 Bakel. Thank you very much for staying this long and for the contributions you've been making over the course of this conference. The idea of this panel is to be slightly less interactive than many of the sessions we've had. But it's for people who've been chairing and presenting to give as reflections of what ond ddim hefyd i'r ddweud o'r ddiwethaf, ac mae'n ddweud o'r cyffredinol yn ymddangos, wrth i'r ddeunydd, ar gyfer hynny'n ddweud, ond dychydig yn ymdweud, ond byddwn ni'n oes ei ddweud Homodd yn ymdweud o'r awdurdod o'r ddweud, nid o'n ddweud yma. Yn oedd ichi adeiladau chywerol – chywerol yswrdd – ym hyfforddiant mewn cyfriferddau cyd-loen ac ynhellfaio cyfriferddau cyrraeddhaf iaith yn yn edrych y gwblid i'r mewn cyfriferddau cyfriferddau yw'r cyfeidio'r cyfriferddau cyfyrdd yma. Yn oedd y fitting sy'n adeiladau cyfriferddau cyfriferddau cyfriferddau rydw i bwysig. Mae yna mynd i gyd-dais am y cyfriferddau, Felch, felly mae'r cyfriferddau mewn cyfriferddau. I'm honoured to be asked to participate on this last panel and I'm relieved to be the first speaker because I have a feeling that what I have to say is so ordinary that the chances are that they're just very obvious concluding remarks at a conference of this kind. But let me begin by endorsing the remarks that John Bell made himself in the opening session of this conference when he said that Cambridge thought there'd been a need for a conference that brought together common law public lawyers and moreover that provided a mechanism for bringing them together again. And I agree with that. We have enough in common to make deep comparison fruitful across common law jurisdictions, but we're sufficiently different to make comparison a source of insight. And I must say we're sufficiently culturally trained to comply with the requirement for 15 minute presentations as well. The common laws are rather odd beast from a comparative point of view and especially its public law subset which is so closely intertwined with politics and the structure of the administration. For decades when the common law was broadly regarded as unified, common lawyers from very different states across the world discussed legal questions as if context was either irrelevant or so similar that it made no difference. I remember participating in a comparative administrative law conference run by Hugh Corder about 10 years ago in South Africa where people from India and Malaysia and Australia and Canada all descended on Cape Town and solemnly exchanged views about mandamus as if we all came from East London. And in a sense we have the same familiarity now when Sir John Laws referred the other night to error within an outside jurisdiction as being the old metaphysics. We all immediately understood what that was all about and fell into our standard positions. But times have changed and in an era when it's fashionable to argue that legal and constitutional systems are converging across the world in a sense common law legal systems are bucking the trend and are diversifying and the diversification continues. We've had numerous examples of that over the last two days and not least in relation to our position on the old metaphysics but also on a number of other matters whether the grounds for review are substantive or procedural, the conception of judicial power approaches to statutory interpretation, the meaning of the principle of legitimacy. I won't drag you through all the points of difference you'll be only to aware of them yourselves. This diversification is partly of course the product of the relaxation of appellate ties setting up the possibility of the various national systems of common law, the common law of Australia, of Canada, of New Zealand and so on. And in Australia this legal nationalism has been further consolidated through insisting that there's a single common law so it's not diverse within Australia, it's just diverse between Australia and the rest of the world. But equally significant I think has been the passage of time as each of these national systems of common law has adapted to the constitutional, political, legal, bureaucratic, supranational, etc. context in which it operates. The how and why of that divergence has been the subject of a lot of discussion over the last few days and there's a lot more to be said about it. But in the meantime I think just in closing it's worth reflecting upon the significance of the divergence. On at least some questions it creates a comparative challenge for common law public lawyers in considering whether the principles and practices operating in one jurisdiction are actually transferable to others and on what conditions. So that for example the extent of deference, judicial deference and the manner in which it's shown is such a question and considering the transferability of those sorts of practices requires attention to be paid to things like the constitutional setting, the structure of the administration and legal and political culture. Where differences between common law systems call for comparative techniques it may affect judicial reasoning as well and there's a link here to that rather irritating debate about judicial references to foreign law that was sparked by United States decisions a decade or so ago. That debate has certainly not stopped what I consider to be a very healthy practice in the rest of the common law world but in at least some states including my own it's coincided with caution on the parts of the courts about references to foreign law. Not to stop them but to encourage the use of comparative method and sometimes to encourage the distinguishing of other common law jurisdictions on the grounds of differences of some kind. Now public lawyers like us can of course help to sort out whatever problems presented by such comparative difficulties. But there's another challenge as well I think and that