 We participate in that conversation about Japanese perspectives towards China, Taiwan, and cross-strait relations. We always have a number of events here at CSIS and many think tanks in Washington about Taiwan. Of course, especially this year, where it is the 35th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act earlier this year. We also hosted here at CSIS a video conference with President Ma Ying-jeo. But it is really quite unusual to have the opportunity to listen to experts, especially leading experts from Japan, talk about the issue of relations between Japan and Taiwan, Sino-Japanese relations, and how the developments in cross-strait relations are viewed by Japan. This is of course a very important issue in the U.S.-Japan alliance, and yet we don't I think spend enough time discussing them. So I was very pleased when Matsuda sensei asked me if I would be willing to host this event today. And so we very much look forward to the presentation by all of the Japanese scholars. Before we begin the first panel, I'm going to turn the floor over to my partner Matsuda San for a few words. Thank you. Thank you, Bonnie, and thank you for coming, everybody. And let me express, I'm Yasuhiro Matsuda from the University of Tokyo, and let me express my deep appreciation to Bonnie and CSIS and all those distinguished, disconsent participants and the audience. Let me briefly introduce the project I am leading and the team I have brought up today. I set up the study group of cross-strait relations, which is called 兩岸關係研究小組 in Chinese in 2009, and we have presently have 11 members, and those are specialists of politics and foreign relations in Taiwan and mainland China and East Asian international politics. And we have engaged in the research project, which is called the Dilemma of Prosperity and Self-Reliance, dilemma between the prosperity and self-reliance. This is the kind of keyword today, especially on my part, and the subtitle is the International Political Economy of Taiwan in the post-democratization era. And the project named Stability Without Reconciliation. That's also the keyword describing the cross-strait relations between Taiwan and the mainland China and Taiwan, and subtitled the International Political Economy of Taiwan in the era of democratic maturity. So we have been doing the topics related to these projects, and I brought four members, including me, to CSIS today, and let me briefly introduce either all of them. The first presentation is Fukuda Madoka. And she is an associate professor of international politics and China studies in Hosei University, and she's going to talk about Japan-Taiwan relationship. She published a book entitled China's Diplomacy in Taiwan, the formulation process of one China principle last year, and she gained Asia-Pacific reward from Main Shimbun. And Japan-Taiwan relation is not discussed much in this town, I think. So I think her presentation will be very much beneficial for everybody. The second presenter is Dr. Takahara Kiyo, and he is the professor of contemporary Chinese politics, the Graduate School of Law and Politics in the University of Tokyo. I think that we don't need to introduce him, and he is such a famous top-leading scholar on China in Japan, and he has published numerous papers and books. And both in Japanese and English, and he's going to talk about the development of Japan-China relations in the period of stability in cross-regulations. China-Japanese relations is also very much hot topic, and you can't wait, right? So I really hope that he can make a great contribution to this occasion. The third presenter is Dr. Huang Weixiu, he is a visiting faculty of Taiwan Research Institute in Waseda University. He is Taiwanese, but he gained a PhD in Waseda University and published a book entitled Taiwan's Mainland Policy Making Process during the Litenhuai Period. He is specialized in the decision-making process of the Mainland Policy Making in Taiwan. And his book was very much appreciated in Japan. He also gained an award in the Japan Association of Taiwan Studies. But this is going to be his very first presentation done in English. I did my first, 14 years ago, in this country, and I almost fainted. I almost fell down to the ground, so please listen to him warmly. Don't be too nervous. The last presenter is me, Hiromatsuda, I'm the Professor of International Politics in the Faculty Initiative in Information Studies at the University of Tokyo. I'm going to talk about the cross-regulations under the Mainland Administration. I think in agenda, there is a time frame from 2008 to 2013, but please remove it, because I updated a little bit until this year. We have written four papers, but not shared with you, I'm sorry, because these papers will be published in the Journal of Contemporary China Studies. That's English-based online academic journal in Waseda University in early next year. So they will be available online next year. So your comments, questions, and criticism are very much welcomed in order to enrich our papers. I think that in Japan, there are many, many Taiwan Studies and China Studies. Japan is one of the leading nations in Asia, and it has a long tradition of doing Taiwan Studies and China Studies. But unfortunately, most of the works are done in Japanese and not introduced well in the outside of the world. And also, the Japanese scholars are always very busy. There are too much hard-working, too much doing a lot of things. There is a geographical and also linguistic limitations and restrictions when we do exchanges with the friends outside of Japan. So I'd like to break this kind of situation and try to promote the academic and policy-oriented research exchanges between Japan and the rest of the world. And I hope that this meeting, today's meeting is going to be a kind of kick-off meeting of this trial. Again, let me express my deep appreciation to Bonnie and CSIS. And thank you all for coming today. Thank you very much. So without further ado, we're going to start our first panel. I'm going to invite our two presenters and two discussants to come up to the table. This panel will be moderated by Professor Mike Mochizuki, who is the Japan-U.S. Relations Chair at the Elliott School of International Relations at George Washington University. So if you'll just give us about 30 seconds, we will get started with our first panel. Apologies. I'm moderating. And Mike Mochizuki is one of our discussants. That's good. Okay. We're now going to get started with our first panel. And since Professor Matsuda was so gracious in introducing our panelists, I think I don't need to do that again. And of course, you have bios with you as well. As I mentioned, Mike Mochizuki has joined us as a discussant for the first paper by Dr. Fukuda. And then we have Dr. Richard Bush, who is the Jun Fu Cecilia Yen-Ku Chair in Taiwan Studies and Director of the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. He will be the discussant for the paper by Takahara-san. So we will begin with Fukuda-san, please. Good morning, everyone. My name is Madoka Fukuda from Hosei University. Thank you for the opportunity to speak here today. Next panel, please. Okay, this panel, from this panel. Since Taiwan's democratization in 1990s, the Japan-Taiwan relationship has become steadily closer. As these figures and pictures show, when the East Japan earthquake occurred in 1911, the contributions from Taiwan totals 20 billion yen greater than the amount from any other country except the United States. And the Japanese people were deeply impressed by the bonds with the Taiwanese people. Okay, next, please. Under the circumstances, there remains no official diplomatic relations. What factors have enabled the Japan-Taiwan relationship? To answer this question, my presentation will begin by briefly introducing recent developments in the Japan-Taiwan relationship. It then will focus on factors that have promoted improvements in recent years. Next, please. And since 1972, successive Japanese administrations have basically taken the same position on the issue of Taiwan. That position is to maintain an offshore relations with Taiwan and hope for stability in Taiwan's trades, respecting the Sino-Japanese joint communique of 1972. Under that regime, the channels between the LDP and the KMT politicians had mainly taken the form of an offshore political dialogue until the 1980s. However, since 1990s, Taiwan's democratization was added a new dimension to Japan-Taiwan relationship. Next, please. Under the re-administrations, Taiwanese democratization has allowed positive memories of the Japanese colonial era and people's affinity for Japanese culture. President Lee often made reference to his own Japanese connections when calling on Japan to further develop its friendship with Taiwan without submitting to China's threats. These words appealed to many Japanese and they began to reconsider their relationship with Taiwan. At that time, many in Japan were beginning to consider that Japan was a potential threat and its authoritarian regime strongly opposed Western democratization. Next, please. In the beginning of the chain administration since 2000, leaders in both Japan and