 As mentioned earlier, states do not incur responsibility for the acts of their organs when they do not act in their capacity as organs, except, as we have seen, in the case of members of the armed forces in time of war. As a rule, individuals do not act on behalf of states and therefore their behaviour is not attributable to any state. Of course, the fact that individuals have acted in a certain way may reveal a wrongful omission by the state. For instance, if a crowd attacks a foreign embassy and sets it ablaze, the host or receiving state will not be responsible for the acts of the crowd as such. The acts of the crowd will not be attributed to the host state, but such acts will reveal the failure of the state to fulfil its obligation to protect the diplomatic premises, an obligation which is owed by the receiving state to the sending state under Article 22 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, and it is also a customary obligation. Because of its failure to protect the embassy from the crowd, the receiving state could be held responsible for the damage caused by the crowd, even if the crowd's violence is not considered as such as an act of that state. While this being said, there are situations where a state will directly bear international responsibility for the conduct of certain individuals. Article 9 of Arsiois envisages a situation which has notably happened in the last days of wars when a territory has been freed from foreign occupation, but that the state administration has not yet been able to re-establish its authority over the territory. In those circumstances, some individuals or groups of individuals may locally take the initiative and may organise public services to the benefit of the community, which is fine, of course, but sometimes those individuals will take measures that are much more questionable like ordering summary executions of foreigners in the name of justice, while those individuals have not been asked and officially entrusted with such functions, but they de facto act on behalf of the state, as if they were empowered to do so. In that, if that is the case, what those individuals do is attributable to the state, and this is what Article 9 provides for, and I quote, the conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a state under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact exercising elements of the governmental authority in the absence or default of the official authorities, and in circumstances such as to call for the exercise of those elements of authority, end of quote. Article 10 of Arsieois deals with the attribution to the state of the conduct of an insurrectional movement. If the insurrectional movement fails to take control of the government, the wrongful conduct of the members of the movement will not be attributable to the state, the state is fighting against the movement, but the state will be responsible for the conduct, actions or omissions of its own organs. However, if the insurrectional movement succeeds in its fight against the government and manages to establish itself as the government of the state, the state will be responsible for the acts of the former government, which is only normal. The state will also be responsible for the acts of the new government once it becomes the government of the state, which is only normal also, but the state will also be responsible for the acts of the insurrectional movement at the time it was not yet the government of the state. The wrongful conduct of the insurrectional movement will be retrospectively attributed to the state, provided that the insurrectional movement succeeds and becomes the government of the state. And likewise, if the insurrectional movement is a separatist movement and if it succeeds in establishing a new state on the part of the territory of the pre-existing state, the mother state, the new state will be responsible for the acts of the movement at the time it was still fighting for independence and at the time the state still did not yet exist. Finally, article 11 of Arsiewa recalls that a state may always acknowledge and adopt the conduct of individuals as its own and therefore be responsible for it. Such a situation notably happened in 1979 during the Islamic revolution in Iran after Iranian students stormed the US Embassy in Tehran and held the diplomatic and consular staff hostage for over a year. The case was decided by the ICJ at the request of the US and the court found that Iran was not responsible for the acts of the students as such at the time they stormed the embassy. But as I mentioned earlier that the students action revealed a wrongful failure by Iran to protect the diplomatic mission. But the court also took note of the fact that as time was passing by, the new Iranian authorities were praising the acts of the students, were commanding them as heroes of the revolution and approving their action. The supreme leader of the Iranian revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, went so far as issuing a decree in November 1979 stating that the embassy was a center of espionage and conspiracy and that the US diplomatic staff would not be freed until the US exceeded to the demands of Iran. Therefore the court considered that from the moment Iran acknowledged and adopted the students conduct as its own, the students were acting on behalf of the government and their conduct was therefore attributable to Iran. As the court concluded, the result of that policy was fundamentally to transform the legal nature of the situation created by the occupation of the embassy and the detention of its diplomatic and consular staff as hostages. The approval given to these facts by the Ayatollah Khomeini and other organs of the Iranian state and the decision to perpetuate them translated continuing occupation of the embassy and detention of the hostages into acts of that state. The militants, authors of the invasions and jailers of the hostages had now become agents of the Iranian state for whose acts the state itself was internationally responsible.