 I'm going to really now ask the second panelist to come in because we are going to look at the more grassroots responses in the context of secular and communal divides. We will also look at the minority questions and those emerging in the, the borderlands. Again, with reference to China, as well as the whole question of contentious federalism remains quite strong, even in this particular session that we're going to look at. So, all in all, I would say that let's start off now with Shanawaz Ali Rehan, who is a PhD scholar at St. Anthony's Oxford University. And he has also worked in the editorials of a show my the Bengali edition of the times of India as well as column and he's the author of several Bengali books on politics. If you'd like to start off Shanawaz, that'd be great. Thanks. Good and meet. I'm audible now. Thank you. Thank you for inviting me to speak and to share the platform. You can increase your volume slightly. I think I'm audible. Yes. So it's a great pleasure for me to share the platform with dignitaries like the famous scholars ranging from fields ranging from history to politics to economics and wonderful audiences also. So, in this election, actually what I am mostly looking into I'm interested is the, the Hindu vote actually, the only vote bank in Bengal. Let's start with the repelling the misconception that there's a Muslim vote bank. If there's no Muslim vote bank right now in Bengal because Muslims are voting TMC Congress, ISF, whatever. But if there is any chunk of any, any vote bank, which really exists right now in Bengal is either the Hindu to a vote bank. The BJP, which won 18 C plus election, last look some election, or the anti BJP Hindu secular vote bank, which we are looking. We are, we are expecting them from whom we are expecting that they will defeat the BJP. And I'm mostly interested in this, both kinds of vote banks, the secular vote bank, and the secular Hindu vote bank, and the, and the Hindu Hindu to a vote bank. But I have found that this anti BJP secular party, they all fail to address the elephant in the room, and that is what is the true character of BJP. But how did the social and intellectual context out of which the Bengal liberalism or the Bengal modernity stand in 90th century Bengal, it's also responsible for the rise of Hindu to a in in North India during the 20th century. So these are the question we need to introspect right now, how the Bengali left and the Congress leaders were drawn to it, even after the partisan. What role, what role this religio or political traditions play in the formation of CPIMS socialist consciousness or Congress or TNC this recent Bengali nationalism. So these are the questions I was, I was wondering from last couple of weeks. And it reminds me, once my supervisor was referring his chat with Deepak Shakurbati, he was told to him that secularism does not in fact have deep conceptual history in India. So can be said about Bengal. It is not an important category in the early nationalist movement that and was only used by the Congress as a way to degenerate the Muslim League as a communal. That is secular communal. Why it only exists in the English usage and why it only made into the constitution with Indira Gandhi is just because that we had a lot of riots later and we thought that now we need secularism. So look, in Bengal also this is the crisis of liberalism. This is the crisis of our notion about secularism or culture, a hegemonic culture, which is the Bengali, which is very much urban and which is very much elite, which is very much upper caste Hindu. So, look how easily did he or those left traitors who those who are not pleased with their party decision to include ISF Abbas Siddiqui in Songjukto Morcha, how easily can they brand Abbas Siddiqui as a communal. Look, I don't have much hope about Abbas Siddiqui or me in Bengal because Abbas Siddiqui is it's like it's like more Catholic than the Pope. Abbas Siddiqui is right now trying to project himself as a more communist than Surya Kanto Mishra. And by doing that, he sometimes forgets to attack BJP for NRC, Kya, Ram Mandir. I never hear that any politician is referring Ram Mandir in this in this election and BD is very consciously avoiding this kind of terms. So, so, so, so what I will say that, and so Abbas Siddiqui or like me, these are these are identity politics, you may like it or you may not like, but the way, the way Mamutabh energy or like those. When they come together, they satisfy with their party's decision to invite Abbas in the brigade, how easily they can, they can equate Abbas with Dilip Ghosh. So, is it possible for a minority living in a, in a country, in a, in a country ruled by Hindutva Brigade, and is it, is it possible that a minority can be in the same footing with a, with a, with its, with his oppressor. You can, you can, so, so why we are not using the same term for other identity politics, either leaders of identity politics like Mayaboti. Three times he made alliance with BJP, but the Muslim politics, the Muslim, the identity politics and Muslims are dissatisfied with the secular parties when they are trying to form a political party, you are equally, you are easily equating them with BJP. So, and, and, and another thing is, another thing is that the Bengali, the Bengali middle class, they are actually, they are actually, they, they, they, the way they are taking Abbas Siddiqui or like me, something as an outsider, I'm talking about those who want to defeat BJP. They