Taiwan felt that they should broaden communication channels with each other for these two reasons. Therefore, the chain administration tried to strengthen the channels between bureaucrats and the Japanese government responded to raise its own channels with Taiwan to higher levels. As for party-to-party channels, each ruling parties, opposition parties, and non-partisan entities all organized interest groups and promoted exchanges with each other. Along with this institutionalization of multi-layer channels, Japan and Taiwan also tried to progress their substantive relationship. Conversely, there remained various unsolved issues at that time to which Chinese government objected either directly or indirectly. Next, when President Ma took office in 2008, some Japanese policymakers were concerned that his administration might neglect Japan because of his cooperative policy towards China and takes tough stance towards the issues of Senkaku Islands and the East China Sea. President Ma, however, presented a new concept, namely a Japan-Taiwan special partnership, to stress his intention to strengthen ties with Japan. After that, Japan and Taiwan have been concluded these agreements without any major protests from China, especially since 2010, the administration has begun to raise sensitive issues that could conflict with China's position regarding Japan-Taiwan relations. In particular, the Japanese officials assumed that the Japan-Taiwan investment agreements was a very important step towards completing a Japan-Taiwan FDA in the future. Furthermore, after 70 years of negotiation, the Japan-Taiwan Fisheries Agreement was concluded in April 2013. As stated above, Japan-Taiwan relations since Taiwanese democratization have continued to lead to enhanced multilayered and substantial ties. One relevant question here is why the relationship between Japan and Taiwan has progressed as described, notwithstanding the fact that Chinese government has continued to deter its improvement. Therefore, this section will explain what factors beyond the power politics have led to improvements in recent Japan-Taiwan relations. Next, please. First, Japan and Taiwan have a complementary relationship in areas of industry and trade. Even after the rupture of the diplomatic relationship in 1972, many Japanese private enterprises maintained their economic ties with Taiwan. Next, please. As Figured 2 and 3 show, trade between Japan and Taiwan expanded remarkably through the 1980s and 1990s. These figures also show that, especially since 2000, the growing economic interdependence with China and the improvement of Japan-Taiwan economic relations are not necessarily in conflict. Next, please. Second, the recent development of regional economic cooperation has encouraged Japan-Taiwan economic cooperation. Japanese government has tried to solidify bilateral agreements with Taiwan as a way to substantially include Taiwan in the process of regional cooperation. As mentioned above, under March 10, Japan and Taiwan have been solidifying their economic ties by signing many unofficial and practical agreements. Next, please. Third, along with economic development and democratization, the civil societies in Japan and Taiwan have come to reflect a sense of common values and solidarity with each other. The Human Development Index shows that only Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan have been ranked as very high among Asian countries in terms of human development. Next, please. In addition, as figure 4 shows, Taiwan exceeded $10,000 per person and had been at the level of development of developed countries since the 1990s. Next, please. Fourth, cultural exchange between Japan and Taiwan has been heavily promoted. In addition to positive memories of the Japanese colonial culture, Taiwanese young people have specifically become more interested in Japanese popular culture in recent years. Next, please. According to a survey conducted by Hakuhodo in 2010 and 2012, people in Taiwan and Hong Kong tend to like not only Japanese cartoons but also Japanese fashions and television dramas more than Korean ones. Next, please. Fifth, as a result of 4 factors mentioned above, people-to-people interaction between Japan and Taiwan have also been strengthened over the past few years. As social affluence and cultural exchange have caused mutual feelings of closeness between Japanese and Taiwanese people to swell. Next, please. As figures 5 and 6 show, recent opinion poll results indicate that about 70% of both Japanese and Taiwanese respondents feel close or relatively close to each other today. Next, please. With regard to the improvement of the Japan-Taiwan relationship during the post-democratization era in Taiwan, the following four points have been revealed. First, although both Chen and Ma administration criticized each other regarding their policies toward Japan, Japan-Taiwan relations during this time have remained fairly consistent rather than changing between different Taiwanese administrations. My presentation characterizes consistency as the result of the institutionalization of channels, the enhancement of practical agreements, and the progress of relationship between the two societies. Second, the institutionalization and progress of the relationship between Japan and Taiwan have been consistent with the political agreements contained in the Sino-Japanese communique in 1972 and their results. Japan and Taiwan have improved their mutual relationship by taking full advantage of the ambiguity of those political agreements. Third, it is undeniable that the possibility of cooperation between Japan and Taiwan has occasionally depended on the reaction of the Chinese government. This has been confirmed by the fact that some forms of cooperation that President Chen failed to perform have become possible in the President-Ma era because the China's policy toward Taiwan changed. Fourth, the importance of having no official diplomatic relationship has been declining in the context of greater social interaction between Japan and Taiwan in this age of globalization. In recent years, the dialogues and agreements of signing to the people of Japan and Taiwan have not been in the matter of power politics and security, but in the area of economy, culture, and people-to-people exchange. Next, please. Finally, on the basis of analysis above, I would like to refer to the Abe administration's policy toward Taiwan today. Prime Minister Abe is already well known as one of the pro-Taiwan politicians in Japan. I suppose that, aside from the influence of his grandfather, he might be impressed by Lee Tong-hoi's words. After this re-sign from the Prime Minister, he visited Taiwan twice in 2010 and 2011 as a former Prime Minister and met not only Lee Tong-hoi but also Ma In-jo and DPP leaders. And since coming back to office, as this lower part, this list shows he has kept regarding the relationship with Taiwan as important as possible. I would like to thank the Prime Minister Abe and the Prime Minister Abe for this lower part. This list shows he has kept regarding the relationship with Taiwan as important. Next, please. After concluding the official's agreements, there still remain some political agendas between Japan and Taiwan. One is a debate about the necessity of a Japan-Taiwan FDA. Though Japanese side has high expectation for its possibility, there are some questions about its economic benefits and possible objections from China in Japan. A debate about a Japanese version of the Taiwan Relations Act has not been treated as an official agenda yet in Japan. Since the end of the last year, however, it has been watched with interest by the rest of China and Taiwan because some newspapers reported Prime Minister Abe's brother, Nobuo Kishi, takes initiative in LDP. I suppose that even if the Abe administration prefers policies to strengthen ties with Taiwan, it will be difficult to deliver them in the near future. As recent opinion polls shows, Japanese public opinions hope the administration to improve diplomatic relations with China. Therefore, the administration will search for repairing the relationship with China at first and then consider about politics toward Taiwan. That's all for my presentation today. Thank you for listening. Thank you, Dr. Fukuda, for a very clear and comprehensive assessment of Japan-Taiwan Relations. I will now turn to our Discussant, Professor Mike Mochizuki. Thank you very much, Bonnie. I want to thank Bonnie and Professor Matsuda for inviting me to be a Discussant on this panel. It's really an honor to be able to comment on Professor Fukuda's paper. I've been a fan of Professor Fukuda's writings and I've learned a lot about cross-strait relations from her many articles and book. As you can tell from her presentation, she has written an excellent paper that summarizes in quite detail the positive development of relations between Taiwan and Japan since the Chen administration. She gives an excellent summary of that development in the paper. What I want to focus by remarks on is on the key analytical argument that she is making. I think there is a very important intellectual puzzle that drives her paper. The puzzle