 Question 36 of Summa Theologica, Paras Prima, Trinity and Creation. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. This recording is by Jim Ruddy. Summa Theologica, Paras Prima, Trinity and Creation by St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Question 36 of the Person of the Holy Ghost. We proceed to treat of what belongs to the Person of the Holy Ghost, who is called not only the Holy Ghost, but also the love and gift of God. Concerning the name Holy Ghost, there are four points of inquiry. Whether this name Holy Ghost is the proper name of one divine person. Whether that divine person who is called the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son. Whether he proceeds from the Father through the Son. And whether the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost. First article, whether this name Holy Ghost is the proper name of one divine person. Objection one, it would seem that this name Holy Ghost is not the proper name of one divine person. For no name which is common to the three persons is the proper name of any one person. But this name of Holy Ghost is common to the three persons. For Hillary shows that the Spirit of God sometimes means the Father. As in the words of Isaiah, the Spirit of the Lord is upon me, and sometimes the Son. As when the Son says, in the Spirit of God I cast out devils, showing that he cast out devils by his own natural power. And that sometimes it means the Holy Ghost, as in the words of Joel. I will pour out of my Spirit over all flesh. Therefore this name Holy Ghost is not the proper name of a divine person. Objection two, further the names of the divine persons are relative terms, as Boethias says. But this name Holy Ghost is not a relative term. Therefore this name is not the proper name of a divine person. Objection three, further, because the Son is the name of a divine person, he cannot be called the Son of this or of that. But the Spirit is spoken of as of this or of that, as appears in the words the Lord said to Moses, I will take of thy Spirit and will give it to them. And also the Spirit of Elias rested upon Elysius. Therefore Holy Ghost does not seem to be the proper name of a divine person. On the contrary, it is said there are three who bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word and the Holy Ghost. As Augustine says, when we ask three what we say three persons, therefore the Holy Ghost is the name of a divine person. I answer that while there are two processions in God, one of these the procession of love has no proper name of its own, as is stated above. As the relations also which follow from this procession are without a name, for which reason the person proceeding in that manner has not a proper name, but as some names are accommodated by the usual mode of speaking to signify the aforesaid relations, as when we use the names of procession and inspiration, which in the strict sense more fittingly signify the notional acts than the relations. So to signify the divine person who proceeds by way of love this name Holy Ghost is by the use of scriptural speech accommodated to him. The appropriateness of this name may be shown in two ways. Firstly from the fact that the person who is called Holy Ghost has something in common with the other persons, whereas Augustine says, because the Holy Ghost is common to both, he himself is called that properly, which both are called in common, for the Father also is a spirit and the Son is a spirit, and the Father is Holy and the Son is Holy. Secondly from the proper signification of the name, for the name spirit in things corporeal seems to signify impulse and motion, for we call the breath and the wind by the term spirit. Now it is a property of love to move and impel the will of the lover toward the object love. Further holiness is attributed to whatever is ordered to God, therefore because the divine person proceeds by way of the love whereby God is loved, that person is most properly named the Holy Ghost. Replied to Objection 1. The expression Holy Spirit, if taken as two words, is applicable to the whole trinity, because by spirit the immateriality of the divine substance is signified, for corporeal spirit is invisible and has but little matter, hence we apply this term to all immaterial and invisible substances. And by adding the word Holy we signify the purity of divine goodness, but if Holy Spirit be taken as one word it is thus that the expression in the usage of the church is accommodated to signify one of the three persons, the one who proceeds by way of love, for the reason above explained. Replied to Objection 2. Although this name Holy Ghost does not indicate a relation, still it takes the place of a relative term in as much as it is accommodated to signify a person distinct from the others by relation only. But this name may be understood as including a relation if we understand the Holy Spirit as being breathed. Replied to Objection 3. In the name Son we understand that relation only which is of something from a principle in regard to that principle. But in the name Father we understand the relation of principle. And likewise in the name of Spirit in as much as it implies a moving power, but to no creature does it belong to be a principle as regards a divine person, but rather the reverse. Therefore we can say our Father and our Spirit, but we cannot say our Son. Second article, whether the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son. Objection 1. It would seem that the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son, for as Dionysius says, we must not dare to say anything concerning the substantial divinity except what has been divinely expressed to us by the sacred oracles. But in the sacred scripture we are not told that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son, but only that he proceeds from the Father as appears from John, the Spirit of Truth who proceeds from the Father. Therefore the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son. Objection 2. Further, in the creed of the Council of Constantinople we read, we believe in the Holy Ghost, the Lord and Life-giver who proceeds from the Father with the Father and the Son to be adored and glorified. Therefore it should not be added in our creed that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son, and those who added such a thing appear to be worthy of anathema. Objection 3. Further, Damascene says, we say that the Holy Ghost is from the Father, and we name him the Spirit of the Father, but we do not say that the Holy Ghost is from the Son, yet we name him the Spirit of the Son. Therefore the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son. Objection 4. Further, nothing proceeds from that wherein it rests. But the Holy Ghost rests in the Son, for it is said in the legend of St. Andrew, Peace be to you and to all who believe in the one God, the Father, and in his only Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, and in the one Holy Ghost proceeding from the Father and abiding in the Son. Therefore the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son. Objection 5. Further, the Son proceeds as the Word, but our breath does not seem to proceed in ourselves from our Word. Therefore the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son. Objection 6. Further, the Holy Ghost proceeds perfectly from the Father. Therefore it is superfluous to say that he proceeds from the Son. Objection 7. Further, the actual and the possible do not differ in things perpetual, and much less so in God. But it is possible for the Holy Ghost to be distinguished from the Son, even if he did not proceed from him, for Anselm says the Son and the Holy Ghost have their being from the Father, but each in a different way, one by birth, the other by procession, so that they are thus distinct from one another. One further on he says, for even if for no other reason were the Son and the Holy Ghost distinct, this alone would suffice. Therefore the Holy Spirit is distinct from the Son without proceeding from him. On the contrary, Athanasius says, the Holy Ghost is from the Father and the Son, not made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding. I answer that it must be said that the Holy Ghost is from the Son. For if he were not from him, he could in no wise be personally distinguished from him, as appears from what has been said above. For it cannot be said that the divine persons are distinguished from each other in any absolute sense, for it would follow that there would not be one essence of the three persons, since everything that is spoken of God in an absolute sense belongs to the unity of essence. Therefore it must be said that the divine persons are distinguished from each other only by the relations. Now the relations cannot distinguish the persons except for as much as they are opposite relations, which appears from the fact that the Father has two relations, by one of which he is related to the Son and by the other to the Holy Ghost. But these are not opposite relations, and therefore they do not make two persons, but belong only to the one person of the Father. If therefore in the Son and the Holy Ghost there were two relations only, whereby each of them were related to the Father, these relations would not be opposite to each other, as neither would be the two relations whereby the Father is related to them. Hence, as the person of the Father is one, it would follow that the person of the Son and the Holy Ghost would be one, having two relations opposed to the two relations of the Father. But this is heretical, since it destroys the fates and the Trinity. Therefore the Son and the Holy Ghost must be related to each other by opposite relations. Now there cannot be in God any relations opposed to each other except relations of origin as proved above. And opposite relations of origin are to be understood of a principle and of what is from the principle. Therefore we must conclude that it is necessary to say that either the Son is from the Holy Ghost, which no one says, or that the Holy Ghost is from the Son as we confess. Furthermore, the order of the procession of each one agrees with this conclusion, for it was said above that the Son proceeds by the way of the intellect as word, and the Holy Ghost by way of the will as love. Now love must proceed from a word, for we do not love anything unless we apprehend it by a mental conception. Hence also in this way it is manifest that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son. We derive a knowledge of the same truth from the very order of nature itself. For we nowhere find that several things proceed from one without order except in those which differ only by their matter, as for instance one Smith produces many knives distinct from each other materially with no order to each other, whereas in things in which there is not only a material distinction, we also find that some order exists in the multitude produced. Hence also in the order of creatures produced the beauty of the divine wisdom is displayed. So if from the one person of the Father two persons proceed, the Son and the Holy Ghost, then there must be some order between them, nor can any other be assigned except the order of their nature whereby one is from the other, therefore it cannot be said that the Son and the Holy Ghost proceed from the Father in such a way that neither of them proceeds from the other unless we admit in them a material distinction which is impossible. Hence also the Greeks themselves recognize that the procession of the Holy Ghost has some order to the Son, for they grant that the Holy Ghost is the spirit of the Son and that he is from the Father through the Son. Some of them are said also to concede that he is from the Son or that he flows from the Son but not that he proceeds which seems to come from ignorance or obstinacy. For a just consideration of the truth will convince anyone that the word procession is the one most commonly applied to all that denotes origin of any kind, for we use the term to describe any kind of origin as when we say that a line proceeds from a point, a ray from the Son, a stream from a source, and likewise in everything else, hence granted that the Holy Ghost originates in any way from the Son, we can conclude that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son. Reply to Objection 1, we ought not to say about God anything which is not found in Holy Scripture either explicitly or implicitly, but although we do not find it verbally expressed in Holy Scripture that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son, still we do find it in the sense of Scripture, especially where the Son says, speaking of the Holy Ghost, He will glorify me because He shall receive of mine. It is also a rule of Holy