are, they, they, they want them in the, in the, in the alliance so that they can, they can have some Muslim vote or CPM can extend its, its base among the Muslims, but still the portrayal of Abbas, still the portrayal of mean supporters is outsiders. So, here, here comes the thing, so how many outsider we have got? Outsider means one whose, whose accent is not false. So, so this, when, when, when we are offended, when Boilas Bijaborgi is saying that cheetah, I can, I can, I can easily identify a person Bengali by his attire, or like he is, he's making some remark, derogatory remarks for the food habit of Bengalis. So, you are only offended when it comes to this Bhodrola kind of cultural thing. But, so, another point what I wanted to say that I think what Dipesh said to my supervisor during that chat can be said about this, this liberalism what we are witnessing right now among the Bengali Bhodrola, those who want to defeat the BJP. No matter the BJP, my another point is no matter BJP, we not lose this election, many Bengali Hindu religious reformers, nobilities or periodical editors reason of Hindu life has actually already become full circle in Bengal, with some changes. And our, our, the, not, I mean, the, the, the secular parties or the, or the Bengali Bhodrola's problem is with these changes that occurred in last 125 years, while this ideology was roaming all over, all over India. The modern day Hindu Bhodrola's problem is more with this change, actually, and Bonkim's Hindutva which formed the first nucleus of, of, of the, of Hindutva politics in Bengal. This, this guy is still our Saito Samrat, if we don't make mention, write his name without mentioning Saito Samrat, one mark will be deducted. Now, this, this kind of the, whatever BJP is doing right now, whatever happening in Bollywood, Bollywood is the more powerful history teacher in, in India than in JNU history professor. Whatever they are doing with the distortion of history or order, this has, actually, this has, everything has already happened in Bengal, 125 years or 150 years back. Now, the question is, is TMC, is Hongjoo Tomahawk capital enough to defeat this, this force, is Bhodrola's are capable enough. I think they might, they may, they may defeat, but, but this is not due to, this is due to the weakness of this may happen due to the weakness of, of BJP mostly, they failed to, they failed to project the chief ministerial candidate, the notion of Hindu divinity is much different in Bengal than Northern India. It may happen for this reason. It may happen that Mahmutas claim to represent the true Bengal, Bengali Hindus has actually getting momentum in different part of Bengal, his visit of different temples has been liked by several voters. The farmers protest or the gas price hiking can be the factor, the BJP, the, the accepting of corrupted TMC leaders into the, into BJP actually inferior, inferior to a lot of BJP supporters. So it may happen for this boot capturing rigging, or like Kornasri, or for example, Shastrasati, but it, but BJP will not differ just because this is a communal party, and that's the crisis with our liberalism. And one more thing I, the last thing I want to, I want to highlight that, that, that, that, the term, the sub the subvolton Hindu tour, which one of the surgeon Kumar, he's a, he's from last couple of months he's writing in every newspaper, he's tracking all the political parties except BJP. So he's saying that, look, it's not the Bhotroloks right now, they are very tiny or they are very, they are very calcutta centric. It's the, it's the, the subvoltains, the lower caste, the Dalits, they're actually right now with BJP, they voted for BJP in 2019. That's why there is a hope that, hope for BJP that they will, they will come in power. I have slightly rephrased it as a Mahfushal Hindu tour because not just the laborers or the, or the farmers are joining BJP, the, the Mahfushal elites are also joining. So, the thing is, one thing is clear that the subvolton, the, the, the, the, the, the Mahfushal Hindu tour is not getting momentum right now, because of these reasons, which I have recently mentioned, fireside, gas, farmers protest, BJP's failure to, to project someone as a CM candidate, Mahavata Banerjee, the way he is right now the true inheritor of the true inheritor of, of the, the, the left party society or this, the relationships. So, for, maybe for these reasons, BJP, the subvoltain Hindu tour will be, will get defeated. But we can't say that this is the, this is, this is the triumph of liberal values or secularism. This is just maybe due to the vote management, or some kind of anti-incommensity of Modi rule. Thank you. Okay, we really have to wrap this because, you know, we're really running. You know, time, time has to be kept slightly and thank you, Shadow us for giving us this glimpse into subvoltain Hindu tour and why some things would work and why, why the change is also happening, I think that ties up greatly with lots of questions and why caste is also important in politics. I don't know whether these things can be tied up with all the regions that, that you've brought out. But I think we, we really need to think about communal polarization and versus community appeasement. And that is something that we'll have from our next speaker, Bengal between communal polarization and community appeasement by Ipsita Haldar, who's associate professor at Comparative at Jadavpur University Comparative Literature and she was also