 Hello and welcome to the United States Institute of Peace. We are delighted to have you with us for today's discussion of Taiwan's recent historic elections and what they mean for Taiwan, the Indo-Pacific region, and beyond. My name is Jennifer Staths and I'm the Director for East Asia and Pacific Programs at USIP. For those of you who don't know us, the US Institute of Peace was founded by the US Congress in 1984 as a national nonpartisan public institution working to help prevent, mitigate, and resolve violent conflict around the world. Now, we have a lot to talk about today with respect to last Saturday's presidential and legislative elections in Taiwan. So I want to get right to it, and I'll start by introducing our moderator for today's event, Dr. Evan Medeiros. Evan is the Penner Family Chair in Asia Studies in the School of Foreign Service, and the Kling Family Distinguished Fellow in US-China Studies at Georgetown University. He previously served for six years on the staff of the National Security Council as Director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia, and then a Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Asia. Perhaps most importantly for today's discussion, he's also a Senior Advisor with the China Program here at USIP. So thanks again to all of you for joining us, and without further ado, Evan, I turn things over to you to introduce our speakers. Thanks. Great. Well, thanks Jennifer. Good morning, good evening, good afternoon to everybody. Thanks for joining us today. I'm Evan Medeiros, Professor at Georgetown. Very, very excited to have two wonderful speakers from Taiwan with us today who are going to talk about what happened with the Taiwan election and what it means for geopolitics, and specifically US-Taiwan relations in China's relations with mainland. Let me introduce our two speakers. We have Vincent Chao and Chen Dongso. Vincent Chao is currently the Director of International Affairs at the DPP and was the campaign spokesman for DPP President-Elect Lai Ching-Thu. So he lived in this election 24-7, 365 were very lucky to have Vincent. He's an old friend of ours. Importantly, in addition to being the spokesperson, he was recently elected as a member of the Taipei City Council, which we're really interested, Vincent, to hear a little bit more about. I live in Washington, D.C. if working for the Taipei City Council is like the Washington City Council, you clearly have your hands full. He's got a very, very interesting distinguished career. He was the political director of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office of the United States. He served as the Chief of Staff to the Foreign Minister Joseph Wu and also the Chief of Staff on the National Security Council. So we're very, very lucky to have Vincent. He mixes the worlds of politics and foreign policy. We are just as fortunate to have Dr. Cheng Dong-Sou, who is a professor of political science at National Taiwan University. He was the Foreign Affairs Advisor to the Campaign Office of Hou You-Yi, who ran for president in 2024 from the KMT. And he also served as Director of Mainland Affairs at the KMT from 20 to 2021. And he was the President of the Prospect Foundation for many years as well. He is a very distinguished and widely published scholar in Taiwan at National Taiwan University. And so as you could, as I'm sure you could tell from their bios, we've got a DPP representative. We have a KMT representative. But most importantly, we have two very thoughtful interlocutors and intellectuals from Taiwan who are here to help us understand what happened in the Taiwan election and what it means for global politics. So Vincent, in no particular order, I'm going to go to you first. Let's just talk about politics before we talk about geopolitics. So Vincent, what give us your take on the election? What happened? What's important to know? Well, first of all, thanks, Evan. Thanks for what thanks to the USIP for holding this event. It's late here in Taipei, but we're so happy that we're doing a live event and between two political parties as well, because it's a great opportunity to share thoughts and perspectives following what was a very, very important election here in Taiwan. And let me start by saying this. I mean, this was a true show of democracy. I mean, we had a very fair campaign process. We had each political party share ideas and in different policies to solve political parties come together on various geopolitical issues on cross-strait defense. I mean, particularly on defense, there was a strong consensus on the need to increase our defense deterrence, which for me personally was very, very welcome because I think it's the first time I've seen such strong convergence on this issue. But aside from that, it was also, I think, a strong message to the international community that the Taiwanese people are firmly on this path of democracy and we will continue down this path for years to come. So with all of that being said, let's get into the topic, which is what were some of the key takeaways politically from the election? And you're right, Evan, let's not get into cross-strait first because that's going to dominate the message going forward. But let me start with this. We ended up with a result that was in line with pulperist predictions, which is that we won the presidential race, but then we did not secure legislative majority. And it shows to a certain extent that the people, I mean, the majority of the people, the most amount of people supported the DPP policies going forward. They supported the DPP's track record of achievements in the past eight years. But they also want strong checks and balances in government and they handed a mandate to the legislature, to the opposition there to suggest that they should play a more vigorous role in working with government to bring different perspectives and ideas forward. So that was a strong takeaway, which is that there was a mandate that was quite clear. I mean, it wasn't a very, very close race, actually, on the presidential side. There's a clear mandate for presidents high and the DPP to keep governing, but there was also a mandate given to the opposition to say you need to play a bigger role on the checks and