Scripture that whatever is said of the Father applies to the Son, although there be added an exclusive term, except only as regards what belongs to the opposite relations whereby the Father and the Son are distinguished from each other. For when the Lord says, no one knoweth the Son, but the Father, the idea of the Son knowing Himself is not excluded, so therefore when we say that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father, even though it would be added that He proceeds from the Father alone, the Son would not thereby be at all excluded because as regards being the principle of the Holy Ghost, the Father and the Son are not opposed to each other, but only as regards the fact that one is the Father and the other is the Son. Reply to Objection 2. In every council of the church, a symbol of faith has been drawn up to meet some prevalent error condemned in the council at that time. Hence subsequent councils are not to be described as making a new symbol of faith, but what was implicitly contained in the first symbol was explained by some addition directed against rising heresies. Hence in the decision of the Council of Calcedon, it is declared that those who were congregated together in the Council of Constantinople handed down the doctrine about the Holy Ghost, not implying that there was anything wanting in the doctrine of their predecessors who would gather together at Nicaea, but explaining what those fathers had understood of the matter. Therefore, because at the time of the ancient councils, the error of those who said that the Holy Ghost did not proceed from the Son had not arisen, it was not necessary to make any explicit declaration on that point, whereas later on, when certain errors rose up, another council assembled in the West, the matter was explicitly defined by the authority of the Roman Pontiff, by whose authority also the ancient councils were summoned and confirmed. Nevertheless, the truth was contained implicitly in the belief that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father. Reply to Objection 3. The Nestorians were the first to introduce the error that the Holy Ghost did not proceed from the Son as appears in a Nestorian creed condemned in the Council of Ephesus. This error was embraced by Theodoric, the Nestorian, and several others after him, among whom was also Dimasen. Hence in that point his opinion is not to be held. Although too it had been asserted by some that while Dimasen did not confess that the Holy Ghost was from the Son, neither do those words of his express a denial thereof. Reply to Objection 4. When the Holy Ghost is said to rest or abide in the Son, it does not mean that he does not proceed from him, for the Son also is said to abide in the Father, although he proceeds from the Father. Also the Holy Ghost is said to rest in the Son as the love of the lover abides in the beloved, or in reference to the human nature of Christ by reason of what is written, on whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending and remaining upon him he it is, who baptizes. Reply to Objection 5. The word in God is not taken after the similitude of the vocal word, whence the breath does not proceed, for it would then be only metaphorical, but after the similitude of the mental word whence proceeds love. Reply to Objection 6. For the reason that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father perfectly, not only is it not superfluous to say he proceeds from the Son, but rather it is absolutely necessary, for as much as one power belongs to the Father and the Son, and because whatever is from the Father must be from the Son unless it be opposed to the property affiliation, for the Son is not from himself, although he is from the Father. And Reply to Objection 7. The Holy Ghost is distinguished from the Son in as much as the origin of one is distinguished from the origin of the other, but the difference itself of origin comes from the fact that the Son is only from the Father, whereas the Holy Ghost is from the Father and the Son, for otherwise the processions would not be distinguished from each other, as explained above. Third article, whether the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son. Objection 1. It would seem that the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Father through the Son, for whatever proceeds from one through another does not proceed immediately, therefore if the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son, he does not proceed immediately, which seems to be unfitting. Objection 2. Further, if the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son, he does not proceed from the Son, except on account of the Father, but whatever causes a thing to be such is yet more so, therefore he proceeds more from the Father than from the Son. Objection 3. Further, the Son has his being by generation, therefore if the Holy Ghost is from the Father through the Son, it follows that the Son is first generated and afterwards the Holy Ghost proceeds, and thus the procession of the Holy Ghost is not eternal, which is heretical. And Objection 4. Further, when anyone acts through another, the same may be said conversely, for as we say that the King acts through the bailiff, so it can be said conversely that the bailiff acts through the King. But we can never say that the Son spirates the Holy Ghost through the Father, therefore it can never be said that the Father spirates the Holy Ghost through the Son. On the contrary, Hillary says, keep me, I pray, in this expression of my faith, that I may ever possess the Father, namely, thyself, that I may adore thy Son together with thee, and that I may deserve thy Holy Spirit, who is through thy only begotten. I answer that whenever one is said to act through another, this preposition through points out in what is covered by it some cause or principle of that act. But since action is a mean between the agent and the thing done, sometimes that which is covered by the preposition through, is the cause of the action as proceeding from the agent. And in this case, it is the cause of why the agent acts, whether it be a final cause or a formal cause, whether it be effective or motive. It is a final cause when we say, for instance, that the artisan works through love of gain. It is a formal cause when we say that he works through his art. It is a motive cause when we say that he works through the command of another. Sometimes, however, that which is covered by this preposition through is the cause of the action regarded as terminating in the thing done. As, for instance, when we say the artisan acts through the mallet, for this does not mean that the mallet is the cause why the artisan acts, but that it is the cause why the thing made proceeds from the artisan and that it has even this effect from the artisan. This is why it is sometimes said that this preposition through sometimes denotes direct authority as when we say the king works through the bailiff and sometimes indirect authority as when we say the bailiff works through the king. Therefore, because the son receives from the father that the Holy Ghost proceeds from him, it can be said that the father spyrates the Holy Ghost through the son or that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the father through the son, which has the same meaning. In reply to Objection 1, in every action, two things are to be considered. The suppositum acting and the power whereby it acts. As, for instance, fire heats through heat. So, if we consider in the father and the son the power whereby they spyrate the Holy Ghost, there is no mean for this is one and the same power. But if we consider the persons themselves spyrating, then as the Holy Ghost proceeds both from the father and from the son, the Holy Ghost proceeds from the father immediately as from him and immediately as from the son and thus he is said to proceed from the father through the son. So also, did Abel proceed immediately from Adam in as much as Adam was his father and immediately as Eve was his mother who had proceeded from Adam. Although indeed this example of a material procession is inept to signify the immaterial procession of the divine persons. Reply to Objection 2, if the son received from the father a numerically distinct power for the spiration of the Holy Ghost, it would follow that he would be a secondary and instrumental cause and thus the Holy Ghost would proceed more from the father than from the son. Whereas on the contrary, the same spirited power belongs to the father and to the son and therefore the Holy Ghost proceeds equally from both although sometimes he is said to proceed principally or properly from the father because the son has this power from the father. Reply to Objection 3, as the begetting of the son is co-eternal with the begetter and hence the father does not exist before begetting the son. So the procession of the Holy Ghost is co-eternal with his principle. Hence the son was not begotten before the Holy Ghost proceeded but each of the operations is eternal. Reply to Objection 4, when anyone is said to work through anything, the converse proposition is not always true, for we do not say that the mallet works through the carpenter. Whereas we can say that the bailiff acts through the king because it is the bailiff's place to act since he is master of his own act but it is not the mallet's place to act but only to be made to act and hence it is used only as an instrument. The bailiff is however said to act through the king although this preposition through denotes a medium for the more a suppositum is prior in action so much the more is its power immediate as regards the effect and as much as the power of the first cause joins the second cause to its effect. Hence also first principles are said to be immediate in the demonstrative sciences. Therefore so far as the bailiff is a medium according to the order of the subjects editing the king is said to work through the bailiff but according to the order of powers the bailiff is said to act through the king for as much as the power of the king gives the bailiff's action its effect. Now there is no order of power between father and son but only order of supposita and hence we say that the father's byrates through the son and not conversely. Fourth article whether the father and the son are one principle of the Holy Ghost. Objection one it would seem that the father and the son are not one principle of the Holy Ghost for the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the father and the son as though they are one not as they are one in nature for the Holy Ghost wouldn't that way proceed from himself as he is one in nature with them nor again in as much as they are united in any one property for it is clear that one property cannot belong to two subjects therefore the Holy Ghost proceeds from the father and the son as distinct from one another therefore the father and the son are not one principle of the Holy Ghost. Objection two further in this proposition the father and the son are one principle of the Holy Ghost we do not designate personal unity because in that case the father and the son would be one person nor again do we designate the unity of property because if one property were the reason of the father and the son being one principle of the Holy Ghost similarly on account of his two properties the father would be two principles of the son and the Holy Ghost which cannot be admitted therefore the father and the son are not one principle of the Holy Ghost. Objection three further the son is not one with the father more than is the Holy Ghost but the Holy Ghost and the father are not one principle that regards any other divine person therefore neither are the father and the son. Objection four further if the father and the son are one principle of the Holy Ghost this one is either the father or it is not the father but we cannot assert either of these positions because if one is the father it follows that the son is the father and if one is not the father it follows that the father is not the father therefore we cannot say that the father and the son are one principle of the Holy Ghost. Objection five further if the father and the son are one principle of the Holy Ghost it seems necessary to say conversely that the one principle of the Holy Ghost is the father and the son but this seems to be false where this word principle stands either for the person of the father or for the person of the son and in either sense it is false therefore this proposition also is false that the father and the son are one principle of the Holy Ghost. 