is why has the relationship between Japan and Taiwan become more institutionalized and cooperative over time, despite what seemed to be initially the sharp disagreements between the DPP and the KMT regarding policy towards Japan, personified in the disagreements between Chen Xiebian and Ma Yingzhou, and despite the protests from China. This puzzle becomes even more problematic because she notes that over this period, you have increasing pluralization and complexity in the relationship between Japan and Taiwan. Why do we see this continuous trend towards cooperation? In her paper, she quickly raises one possible answer to that puzzle and is what she calls the balance of power theory. In her presentation, she refers to this as power politics. She argues that this is not an adequate explanation to understand this puzzle. Her main reasoning for this is that despite the improvement of relations between mainland China and Taiwan during the Ma Yingzhou period, after 2008, you see a continuation of the improvement in Japan-Taiwan relations and basically a continuity of the trajectory that was first developed during the Chen administration. As an alternative explanation, I think she draws on what I would call the liberal theoretical tradition to explain this institutionalization and cooperation. As she noted in her presentation, she refers to the increase in economic interdependence between Taiwan and Japan based on economic complementarity. She refers to the development of regional institutions of economic cooperation. In her paper, she notes APEC and the ASEAN plus three. She also talks about the shared values, social affluence and solidarity, democratic values and a common level of economic development. She talks about cultural exchanges, people-to-people interaction. These are all factors, these are all variables that a liberal theory of international politics would probably privilege in any kind of explanation. I think her argument is quite persuasive, but I think my own view is that she has taken a very crude view of realist theory, power politics, and because of that, she can easily dismiss the role of power calculations and strategic calculations. So I would argue that in fact, it may be kind of a realist perspective that puts a highlight on the kind of strategic dilemmas and strategic tradeoffs that both Japan and Taiwan face in dealing with China that may have created the political space to allow for this kind of improvement. And so from Taiwan's perspective, unless Taiwan is willing to abandon any possibility of stability with mainland China, I think Taiwan always faces this strategic dilemma between China and Japan. And also from Japan's perspective, unless Japan is willing to abandon any possibility of a stable relationship with mainland China, there is a dilemma between mainland China and Taiwan for Japan. And at this point, neither Japan nor Taiwan wants to make an ultimate choice for Japan of Taiwan over China or for Taiwan of Japan over China. So I would argue that this dilemma becomes more vexing for Japan and Taiwan. If Taiwan-China relations become more confrontational and if Japan-China relations become more confrontational. So the strategic challenge for both Taiwan and Japan is to find that strategic sweet spot in which it can manage the horns of this dilemma. And so in a sense, contrary to Professor Madoka's point that sitting up the puzzle, after 2008 there was an improvement in cross-strait relations and therefore that goes against realist thinking. In a sense, I would argue that the improvement of Japan-Taiwan relations, the continuation of the improvement after 2008 was made possible by the permissive environment in which you had a greater stabilization of relations between Taiwan and mainland China. And if we take the counterfactual, if cross-strait relations had continued to deteriorate after 2008, then I think it would have been much more problematic to continue with the improvement of Japan-Taiwan relations. The one might also ask about, well then what about the deterioration in Japan-China relations? And certainly Japan-China relations have deteriorated, but I would submit that it could be much worse. And despite some of the assertive policies of China, what is striking to me in this post-2012 period is a modicum of restraint on both sides. And so both the improvement of cross-strait relations and the exercise of some restraint between Japan and China, despite the Senkaku-Dauyu dispute that I think this has created a permissive political space for the improvement of Japan-Taiwan relations. A second point that I want to make is that, and we can maybe have this in the discussion, is I would like to get a better sense of what the strategic debate in both Taiwan and in Japan is about their bilateral relationship in the context of the U.S.-Japan-China strategic triangle and in the context of the U.S.-Japan-China-Taiwan strategic quadrangle. So what are the strategic preferences of Taiwan regarding Japan and China? How much of an explicit and implicit strategic partner does Taiwan want Japan to be in dealing with mainland China? Would Taiwan like Japan to become more willing, for example, to be involved in a Taiwan contingency in order to enhance deterrence vis-à-vis mainland China? Or would such Japanese involvement be counterproductive from Taiwan's interests? And I think the answers to those questions are by no means obvious. And the same thing goes to Japan. What are the strategic preferences of Japan regarding Taiwan and China? In other words, how satisfied and reassured is Japan with the status quo in cross-strait relations? And by status quo, I don't mean simply that Taiwan has kind of de facto independence, it's separate from China. But the status quo, I mean in terms of the trends that we see in cross-strait relations. And here, on the one hand, we see an increasing capability on the part of mainland China vis-à-vis Taiwan. And on the other hand, we see increasing economic interdependence between Taiwan and mainland China. So how satisfied, how reassured is Japan about this situation? Would Japan really like to see a further improvement in China-Taiwan relations? Or would it be concerned about a further development in China-Taiwan relations? Does Japan have any interest in driving a wedge between mainland China and Taiwan? Or is it simply that it would prefer to prevent the formation of a united front between China and Taiwan vis-à-vis Japanese interests? So in the end, I think it would be very helpful to an American audience to unpack the strategic debate within both Taiwan and in Japan. Because in reading the paper, I get the sense that there is kind of a consensus on both sides. And there may be, but I think given the strategic trade-offs that there may be a debate that kind of lies behind the headlines. Finally, I would like to press Professor Fukuda about some of the critical issues. She treats the Senkaku debt value issue very quickly in her paper, but what's very interesting is about the way Taiwan and Japan has dealt with the Senkaku issue and the fishing rights. In a sense, to separate out the issue of sovereignty and freezing that and promoting economic cooperation, at least on the fishing issue. And we all know that President Ma talked about a peace initiative for the East China Sea. To what extent does the way Japan and Taiwan address the East China Sea problem to what impact does that have on Japan and China's way of dealing with the East China Sea problem. The second issue that I would highlight concerns the changes that we are now seeing in Japan about defense policy. And in particular, Japan's move to exercise the right of collective self-defense. And I think there's a lot of discussion about what this actually means. But I would argue that one of the most profound aspects of this is that Japan could hypothetically become more involved in a Taiwan contingency. Now, is this a good thing or a bad thing from Taiwan's perspective? And then finally, I would just flag the history issue. And here what's amazing to me all along is how the history issue has not been as problematic in Japan-Taiwan relations as it has been for Japan-China relations. And what's the explanation for that? And does this have any implications for how to address the historical issues for Northeast Asia as a whole? Thank you very much. Thanks, Mike. Excellent set of comments and questions. And we'll give Dr. Fukuda some time maybe to think about those questions. And we'll go ahead with our second paper. And I'd like to ask Takahara-san to make his presentation. Thank you. Thank you very much, Bonnie, for hosting this for us. It's a great opportunity. And thank you also for Dr. Bush for being my commentator. The Chinese proverb is that you throw a brick and pull out the jade, and that's what I'm going to do today. And thank you all for coming. On a Monday morning, I'm not sure whether this is the best way to begin your week, but I shall try not to disappoint you too much. But one more good thing is that I do need to look at my slide as I talk, so I have to look that way as I talk, but please forgive me for that. Slide's up, please. Yes, please. Okay. Is there a computer