 And we are pleased to be here kicking off day two of our third annual conference on the South China Sea, as you know, the conference is titled Managing Tensions in the South China Sea. I'd also like to welcome our online audience. We had a very large online audience yesterday and a lot of participation and coverage by Twitter, so welcome to all of you out there. Our panel to kick off this morning is focused on the role of international law in managing disputes. I'm going to introduce our panelists. Each of them will talk for roughly ten minutes and then we'll open the floor for question and answer. For those of you who are following us on Twitter and want to participate and ask questions, please follow us on Twitter at Southeast Asia DC and at CSIS or follow the hashtag CSIS live. That's CSIS-L-I-V-E. It's my honor this morning to introduce a very well qualified panel and I'll start with our friend Dr. Xin Jun Zhang who has flown in from Beijing just last night and told me that he, because of the Dragon Boat races, has to fly back to Beijing, I think, tonight to teach. Tomorrow morning. Tomorrow morning to teach. So he's a true marathoner of international travel and we're very grateful that he would make the time to be with us today. He is an associate professor of public and international law at Tsinghua University in Beijing. His research includes the law of the sea, international environmental law, non-proliferation law and law treaties. He's the executive director of the Center for the Law of the Sea Study at the Tsinghua Law School and a member of the International Law Association, so highly qualified to speak on these issues. Next to him, Henry Bencerto is the former secretary general of the Secretariat of Commission on Maritime and Ocean Affairs or the CMOA, which is a cabinet level interagency coordinating body on the law of the sea and other maritime issues. Henry, for those of you who track the South China Sea issues, is definitely, I think, one of our eminent persons, one of the top lawyers who is thinking about these issues, representing the Philippines, so it's great to have him here with us today. Next to him is our own Peter Dutton from the United States. Peter is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College. He joined the institute in 2007 and became the director in 2011. His research focuses on maritime sovereignty and boundary issues, boundary disputes involving China, international law of the sea and maritime strategy. I think Peter has been with us, I think, for all three of our conferences. He missed last year. Sorry. Peter is great to have you back. And finally, last but not least, as we talked about when we were preparing for this panel, our cleanup hitter is Dr. Nguyen Deng Thang. He is a general international lawyer and obtained his international relations degree from the Institute of International Relations, which is now the diplomatic academy of Vietnam. He has a law degree from the law school at the School of Law in the University of Nottingham in the U.K. and a Ph.D. in the Faculty of Law University at Cambridge that he just earned this year. He's a member of the Vietnam Lawyers Association since 2000 and is a well-known Vietnamese lawyer and writer on international legal issues pertaining to the law of the sea, ocean development and international law. So a great honor to have him with us also today. So I'm going to turn first to our colleague from Beijing who hopefully isn't too jet-lagged and he can start us off. Thank you very much. CSI is inviting me here. Anyway, my topic today, you can see the title and that's exclusively the result of my research and doesn't necessarily reflect the position of Chinese government. First I'd like to have your two backgrounds. The one is in view of the Chinese government on the rule of international law and settling the boundary dispute where I would like to refer you to look at the Chinese practice since 1990s on the land boundary issues. I think that's what importance China discards the NECO Treaty Doctrine. I think some of you may be familiar with that but rely more on the positive international law in terms of treaties managing the dispute. The second one is on the maritime boundary dispute. I would like to suggest you to look at the setting the side dispute and pursuing joint development policy that policies consistent ever since 1970s when China had the disputes with Japan on the Diaoyu-Sengkaku Islands and maintained even today on the issues of South China Sea. The essence of this policy in terms of means of peaceful settlement of dispute is that it put negotiation as a primary means, which in my view is not a problem at all in terms of the UN law, especially Article 2.3 and Article 33.1. But I think as a party state and it may face challenge if referring the dispute settlement procedure in N-Clause, fundamental difference I see here on the N-Clause from the UN system is that in principle in the N-Clause dispute in principle can be referred or shall be referred by one party state if you feel like to a procedure which in tailing binding will make this decision tailing binding decisions. So that exactly happened when our Philippine friends initiate the arbitration early this year. Anyway, in order to fully understand the discussion in the following, I would like to post certain articles as well as declarations. I think the most important one is so-called promissory clause of Article 286. It says that subject to Section 3, any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this convention shall, where no settlement has been reached by recalls to Section 1, be submitted at the request of any party to dispute to the court or tribunal have jurisdiction under this section. What important this year is that these three conditions required the party who unilaterally submit the dispute. The condition now explained later. Especially this condition subject to Section 3, Article 298 is part of Section 3 which gives an optional exception to the application of Section 2, the binding decision procedure. Saying that one signing ratifying or exceeding to the convention at any time, a state may without prejudice to obligations rising under Section 1, declaring in writing that it does not accept any one or more of the procedures provided in Section 2 with respect to one or more of the following categories of the disputes, such as disputes concerning interpretation of application of Article 15, 74, 83 relating to C-boundary delimitation, so those involved in historical basal titles. That is exactly what China did in accordance with its prohibition in October 2006, saying that PRC does not accept any of the procedures provided in Section 2, blah, blah, blah. So why not participate? I think that the first is a matter of auto interpretation. Many parties state who do not want to appear in the court, they will make a decision on the belief that the court or tribunal does not have jurisdiction. You may say that's a silly belief, but anyway, it must make the decision upon this belief. But in case that jurisdiction of the court is solely relied on a compromising clause, I think that respondent state must have a lot to say regarding the interpretation of that clause. It suggests that that auto interpretation might have been well undergone in the review by China upon ratification of N-clause. So even before the arbitration in issues this year, otherwise we can hardly understand the normal cause of the state one ratifying a treaty. Normally the country who ratified the treaty and have the intention to be bound by that treaty will think that we will do that on the belief that it's domestic law and policy will not in violation to the treaty provisions. Anyway by the end of the day, when Philippine challenged the policy and initiated the NX7 procedure validity of the interpretation of the clause, I think here it's also the validity of the claims based on the jurisdiction of the title based on the compromise clause raised by Philippines will inevitably be subject to the arbitration review. In the meantime, we all know that there's public domain, there's a lot of discussions on that. So China must be prepared for all this and ensure its arbitration is not at least a silly one. And in my view, I believe that China's interpretation of article 286's compromise clause is reasonable regarding this non-appearance as a respondent state vis-a-vis the Philippines as well as to the tribunal's argument on tribunal's jurisdiction. I will present the following reasons. So I agree in general that a respondent state can fully justify its non-appearance or non-participation only one, no prima facie jurisdiction basis has been presented by the applicant that is the case in 1955. Therefore, when a compromise clause with a normal formulation was relied by the applicant state for the jurisdiction of basis, the response can hardly resist it by not participating or not appearing. Anyway, there are two fundamental points that China would believe that the tribunal does not have any jurisdiction on the dispute formulated by the Philippines in its application. One is out of dispute by its very nature dispute over the territory of Nansha Islands or inseparable from the territory dispute. China will not participate, otherwise it may constitute a quiz institute that the Philippines claims over certain islands that China believes is illegally occupied by the Philippines or its argument that the islands dispute irrelevant to the present case. So from mere jurisdiction of matter of that point, China may argue that the territory dispute is nothing relevant to the interpretation or application of the convention of that clause. The other important one is on the interpretation of subject to section 3 of article 286. So here I would like to have you to pay attention on this clause. It is quite a new format, not like any compromise clause that has been relied by parties when they apply in the ICJ. The jurisprudence never, in my study, never had such experience. This article, article 286, contains