5. Objection 6. Further, unity and substance makes identity, so if the Father and the Son are the one principle of the Holy Ghost, it follows that they are the same principle, which is denied by many. Therefore we cannot grant that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost. 6. And Objection 7. Further, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are called one Creator, because they are the one principle of the creature. But the Father and the Son are not one, but two spirators as many assert. And this agrees also with what Hillary says, that the Holy Ghost is to be confessed as proceeding from Father and Son as authors. Therefore the Father and the Son are not one principle of the Holy Ghost. On the contrary, Augustine says that the Father and the Son are not two principles, but one principle of the Holy Ghost. I answer that the Father and the Son are in everything one, wherever there is no distinction between them of opposite relation. And since there is no relative opposition between them as the principle of the Holy Ghost, it follows that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost. Some, however, assert that this proposition is incorrect. The Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost, because they declare, since the word principle in the singular number does not signify person but property, it must be taken as an adjective. And for as much as an adjective cannot be modified by another adjective, it cannot properly be said that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost, unless one be taken as an adverb, so that the meaning should be they are one principle, that is, in one and the same way. But then it might be equally right to say that the Father is two principles of the Son and the Holy Ghost, namely in two ways. Therefore, we must say that although this word principle signifies a property, it does so after the manner of a substantive, as do the words Father and Son, even in things created. Hence, it takes its number from the form it signifies, like other substantives. Therefore, as the Father and the Son are one God, by reason of the unity of the form that is signified by this word God, so they are one principle of the Holy Ghost, by reason of the unity of the property that is signified in this word principle. Reply to Objection 1. If we consider the spirited power, the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as they are one in the spirited power, which in a certain way signifies the nature with the property as we shall see later. Nor is there any reason against one property being in two supposita that possess one common nature. But if we consider the supposita of the Spiration, then we may say that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as distinct, for he proceeds from them as a unit of love of both. Reply to Objection 2. In the proposition the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost, one property is designated, which is the form signified by the term. It does not then follow that by reason of the several properties the Father can be called several principles, for this would imply in him a plurality of subjects. Reply to Objection 3. It is not by reason of relative properties that we speak of similitude or dissimilitude in God, but by reason of the essence. Hence, as the Father is not more like to himself than he is to the Son, so likewise neither is the Son more like to the Father than is the Holy Ghost. Reply to Objection 4. These two propositions, the Father and the Son are one principle which is the Father, or one principle which is not the Father, are not mutually contradictory, and hence it is not necessary to assert one or the other of them. For when we say the Father and the Son are one principle, this word principle has not determinate supposition, but rather it stands indeterminately for two persons together. Hence, there is a fallacy of figure of speech as the argument concludes from the indeterminate to the determinate. Reply to Objection 5. This proposition is also true, the one principle of the Holy Ghost is the Father and the Son, because the word principle does not stand for one person only, but indistinctly for the two persons as above explained. Reply to Objection 6. There is no reason against saying that the Father and the Son are the same principle, because the word principle stands confusedly and indistinctly for the two persons together, and reply to Objection 7. Some say that although the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost, there are two spirators by reason of the distinction of supposita, as also there are two spirating, because acts refer to subjects. Yet this does not hold good as to the name creator, because the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as from two distinct persons as above explained, whereas the creature proceeds from the three persons not as distinct persons, but as united in essence. It seems, however, better to say that because spirating is an adjective and spirator a substantive, we can say that the Father and the Son are two spirating by reason of the plurality of the supposita, but not two spirators by reason of the one-spiration, for adjectival words derive their number from the supposita, but substantives from themselves according to the form signified. As to what Hillary says that the Holy Ghost is from the Father and the Son as his authors, this is to be explained in the sense that the substantive here stands for the adjective. The end of question 36. Question 37 of Summa Theologica Parse Prima Trinity and Creation. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. This recording is by Jim Ruddy. Summa Theologica Parse Prima Trinity and Creation by St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 37 of the name of the Holy Ghost, Love. We now inquire concerning the name Love, on which arise two points of inquiry, whether it is the proper name of the Holy Ghost and whether the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost. First article, whether Love is the proper name of the Holy Ghost. Objection one, it would seem that Love is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost. For Augustine says, as the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are called Wisdom, and are not three Wisdoms but one, I know not why the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost should not be called Charity and altogether one Charity. But no name which is predicated in the singular of each person and of altogether is a proper name of a person, therefore this name Love is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost. Objection two, further the Holy Ghost is a subsisting person, but Love is not used to signify a subsisting person, but rather an action passing from the lover to the beloved. Therefore Love is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost. Objection three, further Love is the bond between lovers, for as Daineseus says, Love is a unitive force, but a bond is a medium between what it joins together, not something proceeding from them. Therefore, since the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son, as was shown above, it seems that he is not the Love or bond of the Father and the Son. Objection four, further Love belongs to every lover, but the Holy Ghost is a lover, therefore he has Love. So if the Holy Ghost is Love, he must be Love of Love and Spirit from Spirit, which is not admissible. On the contrary, Gregory says, the Holy Ghost himself is Love. I answer that the name Love in God can be taken essentially and personally. If taken personally, it is the proper name of the Holy Ghost, as Word is the proper name of the Son. To see this, we must know that since, as shown above, there are two processions in God, one by way of the intellect, which is the procession of the Word, and another by way of the Will, which is the procession of Love. For as much as the former is the more known to us, we have been able to apply more suitable names to express our various considerations as regards that procession, but not as regards the procession of the Will. Hence we are obliged to employ circumlocution as regards the person who proceeds and the relations following from this procession, which are called procession and spiration, as stated above, and yet express the origin rather than the relation and the strict sense of the term. Nevertheless we must consider them in respect of each procession simply. For as when a thing is understood by anyone, there results in the one who understands a conception of the object understood, which conception we call Word. So when anyone loves an object, a certain impression results, so to speak, of the thing loved in the affection of the lover, by reason of which the object loved is said to be in the lover, as also the thing understood is in the one who understands. So that when anyone understands and loves himself, he is in himself, not only by real identity, but also as the object understood is in the one who understands and the thing loved is in the lover. As regards the intellect, however, words have been found to describe the mutual relation of the one who understands the object understood as appears in the word to understand, and other words are used to express the procession of the intellectual conception, namely to speak and word. Hence in God, to understand is applied only to the essence, because it does not import relation to the word that proceeds, whereas word is said personally, because it signifies what proceeds, and the term to speak is a notional term as supporting the relation of the principle of the word to the word himself. On the other hand, on the part of the will, with the exception of the words, deletion and love, which express the relation of the lover to the object loved, there are no other terms in use which express the relation of the impression or affection of the object loved, produced in the lover by the fact that he loves to the principle of that impression, or vice versa. And therefore on account of the poverty of our vocabulary, we express these relations by the word love and deletion, just as if we were to call the word intelligence conceived, or wisdom begotten. It follows that so far as love means only the relation of the lover to the object love, love and to love are said of the essence as understanding and to understand. But on the other hand, so far as these words are used to express the relation to its principle of what proceeds by way of love and vice versa, so that by love is understood the love proceeding and by to love is understood the aspiration of the love proceeding. In that sense, love is the name of the person, and to love is a notional term as to speak and to begot. Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is there speaking of charity as it means the divine essence as was said above. Reply to Objection 2. Although to understand and to will and to love signify actions passing on to their objects, nevertheless they are actions that remain in the agents as stated above, yet in such a way that in the agent itself they import a certain relation to their object. Hence love also in ourselves is something that abides in the lover, and the word of the heart is something abiding in the speaker, yet with the relation to the thing expressed by word or loved. But in God, in whom there is nothing accidental, there is more than this because both word and love are subsistent. Therefore, when we say that the Holy Ghost is the love of the Father for the Son or for something else, we do not mean anything that passes into another, but only the relation of love to the beloved as also in the word is imported, the relation of the word to the thing expressed by the word. Reply to Objection 3. The Holy Ghost is said to be the bond of the Father and Son in as much as he is love, because since the Father loves himself and the Son with one love and conversely, there is expressed in the Holy Ghost as love the relation of the Father to the Son and conversely as that of the lover to the beloved. But from the fact that the Father and the Son mutually love one another, it necessarily follows that this mutual love the Holy Ghost proceeds from both. As regards origin, therefore the Holy Ghost is not the medium, but the third person in the Trinity, whereas regards the aforesaid relation, he is the bond between the two persons as proceeding from both. Reply to Objection 4. As it does not belong to the Son, though he understands, to produce a word for it belongs to him to understand as the word proceeding, so in like manner, although the Holy Ghost loves taking love as an essential term, still it does not belong to him to spire a love, which is to take love as a notional term, because he loves essentially as love proceeding, but not as the one whence love proceeds. Second article, whether the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost. Objection 1. It would seem that the Father and the Son