on that? No, I have this watch at that, so I'll be calling on them to change that slide. Yes, yes, please go to that page. So what I have done in my paper, which is not available to you today, unfortunately, is an empirical analysis of the linkage between Chinese domestic politics and its diplomacy and particularly its Japan policy. And I do mainly talk about the Hu Jintao period that is from 2002, 3 to 2012, 13. So in my paper, in my presentation, I shall briefly go through the major points that I have written in the paper, but I'm sure that you are also interested in the most recent developments of Japan-China relations. So I'll talk a bit about the developments, particularly in the last two months or so, because people are now watching very carefully whether there will be a summit meeting between Mr Abe, the Prime Minister of Japan, and Xi Jinping at the APEC summit meeting that is to be held in Beijing in November. So the biggest challenge to me is to keep my presentation short. So without further ado, please look at the first slide. And in that slide, I talk about the different approaches to international affairs that were taken by the previous leader, Mr Jiang Zemin. I'm sure you remember Mr Jiang Zemin very well. And that between, sorry, Mr Hu Jintao's attitude or his policies towards international affairs. Jiang Zemin tended, I mean, often he repeatedly said that the international politics is a competition of comprehensive national power. And therefore, we have to be alert, he told his countrymen, and we have to try and enhance each element of our comprehensive national power, which included economic power, defense power, military power, science and technology power, and also how the nation is united. And while that was the case with Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao tended to take a much softer approach towards international affairs. He gave a talk at the United Nations in 2005 in which he argued for the construction of a harmonious world. Of course, this was in parallel to his assertion of constructing a harmonious society within China. But what happened was people in the leadership, his followers, Hu Jintao's followers, did not quite swallow what Hu Jintao mentioned in September 2005 at the United Nations. And all through, it was quite clear that Hu Jintao was not able to establish his authority and power within the leadership for those 10 years that he acted as the general secretary of the party. You remember Jiang Zemin, the man before him, before Hu Jintao used to be called the core of the central leadership of that generation. That was the wish of Deng Xiaoping that always there should be a core in the central leadership of each generation. However, when Hu Jintao became the top leader, he was never called the core of the central leadership. And his leadership remained a very weak one. Although in 2006, there was a change in that kind of a situation to some extent. In August, he held this central foreign affairs work conference in Beijing. He called for unity. He called for all the members in the party to listen to the party center to follow Hu Jintao himself's policy line on foreign affairs. And in the following month, in September, we saw the downfall of the then Shanghai party secretary Chen Liangyu, who was a typical kind of Shanghai gang person who followed Jiang Zemin. And then in the following month, in October 2006, Hu Jintao invited Mr. Abe, who had just become Prime Minister, leading Mr. Junichiro Koizumi. And that invitation, the day Abe arrived in Beijing, was the first day of the plenary meeting of the Central Committee. So it was a very important day for Hu Jintao and it was quite symbolic that he was showing to the party members that it is very important to improve relations with Japan that had deteriorated during the days of Prime Minister Koizumi. The next, please. So that, having said that, what I'm turning to now is the emergence or the, how should I say, the deep divisions that existed within the party leadership at that time began to surface, especially during the second term of the Hu Jintao administration that began in 2007, 2008. I've talked a lot about these divisions in the past, and I'm sure many of you are familiar with these, so let me try and go through them very quickly. You remember the 2008 World Financial Crisis in the wake of the Lehman Brothers shock, which originated in the United States. There was a view growing in China that no longer is the American model of development valid, and Washington Consensus no more, and time has come for the China model to lead the world, and now the Beijing Consensus should be what should be followed by the world. So some people started to argue that there is this Chinese model of development and that it should be advocated to the rest of the world. However, there were others who were more sober and argued that no, no, no, yes, perhaps macroeconomically, we are doing rather well, and we were able to pull ourselves out of the World Financial Crisis earlier than others. However, once we look into the substance of our development, there are many, many social issues and problems we haven't been able to solve, and China remains to be a developing country. We should never be too arrogant so quickly. So there was a debate, and I think basically this debate continues, although nowadays who argue that, yeah, we are doing quite fine. Why can't we continue like that? Does have a very powerful voice within the leadership. And this debate related to another debate over economic reform, because if you say that there is a Chinese model and that's good, there is no powerful need to reform anything. However, a lot of the economists, along with former Prime Minister Mr. Wenjia Bao, argued that no, that's not the case. We cannot rely on the development model that we used to have because the labor power, the number of workers, it's going to go down. It has already began to come down in 2012 and that without increasing the efficiency, the total factor productivity in the economy and then the Chinese economic future is doomed. And this debate also continues to this day, I would say. Please go to the next slide. Another debate was about political reforms because Wenjia Bao, if you remember, argued repeatedly following what Deng Xiaoping used to say in the 1980s that without political reform, you cannot thoroughly implement economic reform because there is going to be very powerful resistance from the vested interests in society or amongst the party members and therefore without the political reform to remove these vested interests in society and in the party, there's no way that you can implement the core part of the economic reform such as the reform of the state-owned enterprises, the reform of the distributive system, et cetera. But obviously there is a very powerful opposition against any kind of political reform. It was quite symbolic when in 2011, in March, when they had this National People's Congress, during the National People's Congress, then Chairman Mr. Wu Banguo, the number two person in the party at that time, said very clearly that there should not be any fundamental reform in the system because if those reforms come, then we will be facing the possibility of a civil war, which was a very serious remark to be made. I don't think he was joking. That's the kind of an image that the Chinese leaders have in their mind when they think about these issues. Whereas immediately after the NPC, it's the custom for the Prime Minister to hold press conferences, and Wen Jiabao said that quite the opposite, that we do need political reform if we were to be serious about economic reforms. Another related issue about political reform is this debate over universal values. Are there universal values? Is there anything such as universal values? The conventional position of the Chinese Communist Party has been that, yes, there is, and human rights, there is universality in the concept of human rights. So they have signed the UN Convention on Human Rights, both A and B. However, since around 2008, since that year when the World Financial Crisis began, the conservatives in the party have started to argue very forcefully that no, there is no such thing as universal values. There are only Western values, and the Western people are calling them universal values so that they can impose these values on China. And if we accept them, it's going to be very bad for China. And I would say, unfortunately, this is the main stream of thinking in the Central Propaganda Department now. Central Propaganda Department is a very powerful institution in the Chinese Communist Party that controls ideology, education, and the media. Next slide, please. Yes, and also concerning foreign policy, this debate is, I think, well known. There are some people who argue that Deng Xiaoping's line of low-profile, conciliatory diplomacy, Taoguan Yanghui, is out of date. That's the foreign policy line that you should take when you're weak. But now we are very powerful, and therefore our interests now exist overseas quite a lot, and therefore we need to implement more assertive diplomacy, and therefore we should no longer talk about Taoguan