balances component. So that's the first part. The second part is that the K&P's message on cross-strait was not something that was supported by the majority of the Taiwanese people. And it was actually surprising how I think how how uninspiring it was to many Taiwanese people. And I love to get into election issues, but I think this one deserves a bit of discussion on, which is that it does seem like the people of Taiwan, you know, are walking firmly on this path that we've been on, which is that there's convergence on this idea that we are already a sovereign independent country formerly called the Republic of China. There's no need to, of course, declare independence, but neither are we going to go back to this path of convergence with Beijing on different political, economic and social issues. And I mean, the messaging that was in the last phase of the campaign by former president Ma Yingzhou to DW on how people should trust Xi Jinping and that Xi Jinping was not making progress on, what was not desired or did not want, did not push forward on this issue of unification, all of that. I mean, that was just a message that was in the last phase is a brownly rejected by the Taiwanese people. And in fact, many people within the K&T had distanced themselves away from it as well. So that was the second big way, which is just how just how the Taiwanese society seems to have moved on from this message that we've seen consistently in the past, particularly from the K&T. The third idea that the takeaway was that this was an election that wasn't just about Cross-Strait and Cross-Strait played a part, yes, and played an important part, but it wasn't the nominating part. And I would say the dominating part of the election was really on the myriad of social issues that we face here in Taiwan, ranging from high housing prices to to salaries, not keeping up with inflation, cost of living and many of these issues that are faced by advanced democracies and economies, anywhere in the world, but certainly in Taiwan, you know, we're reflected acutely because the DPP has been in power for eight years. You know, we've held all levers of government, at least on a central level for eight years time. And there are expectations that the DPP needs to be making more progress on this. So let me end by saying this. There will be no honeymoon period for Lijing. I think we realize that. I mean, it's we ran on a campaign to say that he is a steady experienced pair of hands and they see he's going to be able to hit the ground running. And the Taiwanese people are going to come to expect that. So we're I mean, it's a two year cycle for elections. So we're going to have another election in 26. And so there really isn't any time to waste. We saw the DPP, you know, increase its votes dramatically compared to the past. We saw a lot of enthusiasm for them, for going to young people. And when we know that we're in a race against time to show that we're able to make progress on many of these social issues that are faced by the people of Taiwan. So let me end there by saying again, it wasn't about cross-strait. It was partially about cross-strait, but the elections were about so much more than just cross-strait issues this time around. Thank you so much, Vincent. Typically articulate, comprehensive. So let me ask you one question. You started out by saying that you believe that this election was a mandate for the DPP, but there are other political commentators that say President-elect Lai won with only 40 percent of the vote. So it's anything but a mandate that 60 percent of the people of Taiwan did not vote for the DPP. And in fact, we're, you know, frustrated with the last eight years when the DPP controlled the levers of power. So a question for you is how do you respond to that very common critique? And secondly, what do you think it is that the 40 percent of the people voted for? And what do you think the other 60 percent of the people want that they're not that that that they didn't think they could get from the DPP? Well, great, two questions. Let me start by saying this. I think I mean, it's a democracy and and unfortunately, it's a winner takes all system. And so there there is just legitimacy connected, obviously, with whoever wins the election, with the majority of votes. And Lai Zhina did that. And I mean, the same argument could be made that, for example, 75 percent of people did not support 65 percent of the people did not support the KMT. You know, 70 percent of people did not support the DPP. I mean, these arguments can be made. But the fact of the matter is that, you know, we received the most out of any political party or candidate in this election. And that in any democracy, obviously gives the president like the mandate to move his agenda forward. So that's the first part. The second part, I think we achieved 40 percent on two aspects. The first aspect, I mean, Tsai Ing-wen was pulling OK in the last stages of the election. Like she wasn't pulling badly. Like we saw my Joe did, for example, in 2016, when the polls were about 79 percent single digits. I mean, she was pulling about 30s to 40s the entire way through the election. And that shows to a certain degree that despite the DPP being in power for eight years and fatigue being associated with that, there was still a strong record of achievement to fall back on. Economic growth, GDP growth over 30 percent, minimum wage over 40 percent. Stock market is doubled, unemployment at record lows. I mean, I could have battled off numbers all day, but the fact of the matter is that there are a strong record of achievements to point back to. But the second part is that I think people see as Taiwan faces a myriad of different geopolitical challenges, whether from across the state, whether in terms of geopolitical rivalries around the world, a great part of competition, whether in terms of global economic trends that a steady and consistent pair of hands is necessary. And Lai is the only person of the three that has central government experience, that has been vice president, that has been premier, that has worked on all of these different issues and has basically built this message on steadiness and consistency, particularly on cost rate and many of these