do not love each other by the Holy Ghost. For Augustine proves that the Father is not wise by the wisdom begotten, but as the Son is wisdom begotten, so the Holy Ghost is the love proceeding, as explained above. Therefore the Father and the Son do not love themselves by the love proceeding, which is the Holy Ghost. Objection 2. Further, in the proposition the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost, this word love is to be taken either essentially or notionally, but it cannot be true of taken essentially, because in the same way we might say the Father understands by the Son, nor again if it is taken notionally, for then in like manner it might be said that the Father and the Son spire by the Holy Ghost, or that the Father generates by the Son. Therefore, in no way is this proposition true, the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost. Objection 3. Further, by the same love the Father loves the Son and himself and us, but the Father does not love himself by the Holy Ghost, for no notional act is reflected back on the principle of the act, since it cannot be said that the Father begets himself or that he spirets himself. Therefore neither can it be said that he loves himself by the Holy Ghost if true love is taken in a notional sense. Again the love wherewith he loves us is not the Holy Ghost, because it imports a relation to creatures and this belongs to the essence. Therefore this also is false. The Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost. On the contrary, Augustine says the Holy Ghost is he whereby the begotten is loved by the one begetting and loves his begetter. I answer that a difficulty about this question is objected to the effect that when we say the Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost, since the ablative is construed as denoting a cause, it seems to mean that the Holy Ghost is the principle of love to the Father and the Son, which cannot be admitted. In view of this difficulty, some have held that it is false that the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost, and they add that it was retracted by Augustine when he retracted its equivalent to the effect that the Father is wise by the wisdom begotten. Others say that the proposition is inaccurate and ought to be expounded as that the Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost, that is by his essential love, which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost. Others further say that this ablative should be construed as importing a sign so that it means the Holy Ghost is the sign that the Father loves the Son in as much as the Holy Ghost proceeds from them both as love. Others again say that this ablative must be construed as importing the relation of formal cause because the Holy Ghost is the love whereby the Father and the Son formally love each other. Others again say that it should be construed as importing the relation of a formal effect and these approach nearer to the truth. To make the matter clear we must consider that since a thing is commonly denominated from its forms as white from whiteness and man from humanity everything once anything is denominated in this particular respect stands to that thing in the relation of form. So when I say this man is clothed with the garment the ablative is to be construed as having relation to the formal cause although the garment is not the form. Now it may happen that a thing may be denominated from that which proceeds from it not only as an agent is from its action but also as from the term itself of the action that is the effect when the effect itself is included in the idea for we say that fire warms by heating although heating is not the heat which is the form of the fire but is an action proceeding from the fire and when we say that a tree flowers with the flower although the flower is not the tree's form but is the effect proceeding from the form. In this way therefore we must say that since in God to love is taken in two ways essentially and notionally when it is taken essentially it means that the father and the son love each other not by the holy ghost but by their essence hence Augustine says who dares to say that the father loves neither himself nor the son nor the holy ghost except by the holy ghost. The opinions first quoted are to be taken in this sense but when the term love is taken in a notional sense it means nothing else than to spirate love just as to speak is to produce a word and to flower is to produce flowers and therefore we say that a tree flowers by its flower so do we say that the father by the word or the son speaks himself and his creatures and that the father and the son love each other and us by the holy ghost or by love proceeding. Reply to objection one to be wise or intelligent is taken only essentially in God therefore we cannot say that the father is wise or intelligent by the son but to love is taken not only essentially but also in a notional sense and in this way we can say that the father and the son love each other by the holy ghost as was explained above. Reply to objection two when the idea of an action includes a determined effect the principle of the action may be denominated both from the action and from the effect so we can say for instance that a tree flowers by its flowering and by its flower when however the idea of an action does not include a determined defect then in that case the principle of the action cannot be denominated from the effect but only from the action for we do not say that the tree produces the flower by the flower but by the production of the flower so when we say spyrates or begets this imports only a notional act hence we cannot say that the father spyrates by the holy ghost or begets by the son but we can say that the father speaks by the word as by the person proceeding and speaks by the speaking as by a notional act for as much as to speak imports a determined determinant person proceeding since to speak means to produce a word likewise to love taken in a notional sense means to produce love and so it can be said that the father loves the son by the holy ghost as by the person proceeding and by love itself as a notional act reply to objection three the father loves not only the son but also himself and us by the holy ghost because as above explained to love taken in a notional sense not only imports the production of a divine person but also the person produced by way of love which has relation to the object love hence as the father speaks himself and every creature by his begotten word and as much as the word begotten adequately represents the father and every creature so he loves himself and every creature by the holy ghost in as much as the holy ghost proceeds as the love of the primal goodness whereby the father loves himself and every creature thus it is evident that relation to the creature is implied both in the word and in the proceeding love as it were in a secondary way in as much as the divine truth and goodness are a principle of understanding and loving all creatures the end of question 37 question 38 of summa theologica pars prima triniti and creation this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org this recording is by Jim Ruddy summa theologica pars prima triniti and creation by st. Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question 38 of the name of the holy ghost as gift there now follows the consideration of the gift concerning which there are two points of inquiry whether gift can be a personal name and whether it is the proper name of the holy ghost first article whether gift is a personal name objection one it would seem that gift is not a personal name for every personal name imports a distinction in God but the name of gift does not import a distinction in God for Augustine says that the holy ghost is so given as God's gift that he also gives himself as God therefore gift is not a personal name objection two further no personal name belongs to the divine essence but the divine essence is the gift which the father gives to the son as Hilary says therefore gift is not a personal name objection three further according to Damascene there is no subjection nor service in the divine persons but gift implies a subjection both as regards him to whom it is given as regards him by whom it is given therefore gift is not a personal name and objection four further gift imports relation to the creature and it thus seems to be said of God in time but personal names are said of God from eternity as father and son therefore gift is not a personal name on the contrary Augustine says as the body of flesh is nothing but flesh so the gift of the holy ghost is nothing but the holy ghost but the holy ghost is a personal name so also therefore is gift I answer the word gift imparts an aptitude for being given and what is given has an aptitude or relation both to the giver and to that to which it is given for it would not be given by anyone unless it was his to give and it is given to someone to be his now a divine person is said to belong to another either by origin as the son belongs to the father or as possessed by another but we are said to possess what we can freely use or enjoy as we please and in this way a divine person cannot be possessed except by a rational creature united to God other creatures can be moved by a divine person not however in such a way as to be able to enjoy the divine person and to use the effect thereof the rational creature does sometimes attain thereto as when it is made partaker of the divine word and of the love proceeding so as freely to know God truly and to love God rightly hence the rational creature alone can possess the divine person nevertheless in order that it may possess him in this manner its own power avails nothing hence this must be given it from above for that is said to be given to us which we have from another source thus a divine person can be given and can be a gift reply to objection one the name gift imports a personal distinction and so far as gift imports something belonging to another through its origin nevertheless the holy ghost gives himself in as much as he is his own and can use or rather enjoy himself as also a free man belongs to himself and as Augustine says what is more yours than yourself or we might say and more fittingly that a gift must belong in a way to the giver but the phrase this is this ones can be understood in several senses in one way it means identity as Augustine says and in that sense gift is the same as the giver but not the same as the one to whom it is given the holy ghost gives himself in that sense in another sense a thing is another's as a possession or as a slave and in that sense gift is essentially distinct from the giver and the gift of God so taken is a created thing in a third sense this is the this ones through its origin only and in this sense the son is the father's and the holy ghost belongs to both therefore so far as gift in this way signifies a possession of the giver it is personally distinguished from the giver and is a personal name reply to objection two the divine essence is the father's gift in the first sense as being the father's by way of identity reply to objection three gift as a personal name and God does not imply subjection but only origin as regards the giver but as regards the one to whom it is given it implies a free use or enjoyment as above explained reply to objection four gift is not so called from being actually given but from its aptitude to be given hence the divine person is called gift from eternity although he is given in time nor does it follow that it is an essential name because it imports a relation to the creature but that it includes something essential in its meaning as the essence is included in the idea of person as stated above second article whether gift is the proper name of the holy ghost objection one it would seem that gift is not the proper name of the holy ghost for the name gift comes from being given but as Isaiah says a son is given to us therefore to be gift belongs to the son as well as to the holy ghost objection two further every proper name of a person signifies a property but this word gift does not signify a property of the holy ghost therefore gift is not a proper name of the holy ghost objection three further the holy ghost can be called the spirit of a man whereas he cannot be called the gift of any man but God's gift only therefore gift is not the proper name of the holy ghost on the contrary Augustine says as to be born is for the son to be from the father so for the holy ghost to be the gift of God is to proceed from father and son but the holy ghost receives his proper name from the fact that he proceeds from father and son therefore gift is the proper name of the holy ghost I answer