Yanghui. But on the other hand, there are more sober people who argue otherwise. Next, please. I only have five more minutes, I have to go. And on the other hand, in society, this is also well known, so I'll just mention it briefly. Increasing dissatisfaction and anxiety in society, that's another big issue in Chinese politics. So people are increasingly dissatisfied despite the increase in the economic size and the standard of living. So there's been rise in neo-Maoism and nationalism on the one hand, and people with means to do so are emigrating out. The emigration boom hasn't stopped, and there's an increasing number of people believing in all sorts of religions. Next slide, please. So what I argue in my paper is that there are, to put it roughly, two sets of thinking. These are ideal types, I would say. But on the one hand, there is a set of thinking on the right side of political spectrum as it were. Those who are inclined towards reforms tend to be more internationalistic and they tend to be more moderate in dealing with foreign countries. But on the other hand, there are the ideologically conservative people who tend to be more nationalistic or even chauvinistic and who tend to take a hard line approach towards foreign affairs. So what I argue in my paper is that in such kind of a situation, the party leadership, of course, needs means to unite the party and unite the nation. When the party is very much deeply divided and the society is more fragmented, how can you unite the nation? And the traditional way of the Chinese Communist Party ever since Mao Zedong's days has been to set up a target of tussles. In the past, it used to be class enemies within the country or the Soviet socialist imperialism or the American imperialism or the KMT in Taiwan. After the end of the Cold War, after the beginning of the reform and opening policies, it was Taiwan the major target of tussles for the CCP. But as we heard from Fukuda-san's presentation, the relationship after Mainju came to power in 2008, it's been very good. So where can they find a target of the struggle, Japan? So thank you, Mr. Ishihara, for provoking us in 2012. Next slide, please. Right. However, in the past two months, there have been many of mediation in Japan-China relations. There have been an upgrading of meetings between ministers and former Prime Minister Fukuda met Xi Jinping in Beijing in late July, and that was quite significant. No one knows exactly what was discussed, but these things certainly show a sign of the Chinese side also looking for ways to mend relations with Japan. Next slide, please. But why now? Why from July? A few hypotheses. An international factor sorry, the domestic political factor first. Xi Jinping further consolidates his power base, as is well known. He succeeded in expelling Shuichai Ho, the former vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, which was announced at the end of June, and another big tiger, Zhou Yongkang, former member of the Politburo Standing Committee. He was formally announced to be under investigation at the end of July, so the fact that he was able to consolidate his power base certainly would have been a very positive factor in this move. Next slide, please. Economically, the Chinese economic situation has become a serious element of concern for the Chinese leadership. The general situation is that the growth rates come down, they're calling it the new normal to calm things down, but anyhow that's a fact, and the real estate prices have declined, local finances are in trouble, deep trouble, and the reforms that were promised last November, last year November, have been slowing coming. As far as Japan-China economic relations are concerned, the confrontation in political relations and economic relations between Japan and China. This is a serious situation because I've always argued that in Japan-China relations, there are two aspects. One is that of fragility in the area of territory, in the area of security, it's a very fragile situation in those areas. However, on the resilient side, we should never forget the resilient aspect in the Japan-China relations such as exchange, cultural exchange, et cetera. But if the security issues, the territory things are affecting the resilient part of the relationship, that is a very serious situation. Next please. And internationally China finds difficulty in promoting the new type of major relationships in the United States. I'd very much like to hear from American colleagues what the situation is in U.S.-China relations, but some of my friends tell me that there is this traditional thinking as it were in China that whenever the relationship with Washington doesn't go smoothly, it will try to mend its relations with Tokyo. So that could be at work at this moment of time. And also there is an increasing recognition in Beijing that the hardline policy against the neighbors, especially Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam, have not really brought any benefits to China. And I have personally heard criticism against the hardline stance that have been taken by the Chinese leadership. Some people openly, at least to some foreigners, mentioning the critique and things that I sense the change in atmosphere. So and also they point out, these critiques point out that the hardline policies have promoted the United Front against China in international fora such as the Shangri-La dialogue. Next, please. And so based on my analysis, how can we move to a new mode of cooperation between Japan-China relations? And certainly the summit between the top leaders at APEC would help, because that would be most useful in sending a clear message, especially to the Chinese people that the phase has changed. The Chinese people, especially the bureaucrats are always looking at the top leader and what sort of signals are coming out from him. And if she meets APEC, that would be the most powerful signal. Okay. Now it's okay to improve Japan-China relations to do positive things about that. So I bet that if there is to be a meeting, all the local or many of the local leaders will be visiting Japan in the past two years. They have not, they have been only one provincial head level leader that led an economic delegation and came to Japan. One is the governor of Tsuchuan who came this year. But people are worried that once they go they might be criticized that he or she is inclined towards Japan. And that is very susceptible to social criticism as you know on the internet now. And but in order to make this happen to promote the relationship I think China must stop being provocative. He must stop sending the boats to the Senkaku islands. It does so every once in fortnight or so now. It's just a serious act of provocation I would say. So as long as they do that, the Chinese should not expect Japan to concede on any issues. Under this such physical pressure Japan will never concede. And if Japan conceded that I think about a serious consequence not only to Japan-China relations but also to the other parts of the world because the Chinese will do the same. I mean huge physical force to change the status quo on South China's even further and on other fronts too. And this is not good for the moderates the internationalists, the reformists. This is the last slide so don't worry. So it's not good for China either. That's the point that I would like to emphasize. But what can Japan do? Japan should discuss the future vision of East Asia because the Chinese are concerned what does Mr Abe really have in his mind? I mean it's vice versa. We are also puzzled what is it that it's really in Xi Jinping's mind? What are his intentions? But both sides have these doubts. At least Japan can take a unilateral move and try to make it clear what sort of order we would like to see realize in East Asia. It should not be an order based on power as the situation is unfortunately within China but we would like to see internationally in the East Asia region an order that is based on international norms. And finally in doing all these things Japan and the United States must keep a close communication. Thank you very much for listening. Thank you very much Takahara-san a very provocative set of analyses and implications for Japan's policy. We'll turn to Dr. Richard Bush for comments. Thank you Bonnie for the privilege of commenting on Takahara-Sensei's paper. He is one of Japan's most talented and respected Chinese specialists so it's a great pleasure. Also I see a number of people in the audience who could do a better job than I could on this task. I also see friends from the Taiwan and PRC media. I want to tell you that my presentation is going to be really boring this morning. I'm not going to say anything interesting as you seem to think I did on Friday. So take a nap. Seriously Professor Takahara's paper is extremely ambitious first of all in terms of its objective it seeks to link the struggle for power in China with the policies of the Chinese government in this case policy towards Japan and instinctively we Chinese specialists know that there must be a connection between what politicians do to gain power and then how they use that power. But defining this