a clause within the structure of ZOM that permits a party state to make a declaration to preclude automatically or by option of declaration of certain categories concerning interpretation of application. That makes the whole interpretive issue complicated. The importance here is, I say, its unique format. It sets the equal footing for the applicant states as well as the responder state. The court of tribunal needs to give them equal treatment in deliberating whether it should have jurisdiction, one second's so-called jurisdiction or test regarding the dispute in the preliminaries phase. That is, for example, how far it may consider circumstances affecting the preliminary stage, how far it will interpret specific clause which is alleged to be part of or excluded from the interpretation or application of the treaty. The second point, why not participate? I will argue that it's also a matter of calculation. There's three calculations. The first, based on the provisions and convention itself, in general, there's no default judgment here. Of course, there's demerits from the convention. For example, China cannot nominate its own arbiter to the case. Also, there's calculation based on ICJA jurisprudence. I listed several cases that some of the countries, including the United States, did not appear in the court. But the result is not always in favor of the applicant. I mean, the respondents sometimes also got their points in the final judgment. Other considerations, I passed here. Implication, finally. I think by non-participating the case, it provides with that China a strong political argument that may be employed to resist attempts to enforce any adverse judgment. That is quite sure on that point. But in the meantime, I think the tribunal's involvement may have motivated the parties to pursue settlements before the final judgment. I will see in a number of cases of ICJA that it's been resolved, it's been out of the court prior to final judgment. And even there is a final judgment, and one party does not intend to abide to follow it, there is still possible for them to have a final settlement achieved by negotiation. And if the judgment is made in favor of Philippines, then the Philippines may use it in the negotiation. Anyway, China still, I think, in the whole, before or after the judgment, I think China still needs to pay very much attention in terms of negotiation with Philippines. That is all. Thank you so much. Thank you very much. Thank you. May we turn now to Henry Bencerto, please? Thank you, Ernie. Thank you. First, pardon my jet lag, I also arrived last night, so if at some point I become incoherent, blame it to the jet lag. But at the same time, for me to be frank, open and candid in the discussion, and I think I suppose that's the start of any fruitful discussion on any issues, I will have to invoke a modified rule on Chatham House rules, which means that if I say something right, owe it to the government. If I say something wrong, it's my personal liability. Having said that, let me proceed. So the title of the presentation is the role of international law in managing disputes in the South China Sea. There are two basic terms here, the role of international law and then managing disputes. I'll forego that because I've been given 10 minutes only, but that's self-explanatory. Let me start the discussion by saying certain principles, preparatory statements that I think is the overview of my presentation. That is that there is a need to manage the escalating tension in the South China Sea so that they don't deteriorate into conflict, that the disputes in the South China Sea are complex. By no means are we saying it's simple. And so therefore any dispute management approach in the South China Sea should be multifaceted, multi-dimensional, and nuanced. That being said, international law plays a key role. It's not the end all be all, but it plays a very fundamental role in managing the dispute, and that's why any management architecture in the South China Sea must be anchored on international law. Let me therefore explain those preparatory statements in terms of the following outline. I'll discuss the nature of international law and then from there go to the relationship between international law and management architecture in the South China Sea, the escalating tension in the South China Sea and the lessons learned, and from there the recommendation proposed management architecture and the role of international law in terms of managing the disputes. And then I'll go into compulsory arbitration, which is really part and parcel of that solution from our perspective. And then I'll go with my own conclusion. Let me start by saying that international law essentially is in its simplest form essentially are the norms and principles that regulate the conduct of interstate relations. So essentially it is fundamental in any society, whether it's domestic and if you look at the international relations as a community of nations, we're also saying the same thing, that law is essential in its constitution and its preservation. And that's why if you are going to consider yourself as part of that community of nations, you have to subject yourself within the parameters of international law. And that's why terms such as rogue states or et cetera refer to those countries which operate outside of the parameters of international law. In the sphere of conflict avoidance and conflict prevention, the rule of law operates to prevent, manage, and even resolve disputes actually. That's the role that international law plays. And some of the principles of international law, just to give you some ideas are peaceful settlement of disputes, non-use of force or non-use of threat of use of force, equality of state. So these are just some of the principles of international law that can actually be applied in any given situation where there is a dispute. And in the context of the South China Sea, in fact, international plays a role. Why? Because all of the parties, including the claimant parties, invoke international law. So in a sense, what you can see there is that international law becomes a common language where everybody speaks. The question is, what is your interpretation? What is my interpretation? And that's why later on I will go to the subject of arbitration. That hopefully would settle what is the correct interpretation in an objective basis, not just one standard or another standard, but on a standard provided by a third party. In fact, some of the principles of international law are already incorporated in the declaration of conduct. So in a sense, the problem in the South China Sea is not the absence of a management architecture. We have the management architecture. And that is the ASEAN China Declaration of Conduct. And the ASEAN Declaration of Conduct, which was concluded in 2002, already contained these principles. The problem in the South China Sea, therefore, is, what is the right management architecture? That is the question, not the absence. Some of the principles, for example, of the Declaration of Conduct, which contains certain principles of international law. The slide will show that. But I would like to emphasize paragraph five and paragraph four. Paragraph five, for example, talks about the norm that you're not supposed to occupy unoccupied features. To give you a background, the Declaration of Conduct came as an offshoot, actually, of the 1998 Mischief Reef incident, when Mischief Reef or Panganiban Reef was actually occupied. And therefore, when you had this Declaration of Conduct, the heart and soul of that declaration is paragraph five. That is supposed to preserve the status quo when this declaration was actually concluded in 2002. And therefore, what paragraph five simply means that there should be no more actually occupation of any unoccupied features. So as you can see, the management architecture that is already in place contains those principles. Yet, despite these principles and despite the management architecture presented by the Declaration of Conduct, one may ask, why is there still tension? And not only is there tension, but the tension seems to escalate to the point where we are right now. So in a sense that management architecture concluded in 2002, was actually not able to prevent what it intended to prevent. That is from tension, from escalating into something that is already of a nature of a conflict. So just to illustrate, by 2009, you had the first official announcement in an official way as to the nine dash line. And then from there, you had an assertion on Reed Bank, which is about 85 nautical miles away from Mischief Reef, which is about 124 nautical miles. Now it's nearer to about 85 nautical miles. The difference between Mischief Reef and also Reed Bank is that Mischief Reef, a low tide elevation that sometimes is above water, Reed Bank is completely submerged under water. And so one may ask, how can you have a historical claim over an area where there is no concept in the first place in the 12th century? The concept of continental shelf is a creation of contemporary modern international law, essentially, presented by the Truman Declaration. And from there, it developed. And then from Reed Bank, there was an assertion about 60 nautical miles away and 30 nautical miles away on another oil blacks, which are also continental shelves, oil blacks 3 and 4 near Palawan. And then last year, in 2012, you had the incident now in Scarborough. This morning, I received information from the home office that there are indications that structures are being built right now. This is trying, we're trying to confirm that. But there are indications we're going in that direction. And then in 2012, for the first time, since 1997 to 2012, early part, if you're going to look at the South China Sea as a quadrant, there used to be a fishing bond imposed by China with respect to the first quadrant involving Vietnam. Last year, we saw the escalation. This moved westward to include the second quadrant. And therefore, we