that gift taken personally in God is the proper name of the holy ghost in proof of this we must know that a gift is properly an unreturnable giving as Aristotle says a thing which is not given with the intention of a return and it thus contains the idea of a gratuitous donation now the reason of donation being gratuitous is love since therefore do we give something to anyone gratuitously for as much as we wish him well so what we first give him is the love whereby we wish him well hence it is manifest that love has the nature of a first gift through which all free gifts are given so since the holy ghost proceeds as love as stated above he proceeds as the first gift hence Augustine says by the gift which is the holy ghost many particular gifts are portioned out to the members of Christ reply to objection one as the son is properly called the image because he proceeds by way of a word whose nature it is to be the similitude of its principle although the holy ghost also is like to the father so also because the holy ghost proceeds from the father as love he is properly called gift although the son too is given for that the son is given is from the father's love according to the words God so loved the world as to give his only begotten son reply to objection two the name gift involves the idea belonging to the giver through its origin and thus it imparts the property of the origin of the holy ghost that is his procession reply to objection three before a gift is given it belongs only to the giver but when it is given it is his to whom it is given therefore because gift does not impart the actual giving it cannot be called a gift of man but the gift of God giving when however it has been given then it is the spirit of man or a gift bestowed on man the end of question 38 question 39 of summa theologica pars prima trinity and creation this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org this recording is by Jim Ruddy summa theologica pars prima trinity and creation by saint Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question 39 of the persons in relation to the essence those things considered belong to the divine persons absolutely we next treat of what concerns the person in reference to the essence to the properties and to the notional acts and of the comparison of these with each other as regards the first of these there are eight points of inquiry first whether the essence in God is the same as the person second whether we should say that the three persons are of one essence third whether essential names should be predicated of the persons in the plural or in the singular fourth whether notional adjectives or verbs or participles can be predicated of the essential names taken in a concrete sense fifth whether the same can be predicated of essential names taken in the abstract sixth whether the names of the persons can be predicated of concrete essential names seventh whether essential attributes can be appropriated to the persons and eight which attributes should be appropriated to each person first article whether in God the essence is the same as the person objection one it would seem that in God the essence is not the same as the person for whenever essence is the same as person or suppositum there can be only one suppositum of one nature as is clear in the case of all separate substances for those things which are really one and the same one cannot be multiplied apart from the other but in God there is one essence and three persons as is clear from what is above expounded therefore essence is not the same as person objection two further simultaneous affirmation and negation of the same things in the same respect cannot be true but affirmation and negation are true of essence and a person for person is distinct whereas essence is not therefore person and essence are not the same objection three further nothing can be subject to itself but person is subject to essence when it is called suppositum or hypothesis therefore person is not the same as essence on the contrary Augustine says when we say the person of the father we mean nothing else but the substance of the father I answer that the truth of this question is quite clear if we consider the divine simplicity for it was shown above that the divine simplicity requires that in God essence is the same as suppositum which in intellectual substances is nothing else than person but a difficulty seems to arise from the fact that while the divine persons are multiplied the essence nevertheless retains its unity and because as Boethius says relation multiplies the trinity of persons some have thought that in God essence and person differ for as much as they held the relations to be adjacent considering only in the relations the idea of reference to another and not the relations as realities but as it was shown above in creatures relations are accidental whereas in God they are the divine essence itself then it follows that in God essence is not really distinct from person yet that the persons are really distinguished from each other for person as above stated signifies relation as subsisting in the divine nature but relation as referred to the essence does not differ there from really but only in our way of thinking whereas as referred to an opposite relation it has a real distinction by virtue of that opposition thus there are one essence and three persons reply to objection one there cannot be a distinction of suppositum in creatures by means of relations but only by essential principles because in creatures relations are not subsisting but in God relations are subsisting so by reason of the opposition between them they distinguish the suppositum and yet the essence is not distinguished because the relations themselves are not distinguished from each other so far as they are identified with the essence reply to objection two as essence and person in God differ in our way of thinking it follows that something can be denied of the one and affirmed of the other and therefore when we suppose the one we need not suppose the other reply to objection three divine things are named by us after the way of created things as explained above and since created natures are individualized by matter which is the subject of the specific nature it follows that individuals are called subjects supposita or hypothesis so the divine persons are named supposita or hypothesis but not as if there really existed any real supposition or subjection second article whether it must be said that the three persons are of one essence objection one it would seem not right to say that the three persons are of one essence for hillary says that the father son and holy ghost are indeed three by substance but one in harmony but the substance of God is his essence therefore the three persons are not of one essence objection two further nothing is to be affirmed of God except what can be confirmed by the authority of holy writ as appears from Dionysius now holy writ never says that the father son and holy ghost are of one essence therefore this should not be asserted objection three further the divine nature is the same as the divine essence it suffices therefore to say that the three persons are of one nature objection four further it is not usual to say that the person is of the essence but rather that the essence is of the person therefore it does not seem fitting to say that the three persons are of one essence objection five further Augustine says that we do not say that the three persons are from one essence lest we should seem to indicate a distinction between the essence and the persons in God but prepositions which imply transition denote the oblique case therefore it is equally wrong to say that the three persons are of one essence objection six further nothing should be said of God which can be occasion of error now to say that the three persons are of one essence or substance furnishes occasion of error for as Hilary says one substance predicated of the father and the son signifies either one subsistent with two denominations or one substance divided into two imperfect substances or a third prior substance taken and assumed by the other two therefore it must not be said that the three persons are of one substance on the contrary Augustine says that the word humusian which the Council of Nicea adopted against the Arians means that the three persons are of one essence I answer that as above explained divine things are named by our intellect not as they really are in themselves for in that way it knows them not but in a way that belongs to things created and as in the objects of the senses once the intellect derives its knowledge the nature of the species is made individual by the matter and thus the nature is as the form and the individual is the suppositum of the form so also in God the essence is taken as the form of the three persons according to our motive signification now in creatures we say that every form belongs to that whereof it is the form as the health and beauty of a man belongs to the man but we do not say of that which has a form that it belongs to the form unless some adjective qualifies the form as when we say that woman is of a handsome figure or that this man is of perfect virtue in like manner as in God the persons are multiplied and the essence is not multiplied we speak of one essence and of the three persons and the three persons of the one essence provided that these genitives be understood as designating the form reply to objection one substances here taken for the hypothesis not for the essence reply to objection two although we may not find it declared in holy rid in so many words that the three persons are of one essence nevertheless we find it so stated as regards the meaning for instance I and the father are one and I am in the father and the father in me and there are many other texts of the same import reply to objection three because nature designates the principle of action while essence comes from being things may be said to be of one nature which agree in some action as all things which give heat but only those things can be said to be of one essence which have one being so the divine unity is better described by saying that the three persons are of one essence than by saying they are of one nature reply to objection four form in the absolute sense is want to be designated as belonging to that of which it is the form as we say the virtue of Peter on the other hand the thing having form is not want to be designated as belonging to the form except when we wish to qualify or designate the form in which case two genitives are required one signifying the form the other signifying the determination of the form as for instance when we say Peter is of great virtue or else one genitive must have the force of two as for instance he is a man of blood that is he is a man who sheds much blood so because the divine essence signifies a form as regards the person it may be properly said that the essences of the person but we cannot say the converse unless we add some term to designate the essence as for instance the father is a person of the divine essence or the three persons are of one essence reply to objection five the preposition from or out of does not designate the habit of a formal cause but rather the habit of an efficient or material cause which causes are in all cases distinguished from those things of which they are the causes for nothing can be its own matter nor its own active principle yet a thing may be its own form as appears in all immaterial things so when we say three persons of one essence taking essences having the habit to deform we do not mean that essences different from person which we should mean if we said three persons from the same essence reply to objection six as Hillary says it would be prejudicial to holy things if we had to do away with them just because some do not think them holy so if some misunderstand home ocean what is that to me if I understand it rightly the oneness of nature does not result from division or from union or from community of possession but from one nature being proper to both father and son third article whether essential names should be predicated in the singular of the three persons objection one it would seem that essential names as the name god should not be predicated in the singular of the three persons but in the plural for as man signifies one that has humanity so god signifies one that has godhead but the three persons are three who have godhead therefore the three persons are three gods objection two further in Genesis where it is said in the beginning god created heaven and earth the Hebrew original has Elohim which may be rendered gods or judges and this word is used on account of the plurality of persons therefore the