 Looking to the East. This is our once every two week show that's taking a look at what's going on in Asia and presenting that to the viewers and listeners of Think Tech. My name is Steve Zerker. I'm usually a guest on the show. Today I'm going to be the host. Jay will not be joining us. The topic of this particular show is the reaction of Asia to this point to the Biden victory. Of course, it's a great change that America will be going through over the next few months as we transition from the Trump presidency to the Biden presidency. And as we've often done in this show, we take a look at how America is influencing countries in Asia. It goes without saying that Asia plays very, very close attention to American politics because of the economic and military influence of the United States. My family, my friends in here in Japan, oftentimes know more about the intricate details of what's going on in the American election than than I do. It's quite remarkable. So today we are joined by a very, very special guest. He's a fellow professor here at Kansai Gaidae. His name is Mark Kogan. Mark is an associate professor of peace and conflict studies at Kansai Gaidae University. That's also where I work as well. I'm sitting in my office here. We're both in Osaka, which is the second largest city in Japan. Mark specializes in peace building, human rights, democratization, social movements, and his strong focus is Thailand and Cambodia, which I'm sure will come up as we talk today. Before he became a professor, he had a very interesting career with the United Nations working in Africa, Central Asia, the Middle East as a communication specialist focusing on climate change, AIDS, anti-corruption, women, political empowerment. So he's still involved actually with the United Nations now that he has been a professor here for the last few years. He holds two graduate degrees in international conflict management and two degrees in political science and psychology. So Mark, thank you so much for taking time to join us today. And we had our colleague Paul Scott on about a month or so ago. I was gathering. Yeah, it went quite well. It was his impressions of the American election sitting in Paris, France, and what he views Europe's responses to the election. That was before the election actually occurred. I wanted to try and bring you in because your focus is more on Asia to get what you think is a response, at least initially, to the election. So Melissa, if we can throw up the one graphic that I had sent to you. This graphic is an overview of the worldwide response. You can see it now. So the countries in red are the countries that have not acknowledged the Biden victory and the Biden eventuality of becoming president in January. So we can see in the Asia region, some very influential countries such as China and Russia. Russia, I'm not so surprised. China, I'm a little bit surprised. But also Vietnam and Cambodia and you can see the red countries in other areas like in South America, Brazil, no surprise there since their leader is very similar to Trump in terms of his political strategy and political action. But anyway, we're focusing on Asia. So you can see India has acknowledged the election. Australia, New Zealand, of course, have done that. But there are parts of Asia that are still not acknowledging the Biden victory. I'm not quite sure why they're doing that. Maybe, Mark, you have some ideas about that, why they're being hesitant. Because even though Trump has not conceded, it's pretty much, I think, a given that Biden will be president in January next year. So, Mark, just at a very high level. So I think that the first thing is that you cannot neglect the internal audiences, not just the external audiences. So for example, with Cambodia, who has not yet acknowledged the Biden win, I think that's more of an internal audience and a dismissal of the United States in general. That has been a key strategy or a key kind of foreign policy narrative with Cambodia. I will say that not everyone in Southeast Asia, at least, are cheering Biden's victory. A lot of them, particularly Vietnam, Trump is a very, very popular figure because of his willingness to take on China. And the others, I think, are on the fence. So for example, Thailand has a kind of strategy of what they call bending with the wind, or it's sort of like bamboo that bends with the wind a little bit. So they're a strategic power for both the United States and China, and they sort of balance politically their foreign policies to sort of match the relationships with both countries. Thailand has had a historic relationship or a special relationship with the United States for many, many years. The United States was a strong backer of military regimes in Thailand in the 1950s and 1960s because of its reputation as sort of a beachhead against communism. And it continues today, but with the arising, and actually, we shouldn't say rising China anymore. We should just say China has risen. They have arrived. They've arrived a long time ago. It's interesting that lag between them. How much farther they have to rise? I don't know. Yeah, I guess when they become the number one economy in the world, and then, oh, then maybe the Western world will say, okay, they're there. In terms of being a regional power and a dominant power in Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific region, you cannot dispute the fact that China has already risen. And you also look at its GDP or its sort of total domestic output. It's significant. I can't call