difficult issues that we face. And and he's gone and gone again and again on record saying that there are things that President Tsai has done very, very well throughout the years and that will be continued for years to come. And so I think that message resonated with many people. Now, let me end by saying this, that the DPP didn't get 60 percent of the votes, as you mentioned, Ivan, and that's not necessarily a reflection on DPP's cross-strait international economic policies, but that it is a reflection that on a number of different social issues, you know, we may have not done well enough. And I mean, no government's perfect. Everybody, anybody that says any politician is perfect or any government policy is perfect is going to be lying, obviously. And of course, there are areas that the DPP, you know, needs to do better on. And I think that was a reflection of that. So we've been given a mandate to work as fast as we can, you know, to deliver results as short as we can. And if we're not able to do that, then we're going to face a lot of problems down the road, particularly in twenty six and twenty eight when voter fatigue is going to be even higher than it is today. So but nevertheless, we are going to make the most of the time we have to try to put forward a vision and results for Taiwanese voters. Vincent, thank you very much. That's a very thoughtful, articulate way to understand what the Taiwanese voters were voting for. So I'd like now to talk to to turn to Dr. Chun Dong, so who is a very famous political scientist in Taiwan who worked for the KMT and Dr. So I sort of have the same question for you. You know, the question of what's your take on the election? Right. How should we interpret the DPP victory? Right. Vincent says it's a mandate. Others, you know, there are other opinions. So let's with I love your take on politics in Taiwan. First of all, I think the mandate to DPP is a discounted mandate. It's only 40 percent. What I would like to address with regard to Vincent's note that people reject KMT's cross-trade policy. I don't think that's a valid claim because Vincent seemed to say that the present March remarks, the present March interview with DW was rejected by most of the people and also was alienated. It was kept a distance even by KMT. So it seems to me that Vincent did not say anything about the substance of KMT's claim in cross-trade policy. In fact, KMT actually conveyed two messages in cross-trade policy. One is that one is to resume dialogue with the other side across Taiwan Strait based upon ROC constitution. And the other one is that KMT is opposing Taiwan independence and also one country, two systems. So I think these two claims are not rejected. In fact, I think I would like to say that cross-trade relations is the topic that is hardly debated in the campaign. But it is not a determining or a critical factor for the final result. It is because that the DPP had tried to portray KMT as a pro-communist party and KMT's position as conceding the country's sovereignty, but that does not resonate, as there is almost nothing that can relate miracle to communist authority in mainland China. Similarly, KMT had tried to illustrate the danger of life's independence linking position as it could lead to war. However, much less people believe that a war is imminent than those who don't believe so. So I think this is not the determining factor for me. The determining factor are several others. First of all, government integrity. This has been discussed intensively, and there are cases involving positive corruption, such as government procurement of the COVID vaccine supplied by the medical vaccine biologics and the project of solar photovoltaic systems in Thailand. Thai administration's approach of national champion in industry development is under serious contestation. In addition, the possible corruption cases are also accounted for by domination of the new type faction within DPP. So, Mayor Ho's proposal of re-establishing special investigation division does attract wide attention and resignation. That VPI obtained an unprecedented low rate of the vote, 40%, despite being elected, can be explained by public outrage over these possible corruption scandals. I would also like to add another important factor that is the economic issue as Evan just mentioned. The economy issues are not put in spotlight in debates between the candidates. These debates are on the candidate's performance while being mayors. For example, social housing. How many social housing are built by the three candidates while they serve as mayors? And also, for example, when it comes to nuclear power plant, the question is not on the value of nuclear power, but on who caused the termination of nuclear power plant. I would say these are important issues, but these are not debated hardly. These are not a determining factor for the final result. Nevertheless, it doesn't mean that the economic issue does not matter on the contrary, the poor economy last year cultivates a wide sense of relative deprivation. That is why VPI has expanded the family house without a license to catch wide attention and harsh criticism. So can be said to the dorm building owned by Mira Ho's wife. And these play some part in accounting for the election results. I would also, yeah, if my time allows, I will add the last factor, which is towards the phenomenon. A cause appeal to rejecting both the blue and the green resonated strongly among the population, especially the young people. After the breakdown of the KMT-TPP negotiation for a joint ticket, codes supporting rate had been down to the level below 20% for a month or so. However, after TPP organized a number of successful rallies, firstly in Kaohsiung later in Taichung and finally in Taipei, the excitement of codes supporters is boosted and spread. And so is supporting rates. Some of these rallies actually are organized by one key supporter to Hanguoyu KMT's presidential candidate for 2020. In the eve of the election day, many blue supporters were thinking that Kaoh could win the election. I think this accounts for his unexpected showing in the election results. I think Kaohsiung successfully grasped votes from both the blue and the green camps. And some would say he