 So this paper, this research is part of my, you know, bigger research agenda, which looks at how investors and shareholders can hold corporate directors, boards of directors responsible for problems in their companies. So the company has gone through some crisis, some financial problem, some, you know, any kind of corporate crisis. Is the board being held accountable by shareholders? And this is an important question because there's a lot of concern that there are all kinds of, you know, corporate problems. And the board of directors, which represents the shareholders as leaders of the company, do not take, do not pay any price. There's no penalty. And if there is no any accountability, then why will the boards do a good job? So given that there are so many, you know, problems in the last few years have gone through a huge financial crisis, are the boards being held accountable? So the study looks at a large number of companies in the United States, which were, which went through financial fraud allegations. And we look at two things. Shareholders have two ways of looking at, of holding their directors accountable. One is that they can take them to the courts and file a lawsuit against the company. And so we examine whether the shareholders actually individually hold the directors responsible in these lawsuits. So do they file a lawsuit against the individual director himself or herself and say that you are responsible for it, so you should be paying a price. So do they use the court system to hold the director accountable? So that's one method. The second method is do they vote against these directors? So the directors come up for re-election. Do the shareholders express their unhappiness with the board, with the directors, by voting against them in these elections? The finding essentially that yes, they use both these methods, but they don't use it enough. So first of all, there is so far no evidence on either of these things. There's a lot of concern on part of the board's individual directors, so whoever we talk to, there are a lot of surveys. And the directors are very afraid, especially in the United States, that they face a lot of risk, that they can be sued in courts, that they will lose their jobs and so on and so forth. But this is fear. Is there any reality to this fear is the first point? And what we find is that in roughly, so when the company faces a problem, roughly 10% of independent directors, so we look only at independent directors on the boards, roughly about 10% of the independent directors are sued in court. Now you can say that's a very small number. It's only 10%. The 90% of directors are not being held accountable. Or you can say 10%. If you're an individual director, a lot of people I tell this number to say that the risk is too high. I didn't realize that I have a 1 in 10 chance of being a party to a lawsuit when I go on to a company. So it depends on the perspective you take, but the number is 10% that your chances of getting in a lawsuit because of the company, because of sitting on the board is about 10%. So that's one thing. We find two other interesting findings. Shareholders oppose directors who have been in companies which face these problems. Shareholders oppose the directors who have been named in the lawsuits even more. So there is something about some directors, these 10% of directors that shareholders and the shareholders who are filing the lawsuit and the ones who are voting against them find that they have done something wrong. So there is accountability against. But the level of voting is fairly small. So the directors on average get only about 6% negative or shareholder oppositions to the extent of 6%. Now again, is the 6% number really small? This is an average number, so there are definitely going to be cases more than 6% and there are going to be cases less than 6%. In the United States, the general level of shareholder support is about 98%. So on average, only about 2% opposition votes are cast against directors. So compared to that, 6% is three times more. But it's still not a big enough, some might say that it's not a big enough number and shareholders are not being too active. So what we have done is to actually measure these things. So that whenever we have a policy discussion, now you have empirical evidence, now you have numbers that you can discuss. You can talk about is 10% too low or too high. What is making it 10%? Are there structural constraints? Are there constraints in the law that prevent the investors who are suing the company from naming more directors? Why are investors voting so little? It is for investors to take note. The large institutional investors very often go with proxy advisers. There are advisory consulting companies which tell the investors which way to vote. Because there are so many companies, there are 5,000 plus companies in the United States and elsewhere in the world as well. And every large mutual fund will own shares in almost all these companies. It's very hard for the fund managers to decide on every case how they should be voting for every director, there are about 10 directors in every company. It's a very hard problem for them to be doing this. And so we have specialized agents, specialized consulting companies, proxy advisers they are called. And so we also look at how often do proxy advisers give opposing recommendation against these directors. And we find that they do, but we have our results show that about 25% of the cases they provide a negative recommendation against these directors. Now it's 25% a large number or a small number. It's up, I think what we are doing by this research is allowing a conversation between investors, proxy advisers, companies, the Securities Exchange Commission and others who can now intelligently discuss these issues. Because now they've been measured, now they know what the outcomes are. And we can decide, the US, the governance people, the society can decide whether 10% is large enough, that's enough of accountability, or the voting is big enough, or the institutional investors, the large mutual funds and others can say, this is too low, we are not holding them accountable enough. Because there is a free riding problem, every company has thousands of investors. Every investor can believe that the other investor is going to take action. But if everyone believes that the other person is going to do something, in the end nobody does anything. But now by seeing these numbers, it's clear that nobody is doing much. Some of the more active institutional investors can take note and say that we need to think about these things much more, much more. So I don't know if this is important, I don't believe regulation can solve the problems, in society regulation has a role. But better informed investors can understand their role better and engage in conversations with companies, with boards, with proxy advisors and among themselves on how should we be thinking about our governance responsibilities, much more. How should we be holding directors more accountable for their performance if they feel that these numbers are too small? I personally feel these numbers are too small, that the negative extent of voting should be more against directors who have been involved in certain problems, but the investors have to decide for themselves, each one. The other option for investors is to just sell the shares in the company and go away. So partly you don't expect 80% of investors to be voting against the company and its director, because if you're that unhappy, you should not be holding shares at all. But then you have to hold some shares, you have to hold shares. Index funds don't have the option, they have to hold shares in a lot of companies, and therefore large institutional investors have to engage in understanding how should we be holding corporate directors accountable. And we are helping them through this research to estimate that.