it a rising power anymore. So the reaction to the Biden win, I would just summarize it by saying that sometimes the reaction is for internal audiences as much as it is for an external audience. For the Chinese, the Chinese basically already acknowledged Biden's victory. That is perhaps a political gamesmanship. I don't know how to read those particular tea leaves, sort of rubbing it in, so to speak, to President Trump a little bit. But the reaction is not as important as the kinds of potential changes that it might see for Southeast Asia and broader Indo-Pacific. Okay, let me put you on hold there, Mark. I'm very interested in your view of what the potential changes would be. But to your point about China's growing influence, one of the quotes I got when I was doing research on this was from Malaysia, which I guess would be one of those countries that has increased its reliance and increased its relationship with China. So the quote that I got from there was that basically Malaysia has kind of in a sense because of the lack of activity, lack of leadership over the last four years has written the United States off to some extent. And it's saying that even with the Biden victory, the US time is over, that it's a new world. So what do you think about that? It's kind of like what you were saying with Vietnam, which has increased its connection with China, and maybe now sees that it doesn't need to be so reliant or dependent on the American market, for example, or American leadership. Even though Vietnam, I mean, Vietnam and China historically have hated each other. But I guess given the current context, Vietnam and maybe Malaysia and other countries, because we've had this vacuum for four years, now recognizing that it's best for us to partner more closely with China. Do you think that that is something that's being discussed in the region and is acknowledged in the region, not just by these countries, but by others as well? So first, let's take Malaysia. Malaysia is a little bit of a difficult case because of its connections to ASEAN and its connections to China in terms of trade. And the trend over the last 20 years is that China's market for Malaysian exports, for Thai exports, for Cambodian exports, is only increasing. And the sort of the connectivity to European and Western markets is sort of on the decline. Goods tend to be cheaper, more accessible in countries where they have existing trade relationships. And RISEP is just another example of an ASEAN led. Okay. I wanted to address that. Let's describe for our viewers what RISEP is. And it was just signed just a few days ago in Vietnam. So it stands for regional comprehensive economic partnership. In essence, it's a Chinese led trade association. It's not Chinese, but it's ASEAN led. Okay. The Western press picks it up as being China, because the United States is not a part of it, right? They're not, no. Yeah. Okay. All right. So ASEAN led, but it includes Japan, it includes the Koreas, it includes Australia, New Zealand, and so forth. And at the moment, this is the largest trade association in the world, represents 30%. I guess it's more than the EU, is what I was reading in terms of its economic, because of China being the number two economy. So it was just signed. And this was perceived under the Obama administration as a counterbalance to the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or the TPP, which was immediately withdrawn from once Trump became president. That's one of the first things he did when he became president in January, 2017. So anyway, sorry to interrupt you, Mark, but I just wanted to make sure that our viewers understood what RISEP is, because I don't think it's actually covered all that much in the Western press. No, no, I don't think so. And that's pretty typical, actually, that it doesn't impact the West, why cover in the first place. But back to my earlier point, what I'm suggesting is that RISEP is a trend towards connectivity to China. So as is the sort of Belt and Road Initiative that is for us to connect the Silk Road or the Maritime Road to China. And China looks at this as a sort of a restoration of Chinese hierarchy, a restoration of Chinese stature in the world. But I don't think that RISEP is a China-led thing, because if it was Chinese-led, I think you'd see a little bit more hesitance on the part of the Japanese to join. And you'd certainly get an instant refusal for India, who's only raised objections because of agricultural concerns. Yeah. Well, this issue of economic dependency and political reality is one that is clearly in Japan. I've talked about this in many previous shows. So China is Japan's number one economic trading partner. It has been that way for many, many, many years. But yet Japan, when it comes to political leadership, is bolted together with the United States policy in general. So this creates this tension in countries in Asia, and maybe worldwide, but anyway, our shows on Asia, about what choice do you make? Do you want to continue to align with the number one military power, the number one political power, but not necessarily as strong economically as historically been the case in the United States, or the growing economic opportunities of working with China? And the fact that, like even New Zealand, China is New Zealand's number one economic trading partner right now. But yet New Zealand is a Western nation, so to speak, and would be more aligned with Western policies and so forth. So this conflict is just deeply embedded in Asia. So that, I think, illustrates