 Gwyddon gyntaf ni'r gweithio phesagwyr newydd fel gwneud sy'n gywed ar y cyfle gaethu ar y ddechrau ymddangos o prosiectau newydd yn y gallu iawn ymddangos arcredigol ymddangosol. Fy souri ein clywed gwahanol o'r ymddangosol, a yn amlwysig nôr o bryd ymddangosol yn wirthyniol ar gyfer ymddangosol. Efallai, mae'n cyfrifio amlaethu fel ychydigol am y clywed ymddangosol ymddangosol sy'n gyffortun. of the existing suite of climate change indices that are out there. You don't need to look in detail, but just observe the pattern of where's red and where's green or blue in the next few slides. You're seeing vulnerability in sub-saharan Africa also in Himalayas, in southern Asia, South-east Asia. But then the green or the positive colours in the rest of the world indicating that other parts of the world are all right. There's a vulnerable parts and then the other bits are all right. That's the impression. And these are the indices that we have at the moment. And I'm asking if they actually tell us anything new. This is the same sort of spatial distribution of a pattern, but it's not a climate change vulnerability index. It's the human development index. And so the different climate change indices that are out there have been developed for a number of different reasons. Some are to simply raise awareness and I'm thinking that respect they've been quite successful. Some of them more explicitly have aimed to inform policy decisions on where to focus adaptation, where to invest for the private sector even, or where not to invest. How to allocate finance has even been a policy question that the indices have been supposedly used for. And a range of different methods from just these three and many other kind of indices that are out there. Some of them are deductive using theoretical explanations and different indicators. Some of them use statistical analysis to say why these indicators are important representation of vulnerability. Some expert or stakeholder involvement. But they all seem to produce fairly similar results. And so I'm asking if that matters. I think it does matter. And the main reason why I think it matters is that they produce or reinforce a misleading perception, which is that rich and emerging economies aren't vulnerable. That their vulnerability is independent of developing countries. And that therefore adaptation to moderate or even more extreme levels of climate change is possible. And that's a viewpoint that you see quite frequently, quite prominently at UN negotiations, the brinkmanship about countries who think they can actually cope with this because they don't see independence between themselves and more vulnerable parts of the world. And whatever happens in the 2015 climate deal, if it's successful, it will no doubt be based on large part about the transfers of finance from one country to another. If it's unsuccessful, then it will imply an even greater need for adaptation finance. So whatever happens in that deal is there'll be a phase of needing to ramp up climate finance, especially from rich countries. And making those arguments within those countries means persuading finance ministries in particular why it is a strategical worthwhile investment to spend millions and billions of pounds on climate adaptation in other countries. And obviously the most important justifications for that are the historical responsibilities and the equity principles that lie behind that. But I think we need more additional arguments as to why people should invest in adaptation. And one of those is based on self-interest. That's a concept that finance ministries tend to be more acutely aware with than equity perhaps. So this is what lies behind the idea of an alternative climate change index. And like I said, this is about indirect impacts. Now, very briefly, we've done some work to look at current adaptation strategies and whether they deal with these indirect impacts. And the short answer is no, they don't. And one of the PS projects we have, Adaptation Without Borders, is looking at trying to address this. But we identify three main reasons why these issues are lacking. One is low awareness itself. And that's what this index is trying to address. The others are about the lack of evidence and research on the topic and the complexity of the risks and impacts that cross boundaries. We're addressing those as well in the project. But this index is about raising awareness simply of the issues. And so what we mean by indirect impacts, traditional adaptation, if you like, focuses with the decision maker and direct climate impacts in that area. So it rains more in Sweden, it floods more in Sweden, let's adapt to that increased flood risk. But we see climate risk as being much more contextual within a global system. And we identify four pathways via which risks cross borders. And that's biophysical, by which means transboundary rivers, transboundary ecosystems, via trade in global markets or international supply chains, financial pathway, which could be foreign direct investment, or it could be personal finance of remittance flows across countries. And the people pathway, which mostly includes human migration, but also human health across borders and changing dynamics in markets like tourism. And so we recognise that there are still climate impacts that are direct on a decision maker, but there are also climate impacts overseas on receptors that create risks for decision makers in other countries. So the suggestion is to create a global index of exposure to indirect impacts via these pathways. And we'd be very open. My idea is it would be a very, quite a crude composite index, which would be a global map in the end, comprising proxy indicators of risk exposure in each of these pathways. And like I said, this work hasn't been done. So these are just a very initial take on the kinds of indicators we might use to represent risks via these pathways. And this is something that obviously we'll need to work on if we start this initiative. And we'd welcome ideas and comments and criticisms on. So the objectives of this index are to reframe the debate about what vulnerability really means, who's vulnerable, how we share certain vulnerabilities, to raise awareness of this interdependence. In part, that can be used to motivate higher ambition on mitigation and climate finance in particular, but clearly also to stimulate more research on indirect impact. But we are aware of the limitations that apply to this index if it was to be developed, just as they do to other existing indices on the limitations of data that we have, the fairly arbitrary nature of the proxy indicators that you select, and how this global map would be a very static, one-dimensional representation of risks that are actually very dynamic. So for those reasons, it can only be used to raise awareness. It can't be used to support actual decision making. It's just one part of the puzzle. But that's not it. I have a dream. And these are the three people who feature in my dream. Simon, Chris and Ellie from York. And for those people outside of SEI, this is the SEI York team who've developed a multi-regional input output model, which is a fantastic tool and it's a tool that I think we can use to explore indirect impacts in much more detail. And so using this kind of analysis, which traces consumption and the embodiment of various resources in consumption spatially through different supply chains of different countries, we could look at using indicators like embedded water from water-stressed countries. That's an indicator that's pretty much already in the model. We could take a very nuanced analytical view of where these indirect impacts occur and therefore much more policy-relevant insights on how to start making interventions to reduce the risks. That's all. Thank you.