how will that change the the nature of diplomacy which after all relies heavily on personal contact, personal mediation, whispers in the corridor etc I mean it's something which exercises us quite a bit and it'll be very interesting to have your sense of what the future may hold for for new approaches to diplomacy. What's a really important question and I think there's no question but that digital diplomacy virtual connections between diplomats and between foreign ministries are going to become more important not just through the pandemic era but in the years and decades beyond that so the mix is inevitably going to shift I don't think that however is the substitute for what you just rightly emphasized and that's the importance of human interactions because that's what diplomacy is at its core it's a business of human interactions and it's the work that gets done as you said in the corridors on the margins of formal meetings that can build trust and relationships and create opportunities for making diplomatic progress so it's going to be a mix and it'll be a challenge I think for the next generation of diplomats to find the right balance between those but I don't think you're ever going to be able to move away from the significance of those face-to-face human interactions however constrained they may be especially in the pandemic era. Thank you so much for giving us a little generously of your time this morning in your case we really appreciate it and I have to say to those who haven't to those in the audience who haven't read Bill's book I can only warmly commend it I think it's not only a fascinating tour de raison of what you have achieved what America has achieved over the last 40 years so but it is it's full of brilliant insights and it's witty it is also extremely well written and I personally enjoyed it immensely. Bill we were delighted to have you thank you very much I'm sure the industry would love to have you again in future whether virtually or physically and we look forward to that very much you we benefit greatly from what you told us about a range of topics there wasn't really enough time to go into the vast array of issues on which your book touches but I think we managed to hit one or two at the same time. Thank you very much indeed for being with us today Bill. It's a great pleasure thanks so much.