what these countries have to respond to in terms of this China-US or China-Western decision. Where do they align their allegiances? It sounds like Malaysia, Cambodia, some countries are doing that. And yet in Japan, struggling with this. I think a really good example of what you're talking about is Australia. So Australia, in terms of economics, it is strongly tied to China. So it's heavily dependent upon the Chinese to buy a lot of Australian products. Its universities, particularly, are funded, mainly by Chinese students. So huge interconnectivity. So the growing trend for a second language in Australia, it used to be Japanese, but of course now it's Mandarin for Asian languages. And then the sort of the economy here is that Australia is also a part of the Quad, so this quadrilateral dialogue, which is aiming to sort of take on Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific region. So because of economic concerns, back in 2007, 2008, Australia sort of withdrew from the Quad because of political concerns about its dependence upon Chinese markets and its dependence or its universities being so connected to China. So, but as China became more aggressive and challenged areas along what they call a gray zone. So there's sort of like this gray line between war and peace. So it's taking its aggression to the point of outright conflict. It's began to reassess itself in terms of its membership in the Quad. And the Quad is no longer sort of just an informal kind of dialogue. There are what they call two plus two meetings being taken place between India and Japan. So the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, two plus two meetings, things like that. So you have a sort of formalization of the Quad as an institution, as a norm-enforcing, post-World War II order-enforcing kind of institution capable of challenging Chinese aggression in the South China Sea and in the wider Indo-Pacific. Okay. Yeah, it's interesting how this is all going to play out. Speaking of Australia, one article I found about the response of Asia to the Biden election. This is from Malcolm Turnbull, who was the Prime Minister when Trump won. He sent a text to Biden saying, what a relief that you won. So that's probably, that's not representative of the government, but it's the representative of the former Prime Minister. But anyway, Mark, I focus on this economic discussion. You were about to talk about what the potential reaction to the Asia Pacific region to the Biden election was. I stopped you there because I wanted to explain what ReCEP was. So please, if you could address that. I said before that the reaction isn't as important. The reaction to his winning the election isn't as important as the potential for change and the reality, the reality based on what has transpired over the last four years, basically US absence from Asia altogether. They sort of a disengagement over the last four years. That puts the United States on the back foot. It puts the United States at a real, real disadvantage. So let me give you an example. Hong Kong. Let's talk about Hong Kong for a second. Right. Despite the fact that there had been political protests in 2014 and 2019, a pro-democracy movement forming pro-democracy legislators in the Hong Kong special administrative region. And Chinese and the US trade war going on. A sort of vehemently anti-China and pro-Hong Kong stance taken by the Trump administration. They didn't back Hong Kong because of human rights and democratization concerns. They backed them for political reasons because it was a challenge to Chinese leadership. So now that there's this Hong Kong security law, which was passed at the end of June of this year, which really dismantles a lot of the freedoms, the lot of opportunities for democratic speech in Hong Kong. And ties down Western influences, Western companies influences in Hong Kong. Plus, just recently, they basically removed all the democratic legislators from the Hong Kong Legco. So what is Biden's policy going to be towards Hong Kong? Nothing. Nothing. He can't do anything. That time is over. So instead of using hard power strategies, like a trade war or special punitive tariffs or issuing what they call Magnitsky style sanctions where you sanction individual Chinese leaders, those are going to be incredibly ineffective. Because American companies and British companies and Western companies operating in Hong Kong are going to be at a significant disadvantage. They're going to be pressured to be tolerant of whatever policies China and Hong Kong put forward. So they're only going to be left with soft power strategies, which are incredibly limited. Like offering a pathway to citizenship, the British government offered a pathway to citizenship for British passport holders or people with Hong Kong passports. So perhaps to accommodate a growing Hong Kong diaspora. But what's Biden's policy going to be towards Hong Kong? The same, because the options are essentially limited. The same with Thailand. You don't think Biden will begin to at least acknowledge the democracy movement that you've written so much about? You just don't see him doing that. Of course, there will be normative pressure. But as I've written about before in academic articles, normative pressure or democratic pressure, particularly that Obama put in after the coup d'etat in May of 2014, was completely ineffective. It didn't do anything. It solidifies or reinforces the idea that Thailand has options and China being a significant option. So Thailand can bend