is to prevent the baby being thrown out with the bathwater altogether. It's helpful I think for us to emphasise not just our differences but the extraordinarily similarities in values, concepts, principles and analytical tools across the common law world. To maintain the mechanisms for cross fertilisation of ideas and experiences even if at the same time we are also taking context into account and conferences of this kind provide tremendous assistance for that I think very important purpose. Let me just make one final concluding remark. The concept of public law as it's been engaged for the purposes of this conference has brought together administrative lawyers and constitutional lawyers primarily. Even there and there that's a very sort of neat combination of public lawyers and many of us teach across both subjects but even there it's been possible to identify differences of approaches between participants depending on which is their primary area of expertise. Notably absent from the programme has been anything by way of specific reference to international law, transnational law, regional law, the globalisation of public law and all those other trendy developments that have featured so prominently on much of the half literature stand at the front for the duration of the conference. And the corollary of that is that there's not too many people here who have expertise in international law except perhaps as a second string to their bow. I've been in two minds over the last couple of days about whether that's a pity or not. In my experience domestic public lawyers and international lawyers tend to talk past each other and while that might be a reason for getting them together it's actually can also be rather counterproductive and annoying. On the other hand those two areas of law domestic public law and public international law are becoming increasingly interdependent and it's important I think that we both engage with each other and that each understands the other's point of view. So this is I think something for organisers to consider in the future. I'm certainly not proposing that the conference be turned into a public international law conference and I bear in mind Richard Hart's observations on the first day that there are already enough conferences for those people. We need one for the domestic public lawyers and this has certainly been the most wonderfully fruitful occasion. But we might perhaps consider having at least a session in which we compare our approaches to international law and the interaction that it undoubtedly has with our own domestic public law systems. So thank you very much Cambridge Organising Crew for this wonderful conference for the wonderful tweeting. It has been a privilege and a pleasure to be involved and I wish you happy recovery time for the next few weeks. Thank you. Well like Cheryl it's my opportunity to thank the organisers of this highly successful conference for inviting me to participate which is a privilege and to congratulate you all on initiating it in the first place. I would say that it's been a particular treat for me because I've drifted into becoming something of a comparative lawyer and like John Bell I'm more accustomed to participating in conferences on the continent. And as I'm at heart an unshakable and unrepentant common lawyer I find myself defending the common law with people who still believe that the English possess no public law and worse still have no constitution and no separation of powers. And it has therefore been a pleasure to relax with colleagues and share experiences with colleagues who have a common methodology and we have a core conceptual vocabulary in which to discuss things and I have learnt a very great deal at this conference. It's been a matter for congratulation too I think to see the global spread of the common law actually personified at a conference. But if I can pause for a moment I can't resist thinking how very much Michael Taggart would have enjoyed this conference and how much I wished he was still here with us. But like Richard Hart I hope that Cambridge will be able to maintain the spread at future meetings and to extend it perhaps. Because it would be very nice to be joined from some of the smaller jurisdictions such as Mauritius which is particularly interesting because it's a member of the Francophonie as well as a member of the Commonwealth. And I've only met one person from the Caribbean so far and delegates from some of the African states north of South Africa would be very interesting. Especially those to whom the rule of law is very important in their countries and they may lack an opportunity to debate it. Also we could perhaps do with more participants from the Indian subcontinent and hopefully a way can be found to help with this very ambitious goal which possibly requires funding. Well again to speak personally I've had the privilege of this conference not only of attending some sessions at which the standard of the presentations was enormously high but also of chairing three very interesting papers that dealt with challenges which to me seem to be those posed for administrative law in the future. Post I would say by contemporary and rapidly changing methods of administration and I think developments such as the rapid development of digital administration on which I listened to an extremely interesting paper from Australia. And the accumulation of information about us all in vast and highly insecure and very badly regulated data banks. Regulation of complex and often dangerous products providing some sort of administrative process but also a regulatory process. Risk regulation procedures in areas of scientific uncertainty such as climate change are challenges that we need to be able to meet in the future. So for me these are the areas of administrative activity to which I want to turn my very limited