 Ladies and gentlemen, I am delighted to be here at the first annual European Systemic Risk Board Conference and to have a chance to consider with you how we can support a strong macro-potential framework for the financial sectors that powers investment and growth in Europe. Recent years had seen a complete overhaul of our regulatory architecture. The 2008-2009 financial crisis exposed in graphic terms our lack of effective regulation, supervision and crisis management capacity. We did not have the systemic oversight to set alarm bells ringing early enough or to prevent failures in an over-leveraged banking sector and the contigation which followed. Going back, it's striking how much has been done to set up a coordinated system of supervision. The European Bank supervisory authorities have improved the quality and consistency of micro-potential oversight across the EU, while the European Systemic Risk Board ensures macro-potential oversight and analysis of systemic risk. We have incorporated Basel standards into EU law and significantly strengthened the protection of bank capital and liquidity reserves. A set of macro-potential instruments to address structural and cyclical systemic risks in Europe's banking sector have also been introduced and are being used across member states. We have set up a banking union with a single supervisor for 129 significant banks and 80 percent of euro area banking assets. The ECB took on specific competences for macro-potential policy and the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive and the Single Resolution Mechanism have given us a crisis management framework. Our proposal for the European Deposit Insurance Scheme is with colleges later. Thanks to the hard work of many of you in this room, we have solid architecture in place. The implementation of macro-potential measures is underway in many countries. Some 219 measures have been taken by national authorities to guard against asset bubbles, especially in the real estate sector, and to manage the systemic importance of financial institutions. Today, our financial system is stronger and better capitalized, albeit with pockets of weakness we are working to overcome. But for all this progress, our macro-potential framework was set up while Europe was dealing with the aftershocks of a large financial crisis. It's a complicated framework, developed gradually and involving many institutions. Now based on an experience we have had in recent years, it's time to see whether it can be refined, whether targeted adjustments can be made to make the framework stronger and to work better. We know there are overlaps and inconsistency in our rules, which could lead to unnecessary regulatory and administrative burdens, and there are main barriers to the smooth coordination and oversight by the ESRF, the ECB, the single supervisory mechanism, and the competent national authorities. That's why the Commission has launched a public consultation to review our macro-potential framework. It's a genuine consultation. We do not have pre-cooked conclusions. The input we receive will shape the action we take. We would value concrete suggestions on how to improve the framework in certain specific areas. Let me say a little about our approach and the areas we would like to explore. At the center of our approach is our commitment to maintaining the right balance between national flexibility and appropriate level of coordination at EU level. For the single market to work well and to guard against contigation, we need EU level coordination and consistency policy approaches. But after so much harmonization of micro-prudential requirements, it is also important that there should be sufficient flexibility at national level on macro-side, so that countries can respond to very different structural and cyclical challenges that affect their financial sectors. To keep this balance, we have set out to examine the scope and conditions related to the use of macro-potential instruments. We want to examine the way these are activated and the institutional arrangements for macro-potential policy in both the Banking Union and EU as a whole. We are clear that changes in one area may need to be complemented by appropriately targeted revisions elsewhere. For example, to achieve a framework that's proportional and effective, revisions can be needed to the macro-potential provisions in the central requirements, capital requirements regulation and directive, and may need to be complemented with targeted revisions of the institutional setup detailed in the ESRB and SSM regulations. Across the board, we want to clarify the conditions for when and how macro-potential measures are used. We are clear that we have to increase their effectiveness and transparency, but also reduce duplications in the framework which in places make our potential requirements disproportionately burdensome. At the same time, we want to look at whether there are gaps in the EU tool set for the banking sector in particular to guard against vulnerabilities stemming from the real estate market. Overvalued real estate has been at the heart of the past banking crisis. Member states have rightly been working to reduce risky lending practices. They have used credit standard measures such as loan-to-value and debt service-to-income limits to strengthen lenders and borrowers' balance sheets. These measures seem to be working. That's good news. We would like to use the consultation to see whether we should incorporate these elements or requirements into EU law while giving individual countries the freedom to set their levels and scope. But also to consider whether we go further and include macro-potential leverage ratios and broader sectoral capital requirements into EU legislation. We would like to hear also your feedback on this topic. We also want to look at how the coordination between micro- and macro-potential authorities is working. If information doesn't flow properly between supervisory authorities, we run the risk of contradictions and duplications in the way rules are applied or of inconsistencies in the way assessments of systemic risks are communicated. This would clearly work against our overarching objective of financial stability. So we will be looking carefully at how we can improve the coordination between competent and designated authorities at European and national level. This consultation provides an opportunity to reflect on the measures we have taken to manage risks to financial stability outside the banking sector. We are clear that existing measures like leverage limits and liquidity management tools for investment funds have only recently been implemented. Before making any changes, we need to have a better understanding on how these measures are working, both in normal and stressed market conditions. Nevertheless, we would like to use the consultation to consider whether ESRB governing bodies would benefit from greater participation of non-bank supervisors. Good coordination among national non-bank supervisors, ESS and ESRB could better support system-wide risk monitoring and analysis. Our institutions should be as lean and efficient as possible and governance arrangements fit for purpose. For the ESRB to fulfill its mandate better, the ECB and SSM's role in the framework need to be clarified further. Equally, we want to look at whether ESRB governments can be simplified to make it more efficient. While maintaining sufficient representation of national authorities, we should consider reducing the size of the general board to allow it to focus on most important financial stability issues. This consultation fits into broader agenda. Our work to build a capital markets union should help enhance financial stability in EU by creating a broader range of funding channels to the wider economy. At the moment, risk is concentrated in the banking sector, including for market-based finance. Deeper capital markets would help us to make us less reliant on that one source of funding. They would increase the pool of capital available for productive investment in the EU and give the European economy the shock absorber function it's lacked to bounce back quickly after the crisis. The European Commission is fully committed to this project. We want to accelerate progress and to be bolder where we can. As part of capital markets union project, we launched a call for evidence on financial services legislation which also has a macro dimension. The aim was to look at financial services regulation in the round to check if it is working as intended and if it's as gross friendly as possible. We'll publish our analysis of the call for evidence responses and recommendations by the end of the year. The trust of their focus is already clear. We need to consider adjustments to increase funding to the wider economy. We need to look at whether we can make legislation more proportionate and whether the compliance burden can be reduced for businesses. The macro potential review can play its part in all these areas while keeping the framework strong. Ladies and gentlemen, our consultation on the macro potential framework is open until 24th of October. We are looking forward to receiving your input. And we will be having a public hearing on 7th of November and publish the feedback statement shortly afterwards. Based on the results of this consultation, we will set out our thinking in a legislative proposal in 2017. This is an opportunity to complete our legislative framework for the financial sector, manage risks effectively and ensure our rules are as proportionate and gross friendly as possible. This is an opportunity we should say together. Thank you. Questions? Anybody curious? Well, if not, I would like to thank you very much for having been with us. It's been a great pleasure and honor. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.