 I'm very happy to be able to come back. So when I have the opportunity to come back, I felt obliged to contribute to actually to your work because recently I heard that your institute has become one of the leading, one of the important think tanks not only in Ireland, but also in Europe. So although I'm not, I'm neither a negotiator for TTIP nor a real expert in international trade, I still want to do something. So today's topic is China's response to transatlantic trade and investment partnership negotiations. My talk will consist of four file paths, a background, and what TTIP is, and maybe another parallel project or proposal for FTA dominated by US trans-Pacific partnership. Also some views from Chinese scholars, Chinese think tanks, and also some policies of Chinese government to respond. Although these policies are not solely for, not solely as a response to this TTIP, the development, but maybe TTIP is also one of the factors that lead to these changes. So for the context, the first hypothesis, this emerging hypothesis of decline west, of course now is changing, is controversial, and whether there is a real decline west and the rest of emerging powers. So here I quoted this from American colonists. Now we are now living through the third great power shift of the modern era. The first was the rise of Western world around 15th century. The second, the rise of the United States in 19th century is now the third, called the rise of the rest. In other context, impacts of the crisis, the ongoing crisis, I think you are familiar with. We do not have time for elaboration. The global financial crisis, European sovereign diet crisis, rise of China, or maybe threat of China, no, I'm not quite sure what's your view on it. And the US tried to desperately maintain its world hegemony. EU tried to desperately avoid the collapse of the eurozone and even the union. A new scenario is that maybe some so-called new normal of Chinese economy. This is a term from President Xi Jinping, some slowing down of Chinese economy. So we are not so confident now maybe as three years ago when the EU and the US decided to launch or start the negotiation for TTIP. And also, whether China will have a middle income trap and actually over the past few months, even during my visit, I heard a lot of bad news, a lot of bad data, bad figures on Chinese economy. So maybe this is an interesting moment to look at this issue. So I'm just political. That is also important to you in US strategic thinking. A few years ago, some American economists called the term G2, or China America. Maybe a Chinese government would not like to accept it. But now we are very comfortable with the so-called new type for great power relationship. China's, this is China's expression, official expression. At beginning, actually, we have thought that this can be applied to all the major powers, including EU, UK. But now it seems it has become more and more exclusive. Only referred to the relationship with the United States. So President Obama's Asia strategy, payable to Asia, European, Ukraine crisis, and its impact. So a lot of maybe conflicting trends or events in the international political and economic relations. So next we come to the story, the road to TTIP. TTIP actually is not a new idea. In 1990s, I think it has been a natural logic. That means these transatlantic partners should have some closer relationships in trade. So in the 1990s, at that time, the Spanish leader and the American leader proposed. So in 2007, some institutional development emerged. Transatlantic Economic Council. However, it has not been a very successful story. No major breakthrough had been made by 2012 or early 2013. A major barrier actually comes from the European Union. In the so-called competitive interdependence, that means the trade relations between, or economic relations between the United States and European Union. European Union has the advantage of the commitment to, I mean, the multilateralism. For European Union, WTO should be the cornerstone. Maybe the United States tend to have more liberalism or liberalization of trade. So in the 1990s, the United States started to build more and more FTAs. Bigger ones, the regional, the NAFTA, and a lot of FTAs in North America, in Asia. So at the beginning, the EU was reluctant to do that. That means that would constitute some challenge or threat to the primacy of the WTO. However, gradually, under the economic pressure, maybe in 2005 or 2006, at that time, Commissioner Mendelssohn, he introduced a new strategy for trade policy in the European Union, Global Europe. Maybe that indicated some shift towards liberalism and mercantilism in EU trade policy. So another, maybe this is also a factor, maybe impetus for the move toward this TTIP. That was a statement and very disappointing development of WTO as the major institution for international trade. Maybe I cannot remember how many years we talked about. However, the negotiations have never been concluded. It seems no promising. So under these contexts, more and more FTAs, some bilateral, regional, or even plurial lateral agreements have been concluded. The so-called proliferation of FTAs, some economists believe that now every country is undergoing a lot of negotiations on average, maybe 12, 10 FTAs with other countries. Or even EU participating in some plural arrangement that means for facilitating trade in service industry. So this is why these major countries try to seek some new arrangements beyond WTO or outside WTO. So finally, at the end of 2012, EU and the United States decided to move on. In June 2013, EU-US officially declared to start the negotiations. So far, seven rounds of negotiations have been conducted. The eighth one is underway currently for some details on regulatory issues. But it seems that now the negotiations are disappointing, not so smooth. EU and the US had hope to conclude the negotiations by the end of 2014. But obviously, it's not likely, not possible. Now for this September or this October, because some believe that negotiations should be concluded before the US general election. I mean, in case the Republic, when maybe the chance is very slim for maybe the danger risk for this. But it seems it's not very likely to conclude the negotiations. A lot of differences in regulatory, particularly in some regulatory issues. Obviously, the TTIP has a huge advantage. Some think tank in Europe made some report. It boosts the growth. Obviously, this is an unprecedented FTA, large market in human history. The total GDP accounts for maybe less than 40% of the world. Investment trade accounts for maybe about 60%. More employment. It will be a zero tariff, removed tariff, and maybe most of