amount of attention and which I think badly need input from public law and public lawyers. So I recommend everybody to think hard about the future. I think it's perhaps important that we should try to leave our comfort zone which is arguments over proportionality versus reasonableness and rationality and learn to grapple with the development of the transnational administrative state. Globalised distributive governance and as Michael Powers put it the risk regulation of absolutely everything. And this I think is enough to keep you going John for a dozen future conferences. Thank you very much indeed. Thank you. I have had a wonderful time and I too would like to thank the organisers for involving me. And thinking about the things that the ideas have been triggered in my what I call my mind over the last few days has been. First of all the first idea is what an extraordinarily broad church we are. We have people here who range from those who are very interested in the public but not dare I say much interested in law from the people who are terribly interested in law but much less interested in the at least the philosophy of the public. And that's I think a good thing. I'm not too worried about that. I'm prepared to talk to anyone. I'm not a snot really. But the range is just fantastic and it made me think about where public law scholarship particularly may be heading. It seems to me that there are two points that worry me actually. And everyone's been very upbeat so far so I'm going to be a bit downbeat and share my worries with you. And in relation to the themes of the conference the first relates to substance and the second relates to process. In relation to substance I think we're in grave danger of having large parts of the public law both nationally and internationally taken over by concerns which aren't really legal concerns. They're concerns about values rather than concerns about law. It seems to me that there is a very important job that public law does and that is to try to stop the agents of the state from doing things in ways that are unlawful and cause serious evils. Now that's a noble task but it does depend on having law and that in my view is an unreconstructed positivist depends on having laws. Things that we can look at and say with a reasonable degree of confidence will allow us to predict outcomes to advise clients to persuade if necessary judges and will allow judges to do things for themselves. Once one gets away from that and starts talking not about rules, not even about principles, not even heaven help us about rights about which I'm profoundly skeptical myself but about values then I'm afraid we have sold the past rather we have given up the hard-aged tools which make public law and public lawyers and their work possible and useful. So I would be inclined to push back from vague notions about for example proportionality and so on towards something which will actually allow us to advise clients and persuade judges and decide cases. It's not about perfect ability public law, we are not a perfectionist undertaking, we are a group of people who in the end are in the job of providing protection against the worst excesses of state power and if we aim for perfectionism then we will lose in the end the ability to do what I regard as our core job. That's my substance worry. The other second worry concerns process and I'm not going to get into the discussion which is very interesting but ultimately I feel unhelpful about what is substance and what is process. But it seems to me that a lot of public law scholarship today is directed to not asking what decision is to be made but how should it be made and perhaps more important to these people who like this sort of thing who should make it. Now as a lawyer that doesn't worry me in the least. If it's a legal question and I think most of the things we deal with are legal questions then we have a duty as lawyers to deal with them and if we're judges we have to deal with them as judges. Talk of deference, talk of variable standards of review or variable intensities of review really are not helpful in that because they hide the fact and it is a brute fact I think that judges once a case is before them will have to decide the case. If the judge says deference, deference I don't feel I am not worthy to decide this case, that is deciding the case. It's just saying you are not going to have a remedy. So we can't escape from the necessity to decide cases by saying oh we're not the right people to decide it. If we're going to be sensible public lawyers we need to take questions about justice ability, deference, varying intensity of review, democratic accountability, political responsibility and so on and say those are all very interesting questions but they are questions for political philosophers not public lawyers. So a great deal of what passes as public law scholarship these days seems to me to have precious little to do with public law as I understand it but then I am an old reactionary fart and the only thing that's changed is that I used to be a young reactionary fart. Now I'm not saying that this is a new phenomenon. It was something that in politics and in law was noted almost exactly 100 years ago by one AV Dicey, some of you will remember the name, who was a very determined lawyer, a public constitutional lawyer and reviewing as he prepared in 1914 the introduction to the 8th edition of his introduction to the study of the law of the constitution, Dicey noted four, you might call them themes, but four areas of new constitutional thinking that had emerged in the 30 years since the publication of his first edition and the four were woman's suffrage, proportional representation, federalism and the referendum. Now it's worth noting that at least three of those remain both topical and to some extent controversial today and at least two of