affects the green camp more than the blue camp. So I think his phenomenon is something to watch for the next several months or even one or two years before the match-stator election in 2006. Thank you, Chandong. Similarly, articulate and comprehensive. So question for you. Obviously, you laid out a lot of criticism of the DPP. But of course, the KMT lost. So what's your view on why did the KMT lose? I think there is a wide consensus among the KMT leadership that we need to work harder to attract young voters. I think it has to do with the approach. Probably not about the substance. I think KMT works very hard to develop policies that could support the young generation. However, I think the young people probably pay as much attention to the approach or the style than to the substance. And I think this is a weak link in the KMT politicians. KMT politicians tend to be conservative. They are very prudent in delivering their ideals. I think this does not resonate among the young generations. I think this is the first thing that people have a high consensus. What the leadership does not have consensus is whether to work with TPP. I think there are two opinions. One is that the KMT should work even harder to obtain cooperation from the TPP so that both parties can form a joint ticket. And that could win much easier. But there is another opinion. The other opinion says that TPP is a dangerous threat to KMT. So KMT should reject that ideal from the very beginning so that the voters, the supporters, the KMT supporters could rally behind any candidate nominated by the party. So these are still debated. Can I ask you, you said it's still debated, but of course the KMT and the TPP tried to come together and in a very pretty dramatic public display, it all fell apart. There's still a conversation about after post the election whether or not the KMT and the TPP can come together even after it was very clear that the two candidates weren't able or interested. I think the debate is on what the KMT should have done to form a joint ticket, whether the KMT should try other ways to form the joint ticket. I think these are the opinions supplied by those who believe that a joint ticket is the only way to win. However, as I said, there are also people who argue that the KMT should reject that ideal from the very beginning. What's your position in this debate? It's a hard question to me, but I would say at least KMT should try even harder to appear to TPP supporters. That's the first thing we need to do. We have to have a wider scope to conversation with young people, with the swing voters. We have to have a clear roadmap with regard to what we are going to do if elected as a ruling party. I'd like to talk about politics one more cycle between both of you. One issue we haven't really touched on is the dynamics in the parliament, the legislative UN, the LI. Vincent, how do you interpret the results and how do you think the LI is going to function? No party has a majority. The TPP has enough votes to caucus with either DPP or KMT. Does the TPP now become the kingmaker? How do you interpret? How should we understand LI dynamics? Great question, Evan. Before I get into it, Evan, I do think that I would do our audience a disservice, but at least not by at least, if I don't respond to at least some of the allegations that were made against the DPP, because this isn't a moderated debate and we're here to talk about policies. I do think that we do have a higher threshold for truth when we're dealing with, for example, an international panel rather than appearing on CTI or TVBS or closer to pan green television stations here in Taiwan. The idea about the vaccine supply, possible corruption, I was mentioned a number of times, and none of those is any truth. Up till now, there has been no lawsuits filed on this issue. There has been nothing that has been ruled by the courts. I think this is why, again and again, the tactics throughout the election just weren't successful because they just weren't based on truth. I mean, the truth of the matter is just that just in the past two days, we've seen lawsuits against that were successful against a number of KMP spokespeople, including one of them from Taoyuan making false allegations against a minister of culture. We've seen a minister of agriculture. We've seen another lawsuit against somebody that was working against with the KMP narrative to spread false information. This person was just released from detention. These are the points in this election that were tough because so much of the rhetoric was just not based on truth. Truth should be a guiding principle for any democratic election anywhere in the world. I'll stop there, but I did feel need to respond to that because we do have a higher threshold. The election is over. The election is definitely over. We don't want to take this in the direction of an election debate, but I'm glad you made your points. Let's get to the issue I talked about, the LY. Let's get to the legislature part. The legislature part is going to be quite interesting because while the TPP holds eight seats, it's really like they hold 80 seats because they will hold the balance of power in the legislature and they will be able to control major pieces of legislation. That gives them quite a bit of power. Vincent, did you say the DPP or the TPP? The TPP has eight seats, but it seems like they have 80 seats because they do control a lot of power in the legislature right now, both in terms of the gender setting, but also in terms of priorities and the pieces of legislation that made under being passed. I guess the question you're getting at, Evan, how do you work past that to actually ensure that we do have a good piece of legislation that's passed? I think what we'll see in coming years are a couple of parts. The first part is that the TPP will continue to exert independence. They're going to try to avoid a trap that has befilled almost every single opposition party here in Taiwan, smaller political party, which is number one, the test of personality. Can this political party survive past the personality of one leader? That's always a challenge we've seen ranging from the people's first party to the new power party to all of these different small