have that fishing bond now imposed practically on half of the two quadrants of the South China Sea. And then the nine oil blacks of China were proposed for development last year as well. The problem with this is they are in the exclusive economic zone of Vietnam. And then the establishment of the Sanchez City, which actually has jurisdiction over, well, there's a confusion here. You see mixed signals, actually, whether it's on the entire South China Sea or just the features. And then early this year, we have an expedition in James Sholl. James Sholl is essentially very symbolic because it's the farthest point in the nine dash line, which is about 85 nautical miles from the coast of Malaysia. And then this year, as we speak right now, there's a low tide elevation where we have a contingent since 1998. And it's being threatened for another Scarborough Sholl. The problem, the difference between Scarborough Sholl and Aung An Sholl is that in Scarborough, there is no structure. There's no contingent in military contingent. Here in Aung An Sholl, there are military contingent. There's some military contingent from the Philippines, and it's being threatened. As of two days ago, some ships have been seen as near, as two nautical miles away, actually. And this has been a growing pattern where you have also fishing vessels in front. And then, of course, now on an increasing pattern, the sovereignty patrols that's been happening there. I have a problem with sovereignty patrols. What does that exactly mean? Anyway, in the open forum, that can be clarified what that exactly means. How does it impact in the freedom of navigation, et cetera? At some point, maybe not today, but tomorrow, how is it going to be? When I say tomorrow, 15 years down the line. So therefore, given this situation, what are the reasons for the escalation of the tension? Why was the DOC as a management structure unable to prevent this tension? And then what can we do to address actually these gaps if there are gaps in the DOC? And then how can we use international law in an effective way to actually manage these disputes? So from some of the analysis, there are views expressed that the reason, one reason why the DOC failed in preventing the tension is because it is not legally binding. It's a declaration of principles, political principles. By no means does it impose obligations on any parties in a legal way. And then there is a lack of clarity in the nature of disputes or maritime entitlements. This is an area that was discussed during the negotiation of the DOC. But for some reasons or another, everybody wants to be nice with each other. Let's forgo those issues. They were not discussed. And eventually they came back to us in a big way. So from our perspective, therefore, it is necessary that the nine dashed line must be clarified. Maritime entitlements of all coastal states, including China, must be clarified. As a management mechanism, how do we operationalize shelving territorial disputes and engage in cooperation? And in this regard, how can we use international law to do this? So these are some of the points of international law. So dispute management tool, I've been given to wrap up. Let me go to the... So UNCLOS provides us certain principles by which we can clarify maritime entitlements. I'll go very fast on this. Territoriality, contingency, and exclusive economics. These are the maritime entitlements enshrined. And so that gives us... And if you apply those principles in the South China Sea, this is how it's going to be to look like, actually. In case of overlap, UNCLOS also provides us certain principles by which you can actually negotiate those overlaps. Essentially, maritime delimitation could be done on a median line basis, maybe in the Q&A, if there are questions. And then on the question of the features on the South China Sea, including the Spratlys, they can actually be addressed by Article 21, 121, on the region of islands. There is a distinction between an island and a rack and a low tide elevations. Maybe in the Q&A, we can go on with that. And therefore that can also be clarified. So in a sense, international provides us a very good idea of how to address these matters. And international is not lacking in those principles. So in terms of the clarification of disputes in the South China Sea, and this is where there is a distinction between territorial disputes and maritime disputes. Territorial disputes refer to the question of who owns the features. As opposed to maritime disputes, which actually refers to entitlements. And this is one way of approaching this matter, that once you're able to distinguish the two, you can have an idea of how to approach the South China Sea and you can use international law, essentially. So in the case of the South China Sea, the territorial disputes refer mainly to the features, but at the same time, it also refers to the territorial sea, because territorial sea is an extension of your sovereignty. This is the territorial dispute. And these are the different occupants, but the maritime dispute is not necessarily territorial dispute. They can be disaggregated. And so when you apply all those principles, you can go with the following process. That not the whole of the South China Sea is territorially disputed. That the area of territorial dispute in the South China Sea is specific, determinable, and measurable. That the area of territorial dispute can be determined and measured by clarifying the nature of and distinction between territorial claims and maritime claims or disputes in the South China Sea. That the nature and distinction between territorial disputes and maritime disputes can be clarified. And that the territorial dispute in the South China Sea is principally on the relevant features, extending to the territorial waters on the principle of land dominating the sea. And then once the extent of the territorial dispute in so far as the land feature and the territorial sea is concerned, you can now actually apply shelving of territorial disputes using the process of enclaving, which is done by many courts actually in deciding disputes of this nature. And by doing that, you're now able to segregate what is territorial disputed from the rest of the waters. By doing that, you now enable yourselves to engage in cooperation. If you look at this room, for example, constituting of 100 people, if there are seven people here who are infected with a bird flu, it's very difficult for us to engage each other because you don't want to be infected by bird flu. What do you do? You segregate the seven people who are infected with a bird flu, put them in a room, quarantine them, and then apply the Nezar medication. The rest of the people can engage in a better way with no fear of being infected. But you don't kill the seven people. You let time decide that, and you let medicine develop, right? But the rest of the people who are healthy can now engage each other. This is what we're saying in the South China Sea. You can now apply part nine, which actually talks about maritime cooperation. And so you can have this as a way of cooperating, as a way of managing, and you can have the specific code of conduct on those areas where you have territorial dispute, and you can actually convert them into marine protected areas. And so joint development is now a possibility. It's very difficult to have a joint development when you have the nine-dash line not clarified. Why? Because the nine-dash line practically covers 85% of all the EEZs of other countries. For me, therefore, when I clean somebody else's suit, that's nice, right? We can share your suit, even if I didn't spend anything on that. But because I have a 45, you have to share that suit. But because I'm nice, you can wear that suit today, but tomorrow I have to. So I'm nice, we can share that suit. I think that's a wrong way of approaching joint development. You have to clarify the area. And when you are able to clarify the area, you can identify what are the appropriate joint development areas. So I'm going to forego the technicalities because I have only 10 minutes. But if there's going to be a discussion on the arbitration, I'm pretty much open on that. Thank you very much. Thanks, Henry. Peter, could we turn to you, please? I don't know what that says about lawyers. And gone over time. Yeah. Thanks, guys. What is the role of international law in managing the disputes in the South China Sea? This question is really twofold. The first part is what objectively speaking can law play to manage the disputes in the South China Sea? The second aspect to the question is what subjectively speaking are the parties to these disputes willing to allow the law to play in managing these same disputes? So let's start with the first question. What role can law play? The most significant strength of international law, especially international treaty law, is its ability to establish norms of expected behavior among the community of sovereign states. This normative power of international law should not be underestimated for its ability to drive and shape the behavior of states towards stabilizing predictable behavior. Maritime disputes in particular have benefited from the normative power of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. In East Asia, in many ways, there's a pattern of close conformity to the norms established by unclaws. Unfortunately, in my view, China represents one of the countries that has not yet fully adopted its norms. China maintains numerous excessive non-normative baseline claims and an ambiguous claim of historic or other rights within the Nine Dash Line that has no basis under unclaws, among other concerns. On the positive side, even with its remaining deficiencies, China is party to unclaws and has fully incorporated many of its other provisions into its domestic laws and also takes an active part in the organizations established by the convention to further develop international law of the sea. The Philippines, on the other hand, is an