Paul Boghossian (Ph.D., Princeton, 1987), is Silver Professor of Philosophy and the director of theNew York Institute of Philosophy. He was Chair of Philosophy from 1994-2004. His research interests are in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language and in epistemology. He is the author of numerous works on a variety of topics, including color, rule-following, eliminativism, naturalism, self-knowledge, a priori knowledge, analytic truth, realism, relativism, the aesthetics of music and the concept of genocide. He has held research fellowships from the National Endowment for the Humanities, Magdalen College (Oxford), the School of Advanced Study (University of London), and from the Australian National University (Canberra). He has been a Visitor at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, a Fulbright Senior Specialist and is a fellow of the New York Institute for the Humanities. He has also taught at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor and at Princeton.
Since 2007 Cappelen has been a Professor at the University of St Andrews where he holds an Arché Chair. He has previously held positions at Somerville College, Oxford, University of Oslo, and Vassar College. He has been the Director of the Arché Philosophical Research Centre and a co-investigator of two research projects funded by longterm AHRC grants: "Contextualism and Relativism" and "Intuitions and Philosophical Methodology". Cappelen was one of the original applicants for the research center Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature (Norwegian Centre of Excellence) at the University of Oslo, where he is director of research and co-director of the Linguistic Agency component. Cappelen has been a member of the Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters since 2008.
Cappelen's most influential work is the 2004 book, Insensitive Semantics (written with Ernie Lepore). The book defends a minimal role for context in semantics and advocates speech act pluralism. It is one of the most cited works in philosophy within the last 10 years.
Cappelen has argued that the role of intuition in Western analytic philosophy is overstated. His 2012 book, Philosophy without Intuitions, controversially claims that intuition plays a minor role - or no role at all - in most modern philosophy.