political parties. The second trap, the bigger one, is being seen as an associate of a larger political party. What we say in Chinese, Xiaolan or Xiaoliu, small blue, small green. I think they're going to have to exert their independence to show that they are independent and to avoid falling into the traps I mentioned earlier. As a result, this may in some parts bring opportunities, but in other parts bring challenge. Opportunities part, I don't think they're going to tow a KMT ideological line, even if the KMT does choose to work with them. At the same time, in terms of challenge, I think they're going to see things through the lens of what makes political sense for them and what is in their political interest as a political party, not necessarily in the interest of what may be the best for the government at the time. Again, that's sort of the situation going forward. I do hear, this is quite interesting, Evan, you get a kick out of this. I do hear in the TPP itself, I hear voices sometimes that people would rather work with the KMT than the TPP because the TPP and for many pan-green voters had represented betrayal in the past and represents, I think, ideals that certainly DPP grassroots supporters aren't necessarily supportive of, namely an inability to have one clear position on cross-rate or on any of these other national identity issues. And so we'll see how this goes. I mean, it's February 1st, we still have a couple of days and certainly this is something that's been discussed by legislative leadership right now, but I do think there will be opportunities on specific issues to work with both political parties going forward. At least I would hope that is the case. Great. Can I ask you one quick follow-up, Vincent? So you think the DPP will have no problem caucusing with the TPP to get legislation done? And question is, is where do you see their interest most commonly intersecting between DPP and TPP? Well, I wouldn't go as far as to say that there is a possibility of caucusing, but there is certainly a possibility of having robust discussions on what makes sense and making progress on those issues, because that's what any responsible government ultimately needs to do. We can't have eight years of no legislation passed at all with each political party sticking to their guns in no room for compromise. I mean, that's just not an effective way to govern the country. So that's first of all. Isn't the president's term four years though? Pardon? Isn't the president's term four years? Yeah, maybe I should have said four years, but I guess the idea would always be, yeah, the idea would always be ultimately that we do well enough for a reelection. But I guess the second point would be in terms of what makes sense in terms of working together. And like I said, I think the TPP is going to look at it and they're not here today, so I'll be very circumspect as I say this and I'll be balanced as I can, which is I think they're going to look out for their own political interest. They're going to look out for their political branding. But they're also going to look out for ways that they can show that they're able to work across the aisle because we can't forget having this idea of the unity government was one of their kind of main campaign planks. And if they deviate too far from that, I don't think it's a great look for them going forward. And so I think they're going to try to find ways of working on specific piece of legislation that they are interested in and make sense for them. And I think form, you know, certainly I speak in a personal capacity right now because I'm not part of the legislature, but I think legislative leaders are going to have that discussion in terms of areas that are potentially, that people can potentially cooperate on. I have no doubt that discussion will take place soon. Thank you. Chandong, I want to bring you into the conversation to get your reactions and in particular your take on the L.Y. What's the KMT's strategy for the L.Y.? What do you think is possible? What should we expect? So welcome your thoughts. Thank you, Evan. First of all, I think this time around, KMT sends a number of young blacks, new blacks into L.Y. And among all these legislators was age under 40. I think most of them are from KMT. So I think KMT, the new blood of KMT legislators were the first of all, proposed bills that are friendly or favored by young people so that it can rebrand KMT as a party close to the young generation and also to support the young generation. I think that's the first thing that I learned about. And secondly, I think KMT would try to work with TPP on important reform for the L.Y. itself. I think several days ago, TPP, one TPP legislator, would be a legislator, said that he proposed. I think this is a caucus-based claim that TPP would push for reform, including to strengthen the legislator's power to punish officials who reject to provide the documents to the L.Y. and also to push for this close of the speaker's personal purse in its dealing with its business in L.Y. And also it proposed to strengthen the process of nominating officials, nominating important officials such as the members of the control room or like say the NCC commissioners. I think these are the organs, the government agencies that are under strong criticism by the public because these government organs, especially NCC, that are supposed to be independent agents but are considered as just part of DPP government. So they take orders from the prime minister and they do not do things independently. So that's why they propose these reform bills. And the KMT has already said, the KMT caucus has already said that KMT caucus will support this proposal. So I think along this line, we can see a possible cooperation between TPP and the KMT. Interesting. Chengdong, who is likely to be the speaker of the House? Okay. DPP caucus will support Youxi Kun, the former speaker of the House. KMT will support Han Guoyu, the presidential candidate for 2020. But given the fact that KMT has 52 seats plus two friendly seats, so if TPP does not support either KMT or DPP, KMT will win over the seat of the speaker. Got it. Well, thank you both. We're sort of coming up on time. I want to be respectful of your time