connection is really hard. Now Professor Takahara's paper is ambitious in another way and that is the nature of the subject of his study. The Chinese government and Chinese Communist Party understands that knowledge is power. So one of the things they do to increase their power is to give information to China specialists like him and me to make it harder for us to do our jobs. Now this is an extreme violation of our human rights but Professor Takahara tries valiantly to overcome this serious obstacle. Now Professor Takahara has a couple of fundamental ideas they're much more than assumptions and these animate his specific analysis of China-Japan relations. Now I'm not doing justice to the richness of his paper by the simplification I'm going to engage in but here I go. The first animating idea as he says on page two is that there is quote a connection between domestic politics and foreign and national defense policies. That is the political leaders of China often wage a struggle against foreign countries or leaders to strengthen the unity of the people in China and to turn the power struggle within the CCP to their advantage. So to grossly simplify foreign policy for China is an inside out phenomenon. Now obviously this first animating idea raises some questions in my mind at least and that is are policies completely subordinated to the struggle for power of the nation of domestic unity or are policies themselves a separate obstacle of struggle? Second question are the policy packages of contending groups melded together really in logically consistent holes? Do we therefore have in some way a 20th version 20th century version of the struggle between the two lines on which he and I both cut our analytic teeth? The second animating idea concerns foreign policy and that is that if relations improve with one target country to use Takahara-san's terms there is likely to be a deterioration in relations with another target country. Thus when cross-strait relations improved after 2008 the prospects for continued good Chinese relations with Japan declined. This raises the question of whether the content of foreign policies matters at all? Shouldn't there be a foreign policy reason per se for changes in China's foreign policy and specifically the deterioration of China-Japan relations after 2008 at some point? Now I don't want to get into details. I actually question his chronology a little bit because my recollection of China-Japan relations in the 2004-2005 period was that they were pretty bad and that was a time when cross-strait relations were pretty bad as well and in fact the two sets of relations were interacting with each other because the things that China did to prepare for a war against Taiwan such as surveying the Seabed of the East China Sea also worsened China's relations with Japan. But I don't want to get into details. I would rather offer a different perspective on Takahara Sensei's big idea on Chinese politics and Chinese policy. And I do this as a supplement to his analysis and as a basis for stimulating discussions. So what are the elements of this alternative perspective? The first and main one is that in my view a key development in China after 1979 was a concerted effort on the part of the Communist Party to foster greater autonomy and capacity for the various agencies of the Chinese government to insulate them from political competition up to a point to make it harder for politicians to interfere in their work through campaigns and ideologically imposed mindless ideas. Actually, I'm prepared to argue that one of the features of political modernization anywhere is to create greater agency autonomy. And that's because modernization in large complex industrial societies is really hard and you need specialization, you need professionalization, you need expertise. This is certainly the story of 20th century America. Now I'm not saying please understand that politics and policies are totally divorced from each other in modern political systems because they are. They are very fairly integrated policy packages with some ideological flavor in the course of competing with rival political parties. They do. I am suggesting however that the interaction between politicians and government agencies has in the last century actually become quite complicated and that complexity really needs to be the focus of our analysis. And I think this is very true of China, particularly after 1979. Now part of agency autonomy is the emergence of tasks. The goals that the agency is required to achieve. It requires a certain definition of the issue concerned and ways and means to achieve goals and achieving tasks requires continuity of implementation and avoiding regular disruptive changes of direction imposed from the outside. Furthermore, the problems that agencies try to solve have a life of their own. The problems of one period beget new problems which require policy adjustments in a new period. Also, interest groups and even think tanks and public sentiment springs up around agency work and complicates their autonomy and the efforts to change how tasks are solved. I would say that Prime Minister Abe is facing that kind of agency resistance that tries to shoot his third economic arrow into the bull's eye of economic growth. Now, I don't really have time to apply my supplemental idea to a Chinese domestic policy but I think it's really the mainstream view of American China specialists that the fostering of agency autonomy and capacity is one of the key developments since 1979. But let me talk more about external policy because that's the focus of our subject today. Now, in operationalizing the task of China's foreign and national security agencies, which I think we agree have gained greater autonomy and capacity, a useful concept in our analysis I think is national interest. That's a key vehicle for fostering agency autonomy and the capacity of those agencies and insulating them more from policies. They can focus on what is China's national interest or what are China's core interests and that serves to insulate them. And I think we've seen in the last 35 years an effort to define more precision and durability China's national interests concerning Japan, the United States, Taiwan and so on. We've seen vigorous efforts of those agencies to defend and promote their definitions of the national interest. Now, obviously a definition of national interest evolves over time partly because of changes in external factors like politics but more because of changes in the external environment such as the balance of power. You know, of course the definition and implementation of national interest can sometimes get wrapped up in elite contests for power and the pressure of nationalistic publics. I mean, these factors are important but I would also say that another extremely important factor in the promotion and defense of national interest are the policies and actions of other countries and their impact for good or ill on China's interests as Beijing defines them. So again, to be quite simplistic Chinese foreign policy is not just inside out, it's also outside in and that makes it extremely complex. So sort of getting concrete. In my view, it was because Beijing perceived rightly or wrongly that Li Dengwei posed a challenge to China's fundamental interests that it pursued a harder line policy towards Taiwan including its military buildup and the same applies for its response to Chen Shui-bian. A principal reason that Beijing has hardened its approach to the United States in recent years is because it perceives wrongly, I believe that the rebalancing policy is quite negatively against China and I would speculate the principal reason that China pursued a tougher policy towards Japan from around 2001 to 2006 and then after 2012 was because that it perceived that the policies of Prime Minister Koizumi Noda and Abe after 2012 were in some sense hostile. Now we can dispute whether Chinese perceptions were correct and merited the responses that Beijing deployed. We cannot deny that Chinese domestic politics shaped that response both elite and mass. But to explain China's decisions towards Japan we need to incorporate these outside-in factors. We also need to look at cases in depth because I suspect that each case is going to be very different have its own complexity but the work of building those cases is going to be very important. I think Professor Takahara has provided us a good foundation on doing that work and so it's in that spirit that I offer these supplemental remarks. Thank you very much. Thank you Richard. I think when we examine Chinese policy towards really any issue we have to ask the question about what the right balance is between domestic factors and international factors in explaining China's policy. What Richard has referred to is either outside-in or inside-out and so I too would have a question as to whether Takahara sensei has struck that right balance in his paper. I would never dismiss domestic factors but I think that in the case of the Sino-Japanese relationship as in the case of China's relations with the United States there is the reactive factor or the international factor that also explains