the non-tariff barriers for trade. Of course, it's a good thing. But there are some barriers, some constraints. Agriculture, obviously, the kind of CEP. International climate change regime. Clean energy, food safety, maybe the European Union, for example, has maybe strict rules on this. Even the cultural industry, the famous, maybe the French, varies over maybe the Hollywood film's dominance over, from actually 20 or 30 years ago, they wage a war, a battle against the influence of American films. But now, it's still an issue. So the prospects, maybe a full success or partial, maybe this is a likely result. Successful on tariff issues, but with some compromises on regulatory issues. Ophelia is also possible, but maybe it involves huge political and economic risks because both sides invested a lot. It will weaken the confidence. So a parallel story is called the Trans-Pacific Partnership. It's actually another one, another efforts for retreat agreements dominated by the United States, including 12 Pacific countries, Japan, Singapore, or even Latin. So it's very controversial. That means whether this or TTIP or TPP economic or political. For the United States and the European Union, they argue it's mainly, officially, they argue it's mainly economic, only for trade, for growth, for job. But some observers believe both TTIP and TPP are exclusive of third countries like China. Of course, some other concerns may be a better position in EU member countries for the rise of Asian challenges, helping EU out of crisis, and also has the prospects of sustaining Western leadership over the global trade system. Or from European Union perspective, maybe it can have the function of diversion of the US pivot to Asia. In a Financial Times article, I also argue that the central objective of the Trans-Pacific or TTIP trade negotiations is the exclusion of China. That is to build anyone but China club. Because obviously, China cannot join the TTIP. But some people argue that TPP is open to China. However, Chinese government refused to join the negotiations for TPP. But would prefer finalizing the doha run with WTO and establishing more or less inclusive plurilateral, bilateral, or regional trade agreements. So next, I will give very brief and conscious time of the responses from Chinese scholars or think tanks. Recently, Chinese government stressed the importance of think tanks in this year making. So Chinese scholars view on TTIP, TPP is divided. One kind regarded as Western geopolitical strategy to dominant international rules and norms, and isolated China. I read some report from some leading think tanks in China. They gave this view. They even said that it was the total political project. That means there is a huge threat to China. Actually, Chinese government was very concerned about development in early 2013. A lot of discussions on the impact of this kind of move. So the other camp is rooted in economics, particularly China's recently announced reform projects. Their view is that TTIP and TPP can be used as an act to know impactors to drive domestic economic reforms in much the same way as WTO accession was 20 years ago. For middle ground, this is also my view. In my paper, actually, I wrote this. That is, the TTIP and TPP is definitely not purely economic. But the possibility exists between China and the West for making dialogue and building a consensus on international norms and rules. Both China and the West have the dual identity of both challenger, revisionist, and defender of existing international rules and norms. So for some international relations scholars, they tend to believe China is a challenger, is a revisionist for existing, maybe, international order or international norms and rules. But obviously, we have different views. And maybe China is becoming more and more aggressive in recent years, more assertive. However, in international trade norms and rules, it seemed to me that, actually, the Western countries, the United States and the European Union, actually, are trying to revise, trying to change the system. For example, maybe in the existing rules, WTO, actually, know quite clear rules on exchange rate, environmental issues. So maybe the Western countries actually are trying to insert such rules. China actually have benefited hugely from the existing system or the past studies. So maybe we just try to preserve the status quo. But also, some other observations, China and other emerging powers are too big to be isolated. Let me know one can ignore the existence. That means even though the TTIP is successful, the United States and the EU cannot dominate the rules. China needs to actively participate in agenda-citing and the rule-making in the new global and the regional order. This does not necessarily mean a zero-sum game between China and the West, as some other scholars suggested. Actually, this is also opportunity, even for China to modernize our governance, to adopt some rules, actually, even some Western rules. But we have to take into account our own interests. I mean, this is, again, a consensus building process in climate change, in clean energy, or even food safety, not necessarily mean something bad. So China's responses, some maybe, as I said, maybe not necessarily responses directly related to TTIP. But obviously, for China, we believe that in this context, the European Union is a very valuable partner. So we hope to strengthen our relations with the European Union over the past two or three years. We have had several reports, of course, a general document, a general paper, a policy paper was called China-EU 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, this bilateral paper. We are also trying to conclude the negotiations for a comprehensive EU-China Investment Agreement. China is very keen for a joint feasibility study on China-EU free trade agreement. Of course, this is a very difficult task, very ambitious. But anyway, last spring, EU agreed in principle to start the study on the feasibility of comprehensive FTA between EU and China. The last one is the rescue for Greece, this new story I added during my trip. Because yesterday, to Bangor, to Wales yesterday, because I found the news, I mean, Chinese Premier made a phone call to great leaders to promise to give some support. This reminds me of some discussion one years ago, maybe at the end of 2013 or early, some of the Chinese think tanks actually, they said that they felt very regretful for Chinese government to not to rescue Europe in the second half of 2011. I mean, they believe Chinese government could or should have done more in the most difficult times of European Union in 2011. However, at that time, some investment banks in China gave some