the Charles Wallace fellow in South Asia Institute so welcome to the forum Ipsita. Ipsita's essays on community identity, visual and sonic piety and issues of citizenship of the sheer Muslims of Bengal through the readings of Muharram have been published in different journals and anthologies as well. And she's also as a monograph that is forthcoming on the polemic of identity formation, religiosity and literary of the Bengal Muslims in the wake of Bengali nationalism from Rokhlej. So over to you Ipsita, if you would like to keep to, you know, a few points and keep it short as well. Thank you. Thank you, Professor Sanjukta Ghosh for inviting me to be a part of this prestigious panel. I'm sharing this virtual platform with the imminent experts but not as a political analyst. I'm here as a common voter with my basic reflections as a teacher of the humanities. One of my observations will resonate to be the nodal points of Shanavas, the previous speaker, and many issues are already brilliantly posited by the scholars in the previous session. No matter who wins on May 2, a Bengal elections 2021 will be remembered for a big loss. The unprecedented communal polarization and hate speeches. Towards the religious minority has already become a driving force among the majority of the masses and the eruption of violence did not remain a state of exception anymore. Rather physical and psychological violence towards the Muslims has become rampant, regular and everyday articulated in open head speech, life threats and lynching. It has become normalized and I must say banal. Provided another occasion for vilification. The mainstream media offered the confused masses their real enemy, the big jump up as a super spreader of the virus. It was the unprecedented irresponsibility of the media to sensitize the majority masses against certain people by calling them corona bombs by designating and designating the Nizamuddin, I mean congregation as conspiracy against India. So the pandemic became communalized and just before the corona outbreak we have seen how the students of Jamia Melia Islamia, activists, and the community people participating in the anti CIA inertia movement were indiscriminately arrested and tortured, and how the Muslim agitators were declared the writers and imprisoned. It was the double gate visualization of the movement we should admit. In the assembly polls started in Bengal. Communalization and polarization of Bengal was the most ready to handle the most democratic political process to form a democratic enterprise. The strongest part of politics this I'm sorry the strangest part of politics in our country is its sudden responsiveness, rather than a scrutiny of the government's model of development, tangible economic or intangible cultural growth, human rights and justice. Ridges of grievances we crave for drama glamour and instant gratification. Hate speech today has all three elements. And it is to be remembered that it is not only towards the religious minority, hate speech of some of the nodal politicians are now being directed towards women, the leads and ethnic minorities, crossing all ethical barriers and when confronted, they're completely unapologetic for such indecent remarks. And those politicians are simply justifying their lumpen vocabulary and styles of speaking as being what and how the masses speak. Because they are claiming to be breaking any elitism that takes the masses away from social resources and opportunities. I have two issues to mark here. Firstly, who are the masses in Bengal now, according to this discourse, and how their culture socialization speech are being appropriated and in interpreted here. If this politician speak in the language of the masses. How could such anti low caste, anti ethnicity remarks saturate their speech. Bengal BJP, and it's take mascot wisely did not target the Bengali buzzer look, but we have just learned from Sena's that it's actually a kind of overlap territory, you can't really separate the domain of lumpenization, you know, from the Bengali buzzer look to the uniform relation of politics and political language, and social media can be a very important archive to understand that that shared kind of, you know, exchange. BJP targeted grassroots for polarization firstly, it appealed to rural youths and the leads and adivasis by saying they were deprived in the previous political regimes and gave them the promise of muscular masculine strength and mainstream identity. Considering that position vis-a-vis the caste based Hindu society, we're empowering to this huge section. BJP polarization can be said to be bottom up and make Hindu fundamentalism aspirational for semi urban and rural youths, the leads and adivasis in a state where the founder of the party Shamma Prashant Mukherjee was born. BJP was so far sort of non-existent, but from 18 Parliament receipts in 2019 about which Professor Ghotok has elaborated, you know, properly. From this 18 Parliament receipts in 2019 the way BJP has made deep inroads to the nooks and corners of Bengal only proves that communal feelings were not absent, they were only dormant and not generalised properly since the time of the Bengal partition in 1947. Since the time of left front, which laid the state politics for a stretch of a very important 34 years. This Bengal election seems to be very important for BJP to win as it means a historical shift and a long-term impact on the communal life of the people. The groundwork for polarization was