three persons are several gods and not one god objection three further this word thing when it is said absolutely seems to belong to substance but it is predicated of the three persons in the plural for Augustine says the things that are the objects of our future glory are the father son and holy ghost therefore other essential names can be predicated in the plural of the three persons objection four further as this word god signifies a being who has deity so also this word persons signifies a being subsisting in an intellectual nature but we say there are three persons so for the same reason we can say there are three gods on the contrary it is said here oh israel the lord thy god is one god I answer that some essential names signify the essence after the manner of substantive while others signify it after the manner of adjectives those which signify it as substantive are predicated of the three persons in the singular only and not in the plural those which signify the essence as adjectives are predicated of the three persons in the plural the reason of this is that substitutes signify something by way of substance while adjectives signify something by way of accident which adheres to a subject now just as substance has existence of itself so also it has of itself unity or multitude where for the singularity or plurality of a substantive name depends upon the form signified by the name but as accidents have their existence in a subject so they have unity or plurality from their subject and therefore the singularity and plurality of adjectives depends upon their supposita and creatures one form does not exist in several supposita except by unity of order as the form of an ordered multitude so if the names signifying such a form are substantives they are predicated of many in the singular but otherwise if they are adjectives for we say that many men are a college or an army or a people but we say that many men are collegians now in god the divine essence is signified by way of a form as explained above which indeed is simple and supremely one as shown above so names which signify the divine essence in a substantive manner are predicated of the three persons in the singular and not in the plural this then is the reason why we say that Socrates Plato and Cicero are three men whereas we do not say the father son and holy ghost are three gods but one god for as much as in the three supposita of human nature there are three humanities whereas in the three divine persons there is but one divine essence on the other hand the names which signify essence in an adjectival manner are predicated of the three persons plural by reason of the plurality of supposita for we say there are three existent or three wise beings or three eternal uncreated and immense beings if these terms are understood in an adjectival sense but have taken in a substantive sense we say one uncreated immense eternal being as Athanasius declares reply to objection one though the name god signifies the being having godhead nevertheless the mode of signification is different for the name god is used substantively whereas having godhead is used adjectively consequently although there are three having godhead it does not follow that there are three gods replied to objection two various languages have diverse modes of expression so as by reason of the plurality of supposita the greek said three hypotheses so also in Hebrew Elohim is in the plural we however do not apply the plural either to god or to substance lest plurality be referred to the substance reply to objection three this word thing is one of the transcendentals when so far as it is referred to relation it is predicated of god in the plural whereas so far as it is referred to the substance it is predicated in the singular so augustin says in the passage quoted that the same trinity is a thing supreme replied to objection four the form signified by the word person is not essence or nature but personality so as there are three personalities that is three personal properties in the father son and holy ghost it is predicated of the three not in the singular but in the plural fourth article whether the concrete essential names can stand for the person objection one it would seem that the concrete essential names cannot stand for the person so that we can truly say god begot god for as a logician say a singular term signifies what it stands for but this name god seems to be a singular term for it cannot be predicated in the plural as above explained therefore since it signifies the essence it stands for the essence and not for the person objection two further a term in the subject is not modified by a term in the predicate as to a signification but only as to the sense signified in the predicate but when i say god creates this name god stands for the essence so when we say god begot this term god cannot by reason of the notional predicate stand for person objection three further if this be true god begot because the father generates for the same reason this is true god does not beget because the son does not beget therefore there is god who begets and there is god who does not beget and thus it follows that there are two gods objection four further if god begot god he begot either god that is himself or another god but he did not beget god that is himself or as agustin says nothing begets itself neither did he beget another god as there is only one god therefore it is false to say god begot god objection five further if god begot god he begot either god who is the father or god who is not the father if god who is the father then god the father was begotten if god who is not the father then there is a god who is not god the father which is false therefore it cannot be said that god begot god on the contrary in the creed it is said god of god i answered that some have said that this name god and the like properly according to their nature stand for the essence but by reason of some notional adjunct are made to stand for the person this apparent opinion apparently arose from considering the divine simplicity which requires that in god he who possesses and what is possessed be the same so he who possesses godhead which is signified by the name god is the same as godhead but when we consider the proper way of expressing ourselves the motive signification must be considered no less than the thing signified hence as this word god signifies the divine essence as in who him who possesses it just as the name man signifies humanity in a subject others more truly have said that this word god from its motive signification can in its proper sense stand for person as does the word man so this word god sometimes stands for the essence as when we say god creates because this predicate is attributed to the subject by reason of the form signified that is godhead but sometimes it stands for the person either for only one as when we say god begets or for two as when we say god spirates or for three as when it is said to the king of ages immortal invisible the only god reply to objection one although this name god agrees with singular terms as regards the form signified not being multiplied nevertheless it agrees also with general terms so far as the form signified is to be found in several suppositor so it need not always stand for the essence that signifies reply to objection two this holds good against those who say that the word god does not naturally stand for person reply to objection three the word god stands for the person in a different way from that in which this word man does for since the form signified by this word man that is humanity is really divided amongst its different subjects it stands of itself for the person even if there is no adjunct determining it to the person that is to a distinct subject the unity or community of the human nature however is not a reality but is only in the consideration of the mind hence this term man does not stand for the common nature unless this is required by some adjunct as when we say man is a species whereas the form signified by the name god that is the divine essence is really one and common so of itself it stands for the common nature but by some adjunct it may be restricted so as to stand for the person so when we say god generates by reason of the notional act this name god stands for the person of the father but when we say god does not generate there is no adjunct to determine this name to the person of the son and hence the phrase means that generation is repugnant to the divine nature if however something be added belonging to the person of the son this proposition for instance god begotten does not beget is true consequently it does not follow that there exists a god generator and a god not generator unless there be an adjunct pertaining to the persons as for instance if we were to say the father is god the generator and the son is god the non-generator and so it does not follow that there are many gods for the father and the son are one god as was said above reply to objection four this is false the father begot god that is himself because the word himself as a reciprocal term refers to the same suppositum nor is this contrary to what augustin says that god the father begot another self for as much as the word say is either in the ablative case and then it means he begot another from himself or it indicates a single relation and thus points to identity of nature this is however either a figurative or an emphatic way of speaking so that it would really mean he begot another most like to himself likewise also it is false to say he begot another god because although the son is another than the father as above explained nevertheless it cannot be said that he is another god for as much as this adjective another would be understood to apply to the substantive god and thus the meaning would be that there is a distinction of godhead yet this proposition he begot another god is tolerated by some provided that another be taken as a substantive and the word god be construed in apposition with it this however is an inexact way of speaking and to be avoided for fear of giving occasion to error reply to objection five to say god begot god who is god the father is wrong because since the word father is construed in apposition to god the word god is restricted to the person of the father so that it would mean he begot god who is himself the father and then the father would be spoken of as begotten which is false wherefore the negative of the proposition is true he begot god who is not god the father if however we understand these words not to be in apposition and require something to be added then on the contrary the affirmative proposition is true and the negative is false so that the meaning would be he begot god who is god who is the father such a rendering however appears to be forced so that it is better to say simply that the affirmative proposition is false and the negative is true yet prepositive is said that both the negative and affirmative are false because this relation who in the affirmative proposition can be referred to the suppositive where in the negative it denotes both the thing signified and the suppositive once in the affirmative this sense is that to be god the father is befitting to the person of the son and in the negative sense is that to be god the father is to be removed from the son's divinity as well as from his personality this however appears to be irrational since according to the philosopher what is open to affirmation is open also to negation fifth article whether abstract essential names can stand for the person objection one it would seem that abstract essential names can stand for the person so that this proposition is true essence begets essence for Augustine says the father and the son are one wisdom because they are one essence and taken singly wisdom is from wisdom as essence from essence objection to further generation or corruption in ourselves implies generation or corruption of what is within us but the sun is generated therefore since the divine essence is in the sun it seems that the divine essence is generated objection three further god and the divine essence are the same as is clear from what is above explained but as was shown it is true to say that god begets god therefore this is also true essence begets essence objection four further a predicate can stand for that of which it is predicated but the father is the divine essence therefore essence can stand for the person of the father thus the essence begets objection five further the essence is a thing begetting because the essence is the father who is begetting therefore if the essence is not begetting the essence will be a thing begetting and not begetting which cannot be and objection six further