excellent example of a country that made the political decision to embrace full normative conformity with the provisions and requirements of unclaws as a way to enhance its power status in relationship to its maritime claims. Prior to 2008, the Philippines labored under a centuries-old colonial articulation of its maritime sovereignty that bore no resemblance to current international law but which was enshrined in its constitution and was therefore very politically difficult to change. Nonetheless, by spring 2009, the Philippine government found the political will to bring every aspect of its domestic legislation into full conformity with unclaws, throwing off centuries-old, non-normative claims based on the vestiges of history. It's really quite admirable. In doing so, since many of its maritime claims conflict with those of China and Vietnam, as we know in some ways, the Philippines is leading its stronger neighbors by example. Thus, objectively, international law has the power to bring the behavior of states into alignment some more, some less in ways that contribute greatly to global stability. And it has done so in East Asia through the mechanism of unclaws. Subjectively, however, states appear to continue to choose to deviate from legal norms when they perceive that those norms do not sufficiently protect their objectives or interests and when they have the power to shield themselves sufficiently from the consequences of non-compliance. Thus, there is an inextricable link between power and law. The role of international law cannot be divorced from power. What roles are regional states willing to allow law to play? The second question. The diagram lays out the five basic framework approaches to international dispute resolution. The spectrum begins with three diplomatic or institutional options. The first of these is direct bilateral negotiations between disputing parties. The second is multilateral negotiations either through an appropriate institution, such as ASEAN or the UN, or undertaken on an ad hoc basis among the various disputing parties. The third is to submit the dispute to an arbitration or litigation process through an appropriate international legal institution. The fourth and fifth approaches are power-based. Non-militarized coercion and armed conflict. Of these five approaches, China's stated preference is bilateral negotiations to resolve conflict. But these negotiations have gone nowhere over the past two decades because China demands more than its negotiating partners are willing to give up. I've been told by folks from both Vietnam and the Philippines that in negotiations, the Chinese begin with sovereignty is ours, now we can negotiate. And this is too much. The negotiating partners can't begin from there. So China has also participated in multilateral negotiations in the past, and this has led to some successes, including the declaration of conduct of parties in the South China Sea. But by 2008, the Chinese had concluded that only they were negotiating in good faith and that the other disputing parties were taking advantage of Chinese restraint to seize control of valuable hydrocarbon resources. The Chinese thereafter sought actively to divide ASEAN to forestall any meaningful collective pressure from that direction. Likewise, the Chinese have so far refused to submit to international arbitration or litigation, perhaps because they know that international law does not support many of their assertions, especially their more expansive claims, such as jurisdictional claims over the waters of the South China Sea based on the nine dash line. On the power side of the equation, China has been deterred over the past few decades from using armed conflict to resolve the disputes. But since 2008, China's strategic emphasis has settled into the gap between armed conflict, from which it has been deterred, and institutional approaches from which it found to be ineffective to advance its interests. In the gap between these strategies lies the power-based approach of non-militarized coercion. Only one aspect, in my view, of China's strategy can be said to involve international law. China uses the language of the law to justify its claims and its right to use power to pursue them. Regrettably so far, China has chosen not to formally conform its South China Sea claims to relevant international law, or to use international legal mechanisms to help resolve its maritime disputes with its neighboring states. China's strategy includes the use of power and even low levels of force, but not international law or its international mechanisms. The Philippines, on the other hand, has a relatively weaker state, closely allied with the United States to protect its security interests has, predictably, been much more supportive of international law and international legal mechanisms to try to resolve maritime disputes in its favor. This led the Philippine government to update its domestic law to bring its claims into conformity with international law, and to use international arbitration as its mechanism of dispute resolution. So far, China continues to reject participation in the arbitral process initiated by the Philippines, even though arbitration will continue without them. A very important outcome of this case could be that China is faced with the embarrassment of the formal international rejection of its claims and a clear reinforcement of the rules and norms concerning rights and obligations at sea that Enclos establishes. How would, how China would react to being so clearly set on the wrong side of widely accepted international law remains to be seen. Continued failure by China to participate in the process or worse, a decision to ignore unfavorable results would be a signal from Beijing that no amount of international disapproval will sway it. Thus, since there is a relationship between power and international law and norms, another impact could be to encourage others in the region and beyond to enhance, to enhance their coercive capacity and engage in accelerated balancing activities in order to reinforce their claim strength and their overall security in the face of a more powerful China. Given the political and military cost to China of remaining outside the normative legal process, perhaps the single biggest impact of the Philippine arbitration is that it does in fact incentivize China to reopen the avenue of bilateral negotiations on terms that are more realistically acceptable to the Philippines and their other negotiating partners. I have to ask though, will the Philippines be equally flexible and willing to reopen the negotiations as a way to save Chinese face and help in that way to bring stability to the region? This could be the most effective outcome of the arbitration process and one of the real true benefits of using international law is that it drives parties back to negotiation, meaningful, effective negotiation. So what should the US rule be in reinforcing international law? To date, the United States has carved out two roles for itself in supporting peaceful resolution of East Asian maritime disputes. First and most importantly, American Alliance's security partnerships and security guarantees in combination with the maintenance of strong military power resident in East Asia have so far taken military conflict that fifth approach discussed in the framework above off the table as a method of dispute resolution. Second, the US does use its persuasive power to reinforce international law norms and its diplomatic power to encourage the disputing parties to resolve their conflicts through peaceful means. That is the first three approaches green discussed in the framework to my right. The US has so far played a very limited role in affecting Beijing's calculations about the fourth framework option that of pursuing non-military strategy. I'll leave that for discussion and in question and answer if you'd like to talk about that further. But I have four policy recommendations. First, the US must maintain deterrent military power in East Asia. The single most important role for the United States in East Asia is to keep conflict off the table as a means of dispute resolution. If we do nothing else, we must focus on continuing to achieve this. Second, the United States must support the ability of regional states to expend scarce resources on their own counter coercion capabilities. By focusing on military deterrence, the United States allows regional states to allocate more of their defense resources on developing Coast Guard and other non-military capabilities necessary to withstand Chinese coercive pressure at sea. Third, the United States should continue to leverage the gravitational power of international norms. The United States should continue to bring its diplomatic power to bear to persuade and encourage parties to pursue diplomatic or institutional measures. Continued American leadership in this regard may also give encouragement to other states inclined to voice similar expectations. American persuasive power would also be strengthened by reassertion of the American leadership role over the development of international law at sea. Since Enclos is the basis of modern international law at sea, the US should ratify the convention in order to more effectively exercise, maintain and perpetuate its leadership and to strengthen the normative framework that Enclos provides. Finally, the United States, in my view, should remain neutral about sovereignty but not about drawing boundaries at sea. The American policy of neutrality on the outcome of sovereignty disputes, that is disputes over the ownership of islands, rocks and reefs, in my view, is a good one as long as the dispute is resolved without the use of force. Our refusal to be drawn into conflict with a rising power over a piece of territory that is relatively trivial is an important aspect of regional and global stability. On the other hand, the United States has a strong interest in seeing the provisions of Enclos strengthened since they provide