done before 2019 Lok Sabha elections. The central government published citizenship matrix that triggered the Hindu majority of Bengal to think that they were going to be outnumbered by the Muslims with their many wives. And on the other side, the Mamata Banerjee gestures like her giving stipends to Imams and her suspending Sayedur Gapuja emartions on the day of Ashura, the 10th of Muharram in 1917 were represented as minority appeasement. Such steps of the chief minister failed to create community harmony and could not show possible models of empowerment from below for the Muslim community in general. About this, many interesting, you know, discussion have already been met in the previous session. In Bengal, in Bengal, a non-negotiable vacuum was created. The left front, after his defeat in the election, went into hibernation and did not show its youth cadders the possible political ways to consolidate into a constructive oppositional force. Youths caught in the vacuum created by the left front and the lack of clear cut strategy by TMC joined the BJP in large numbers attracted by to repeat hypermasculine Hindutva. Srinomul, after, even after sensing this shift, however, disappointingly did not counter the communal polarization with continuous progressive development policies, rather it relied on goals, instant ratifications that bypass the question of capacity building. So the beneficiary does not get skilled, but does not get skills, but a feeling of entitlement. So the promises of bigger goals can change one's political orientation overnight. Exactly what's happening right now. When I talked with my friends who said teach at the girls, rural girls, Mabdasas, they say why doesn't didi instead ask what we, or these girls actually need. But here, I am quoting them, we need to mention that the cycle in the partnership project actually brought paradigmatic shift in female education in the state. Many mother, my mother as a teacher friends know that even if Srinomul dole is superficial and top down, just to ensure the loyalty of the community. Srinomul stands as the most reliable anti fundamentalist force in this election. Left front, sadly, could not play the part of a constructive position in this 10 years, as if, and I quote a kind of very committed left front worker here that as if defeat and resurrection does not happen in any political parties history. These committed left voters express their disappointment in the private and also in public as well. This could not attract rural and suburban youth in large numbers, not stop the defection of its general cadres to the right wing. During elections, it's abrupt alliance with Congress, which with which it is it has a very troubled past and inbuilt rates might not be very convincing too many this assembly election. It seems to be a turning point for left front as well with its newly advocate capable youth brigade as the critique of religious fundamentalism. That is a sign of promise that might be a sign of promise. But the main question is why bengal could get polarized to this extent. Is it that moment as dole to the neighborhood club neighborhood clubs start up emotions at every ritual location, which made the community more self conscious as a Hindu community. Is it the culture of politicians with fickle ideologies defecting to other parties, or is it the left front focus on class as the key element to understand injustice without addressing the deep rooted caste and religious biases in the society, even while carrying the legacy of the 1947 Bengal partition. The religious consciousness now out of Pooja rooms into streets. The majority Hindu Hindus grew more conscious of the facilities that you see from the state, and what the minorities received. That three normal turn BJP candidate could reorient the voters of non diagram community, communally in three four months flat can be taken as a very important symptom here. It is clear that religious multiplicity was never addressed as the strength of a community, and it never reflected in the education policy of the state. Because or is it no grass root level training of the teachers to address the unique realistic history of our community through classroom teaching unity in diversity, remained a statement on on culture without if ever addressing religious moorings of the people in the secular context that the constitution of India conceptualized differently from the European understanding of secularism. And all in grossing class struggle overshadowed and consumed all kinds of social difference and multiplicity. Momo the celebrated religious events without her government educating people on the responsibility of cohabiting with differences with the responsibility of cohabiting with minority to be there. There are different sets of attributes. In this context, left front alliance with food for a sheriff's about said the key looks like attracting the Muslim voters are cutting up momentous treasure trove of course. Now how to read this alliance. Is there any pending homework on the intersectional connection between class and religion as a groundwork for this alliance. Is there in have the left front members reoriented themselves to understand the social relevance of a religious outfit. Right now, it is quite evident that Bengals legacy of a culturally progressive civil society, not only in Kolkata but also in the districts, which was vibrant and strong for generations has suffered massively. The link at the extended in social media