Chinese policy. So we have about 25 minutes left in the panel and I think what I'll do is I will take a few questions and then when we come back to the panel in addition to responding to the questions I would invite our speakers to respond to the comments that have been made by our discussants. So if I could ask you to raise your hand, identify yourself, wait for the microphone and please make your question brief so that we can get in as many as possible. Okay, we'll start with Ben Self. Thank you very much. Thank you for the papers. I'm Ben Self, I'm adjunct here at the Japan Chair at CSIS and at GW where I teach Japanese politics. And it's Japanese politics that's the core of my question today. I know the object of analysis is mainly China and Taiwan and you've explored that level when you talked about the inside out and the outside in. The inside you're talking about is only the China side and I'd like to hear these papers or your comments address the domestic politics of Japan. Nobody mentioned once the DPJ, I mean you mentioned Noda briefly, but the alternation of government within Japan must have some effect on its relations with both Taiwan and China. And then at a more fine-grained level the problem of political leadership and political individuals and their relationships with these countries we hear all about the behind the scenes trips. You mentioned Abe's trip as post-Prime Minister to Taiwan but the problem of the personal political relationships and personal views of elite politicians within Japan and their strong tendency to have a trade-off mentality to use Taiwan against China or to have a close relationship with China and keep an arms distance from Taiwan. And there was no discussion of that which I think is salient to both of these important relationships, Japan-Taiwan and Japan-Taiwan. Thank you very much. Garret, in the front here. Hi, my name is Garret Van Ruiz I'm editor of Taiwan communique. I had a question for Kodesan. It was an excellent presentation and good to see you again here in Washington. In your presentation you painted a very positive picture of the Japan-Taiwan relations after 2008. But if you look more closely then you see that the first two years it actually went downhill very fast. I think the policies of my administration at that time on the Senkakus, on historical issues really went in the other direction. He nudged more closely to China. But it did not resonate very well with the majority view of the Taiwanese population which was more pro-Japan and also irked the United States because they did not want to see conflict between two democratic allies, Japan and Taiwan, and particularly the water-boat-gun battle between Japanese and Taiwan coast guards really was looked at very negatively here in Washington. So my question to you is would you agree that this positive situation only happened after a very significant downturn in the beginning? Okay, David Brown. Thank you, David Brown from SICE. I very much appreciate all the panelists' presentations and the discussions. My question is to Professor Fukukuda. And that as you talked quite a bit about social contacts between Japan and Taiwan improving in this period, I think it's also true that there was in the area of defense and security contacts very quietly between officials that this evolved particularly during the period of Chen Shui-bian. I wonder if you could talk a little bit about that. Explain how that developed and what the limitations are today in a period of quite tense relations between Japan and China. What are the limitations felt by the Japanese side on how far they can go in cooperating with Taiwan? Okay, and one last question up here in front. Thank you. I'm André Souvezot and I'm the chief representative in Vietnam for the interstate traveler company in Detroit, Michigan the high-speed train trying to get it there. Anyway, what a wonderful presentation. For my question addressed to I basically based on Takahara-san's presentation I just want to say by background that when the U.S. China joint communique came out in 1982 I was the political military advisor to the Bureau of East Asia Pacific Affairs and when I first saw the content of it I thought, oh my gosh we've given in too much to China but it really was brilliant because in my view it allowed both sides to declare victory. Anyway, but the question is this your presentation about how Beijing is beginning to see that it's euphemistically called a serve of policy actually encroaching in the exclusive economic zones of other countries like the Philippines and Vietnam they're starting to be aware that it is not serving their interests that everybody wishes them will we all want good relations with China but we just don't want to succumb to their naked aggression against others exclusive economic zones. So my question is this wouldn't it be better to wouldn't the international better international unity against these incursions stated at least clearly in some language that it's not a dispute and aggression against other sovereignty wouldn't this then reinforce the pragmatists in Beijing and reduce the power of the soveness that's my question. Okay, great thank you very much. We'll come back to the panel now we'll start with Dr. Fukuda to address the questions that were posed to you please. Thank you very much for Professor Mochizuki's important comments and many questions from floor so at first I want to add some explanation about presentation today as a starting point of this analysis today I want to analysis Japan and Taiwan relations from different perspective of power politics because because in Japan many studies about Japan-Taiwan relations stress stress power politics the factor of power politics more than power politics too much but as Professor Mochizuki pointed the factors of power politics is also important to understand why the relationship between Japan and Taiwan is so understand that the relationship between Japan and Taiwan continue is continuing to improve so much and it is the really difficult problem where Japan should welcome Japan should welcome cooperation between Taiwan and China and where is the red line of red line that the Japanese the Japan can accept accept the the the development of the cooperation between Taiwan and China but it is a very important question but I have not found a right answer to this question now so it is very difficult question and this question deeply related to the issues of Senkaku and history historical issues of Senkaku and historical issues as I mentioned in my paper after 2008 in Japan there are many concerning about the United Front between China, mainland China and Taiwan and now it is still existing but in Japan I always think we should consider that sometimes there is a gap between Taiwanese official statement and the and the people's opinions in Taiwan so I am I am I am optimistic about this optimistic about the relationship between Japan and Taiwan about this this problem and finally about the collective self-defense I am understanding that it will not change Japanese role in the security of Taiwan straight a lot by this by removing the collective self-defense in Japan because unfortunately we have we don't have official diplomatic relationship and security ties with Taiwan and so so Japan is only ally of the United States not the Taiwan and after approving the collective self-defense however Japan can defense the Japan can escort the United States ship in the Taiwan straight maybe it is the very limited commitment to the security of the Taiwan straight and okay and I have some more questions from the floor about the okay about the the impact of the personal political political political relationship with China and Taiwan I think about the the issues of about the issues of China the personal behavior and preference of the leaders more important than other area in Japanese diplomatic issues historically this is my answer thank you very much Fukuda sensei and if you have perhaps in the during the break other questions that have been left unanswered you can discuss with the question it was okay Takahara sensei thank you very much Dr Bush for very very good comments I have a feel that I'll be making similar comments if I have and had to respond to my presentation on the point that is it only domestic politics that decide Chinese foreign policy of course not and Bonnie's point that I should pay more attention to the balance of course I think you're both quite right I was trying to emphasize a certain perspective or aspect when we look into Chinese foreign policy making and particularly China's Japan policy but my rhetoric was not good enough I should have paid more attention to the way I my argument certainly there is the other way round that is that foreign policy or external relationships affect Chinese politics for example in 2008 if you remember in June Japan and China agreed upon this development of the East China sea which was a great diplomatic achievement from my point of view and from many points of view however it was severely criticized by China it was a bad deal it was sort of a give out of our national interests and so on and it certainly weakened the political