them will be even more topical and controversial tomorrow. But he went on to note two things about these. The first was that these novelties weren't actually novelties, very little real ingenuity had been put by politicians and by education constitutional lawyers into the development of public law in this country during those 30 years compared to the amount of ingenuity that has been put into doing things like developing railways and steamships and such like. What was new was that people were newly interested in them. But the second thing which is much more important I think for our purposes is that we've rather lost sight of the fact that there are two important qualities of law. One is that it should be good or wise and the other is that it shouldn't outrage public opinion. Now he said all those four novelties so called had been devoted to the second of those making sure that as far as possible laws don't outrage public opinion. And remarkably little effort had been put in to the equally if not more important task of making sure that law is good and wise. Now I'm afraid that the type of scholarship which focuses on who should decide and on the processes by which the decision should be made rather than on what decision would be good and wise. That seems to me to be unfortunate and likely to lead to both a less effective and also a somewhat impoverished public law. Those of you who are still awake will have noticed that there's a certain creative tension between my first point and my second. But I'm going to stop and leave you to sort that out. John, you just took emergency measures to cool us off when you got at the front. So I'm well aware that I'm the only person who stands between you and your taxi or you and your beer and in fact between me and my beer. So I'm not going to spend a long time either defending the last 30 years of Canadian and Minister of Law jurisprudence against David or pointing out the contradiction which he alerted us to between saying that we should be lawyers not political philosophers and then telling us that what we should be focusing on is whether laws are good and wise rather than on legal issues. So I'm not going to do that. I will point out although he says that he's not a snob which I believe I did discover during this conference that he's actually quite a violent man. You might recall that in the session where Mark Erinson and I spoke and David presided. He had one point threatened to reach for his revolver if I used the word parliamentary intention again. And I never thought I'd think there was anything in common between you and Joseph Goebbels but that's one thing I've discovered at this conference. My friend Joseph would have had a lot of reasons as well. So I want to go back to the theme that John Law's introduces tension between individual and state and also to the theme that Jerry Mason introduced about public reason. And I'm just going to mention my friend Thomas Hobbes briefly because I do think that it was Hobbes who came up with the first attempt to understand the state legally. That is as an artificial person who speaks through law and when officials speak in the state's name they have to speak in the language of legal reason. And I think this is a very important idea because it fits with the assumption of most of us here. I think that the administrative state is legitimate. We don't think that there's a new despotism out there that has to be combated. But what we want to do is to try to understand its legitimacy which requires us in part understanding how that state is legally conditioned and understanding how it can be understood as a reason-giving institution. And this seemed to me to be a theme although I know it's what I wanted to impose on the conference that did run through the conference. And I was reminded by the session I attended on legitimate expectations of something that a great public lawyer and a great friend to many people here once said to me and I'm of course recording the person that Carol recalled, Mike Taggart. And I think for those to the many to whom he was such a great friend his absence at this conference has been quite palpable. So I was writing with Mike and with Murray Hunt an article about the long journey from a New Zealand case to Vita through an Australian case Teo to one of the major Canadian decisions of the last 20 or so years and that is the Canadian Supreme Court's decision in Baker. All of these decisions are about the effect, if any, that the ratified but unincorporated convention on the rights of the child should have one deportation decisions. And in all three decisions the apex courts of the country struggle to find a way of giving effect to the convention so that the best interests of the children would be taken into account in a deportation decision without stepping over the boundaries as they conceive them of the separation of powers. Now in New Zealand and Australia as I recall the vehicle was legitimate expectations but the fury and scorn that greeted the decision in Australia, Teo, meant that when the Canadian Supreme Court decided it gave its decision in Baker mention of the journey that had got these issues to the Canadian Supreme Court was taboo they couldn't bring themselves to mention either legitimate expectations or Teo. So the court got to its result through a kind of interpretive process which was on the face of it quite different from the legitimate expectations device that had been relied on by the New Zealand and Australian courts. And Mike Cuth thought this was quite interesting. Why? Because what he thought was that if you abstracted from the different routes that the courts had come to reach really quite similar decisions we would find something like a common project in common law countries and that the courts were trying to understand that administrative decision makers should be understood