since it's late in Taipei. Let's get to cross-strait. Chengdong, implications, your top three implications of the election for cross-strait. Okay. First of all, DPP gets the certain that's unprecedented, that's unhistorical. So the mainland China must be frustrated definitely. But secondly, in the L.Y., no party gets a simple majority. So it can be interpreted as the majority of the people want to have a better relationship with the mainland China. Given the fact that TPP also takes a pragmatic approach to mainland China when it comes to cross-strait relations, and Cohen even said that both sides across the United States belongs to one family. So I think that kind of rhetorical seems to be welcomed by mainland China. So this is the second message. A third message, United States will become critically important in cross-strait relations. I think the importance of United States will become even higher. Why? Because the president-elect will and lie has no, up to this point, has no way to restart dialogue with mainland China. And so the only possible way for him to manage cross-strait relations is to work with the United States. And also he does not have a full control over L.Y. So he needs United States as his back to work with L.Y. So on these two fronts, I think Taiwan will work even closer with the United States. And also because the mainland China, the communist authority, does not have any way to, and does not even want to do that with the president-elect line. So United States is their leeway to control the situation, to put all this change under control. You predict stability in cross-strait relations, but no improvement. But you also expect US-Taiwan ties to continue to expand. Is that a fair summary of your position? Yeah, but I want to add one more point. You just give me three points, but I want to add the force. The force is that US-Taiwan cooperation will be on a very tight rope, because any lift in official contact could face a harsh response from Beijing. So even though the two sides will work closely, but the way in which the cooperation goes will be in a very cautious manner. Okay. So Vincent, same question over to you. What's your take on the implications for cross-strait? You heard Chen Dong would welcome the DPP perspective. I think we're coming to a point, Evan, where Beijing really needs to make a decision on whether they want to be a responsible, pragmatic stakeholder for peace, because I'll start with Lai, and the DPP and Lai has made very clear throughout this campaign, again and again, that we are the party of the status quo, that we will maintain the status quo, we will continue to do four commitments, President Tsai when laid out in 2021. We will continue the RLC constitutional framework as was annunciated. And reminder to everybody of the four commitments from President Lai? No, that's a good one. Well, four commitments at this time, 10.43 PM in Taipei. My brain may be a little bit hazy, but I'll give the general overview. That's fine. But the gist is that, number one, our commitment to a free and democratic constitutional order. The second part is that the PRC and the RLC are not subordinate to each other. The third one is that we will resist efforts to annex us or enroll on our sovereignty. And then the fourth one is that the future of the RLC must be decided in accordance of the 23 million people of Taiwan. So, you know, you can talk about my homework on this issue, Evan, but the fact is that this is a very important policy for us. And this is why that we're committed to getting all of this right. And again, I wanted to refer comments on January 13th to the RLC constitutional framework that President elect Lai Chengdu has laid out, you know, showcasing fully that this is a party of continuation, that it's going to be administration of continuation. There's going to be no surprises. There's going to be every effort to be a responsible pragmatic stakeholder here in the region based, again, on number one, having no provocations against the other side. But number two, also standing firm for principles and values. But number three, having our doors open. And we're committed to doing that. I mean, Lai has said on a campaign trail that, you know, he'd love to be able to sit down with anybody based on parody dignity, but she didn't get particularly clear, you know, in the sense that this is a dining companion that he had mentioned. But I mean, kind of the half kidding aside, it's really does show that we do want to have some sort of relationship with Beijing. And we do believe that is conducive to do so. So with that being said, Evan, the key point, again, is that Beijing also needs to make a decision because it takes two to tango. And do we continue down this road of confrontation that really I think is putting it's setting them back more and more in terms of their interest of winning the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese people. I mean, if the goal is to win the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese people, you know, having diplomatic switches like Na Ru, you know, which is seen by the people of Taiwan as penalizing our democracy, you know, efforts to pressure Taiwan diplomatically, economically in terms of the military situation. And all of this is completely counterproductive to bring the two sides closer together. You know, but however, if there is an opportunity for both sides to be able to sit down together and think about kind of a way forward, I think that would be the most ideal scenario because ultimately we all have a role and a stake here in peace and stability. And let me end by saying this, that I think what Beijing often gets wrong is that the DPP isn't driving this trend of Taiwanese identity forward. The DPP reflects that trend. And I can say that with confidence, because if we look at the National Zenzu University national identity polls, which have done consistently for past decades, you know, the increase in Taiwanese identity actually took place the most under President Ma Yingzhou between 2008 and 2016. And the increase during those eight years was actually more pronounced and higher than increased during President Tsai Ing-wen between 2016 and 24. So the idea is that if Taiwanese identity is