the only near universal framework that decreases resource and security disputes in the maritime domain. The United States Department of State should issue a public official statement that challenges any right for China to use the nine-dash line as a basis for maritime boundary making. Not history, not power, but international law must be the standard. In the end, there may be nothing that can persuade China to abandon its power-based strategies for consolidating its control over the islands and other territorial features in the South China Sea. If so, China will have to pay the price for its policies and that price may be that Chinese command sandbars, but not friends. To answer the question posed to the panel, as the disputes unfold over the coming months, years, and perhaps decades, the role of international law in the South China Sea will be to serve as the steady counterweight to the use of raw power. Thank you. Dr. Tang. Thank you. Good morning. I have a no-power voice. The Virgin was lower. So I'm going to sit. And, yeah, first of all, I would like to express my sincere thanks to the organizer for inviting me to this important conference. And it is indeed a privilege for me to speak before this distinguished audience. And my topic is about the rule of law, enclosed in the South China Sea. And let me first explain why I chose this topic. When I was invited by CSIS to the conference and to set a panel on the role of international law in managing disputes, I was excited, of course, but I was nervous. I was nervous because I do not know what to talk. We are lawyers and when we talk about disputes, we often talk about bringing dispute to court and that is a matter. Of course, we can talk more about technical details, but I don't know whether I can compete with Mr. Ben Soto here with the architecture of the Philippine arbitration. My excitement is stinging greater than my nerve, so I try to find something to speak. And I look at the theme of the conference and the theme of the conference is about managing tensions in the South China Sea. And the key word is tensions and that strikes me. And I just have a question, why do we have tensions? When we have international law to settle disputes, why do we still have tensions? So the idea of the rule of law comes up and I think that I can talk more about the rule of law and which is also a common theme in unclose and that is the reason for my choice to speak about rule of law, unclose and the South China Sea without dispute or tensions. And when lawyers talk about the rule of law, we often refer to Dicey, the British constitutional lawyer of the 19th century who gave much substance to the phrase rule of law. And he identified three basic elements of the rule of law, the absence of arbitrage, power, equality before the law and the privilege of judicial process. And I will proceed my presentation on this basis. And these three elements which are quintet but also distinct to some extent. So I will discuss each element in turn and in connection with unclose and the South China Sea. So first, about the absence of arbitrary power. In domestic context, when we talk about the rule of law, the first element of rule along the absence of arbitrary power, we talk about the constraints imposed on governments. At international level, we don't have a world government but the idea is basically the same. We talk about constraints imposed by international law on states, on nations. And I think the most important thing, international law, the most important development in international in the last century is about the constraint on the use of force. The outlawry of the use of force. Article 24 of the United Nations Convention, United Nations Charter, speak about the prohibition of the use of threat and use of force. And I think it's very important. And the prohibition of the use of force and threat of force is also clearly stated in unclose. If you look at the biennial of the convention, it talks about peaceful use of the sea and article one, article three one all, articulate that idea by expressly prohibiting the threat or use of force in activities at sea. And looking at the situation in the South China Sea and hearing about the discussion, the intervention by speakers and participants yesterday. I think that that element of the rule of law, the non-use of force is not strictly observed. I think that in many occasion violation of the prohibition on the use of force is occured. And one example is the incident that one of speaker and several speakers talk about the firing at Vietnamese vessel by the Chinese Navy in the South China Sea. That is clear violation of the use of force. And also some of the speakers talks about China's using its military cloud and to enforce laws throughout the South China Sea. And it's trying me that China does not provide clear basis for its enforcement, law enforcement activities in the South China Sea. Of course, we have a very generous statement by the Deputy Chief of Joint Staff of PNA in Singapore last week that China has sovereignty over the South China Sea. But it's not a clear legal basis. And talking about the legal basis, I want to move to the second element of the rule of law in international affairs. The second element of the rule of law is about equality before law. Of course, talking about equality in international law, we do not talk about that every states have an equal rights. But the state have equal rights in like or similar situations. Of course, landlocked state cannot claim maritime zones. But the idea of the equality before the law is that, first you have to observe international law in a bona fide manner, in good faith. And the second aspect is that we have a comprehensive legal system. International law is not an alacr choice where you can pick and choose the rules that it better fit your interests. So these two aspects apply to every nation, big or small. But of course, we understand that international, as I said earlier, international law set our constraints on states. But I must emphasize that those constraints and disadvantages are outweighed overwhelmingly by the advantages that international law and international legal systems confers upon states. And that we have to bear that in mind. That benefit the stability in the world that guaranteed by a comprehensive legal system brings to us. And the element of equality before the law is also in stride in unclose. If we look at the history of the law of the C Convention, it is the need of the states to have a legal order for the oceans, though we don't have competing activities to grab the resources of the sea. And that is the very idea of the law of the C Convention and we have a convention with comprehensively regulates all activities at sea and almost all activity at sea. And the last president of the conference on the law of the sea, the third conference on the law of the sea, that led to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Claim that the unclose is a constitution for the oceans. And indeed, the convention provide a comprehensive legal system for all activities at sea. And the principle of good faith is also guaranteed in unclose. If we look at article 300 of unclose, it talks about good faith, non-abuse of rights in implementing the convention. And now we'll compare that with the situation in the South China Sea. I don't think that the second aspect of the rule of law is strictly observed either. And one of those problem, I think that some of, and many speakers and participants raised yesterday is about the lack of clarity in China's nine dashed line. And, but I can tell you that whatever intention that China's may have to introduce or to claim maritime areas in the South China Sea by the nine dashed lines is in violation of the second aspect of the rule of law, that is equality before law. And now I explain to you why. If China went back on its commitment on the unclose and use a nine dashed line as a claim of historic waters in the South China Sea, or the area of historic rising the South China Sea, that is violate the first aspect of the equality before the law, that no pitch and choose among different rules. If you apply the unclose, you have to apply it wholeheartedly and in the whole. And if China's use the nine dashed lines to denote its maritime areas in the South China Sea based on its claim sovereignty over the outcrop in the South China Seas, and we can see Mr. Poling very happily depicted to us, the maximum maritime areas that can be generated by the disputed feature in the South China Sea is significantly smaller than a nine dashed line. And of course, we know that there's some difficulty in interpretation of the provision of unclose. When there may be different and disputes occur in the interpretation application of unclose, but that is exactly the time, I think that the third element of the rule of law coming through the picture, that is we have to privilege judicial process. And the third element of the rule of law, the privilege of judicial process is to give greater recognition of the role of international court and tribunals in settling disputes. And I may be considered silly because a lot of people think that this aspect of the rule of law does not fly in Asian context, where Asian countries are less legitimate than European partners, European countries, and we have the same way to manage rather than settle the disputes. But if we look at the several decades, the past, we have Malaysia in Indonesia go into ICJ, Malaysia, Singapore going to ICJ to settle their Salmon Tea Island dispute. And we have a very recently Cambodia and Thailand go back to the ICJ to seek interpretation of a decision some 50 years ago. And now we have a little bit further, we have Myanmar, Bangladesh in India went to eat loss for their maritime delimitation disputes. So I don't think that we have problem with using litigation to settle this bill. And now currently as Mr. Ben Soto have told us, Philippines resort to amputation procedure on the enclose to settle the dispute