as giving reasons to those who are subject to their power. And what's more reasons that are qualitatively different from the kind of cost benefit reasons that Jerry Mayshaw told us we might want to think administrative decision makers should get away from. So qualitatively good reasons. And this is what all three courts were interested in. Now Mike was far more sceptical than I am both about the prospects for achieving this end, legitimating the administrative state and he was also far more sceptical about the role of judges in helping us to get there. But I do like to think that much perhaps all of this conference has been about the tension between liberty and authority that I think John Laws alerted us to at the beginning and the role of legal public reason, legal public reason. So I think that my friend David and I share desire to focus on the legal here in managing that tension. So that's all I have to say but before you clap for me you've already I think clap for the organisers at the end of each presenters. We've presentation today but I would like you to ignore me now and just join us all in thanking the four people who did so much hard work to make this such a great conference so thank you. It's good. They've been very good at letting you go home a bit early. Can I first thank the participants? In one sense the conference wouldn't work without the participants but you'd be particularly good first as contributors of papers with posting them, giving them to us in advance and therefore enabling others to engage with your work. And to think about it. And secondly your contribution in the various sessions have been really good debates engaging with the issues and encouraging each other to develop new ideas. I think what has come out of this is very much a range of new ideas and as colleagues here have already indicated a range of agendas that need to be taken forward. It's been a broad-ranging conference even within a particular theme or process and substance and there have been wide-ranging discussions on a variety of areas of public law. And the quality of the papers have been well-developed but provisional. I think that's been the neat way that you've come to this conference, throwing ideas in but that are well-developed representing the research you've been doing for a while and yet open to the views of other people before they get finalised in some form of publication. And I think what it does is to reveal the health of public law scholarship as a research field in the academy and if we've done nothing more we can demonstrate that public law in the wide variety that Cheryl was pointing to and maybe there are other areas that we didn't cover is a field of vibrant activity across the common law world. There's been a good debate, as others have said, between the different common law countries but there have been noticeably people here from non-common law countries taking part and observing our scholarship and contributing and that's actually very good because what it means is that common law scholarship is not sort of introverted but actually able to look outwards. And the sort of contributions and debates have been about contacts, Cheryl was pointing to Rick Rawlings and others, have shown that in a sense the common law doesn't exist in a bubble, it interacts in different ways in different parts of the world and that is an important contribution that we make not only to our own jurisdictions but to the jurisdictions which are our neighbours. And I think what people have done by keeping to time is to enable debate with lots of people participating. Our thanks obviously go to Richard Hart not only for the financial contribution but also for helping us to design based on his experience a form of conference that will work. Obviously there are potential issues and we will be very keen to receive ideas about how the conference might work better or what things we should keep and what things we should ditch for the next conference in September 2016. But I think Richard has been a great support and we look forward to in particular the opportunity to publish with Bloomsbury Hart publications a collection of some of the essays. We obviously won't be able to include all, we'll be limited to probably about a dozen but I hope that the quality of the work has been such that even if we're not able to include in that particular publication I'm sure there will be other outlets for the really tremendous research that's going on in the field. My sort of final remarks are for the three gentlemen sitting in the front here. Jason and Mark spent a lot of time conceiving this project. Not merely conceiving it as an intellectual project as a thematic project but very much thinking about mechanics and what they put in place a year or so ago in terms of mechanical structures have seamlessly managed to enable the kind of discussion that we've had across the various panels. And they have put in a tremendous amount of work and I'm very grateful indeed for what they've done. Equally Philip has been a great contributor not only to the academic side but the grey hairs you may be seeing or developing on his hair now are to do with the practical organisation of things like accommodation and food. Which have posed a few problems from time to time. So I think the three of them have done a tremendous job. I've just been sort of back the eminence grease in the background but not actually doing a great deal of the practical stuff that they've done. And I'll thanks also to Anna Julia, Barry, Chinton, Lorna, Nicky Forrest and Shona who've been the assistants who've been seamlessly supporting the conference. I'm making sure that there haven't been too many problems, too many disasters occurring. But can we thank those six for their contribution please. And so my final words are simply safe journey and see you again in September 2016.