going to increase under a KMT administration as well, it's no longer about party politics. It's really about a reflection of the current situation that we're in across the street, which is the two sides are not subordinate to each other, which is that Taiwan does have growing recognition and awareness and commitment towards our democracy, and that we do see the values of the people on both sides is drifting further apart from one another. So if Beijing can recognize those trends, then hopefully they can also recognize the utility of at least having some sort of exchanges and discussions with Taiwan so that we can jointly manage the situation here and also maintain peace and stability in the region. Thank you, Vincent. So of course, China-Taiwan relations is a part of the equation and important part. But also, there's Taiwan-US relations. And under President Tsai—sorry, yes, under President Tsai, we saw a pretty substantial consistent expansion in US-Taiwan relations. In particular, Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited. McCarthy wanted to visit, but then ended up meeting with President Tsai in California. Yeah. So I guess my question for you is, so what should we expect from the DPP in terms of their relationship with the United States? Are you looking for more House speakers to visit? Certainly, our Congress is very intensively focused on the Taiwan question. Bigger, better, arms sales, President Lai's, yeah, I think, struggled with defense reform a little bit. So what should we expect on that side of the equation from the DPP? I think very strong joint efforts to maintain peace and stability here. And peace and stability, that's going to be achieved number one through robust deterrence, but number two also through policy consistency. And I think those are going to be the two main planks that we're going to see going forward. So for example, on the deterrence part, there are really two parts in deterrence. The first part is the military component, and we're absolutely committed to that. So we've seen, for example, our defense spending go from 1.78% to 2.5%. We've seen new capabilities come in. We've seen conscription go back up from four months to 12 months. That has to continue in earnest. And that has to continue in lockstep with the United States efforts to also strengthen the deterrence as well as those from regional partners and allies here. So all of that, again, is designed to have a military angle to it. So to say that we must never give an opportunity for Xi Jinping to wake up one day and decide that today's a good day and that he has the confidence levels that are requisite to engage in a contingency scenario here. So that's number one. Also, if we can't do anything that would provoke him, that would force him to wake up and realize, oops, maybe I need to do something that I wasn't planning to do. That's the other part of the equation. Well, so it's all based on risk and cost. And so the risk and cost of him taking action must be astronomically high. The risk and cost of him not taking action must be astronomically low. And there are two components to that. So we talked about keeping the risk and cost of military action high. We're also committed to keeping the risk and cost of not taking action very, very low because he faces, obviously, domestic pressures. He faces the legitimacy issue. He faces the historical mention of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. All of this is going to create risk and cost of him not taking action over time. And we must ensure that we lower that, which is why we've maintained the status quo, which is why we're committed to a policy of consistency, and which is why we've committed to no provocations while maintaining our principles and values. So that's the first deterrence part of it on a defense component. But the second part is really working with international partners and allies as well. And this administration here in the U.S. has been very, very strong in engaging with Japan, Australia and Europe and G7 and countries and allies around the world to jointly support peace and stability here. And that brings variables to the equation. And again, that through variables you create risk and cost, and therefore deterrence. So I think we'll need to focus on that. I'm going to make sure that we give Cheng Dong an opportunity and the class running out. So if you wouldn't mind, Cheng Dong, what's your take on the implications of where cross trade is going to go in light of what Vincent said? Do you see the DPP being able to manage ties with the mainland? And do you see the DPP? Do you think it's a good thing for Taiwan to continue to expand its relationship with the United States? How would you respond to Vincent? I would say I hope DPP can successfully manage the cross-strait relation so that peace and stability across China's trade can be maintained. But I'm a little bit worried that DPP does not really address the critical issue in cross-strait relation. That is to abide by the ROC constitution. I just mentioned that dialogue based upon ROC constitution are the way cross-strait dialogue has been conducted in the past. So I think there are two things that I would like to add. First of all, during Taiwan administration, I see a tendency by our government to place cross-strait negotiation as a precondition for cross-strait people-to-people exchange. I don't think that's good for cross-strait relations, neither for Taiwan's good. Because people-to-people exchange across Taiwan's trade is important for both sides to enhance understanding with each other. And that could lower the tension, that could increase the hospitality. So I hope that in the future, in the upcoming live administration, the government can work harder to expand the space for cross-strait people-to-people exchange, no matter what the other side does in political or military aspects. Firstly, secondly, I just want to let you know, we only have about six minutes left, and I'd like to get to a question. So let's just move on. Secondly, I hope that in US-Taiwan relations, I'm hoping that the live administration, the upcoming live administration, will pay more emphasis on substance rather than on the appearance. So when I say appearance, I