in the South China Sea, which were unfortunately rejected by China. But I would not comment on the decision of China to reject the amputation, but I would like to highlight in a different context, China was a very active player in dispute settlement in using dispute settlement procedure that is in the WTO. China stand ready to adhere to their commitments under WTO and China make frequent use of the WTO dispute settlements. So my policy advice even my hair is very humble. I agree with my Vietnamese colleague Mr. Thuy said yesterday that international law is not observed and that is the cause for tensions. And my very humble policy recommendation is that very simple going to the basic, rather than talking about international law, we just upholding the rule of law. Thank you very much. I have some vague quotation, but time is up. Thank you very much. Well, that was an excellent panel and I wanna thank all of you for your contributions. I'd like to open the floor to questions, same rules, just identify yourself and your organization. I'll go to the gentleman here to start. My name is Michael Yehuda and I'm attached to George Washington University. My question is really about the legal status as a whole of what the Chinese call the Nansha, others call the Spratlys. Is it recognized in some sense legally as an entity? Is it some kind of archipelago? And after all, some states claim only some islands, others claim the whole of the islands. So is there any view of international law of the standing of this large number of islands and islets and shoals and so on? Is there some sense of common agreement as to whether they constitute a unity in international law? I would like to, Henry, go ahead. Please use your mic. Thank you for the question and I think that question is very relevant because when you talk of Spratlys, as if it's one entity, the truth is what we have is a political geography, even including the way the world is set up. It's not that God created the world, this is the United States, this is the Philippines or this is Malaysia. What we have is actually the outcome of a historical evolution and so these boundaries that we call geographies are actually a political geography that we're speaking of. In the light of the Spratlys, it's the same thing. It's not as if the Spratlys is one entity. This term refers actually to a group of several geological features depending on who the author is. It could number anywhere between a low of 65 to a high of 195. I guess it has something to do with the counting method. Some are counted as a cluster, others are individually. Aside from the fact that you have global warming and so some of the features have disappeared in the process. In terms of those surveys, for example, we have noted that 15 features have already been out of the map already. So in a sense, what you have here, going back to your question, sir, is that there's no political agreement yet on that and so what you see there for in terms of the Spratlys and I will refer to it as the neutral term, you have different claimants claiming different features. That's how it is, sir. Thank you. Did anyone else want to comment on that? Okay. Mr. Robinson here. Well, good morning. I would like to make, if I could, some comments. And again, I was the legal advisor at the time of the negotiation of the law of the Sea Convention. I was in charge of the Gulf of Maine case, which was the first exclusive economic zone case and I had the misfortune of also having to run the Nicaragua case through the jurisdictional phase. My first comment is that what I find very disturbing through this conference is that the People's Republic of China does not seem to recognize, in my opinion, humble opinion with all due respect, that what appears in its short-term interest may not be in its long-term interest. Let's take, for example, the freedom of navigation. The South China Sea, I think it's fair to say, has been regarded as the high seas for what? 500 years? 600? 700? 1000? The freedom of navigation ultimately will be absolutely essential for the People's Republic of China. So why does the People's Republic of China want to take a position on freedom of navigation that is not only contrary clearly to the law of the sea negotiations? But I would argue is clearly not in its long-term interest. That is just an example. When you mentioned subject to section three, I would, with all due respect, I would do to differ. If you look at, for example, the North American Free Trade Agreement, you'll find many such sections. The law of the sea convention is the single longest, most complex, multilateral treaty that has ever been negotiated. It's between 400 and 500 pages long. The NAFTA is over 1,000 pages long. You will find many subject to. I think if you looked at the Geneva Conventions, you would also find a number of similar propositions. I would like also just to say is one thing out of interest. The first major nation to tell and an international court to go to hell, I believe, was France in the nuclear test case. And then the United States, unfortunately, we also mimic that in the Nicaragua case following the jurisdictional decision. But we did argue jurisdiction. And in the case of the South China Sea, unfortunately, I would argue the problem now that China has is that if you take Article 286 and 298, and the Chinese declaration, when you ratified unclose, they're not entirely in sync. And that is your problem. But in any event, in the Nicaragua case and in the nuclear test case, while these two nations told the court to go to hell, both nations actually wrote a very detailed pleading as if they were in the case, even though they weren't, and they took it into the library of the International Court of Justice and placed it on the library table. And as far as I know, every single judge actually read those pleadings in both cases. So maybe China should think of doing something similar in the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea. Thank you, Mr. Robinson. Would anyone like to respond to that comment? Dr. Tang. As I said earlier, that I have some quotation and I just want to echo what the former legal advisor of the US State Department said. And I quote from a former legal advisor of the British Common Ground Office. Let sir answer what? And he said that the rule of law is something which can be established overnight either national or internationally. It benefits a long term, not short term. They are perceived not by short sighted, but by those with farsight and insight. Thank you very much. Bonnie Glazier? Oh, did you want to respond? Yes. Oh, Bonnie, sorry. Dr. Zhang wanted to comment. Please hit the microphone. I would like to send the comments from Mr. Robinson. I think this is very interesting. Well, I omitted the freedom navigation because I think it's very clear from, if you look at the DOC and the relevant Chinese positions regarding the freedom navigation, the South China Sea, there's no doubt that the Chinese government position that's the freedom navigation should be respected in that region, in that area. My investigation of the case is quite different from yours, maybe. The first to say go to hell, the Internet child, the call to child traveling was not France. It's Kwantamala in the 1950s. In the first phrase, Kwantamala did not participate in an Audubon case where he was sued by European, very little European countries. But in any way, I think it's a quite different story with regarding to the subject two provisions, subject two in that case. But I would like to ask if you can give me the NAFTA treaty because subject two, I understand that a lot of treaties, there are provisions incorporated in the subject two. But that is very unusual in the compromising clause. So if we look at Nicaragua case and the audio platform case, the United States actually raised a similar objection, but that not relied on the compromising clause, which is I think article 21 of the freedom of friendship and freedom of navigation between the U.S. and Nicaragua. There is a compromise clause, but in that clause is nothing of subject two. The U.S. relied rather on another substantive provisions. I think it's article 20 something, saying that these provisions will probably will not deal with user force, something like all the things concerning security. But that preclusion was not down in the compromising clause. So that is quite different from here. This is much similar if we go to the jurisdictional test of interpretation, that would be similar in my view to the case of genocide case, where Yugoslavia was sued by some, the former states of Yugoslavia, where they dispute actually on the term of whether or not there's international dispute in the compromise clause. So that's I think is quite different. And that's make equal footing in my view to give a very strong backup of China in dissenting the jurisdictional issues in the first phase. Bonnie? Yes, thank you very much, an outstanding panel. Bonnie Glazer, I'm a senior advisor for Asia here at CSIS. I have a question for Professor Zhang. I'm not an international lawyer. So maybe you can help me to understand this point. I think I understood you to say that if China were to participate in this arbitration case, that it would be lending legitimacy to the Philippines claim. And I don't really understand why that is the case. I know that China has consistently said that it has indisputable sovereignty, but it has not denied that there is a dispute. Whereas of course in the East China Sea, Japan not only says it has indisputable sovereignty, of course using other language, but denies that a dispute exists. So my understanding is that China has always recognized that there are other claims, that there is a dispute. So why is it that simply participating in this arbitral tribunal case would lend additional legitimacy to the Philippines claim? Thank you. We can think that every dispute, you can put it into a historical political context. That is actually the argument presented by, I think Britain