the intellectual emptiness and head is much visible. It is also clear that it's not only the it or it sells or pro establishment media that are responsible for communal polarization the middle class, but you look are already polarized supporting and perpetuating hatred with a new logic that is also unprecedented violence towards the minority other has become an integral element of political consciousness. A part of open public rhetoric. And I would like to end here by quoting a new convert friend of mine who said, I quote, we need a non bramhin chief minister now. There should be a goshe after the water chariots and brand managers. And I end here by saying the mimicry of a cast predict sounds extremely annoying to many. Thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you so much if she that I think there are some questions that you might like to address later. If we have the time, but I want to move to contentious federations and battle for Bengal. From amber goshe amber are you ready for this moment I think that you've been waiting so patiently to talk on the battle for Bengal. And I just want to also tell everyone that amber goshe is based in Jadavpur University. And he's a researcher on political reform at the observer research foundation Kolkata, and he's also recently co authored a monograph on Bengal elections are very timely titled battle for Bengal 2021 political themes and electoral dynamics over to amber. Thank you. Thank you, Dr coach. I'm audible I hope. Yes. Thank you. Thank you. So basically, you know, it's indeed a great, great opportunity to be a part of this very, very eminent and interesting panel. Indeed a very captivating and nuanced discussion. I personally learned a lot from it. So basically the, the monograph that has recently co authored with my colleague, Somya at war is, you know, it looks at the electoral data to highlight the the meteoric political consolidation of the BJP over time in the last few years in the state, and how it has emerged as a major political force, challenging the incumbent ruling party. You know, since this the story of BJP's, you know, you know, consolidation has already been, you know, taken up adequately by a professor got to and also Dr Roy. I'll not, you know, you know, delve much into it. So I'll directly go into my, you know, main main point that I intend to make today on on contentious, you know, federalism, and how the narrative of, you know, such, you know, such contentious notion of federalism and politics is kind of being manifested in the context of Bengal elections. That has something, you know, directly, you know, you know, directly linked to the overarching theme of Bengal elections, the one of the most dominant themes of Bengal election, which is the BJP. Since BJP is now, you know, is the is the almost the the politically hegemonic force at the national level in India, and also in part in many states. The discussion on federalism and what is, you know, what is the nature of federalism or the fate of federalism that, you know, India is going to look at in the run up to this election and definitely, you know, depends a lot on the outcome of the election. To be very fair, historically speaking, Bengal has a legacy of political dissent. And the state government, you know, has largely defined itself, its politics in opposition to the center, the union government, of course, you know, barring the first two decades, you know, where the Congress ruled both the center and the state, independent. But then, since then, we have seen how the left front rule, and then, you know, followed by the TMC have, you know, defined their politics in opposition to, you know, the center, which is a narrative of safeguarding the region or, you know, Bengal's specific interests against the high handedness, insensitivity and discrimination of the center, you know, who is largely, you know, perceived to be alien to the state's needs as well as region's culture. Now, coming to the contemporary scenario, contentious federalism has been, you know, one of the major, I mean, the modest opportunity of the interactions between the BJP left center, and as BJP eventually rose to become the most dominant political force, and of course the states, you know, which are ruled by the opposition parties. But, you know, in this entire narrative of, you know, combative or contentious federalism, West Bengal stands out as something, you know, very unique case, which is primarily because the state government was led by Mamata Banerjee, and emerged as one of the most vocal, you know, critics, apparently, the most vocal critics of the BJP-led central government and its policies, both on the institutional level as well as, you know, the political front. For a perpetual political tussle with the center over a host of policy issues which ranges from the GST compensation, the COVID-19 crisis, arm fund management, the funding issue, the CA and RC implementation, very vital, the farm legislations, the contentious farm legislations recently passed, the implementation of the central schemes. And of course the foreign policy issues, for example, TISA water sharing with Bangladesh. Now these, this narrative of constant, you know, contention over a vast range of policies have been simultaneous with BJP's rise in Bengal. And of course, apart from the policy level differences, the kind of institutional intimidation that, you know, that the BJP's accused of against the opposition parties that have also been very, you