mean the level of officials in bilateral contacts, whether it's speakers to come or whether it's the name of the office. I don't think this matters that much. At least it's not as important as the substance, such as the quality and quantity of our arms sales, such as the level of bilateral military cooperation. I think these are critical things for Taiwan's security. I completely agree. And one, I asked you to, maybe you could respond very briefly. So one of the big issues, of course, is whether or not in the legislative UN, there will be KMT support for DPP special budgets to fund arms sales. And do you believe the KMT is prepared to support those special budgets? I cannot speak for the KMT caucus, but I think there is a consensus among KMT leadership that enhancing defense is the first and most important thing for Taiwan to ensure our security. But I think DPP should work very hard to make sure that there is no worry about corruption in those bills. Yes, of course, nobody wants corruption. Okay, so we only have about five minutes left and I'm very mindful that it's very late in Taipei, so I want to end on time. So we have several excellent questions from our listeners today. I'm going to give you two and ask each one of you to respond briefly. First question, can you comment on Nehru's decision to deregognize Taiwan and up for China? Was this a deliberate effort on the part of the PRC? And what does that mean for cross-strait relations going forward? Second question is about Taiwan-South Korea relations that the UN government welcomed the result of the Taiwan election and the UN government is much more, I guess, skeptical of China. So what do you foresee in Taiwan's relationship with South Korea? Vincent, to you first, and again, we only have five minutes left, so let's be as tight as possible. I'll make it very brief. On Nehru's decision, obviously it was politically motivated. The timing of it, I think, makes it very clear that this was a decision that was designed to undermine and hurt our democracy and to also penalize Taiwan for engaging in a democracy that had results contrary to what Beijing may have wanted. So it's unfortunate that our diplomatic allies continued to be used as political pawns by Beijing, and certainly we don't think that this is a welcome development, whether from the terms of Taiwan's international space, or just good governance around the world in general. So that's the first part. The second part, in terms of South Korea relations, that's actually very interesting because this is, I think, an area of quite large potential. I mean, we're starting from quite a low baseline in terms of that relationship, but there is a lot going on already right now behind the scenes. The economic trade volumes I've seen are just astounding. The connection in terms of supply chain linkages are very, very strong. And so I think if there's an opportunity for South Korea to speak out more vigorously for regional peace and stability and work with the United States and other partners to show that there is a common stake in this region, I think that also builds deterrence here and ultimately contributes to the peace and prosperity that all countries in the region need and would ultimately support. Cheng Dong? I think the decision to take away a normal from ROC's diplomatic relation is not legitimate. And unnecessary. But what worries me is that are there other countries in the pipeline that the PRC is prepared to take away from ROC? I think these are the things that are the incoming governments should be prepared for and also to find ways to stop that. And secondly, in Taiwan-South Korean relations, I think both countries have a strong semiconductor industries. And both countries are supporting US French drawing policies. So we both countries should work together on this front so that our semiconductor industry can continue to grow at the same time can also be a strong partner to US semiconductor industry. Thank you. So let's see we have two minutes left. So I'm going to give a minute to each one of you for your final parting shot. Vincent? Well, thanks again, Evan and friends from USIP for doing this. Again, I think, you know, international support for Taiwan's democracy is absolutely appreciated and absolutely critical for maintaining peace and stability here. We're so happy about the confirmation again of the Taiwanese people in terms of our insistence and determination to maintain our freedom of democracy and way of life. And I think as I'll end on one note that our president like Legend made, which is we do look forward to working across party lines. We do look forward to coming together in unity for the good of our society. And we do look forward to making progress on many of these issues that we face together as a nation and together to find a common way forward. So I'll stop there and again say thank you for holding this event. Thank you. Chandong? Yeah, I would also like USIP for inviting us and for holding this event. And this is a very good one. And I would also like to say that I want the incoming line administration to realize that KMT and TPP, both the opposition parties are not barriers to Taiwan's strengths. They are assets to Taiwan's strengths, especially despite that, we have the KMT has a different approach to cross-strait relations into the mainland China. But if used smartly, that could add up to the government's policy tools so that the cross-strait relations can be managed even better. So I'm hoping that the incoming government can bring the country together, including the two opposition parties, so that we as a country can strengthen our standing worldwide and also to ensure that Taiwan is safe and secure. Well, I think we can all agree that a Taiwan that is more politically unified, a Taiwan that is more safe, secure, and resilient is good for the people of Taiwan and it's good for the world. So Dr. Chandong So, Vincent Chao, thank you so much for joining us. This has been a wonderful conversation, an important contribution to the international debates about Taiwan's future. And perhaps as we get closer to the inauguration in May, we can have you back and have this conversation once again. Thank you both. Thank you to everybody joining us today.