in the Lakhobi case, as well as and by Iran in the Iranian hostage case. So that is people will tend to think that, well, you come to cotton sumi and that claim or the dispute, whatever your package is in the great context of this political structure. But here I think the story is different here. What I say is that in my view that Philippines application was made fundamentally based on a precondition that there is some of the islands was belongs to and there's no dispute to the Philippines. And there's no question of the territorial disputes in the Nanshai islands, whatever you think the entity of the islands would be. Therefore, that is a very well, I will think this very well packaged case. I know that they have very good lawyers. But anyway, especially on the territorial issue disputes, which China will think, it's not merely as a historical or political context, but something fundamentally falling the very nature of the dispute that the Philippine package or it's inseparable to any claims that Philippine may raise. Okay, Dr. Amherst, Don. Don Amherst in Stanford University. I would like to zero in on what to me is the sort of looming issue. And I'd like the panel to focus rather narrowly, if I may, on this issue. I see two questions. The first question is, will the arbitral court declare its own jurisdiction? Under, I gather, competence, competence, but I don't need to know the background of whether that's German or Latin or whatever. I just need to know what particularly our friends from China and the Philippines think about the reasoning that is likely to drive a decision on jurisdiction in one direction or another. It seems to me that from Professor Zhang's presentation, there are two possibilities as I see it, but I'm an outsider here and I'm not versed in the legal details. One is that it is infected, the Philippine submission is infected by sovereignty, by issues of ownership of what you call the Nansha Islands, that is the Spratlys. And therefore it will be thrown out. The whole submission will be thrown out on those grounds. It is also possible perhaps that they might argue that demarcation issues are unavoidably implicated in the Philippine submission and that on those grounds it will be rejected. But I leave it up to you but please clarify for me the arguments why we should believe that the court will say yes, we have jurisdiction and why they might say the opposite. No, we do not have jurisdiction and if you could predict the outcome, I would be even happier. The second question has to do with the situation if they decide that they do have jurisdiction. And then what happens? And I won't go through the various possibilities except to suggest one which strikes me as a lay person who doesn't like lawyers. Sorry about that. As a lay person, is it not quite possible if not even likely that if the arbitral court says yes, we have jurisdiction, they will find the Philippine submission ruleable, okay, that's a word, on only one count, namely whether or not the nine dashed line is in conformity with Unclos. And they're all the other stuff. I think they're 13 different requests but I haven't read it in quite a while so I'm not really sure. And the word sovereignty does appear in the Philippine submission several times, right? Let's not get into those details but I want you to respond specifically to this prediction that if the court decides yes, we have sovereignty, they will rule the nine dashed line incompatible with Unclos which will have at least a moral effect on Beijing but the rest of the Philippine submission either they will reject it or not comment at all. The first question, I think it's very clear that the court will have the competence to decide the jurisdiction of their own. You can argue that they don't have jurisdiction but you have to wait for the court to decide as very clear. But it doesn't mean that the state choose not to participate cannot present their explanations on why they don't participate. That is, I just give my views. Could be wrong, could be silly but I give you my explanations, not necessarily the governments. The second one is on the UShip line. I would like to have you pay attention to this, the very nature of declaratory judgment in the legal term. It is though not very, it's sometimes also invoked that request to the wrist by the applicant countries and the court, ICJA, PCIJ did make declaratory judgment. But you may have, I think that the fundamental rule of the court is to settle the dispute rather than make a declaration on what is right or what is wrong. So that is the main function, especially in terms of arbitration. I will start and I assume myself if I'm a judge, I will better not go that far in implementing my function as a judicial organ set by the convention in deciding or adjudicate dispute concerning the dispute arising out of the convention. Enric, would you like to comment? Sir, thank you for your question. It allows me to discuss the last part of my presentation and I'd like to explain it in a, let me try to explain it in a non-lawyer fashion because like you. I think that's what Don was asking for. So I'll try to reduce it in a layman's room. I think the first point we have to remember is that under international law, we're talking of in general, consent is necessary to bring another party. So it has to be mutual consent. Now we go to the specific case of UNCLOS. In the case of UNCLOS, that consent has been given when the party ratified UNCLOS. In this case, the question is, I will go into that, sir. I'm trying to do it step by step. All right, in the case of UNCLOS, sir, China and the Philippines have both exceeded ratified UNCLOS. Consent was given. However, in UNCLOS, reservation is allowed. And so I'll go to your reservation. Four things will not allow UNCLOS to have jurisdiction. The first point, sir, it cannot decide on sovereignty questions because UNCLOS has been designed not to address sovereignty questions. It's about maritime entitlements. The last three ones would be on the reservations. What are these reservations? Maritime delimitation, as discussed. Military operations and issues which are in the agenda of the UN Security Council. These are the three reservations which China made. Now, outside of these four issues, what is the default? The general rule is compulsory jurisdiction. Therefore, if you merge the two, can you therefore bring an issue and apply compulsory jurisdiction outside of the four issues? The answer is yes, because the general rule, the residual rule governs. All right, now you go to the specific question. What are the issues brought therefore by the Philippines? Do they fall under any of these? Let's go to the sovereignty. Are we asking the tribunal to decide on who is the owner of the feature? No, sir. We're not asking that. What we are asking, if a feature is an island or a rack or a low tide elevation, if they are of such character, what are the maritime entitlements of those features under UNCLOS? And so it is therefore refers to entitlements of these features under Article 121. And so we're not going into any of these reservations made. What we are asking the court actually is to address those issues. If they are of this nature, what is the maritime entitlement? Now one can say, but one thing leads to another in the same way in our life, it's like that. But when you look at UNCLOS, you can actually relate everything. I can say that we're both relatives under Adam and Eve. We can make all those cause and effect, but that's not how the way law operates. There is such as a direct and proximate cause and effect. So we have to make the distinction. When you look at UNCLOS, it makes two distinct concepts. The concept of maritime entitlement and the concept of maritime delimitation. They are not fused together, though they are interrelated. They're not necessarily one and the same. And so essentially UNCLOS, and we've shown it, talks about maritime entitlements that any particular state is entitled to. So that's how it is. Now, having said that, having said that therefore, is it in our interest to have the tribunal decide on this? I would say, sir, from my perspective, yes, because it will affirm international law and the rule of law. We take out the role the tribunals play. What do you have? Law of the jungle. Talk about negotiation, sir. It's a power play. It's a question of who has more power and who has not. Law levels the playing field based on objective standard. And this is exactly what we're saying. This is the point why we have brought the matter before a third party adjudication. China says one thing. We say another thing. Both invoke international law. We sit there for better for both of us to have a third party settle between the two of us. What is the correct interpretation of law? And so what appears to be a legal issue will actually have far-reaching consequences in terms of economics and politics because politically speaking, therefore, if we don't follow certain norms and principles by in terms of how we interact with each other, it's always the powerful who will dictate the terms. If that is the future international system that we want, I think that's going to be problematic. If we go by that, we lay the foundations for future conflict. This is the time by which we have to lay the correct principles by which we may have short-term disputes right now. But if we settle these issues which keep on hounding us, we are going to ensure, in my sense, at least a future that will be more stable. That is the political consequence of what we're doing, sir. So I hope that on the, I cannot give you more details because I don't want to lay the details of the legal issue. Peter, you wanted to comment. I think Dr. Zhang wants to comment. I do, I do. Well, you're getting four lawyers, five opinions. So you're directly to answer your question, all right? And it's important that you be patient and hear some of these things because you can't get a black and white answer. It's not possible. And here's why. Will the arbitral