position of Hu Jintao inside Chinese politics but the question is as an academic how can I prove it you know Richard did mention the difficulty in getting data we can sort of infer that's most likely what happened we do hear those things from our Chinese friends but if I don't get the evidence I cannot write that kind of a thing in my paper and therefore it's very difficult so the rhetoric becomes very important but I didn't do that very well apparently what about the relationship for example you mentioned the example of Japan-China relations and cross-strait relationships in 2005 to 2006 that doesn't contradict my point because as long as the Chinese Communist Party has a target of Tatsuo then it's okay so it doesn't matter how many they have they used to have many in the past so if they have two that's okay if they have three that's alright so that's not really the key point another question greater agency autonomy yes that's what they've been trying to achieve I would say also but now the difficulty is how to form a coordination amongst all these different interests held by different government agencies and certainly the Chinese NSC I suppose is an attempt to tackle this problem but as we know maybe the new NSC hasn't matured enough to function play this coordinating function as we saw in May to July this year the drilling that was done by the oil department as they were protected by the Chinese Navy was a typical case I would say which by many Chinese is judged as something that clearly damaged its foreign relations so that's one example of bad coordination the Chinese Communist Party is trying to overcome this difficulty then asked about Japanese politics I really don't know about Japanese politics so I might be saying something quite very wrong but my impression is that now the Chinese are criticizing Mr. Abe very severely for the bad relationship that Japan and China are having but I would say that it was under the DPJ government that this current crisis began and as long as China exerts this physical pressure on Japan any government under any leader would take a very similar policy I would say basically or essentially if it was Mr. Noda continuing I don't know maybe somebody else who is pro-China who seem to be more pro-China would make more efforts to mend the relationship probably but Abe has also mentioned that the door is always open the window is always open he doesn't criticize China directly very much although he keeps on criticizing the point that any country should not use its force to change the status quo which I believe any leader of Japan would say now so my answer to you I might be very wrong but there's no essential difference in the China policy on the Japanese side I would say between the LDP or the DPJ what else your question about the announcement of the international normal yes I agree with that but the problem is the Chinese leadership has been saying a lot of nice things like they will solve all these confrontations through peaceful means et cetera they don't want to see the use of force or any confrontation but what they do is quite different from what they say so that's the problem if Mr Abe could meet Mr Xi Jinping in November and if both sides could declare that they will use peaceful means to solve whatever problems that they have between them I think that would be very encouraging and that would be very much welcome by the rest of the region and the rest of the world so we should aim for that okay I think we have time maybe just for two very short questions wait for the mic please Michael Yehuda from GW I'd like to echo what everyone has said about the excellence of the papers and also of the discussions but it seems to me although we focus very much on perspectives and policies there is a huge structural problem and that is the security dilemma that exists between China and Japan in particular in the sense that now that China has declared for some time it wants to be a maritime power it wants to reach out beyond the first island chain and into the wider Pacific from a Japanese perspective that could be very damaging to their national interests because that would put the whole trade routes on which they depend in jeopardy and it also means therefore that Japan would not be so keen to see Taiwan united with China except under very specific conditions that would not enable Taiwan to become if you like a bastion for Chinese military penetration further into the west so I'd be interested in comments on that okay one last short question over here Hi my name is Yuda Cho I'm a second year master's student in Elliott School, GW I actually have two questions but I'll keep the Taiwan domestic questions later on and I'll ask prestigious professors to try to answer their question my one question is about the collective defensive policy that's carried out by Japan how would our prestigious speakers Takahara sensei to answer how can from Japanese perspective how would Taiwan fit into the collective defense policy in the policy of this collective defensive view thank you great very good questions okay Takahara-san will you go first please thank you Michael for a very good question because I left that out the basic reason why China's been behaving in this way let's say in the past 10 years or so is because their national power has increased and that they are able to do what they were not able to do in the past so even if we were even if Abe and Xi Jinping could overcome the immediate crisis as it were and try to change the phase and start developing our relationship again the bigger question remains that how are we going to assist with China when it keeps on developing its military might and when it keeps on pushing its military maritime advancement and in order to solve this bigger issue certainly Japan and China must engage themselves in serious dialogue together with the United States as to the way that we can find an arrangement in which we can coexist peacefully and comfortably okay Fukuda-san has yielded her time to Dr. Richard thank you Michael that's a great question I'm a card carrying defensive realist and we both use the metaphor of a single mountain can't tolerate two tigers but I would say that there are dilemmas and there are dilemmas that despite the growth of Chinese power how it chooses to deploy and use that power can have make a difference in terms how Japan perceives China's rise and what it does about it one small example in the case of the Senkaku Jailu Islands there are ways that China could be less assertive shall we say in how it asserts its claims over the islands and that might if it chooses constructive ways that could diffuse that issue to some extent thanks just 10 seconds to the second question in the second panel Matsuda-san will be on and he is the expert on collective self-defense so please wait we'll hold that question Dr. Mochizuki would you like to add something just very quickly in response to Ben's sales question about Japanese domestic politics I was going to talk about that but I didn't have enough time but what's interesting to me when you look at the big picture is that in the 1960s and right before normalization the big divide in Japan about foreign policy was between kind of a pro-China and a pro-Taiwan group and in fact within the LDP there were some that was on the pro-Taiwan group organization and some on the pro-China after the 1972 normalization especially the peace and friendship treaty that division began to fall apart and so what's been very interesting is when you look at the parliamentary leagues in Japan in favor of good relations with Taiwan or with China there is now an overlap and so in a sense up until recently has been basically to have it both ways stable relations with China and improving relationship with Taiwan so the big question here is now are we beginning to see a slight shift closer towards the Taiwan side and that's an open question and what's doubling interesting is that partisan politics is not the way to really capture this because within the DPJ we have divisions as well there's a sharp difference between the way Mr. Mayhada approaches this issue and someone like Mr. Hatayam or Mr. Khan and one of the reasons that we have this mess is the way Mr. Mayhada and others of his persuasion responded to the 2010 fishing trawler incident that's really the beginning we focus a lot on 2012 but it was that and then the way Mr. Khan reversed that which then set up the possibility for Mr. Ishii Hatayam to challenge the policy. This has been a terrific discussion before we close just let me say that most of the power points that our Japanese participants speakers have given today are on the table outside and you can get copies of them there just to give a little advertisement for a future program. On October 6 we're going to have Dr. Jessica Chun-Weis come talk about her new book Powerful Patriots which is related to the issues we are talking about today as she examines protests in China and in particular of course anti-Japanese protests so we hope that you can all join us for that and please join me in thanking our speakers on our first panel. We'll resume in 10 minutes . . . . . . . . . . . . .