with the wind. It can navigate a sort of difficult alliance between the United States and China. And because it has options with China to its east, can ignore all that democratic pressure. Plus, since this is not just an internal democratic struggle, it is a struggle about Thailand's monarchy, which really controls the levers of power in the country. This is not something the United States would want to get into because that is going to be very, very contentious. They will stay dead quiet about that. It's absolutely too controversial. So you're saying the real politic on this is that even with the Biden ascension to the presidency, there is his ability to influence Asian democracy movements or other aspects of Asian policy is somewhat limited. Because of choice. The options are simply too limited. Okay. Let me stop you. We have a question from a viewer that came in. This has to do with reset. So what should Biden do about this new Asian trade organization? Can he bring the United States in? That's an interesting question. Should he try to collaborate? What resistance would he have? So, Mark, do you think it's possible that the United States would join reset? I mean, there's still the TPP still exists. The Japan is the leading member of that. I guess maybe a more reasonable alternative would be the United States re-engages with the TPP. Although, my goodness, four years of cost. ReCEP is an ASEAN-controlled trade agreement and it would not definitely include the United States. There's no options there. The withdrawal from TPP in January of 2017 was catastrophic for the United States because it lost all of its cards in the game. Despite the urging from Japan, despite the urging from a lot of pro-US players in TPP, was not able to convince Trump that this is a strategic opportunity that has been missed. So, regardless of what happens, whether Biden pivots back to Asia or whatever, there are no opportunities for reset. But there might be for TPP. They might be able to re-engage in TPP. This is a difficult scenario for the United States. There are no great options. Only, you know, sort of, so-so options. Okay. Mark, we're running out of time, but I'm going to address this last question we have. Historically, and I think of Carter administration as being the prime example of this, America did support democratic movements, did want to spread the principles that we Americans like to believe that our country represents freedom and self-motivation and so forth. So, certainly under Trump, that has all been cast aside because Trump really didn't care about all of that. Do you think, well, I guess there's two parts of this question that I'm not giving you much time to answer. Do you think, given the political realities that you're describing here, the Biden would take this mantle back on again and say, we're a world leader. We promote democracy. We understand that this is under threat all over the world now. Will they actually adopt that attitude? And then if they do, will it make any difference? So, I know those are two very tough questions and we only have a couple of minutes. What do you think? Let me try to answer that for you. So, Biden has promised to hold a kind of summit on democracy after after January. But I think that is to, as you say, trying to assume the mantle as a sort of beacon for democracy or a supporter for democracy around the world. But in terms of what it can do, in terms of policy is limited. As I told you, it's Hong Kong, very little options, interfering in Thailand's internal affairs, a monarchical reform, that's not something that any country would want to do. The political pressure it can put on China in terms of human rights pressure when it comes to Uyghur Muslims in China's West, that won't change. I don't think that will change from Trump. Trump uses that as a sort of a political weapon instead of a sort of a normative tool for diplomacy. But I've just got to say it again, options for Biden in terms of assuming the mantle for democracy in general, which has been in recession basically since 2005, 2003 are limited, very, very limited. Okay. All right, Mark. Well, we're running out of time here. We're right up against it. Any closing statement? You know, it's kind of a negative message that you're bringing here that the world has become so complicated and maybe entrenched in a way that America's influence, even despite the four-year vacuum that we've gone through here, let's say even if Clinton had won the election, the role that the American can play in Asia, your message is basically it's somewhat limited. Yeah. Well, this is the consequence of four years of America first. This is a consequence of America's sort of lack of leadership. Yeah, it's worse. You know, presidents are at best caretakers of American democracy. And at worst, dangerous. That could be dangerous to economies and political societies around the world. And I think that Trump's America first anti-China policies have cost the United States dearly in the West or in the East. And it will take Biden's entire four years to try to get the United States back on course. And it's going to take at least eight or more to fix all of the damage. This is the reality. Well, on that wonderful point, I think we have to wrap up. Thanks so much, Mark. We could easily go on for much, much longer. And I'm going to invite you back on the show again as maybe we get further into the Biden administration and see what the early consequences are, if any, maybe six months from now. Thank you so much. Appreciate it.