Augustine says the father is the principle of the whole godhead but he is the principle only by begetting or spirating therefore the father begets or spirates the godhead on the contrary Augustine says nothing begets itself but if the essence begets the essence it begets itself only since nothing exists in god as distinguished from the divine essence therefore the essence does not beget essence i answer that concerning this the abbot Joachim heard and asserting that as we can say god begot god so we can say essence begot essence considering that by reason of the divine simplicity god is nothing else but the divine essence in this he was wrong because if we wish to express ourselves correctly we must take into account not only the thing which is signified but also the mode of its signification as above stated now although god is really the same as godhead nevertheless the mode of signification is not in each case the same for since this word god signifies the divine essence in him that possesses it from its mode of signification it can of its own nature stand for person thus the things which properly belong to the persons can be predicated of this word god as for instance we can say god has begotten or is begetter as above explained the word essence however in its mode of signification cannot stand for person because it signifies the essence as an abstract form consequently what properly belongs to the persons whereby they are distinguished from each other cannot be attributed to the essence for that would imply distinction in the divine essence in the same way as there exists distinction in this apposita reply to objection one to express unity of essence and a person the holy doctors have sometimes expressed themselves with greater emphasis than the strict propriety of terms allows when instead of enlarging upon such expressions we should rather explain them thus for instance abstract names should be explained by concrete names or even by personal names as when we find essence from essence or wisdom from wisdom we should take the sense to be the son who is essence and wisdom is from the father who is essence and wisdom nevertheless as regards these abstract names a certain order should be observed for as much as what belongs to action is more nearly allied to the persons because actions belong to supposita so nature from nature and wisdom from wisdom are less inexact than essence from essence reply to objection two in creatures the one generated has not the same nature numerically as the generator but only another nature numerically distinct which commences to exist in it anew by generation and ceases to exist by corruption and so it is generated and corrupted accidentally whereas god begotten has the same nature numerically as the begetter so the divine nature in the sun is not begotten either directly or accidentally reply to objection three although god and the divine essence are really the same nevertheless on account of their different mode of signification we must speak in a different way about each of them reply to objection four the divine essence is predicated of the father by mode of identity by reason of the divine simplicity yet it does not follow that it can stand for the father its mode of signification being different the subjection would hold good as regards things which are predicated of another as the universal of a particular reply to objection five the difference between substantive and adjectival names consists in this that the former carry their subject with them whereas the latter do not but add the thing signified to the substantive whist logicians are want to say that the substantive is considered in the light of suppositum whereas the adjective indicates something added to the suppositum therefore substantive personal terms can be predicated of the essence because they are really the same nor does it follow that a personal property makes a distinct essence but it belongs to the suppositum implied in the substantive but notional and personal adjectives cannot be predicated of the essence unless we add some substantive we cannot say that the essence is begetting yet we can say that the essence is a thing begetting or that it is god begetting if thing and god stand for person but not if they stand for essence consequently there exists no contradiction in saying that essence is a thing begetting and a thing not begetting because in the first case thing stands for person and in the second it stands for the essence reply to objection six so far as godhead is one in several supposita it agrees in a certain degree with the form of a collective term so when we say the father is the principle of the whole godhead the term godhead can be taken for all the persons together in as much as it is the principle in all the divine persons nor does it follow that he is his own principle as one of the people may be called the ruler of the people without being ruler of himself we may also say that he is the principle of the whole godhead not as generating or spirating it but as communicating it by generation and spirations sixth article whether the persons can be predicated of the essential terms of jackson one it seems that the persons cannot be predicated of the concrete essential names so that we can say for instance god is three persons or god is the trinity for it is false to say man is every man because it cannot be verified as regards any particular subject for neither Socrates nor Plato nor anyone else's every man in the same way this proposition god is the trinity cannot be verified in any one of the supposita of the divine nature for the father is not the trinity nor is the sun nor is the holy ghost so to say god is the trinity is false objection to further the lower is not predicated of the higher except by accidental predication as when I say animal is man for it is accidental to animal to be man but this name god as regards the three persons is as a general term to inferior terms as damasin says therefore it seems that the names of the persons cannot be predicated of this name god except in an accidental sense on the contrary Augustine says in his sermon on faith we believe that one god is one divinely named trinity I answer that as above explained although adjectival terms whether personal or notional cannot be predicated of the essence nevertheless substantive terms can be so predicated owing to the real identity of essence and person the divine essence is not only really the same as one person but it is really the same as the three persons whence one person and two and three can be predicated of the essence as if we were to say the essence is the father and the son and the holy ghost and because this word god can of itself stand for the essence as above explained hence as it is true to say the essence is the three persons so likewise it is true to say god is the three persons reply to objection one as above explained this term man can of itself stand for person whereas an adjunct is required for it to stand for the universal human nature so it is false to say man is every man because it cannot be verified of any particular human subject on the contrary this word god can of itself be taken for the divine essence so although to say of any of the supposita of the divine nature god is the trinity is untrue nevertheless it is true of the divine essence this was denied by porotenus because he did not take note of this distinction reply to objection two when we say god or the divine essence is the father the predication is one of identity and not of the lower in regard to a higher species because in god there is no universal and singular hence as this proposition the father is god is of itself true so this proposition god is the father is true of itself and by no means accidentally seventh article whether the essential names should be appropriated to the persons objection one it would seem that the essential names should not be appropriated to the persons for whatever might verge on error in faith should be avoided in the treatment of divine things for as Jerome says careless words involve risk of heresy but to appropriate to any one person the names which are common to the three persons may verge on error in faith for it may be supposed either that such belong only to the person to whom they are appropriated or that they belong to him in a fuller degree than the to the others therefore the essential attributes should not be appropriated to the persons objection two further the essential attributes expressed in the abstract signify by mode of form but one person is not as a form to another since a form is not distinguished in subject from that of which it is the form therefore the essential attributes especially when expressed in the abstract are not to be appropriated to the persons objection three further property is prior to the appropriated for property is included in the idea of the appropriated but the essential attributes in our way of understanding are prior to the persons as what is common is prior to what is proper therefore the essential attributes are not to be appropriated to the persons on the contrary the apostle says christ the power of god and the wisdom of god i answer that for the manifestation of our faith it is fitting that the essential attributes should be appropriated to the persons for although the trinity of persons cannot be proved by demonstration as was above expounded nevertheless it is fitting that it be declared by things which are more known to us now the essential attributes of god are more clear to us from the standpoint of reason than the personal properties because we can derive certain knowledge of the essential attributes from creatures which are sources of knowledge to us such as we cannot obtain regarding the personal properties as was above explained as therefore we make use of the likeness of the trace or image found in creatures for the manifestation of the divine persons so also in the same manner do we make use of the essential attributes and such a manifestation of the divine persons by the use of the essential attributes is called appropriation the divine person can be manifested in two-fold manner by the essential attributes in one way by similitude and thus the things which belong to the intellect are appropriated to the son who proceeds by way of intellect as word in another way by dissimilitude as power is appropriate to the father as agustin says because fathers by reason of old age are sometimes feeble lest anything of the kind be imagined of god replied to objection one the essential attributes are not appropriated to the persons as if they exclusively belong to them but in order to make the persons manifest by way of similitude or dissimilitude as above explained so no error in faith can arise but rather manifestation of the truth replied to objection two if the essential attributes were appropriated to the persons as exclusively belonging to each of them then it would follow that one person would be as a form as regards another which agustin altogether repudiates showing that the father is wise not by wisdom begotten by him as though only the son were wisdom so that the father and the son together only can be called wise but not the father without the son but the son is called the wisdom of the father because he is wisdom from the father who is wisdom for each of them is of himself wisdom and both together are one wisdom once the father is not wise by the wisdom begotten by him but by the wisdom which is his own essence replied to objection three although the essential attribute is in its proper concept prior to person according to our way of understanding nevertheless so far as it is appropriated there is nothing to prevent the personal property from being prior to that which is appropriated thus color is posterior to body considered as body but is naturally prior to white body considered as white eighth article whether the essential attributes are appropriated to the persons in a fitting manner by the holy doctors objection one it would seem that the essential attributes are appropriated to the persons unfittingly by the holy doctors for Hilary says eternity is in the father the species in the image and use is in the gift in which words he designates three names proper to the persons the name of the father the name image proper to the son and the name bounty or gift which is proper to the holy ghost he also designates three appropriated terms for he appropriates eternity to the father species to the son and use to the holy ghost this he does apparently without reason for eternity imports duration of existence species the principle of existence and use belongs to the operation but essence and operation are not found to be appropriated to any person therefore the above terms