opinion to the Chinese government. IR scholars, I mean, international relations scholars persuaded the Chinese government to do more. The investment bank were very pessimistic about the future of Europe. They said, Europe will collapse. If you buy the bonds, maybe you'll lose a lot of money. So anyway, this time, Chinese government indicated, but also actually Greece has very good relations with the Chinese government, which the previous government agreed to give consent for Chinese to invest in a port. This is a Chinese government is very happy about that. So the second one is so-called the road and the belt strategy. This is a new buzzword of Chinese government. Everybody in China, even in university, that means universities are encouraged to become think tanks now in China. So everybody talk about so-called road and the belt. Road means the silk road. I think you know silk road. It's icon in history in Han dynasty, Tang dynasty, for trade with Central Asia, Arabian countries. So we use that. So that is a silk road economic belt referred to the Central Asia, the Arabian countries. Maybe interesting is which will be the end point of this belt. Maybe Italy, Rome, because in history, Greece, Italy, it was the end point. Or even Berlin, Germany. But anyway, and also actually the Central and Eastern European countries are very interesting. So no matter why the Western European countries, the UK would be part of that. If some Central and Eastern European countries join this process, maybe this will have some impact on European Union because you have the free trade area, you have the Union, or even for very advanced economic and monetary Union. So the other one is called the maritime silk road, the Southeast Asian island. So the strategy, I think in October 2013, President Xi made the official proposal initiative for this strategy. So it means, of course, mutual benefits, solution to Chinese over production, maybe over production, or over capacity in some way. This is now our problem in this recent story. And some new financial institutions in Asia or in other countries. Connectivity, this is a keyword. It can mean different things. Actually, the United States over years also had such a strategy, so-called the silk road. Connectivity can mean internet, or can also mean some training for understanding. So that means a connection in different ways. It can mean building of infrastructure. This is the most important part, maybe. Infrastructure, the roads, airport, the high-speed train. This is another interest of China. We believe we have a good technology. So we can invest, we have money, we have the technology, we have the labor, and also the cultural connections, the so-called people-to-people exchange. So another related story is the APEC summit last year. It was an event in China. We had several days extra holidays in Beijing. Blue skies. Blue skies, so yes. This is the revitalizing the APEC. That means we give new importance to APEC and the regional cooperation. Because over the past one decade, at least, in Chinese strategic thinking, APEC was marginalized. Actually, we didn't like APEC because too much American and Japanese influence in APEC. But this time, we took this opportunity of the summit. We re-assert our influence. And other countries, actually, are very, all the other members, including the United States, are very supportive. They give what we want to. So yes, again, another FTAAP, another free trade agreement. So this, again, is not a new idea. The relevant country talked about for many years. However, it's very difficult for these APEC countries for free trade agreement. No progress for many years. This time, Chinese government officially gave the initiative for promoting this process. And all the other countries agree. So these are collective strategic studies. Now this is in APEC declaration. But obviously, this is a very difficult task, maybe, for a foreseeable future. It's not likely to happen. But anyway, these countries show their will to start the process. And also, actually, it could include the TPP and some other regional. It's a bigger project. This is also what Chinese government would like to see. So some other things, accelerating the negotiations for more bilateral FTAs. We have had FTA with ASEAN countries. We had the FTA with Switzerland. It's un-euro with the European country. And also, before the APEC summit, we declared that we all declared that we almost concluded our negotiations with Korea, with Australia, faster than most people had expected. So another is this photo. This is a new type of great power relationship. We believe that this is very important. This is another gesture following the APEC summit during his visit to China. President Obama and President Xi Jinping announced both countries will curb greenhouse gas emissions over the next two decades. The United States would cut its 2005 level carbon emission by 26% to 28% before the year 2025. China would peak our carbon emission by 2030. And we'll also aim to get 20% of energy from zero carbon emission sources that same year. The first time China, this is very important. But of course, some critics still argue that it's only maybe a utopian plan. Because maybe US Congress would not support this kind of agreement. This is only a gesture. However, anyway, in history, this first time the US states gave a very clear target for the reduction. And China promised to have a peak for emission. Because our preview view has long been that we can cut emission, but we cut emission by maybe per unit of GDP. We could cut emission by 40% or 50% by per unit of GDP. But over, for example, eight or 10 years. But because of high growth in the GDP. So the total emission would still increase by 50%. So this is maybe the first time. And also, the two countries claim our leadership. It's not a good thing for the European Union because the European Union believed it's a leader in the world. But the United States and China said, we are the leaders, even in climate change. And so lastly, maybe China is trying to deepen our domestic reform agenda. We established some so-called FTC, free trade zones, that means some domestic free trade areas for some experiments in different policies to open further to outside world. In Shanghai or some other countries now and other cities, other provinces are very interested. It seems that Fujian, Guangdong, Tianjin has got the support from the government more applying for after this kind of experiment. Chinese government believe that it's very important for us to have a grand strategy to address the challenges, to best plan and coordinate the domestic and external strategies. So this is my report. Thank you. Thank you very much.