panel declare jurisdiction? There are three possibilities. Possibility one is that they'll choose to do a bifurcated decision, meaning that they'll rule on jurisdiction first and then if they find it, move on to the merits, right? That's a possibility. They did that, the International Court of Justice did that in the Nicaragua, Columbia case of, I remember, and it resulted in certain complications, frankly, in the case. So the second possibility is that there'll be a packaged decision. I think this is probably the more likely approach that there'll be a packaged decision on jurisdiction that talks in detail about the merits. So when they figure out what all of the issues are, whether the four areas that you can't rule on are separated out and there's anything left over, then you'll get a jurisdiction opinion and a decision all at the same time. That second approach, the packaged approach. And so you may get a definitive answer with the jurisdiction decision on the merits of the case as well at the same time. But either way in that packaged approach, you're gonna get guidance on the law, right? So that's the value of the packaged approach is that they're gonna have to go through all the legal and technical geographical analysis. And so there'll be a lot of information offered about what the opinion would be if they had jurisdiction, even if they don't find it. So that's a very important possibility, I think. And even if they find that they don't have jurisdiction, I hope that's what they do. Because this is an area where we're begging for some clarity right now. The third possibility is that the negotiations end up withdrawing the case and you don't get an answer. Right, so no jurisdictional answer or no legal answer. I predict, I'm gonna give you a prediction, you ask for it. Yes, they will find that there is a narrow band of jurisdiction available. And it's gonna deal with Article 121-3 and that would be a blessing to the world if they do find that. Because Article 123 is a very difficult, that's a rock versus island, 12 versus 200, we don't know, right? So state practice is all over the map and the US is just as bad as anybody else. So the bottom line is the international legal community would benefit greatly by getting some clarity on Article 123 and I think they can find jurisdiction on Article 123. Here's an example. Scarborough Scholl actually has, I think the answer is five, maybe six, rocks that are above water at high tide. The Nicaragua-Colombia case reaffirmed what was already law which says that any piece of naturally formed territory above water at high tide is subject to sovereignty if it's as small as this picture or as big as a continent, right? So the bottom line is there is sovereign territory on Scarborough Scholl, five rocks at least. So you draw 12 miles around them at a minimum, right? That's what Article 121-3 says. And then the question is, is there any piece of the show that's left over that would be international waters if Article 121-3 limits the ability of the coastal state to reach beyond 12 miles? And the answer to that as I understand the geography is, yes, and if that's the case, then both the Philippines and China would have the right to fish there, right? So I think the court can find jurisdiction over at least that narrow issue. So your second question is, will the court give an answer on the nine-dash line, right? No, the court won't give an answer directly on the nine-dash line. Here's my prediction, right, as a lawyer, right? Frankly, I hope they do, I hope they find a way to prove me wrong, but why wouldn't they? Because China hasn't defined what the nine-dash line is. The fact that it's ambiguous makes it hard for the court to rule what it is. We don't know what it is. So what will they do instead? If I were on the court, this is what I would do, I would rule by implication. I say, I don't know what the nine-dash line is, but here's the rules that you have to follow, right? And so in other words, ignore the nine-dash line, tell the parties, here's the rules you have to follow. The rules are geography, 12 miles, article 121.3 limits beyond that, therefore there is a continental shelf. And that continental shelf apportains to certain geography, right? Not to history or power or anything else that apportains to geography. So this is how I think, if I remember the arbitral panel, that's how I would rule. So, I don't know, maybe we'll get one more opinion and then we'll all vote. Yeah, actually Dr. Zhang is gonna have the last word and then we have to wrap up. Okay, Peter, I very much refrain myself from predicting anything that I caught. I think that put my career under a great risk. The reason is not, you never know what the judge was, what his mentality was, what is, you never, you can hardly. So there are possibilities and I better not predict. But one thing, I almost, for sure not, the bifurcation could hardly be possible. Of course it depends on the procedures. Well better, I will not predict anything here. But it depends on the procedures and the procedures will be made by the five judges. Well, when China did not participate, China will lose the power to say anything on that procedure. So I don't think those, the judges, if they want to get more payment, they better to prolong this. You know, I said, well, I better not say that. On Harry's, I have always the question, as I agree with you, that Enclos prescribes through on the entitlement of the Marian entitlement. But that come back to my question, how can the judge decide the entitlement without deciding the ownership of the National Island? So that is the dilemma they will face. And in that sense, they may somehow hear the objections from China, which, well, made my view, I presented in my presentation in the first aspect. And the second, I completely disagree with you on your perception of rule of law, emphasizing, if not exclusively, but mainly on the third party jurisdiction. I understand, Philippines is a small country. They have, they fear that they will be disadvantaged in the bilateral negotiation with China. But I would like to have you look at the history, the practice, the state practice. I understand that you have the fear, but the fear would be, I think, for our health. We better, you know, if we do have some concrete evidence to supporting such a fear, otherwise, you know, we. So the history is that you know that we have the Tonkin Bay Agreement with Vietnam. And you know that the U.S. ship line originally had 11 parts, but one part in the Tonkin Bay has been deleted. Well, I'm finally deleted as a result of this agreement. So in that sense, I think the South China Sea issues in the Chinese perspective, maybe also in Philippine perspective, and also in the literal states perspective in that semi-unclosed sea, is a very complicated issue involving history and special political context. That is reason I think that people, all the literal states in the semi-unclosed sea region, in accordance with the provisions article one, two, three, I guess, to negotiate for a result, a management of that region. In that sense, I think the territorial dispute over the islands or the features looks inseparable from the other things. Well, then I suggest we better to put them together as a package in the negotiation for the future management of the South China Sea, which is indeed a semi-unclosed sea. We, nobody can actually, can take back by using our force, no matter how strong your claim would be over the features and islands in the Nanshan. That is, I think China will not do that. And that's had been reflected by the 2002 DOC, which is very clear intention of the parties in respecting the status quo. So in that case, you can hardly just talk one aspect of the whole package by ignoring that exactly prohibit by the enclosed, because enclosed yourself is a package to you. Henry, a really quick, please. Very quick points. One, arbitration is a very serious matter. You don't go into that. Overnight. The reason why we're going into arbitration is precisely because negotiation was not going anywhere. And two decades was mentioned. It's more than two decades, actually. The problem is, there's also urgency. Why? I've shown you what is happening in the South China Sea. There has to be a connection between articulation and also what's happening. As we speak right now, a union is under threat. Force is not going to be used, but what happened in Scarborough? What happened in a union right now? What is happening there right now? So there's a sense of urgency. This is something that you have to prolong because status quo will be different 10 years from now. That status quo changed from mischief reap when the DOC was concluded in 2002. What was the status quo? Status quo was mischief reap. After DOC was concluded, what's the status quo now? Scarborough is under threat. So many sovereignty patrols. So in a sense, therefore, it's not just a question of a theoretical solution. This must have grounding on what's actually happening on the ground. My third point. I will have to disagree with that on the nine dash line, but I cannot lay out details on that because that is a matter that will have to be addressed in the memorials. I will have to, second, it's not true that there's ambiguity on the nine dash line. We have documents in our possession which says they have indisputable sovereignty. And that's the very reason why there's an assertion on the read bank and areas three and four. What is the reason for that? Not, so there is an indisputable sovereignty claim on that. And so this is our point. There, you cannot exercise that too much flexibility in terms of saying one day and then another thing on another day. Maybe it's better that that settle this once and for all what exactly it is. And then it makes it easier for us now to talk on the same language. My final point, I'll forget the final point. Ladies and gentlemen, I think I've proven the point that you cannot control four lawyers on a panel. Please join me in thanking them very much.