are not fitting me appropriated to the persons objection to further Augustine says unity is in the father equality in the son and in the holy ghost is the concord of equality in unity this does not however seem fitting because one person does not receive formal denomination from what is appropriated to another for the father is not wise by the wisdom begotten as above explained but as he subjoins all these three are one by the father all are equal by the son and all united by the holy ghost the above therefore are not fittingly appropriated to the persons objection three further according to Augustine to the father is attributed power to the son wisdom and to the holy ghost goodness nor does this seem fitting for strength this part of power whereas strength is found to be appropriated to the son according to the text christ the strength of god so it is likewise appropriate to the holy ghost according to the words strength came out from him and healed all therefore power should not be appropriated to the father objection four likewise Augustine says what the apostle says from him and by him and in him is not to be taken in a confused sense and from him refers to the father by him to the son and in him to the holy ghost this however seems to be incorrectly said for the words in him seem to imply the relation of final cause which is first among the causes therefore this relation of cause should be appropriate to the father who is the principle from no principle objection five likewise truth is appropriated to the son according to john i am the way the truth and the life and likewise the book of life according to psalms in the beginning of the book it is written of me for a gloss observes this that is with the father who is in my head also this word who is because on the text of isaias behold i go to the gentiles a gloss adds the son speaks who said to moses i am who am these appear to belong to the son and are not appropriated for truth according to augustin is the supreme similitude of the principle without any dissimilitude so it seems that it properly belongs to the son who has a principle also the book of life seems proper to the son as signifying a thing from another for every book is written by someone this also who is appears to be proper to the son because if when it was said to moses i am who am the trinity spoke then moses could have said he who is father son and holy ghost and the holy ghost sent me to you so also he could have said further he who is the father and the son and the holy ghost sent me to you pointing out a certain person this however is false because no person is father son and holy ghost therefore it cannot be common to the trinity but is proper to the son i answer that our intellect which is led to the knowledge of god from creatures must consider god according to the mode derived from creatures and considering any creature four points present themselves to us in do order firstly the thing itself taken absolutely is considered as a being secondly it is considered as one thirdly its intrinsic power of operation and causality is considered the fourth point of consideration embraces its relation to its effects hence this fourfold consideration comes to our mind in reference to god according to the first point of consideration whereby we consider god absolutely in his being the appropriation mentioned by hillary applies according to which eternity is appropriated to the father species to the sun use to the holy ghost for eternity as meaning a being without a principle as a likeness to the property of the father who is a principle without a principle species or beauty has a likeness to the property of the sun for beauty includes three conditions integrity or perfection since those things which are impaired are by the very fact ugly do proportion or harmony and lastly brightness or clarity when things are called beautiful which have a bright color the first of these has a likeness to the property of the sun in as much as he as son has in himself truly and perfectly the nature of the father to insinuate this augustin says in his explanation where that is in the sun there is supreme and primal life and so forth the second degrees with the sun's property in as much as he is the express image of the father hence we see that an image is said to be beautiful if it perfectly represents even an ugly thing this is indicated by augustin when he says where there exists wondrous proportion and primal equality and so forth the third degrees with the property of the sun as the word which is the light and splendor of the intellect as damascene says augustin alludes to the same when he says as the perfect word not wanting in anything and so to speak the art of the omnipotent god and so forth use as a likeness to the property of the holy ghost provided the use be taken in a wide sense as including also the sense of to enjoy according as to use is to employ something at the back of the will and to enjoy means to use joyfully as augustin says so use whereby the father and the son enjoy each other agrees with the property of the holy ghost as love this is what augustin says that love that delectation that felicity or beatitude is called use by him but the use by which we enjoy god is likened to the property of the holy ghost as the gift and augustin points to this when he says in the trinity the holy ghost the sweetness of the begetter and the begotten pours out upon us mere creatures his immense bounty and wealth thus it is clear how eternity species and use are attributed or appropriate it to the persons but not essence or operation because being common there is nothing in their concept to liken them to the properties of the person the second consideration of god regards him as one in that view augustin appropriates unity to the father equality to the son concord or union to the holy ghost it is manifest that these three imply unity but in different ways for unity is said absolutely as it does not presuppose anything else and for this reason it is appropriated to the father to whom any other person is not presupposed since he is the principle without principle equality implies unity is regards another for that is equal which has the same quantity as another so equality is appropriated to the son who is the principle from a principle union implies the unity of two and is therefore appropriated to the holy ghost in as much as he proceeds from two and from this we can understand what augustin means when he says that the three are one by reason of the father they are equal by reason of the son and are united by reason of the holy ghost for it is clear that we trace a thing back to that in which we find it first just as in this lower world we attribute life to the vegetative soul because therein we find the first trace of life now unity is perceived at once in the person of the father even if by an impossible hypothesis the other persons were removed so the other persons derive their unity from the father but if the other persons be removed we do not find equality in the father but we find it as soon as we suppose the son so all are equal by reason of the son not as if the son were the principle of equality in the father but that without the son equal to the father the father could not be called equal because his equality is considered firstly in regard to the son for that the holy ghost is equal to the father is also from the son likewise if the holy ghost who is the union of the two be excluded we cannot understand the oneness of the union between the father and the son so all are connected by reason of the holy ghost because given the holy ghost we find whence the father and the son are said to be united according to the third consideration which brings before us the adequate power of god in the sphere of causality there is said to be a third kind of appropriation of power wisdom and goodness this kind of appropriation is made both by reason of similitude as regards what exists in the divine persons and by reason of dissimilitude if we consider what is in creatures for power has the nature of a principle and so it has a likeness to the heavenly father who is the principle of the whole godhead but in an earthly father it is wanting sometimes by reason of old age wisdom has likeness to the heavenly son as the word for a word is nothing but the concept of wisdom in an earthly son this is sometimes absent by reason of lack of years goodness as the nature and object of love has likeness to the holy ghost but seems repugnant to the earthly spirit which often implies a certain violent impulse according to isaus the spirit of the strong is as a blast beating on the wall strength is appropriated to the son and to the holy ghost not as denoting the power itself of a thing but as sometimes used to express that which proceeds from power for instance we say that the strong work done by an agent is its strength according to the fourth consideration that is god's relation to his effects there arises appropriation of the expression from whom by whom and in whom for this preposition from sometimes implies a certain relation of the material cause which has no place in god and sometimes it expresses the relation of the efficient cause which can be applied to god by reason of his active power hence it is appropriated to the father in the same way as power the preposition by sometimes designates an intermediate cause thus we may say that a smith works by a hammer hence the word by is not always appropriated to the son but belongs to the son properly and strictly according to the text all things were made by him not that the son is an instrument but as the principle from a principle sometimes it designates the habit of a form by which an agent works thus we say that an artificer works by his art hence as wisdom and art are appropriated to the son so also is the expression by whom the preposition in strictly denotes the habit of one containing now god contains things in two ways in one way by their similitudes thus things are said to be in god as existing in his knowledge in this sense the expression in him should be appropriated to the son in another sense things are contained in god for as much as he in his goodness preserves and governs them by guiding them to a fitting end and in this sense the expression in him is appropriated to the holy ghost as likewise is goodness nor need the habit of the final cause though the first of causes be appropriated to the father who is the principle without a principle because the divine persons of whom the father is the principal do not proceed from him as towards an end since each of them is the last end but they proceed by a natural procession which seems more to belong to the nature of a natural power regarding the other points of inquiry we can say that since truth belongs to the intellect as stated above it is appropriated to the son without however being a property of his for truth can be considered as existing in the thought or in the thing itself hence as intellect and thing in their essential meaning are referred to the essence and not to the persons so the same is to be said of truth the definition quoted from august and belongs to truth as appropriated to the son the book of life directly means knowledge but indirectly it means life for as above explained it is God's knowledge regarding those who are to possess eternal life consequently it is appropriated to the son although life is appropriated to the holy ghost as implying a certain kind of interior movement agreeing in that sense with the property of the holy ghost as love to be written by another is not of the essence of a book considered as such but this belongs to it only as a work produced so this does not imply origin or is it personal but an appropriation to a person the expression who is is appropriated to the person of the son not by reason of itself but by reason of an adjunct in as much as in God's word to moses was prefigured the delivery of the human race accomplished by the son yet for as much as the word who is taken in a relative sense it may sometimes relate to the person of the son and in that sense it would be taken personally as for instance we were to say the son is the begotten who is in as much as God begotten is personal but taken indefinitely it is an essential term and although the pronoun this seems grammatically to point to a particular person nevertheless everything that we can point to can be grammatically treated as a person although in its own nature it is not a person as we may say this stone and this ass so speaking in a grammatical sense so far as the word God signifies and stands for the divine essence the latter may be designated by the pronoun this according to exodus this is my god and i will glorify him the end of question 39