know, very, very vehemently kind of, you know, critic by the, by the amount of energy. So, so this has created, you know, the uniqueness of Bengal in terms of in the evolving federal dynamics, its constant, you know, concern, as there is a constant, you know, opposition. Unlike many other states ruled by regional parties, for example, or a sub, you know, by Navin Patnaik or, you know, Delhi by Arvind Kejriwal, where the opposition has been very, you know, selective in nature. You know, there are also many instances in which these these other regional parties strong in their own respective states but also have been quite accommodative. You know, in terms of, you know, in terms of accepting BJP or supporting BJP in many of its major policy divisions. So, but, but, but to normal Congress under BAM, you know, month of energy becomes an exception with its, you know, constant, you know, kind of an antagonistic stand that it, that it has been taking against the center. One can argue that TMC's, you know, emergence has been more of a symbolic or a performative, you know, figure of opposition against the BJP, but, but, but nevertheless, you know, a very, very formidable kind of a kind of a constant resentment that has, you know, marked the federal So now, now coming to the elections, how BJP is using the narrative, the political narrative of federal governance, you know, and national security to kind of challenge the TMC's dominance in the state. What is, what is BJP's argument all about, which has a very strong, you know, bearing on the on the on the narrative of federalism in India. BJP's narrative is basically that since that, you know, since, you know, West Bengal is a is a is a bordering state, you know, where the entire narrative of, you know, infiltration of the immigrants, especially Bangladeshi Muslims, the premise on which the entire CNRC debate has been, you know, kind of politicized and, you know, activated by the BJP in the state. Also the also the issue of trafficking, cattle trafficking to be more precise. CNRC, all of this has been, you know, being being being articulated by the BJP as issues of national security and the narrative which is being constantly pushed is that BJP as as as a party which is, you know, in power at the center has the very with all to, you know, to to take care of these national security issues can secure the border border well. And and and and it's fighting the and fight fighting the ruling TMC which it is you know increasingly projecting as as as an intent or a stumbling block or hindrance in this entire process of, you know, process of systematizing or or or or triggering the border or or you know, taking care of the entire national security dynamics. Despite the fact that you know, India has, you know, seen a very lingering, you know, skirmish water skirmish with China. China doesn't come in a in a very real sense in the in the you know, Chinese threat doesn't come in a very real sense in in a very serious nationalistic rhetoric in in in the Bengal elections. Of course, you know, needless to say that though though though the center has, you know, some basic structural constitutional high handedness, you know, powers to, you know, to control the all the foreign policy divisions as well as issues of national security, the practical ground, since the center needs to always negotiate and have the, you know, the the state government concerned on board, you know, as we have seen in case of these water treaty with Bangladesh where month of energy couldn't be you know, convinced. So definitely similar kind of political dispensation at the at the state definitely eases out, you know, the kind of hindrances that comes in the way of the center to pursue many of its foreign policy projects, many of which can be can be, you know, contentious in nature. That is true. But but but but how this narrative of of you know, double engine government, which is being projected by the BJP, in order to push the idea that similar kind of government, you know, if there's a BJP government at the state level, then all kinds of, you know, funds, centers funds as well as, you know, central schemes can be very in a very hassle free manner can be, you know, can can can can be distributed to the people of Bengal. And also the national security, you know, questions can also be taken care of. So, so this is this is the narrative of the of the double engine, you know, you know, you know, government that the BJP is talking about. Interestingly, this, this is a marked departure from from the conventional narrative that Bengal has always seen which which defines the Bengals exception exceptionalism in the sense that a regional party in Bengal, you know, is is has has been touted as you know to be to be to be to be well equipped, you know, to safeguard the regions, you know, specific idiosyncratic interests against the center which is very alien, you know, you know what happened, you know, throughout the left rule and then then the TMC rule that, you know, the regional party is seen as a vanguard of the region's culture as well as region's interest, who is you know, well equipped to check the center's high handedness of the centers, you know, overwhelming dominance, arbitrariness, which might jeopardize the state's interest. This entire narrative, you know, was turned on its head by the BJP by saying that this, these regional forces these specific regional, you know, political parties. You know, has been, you know, has been the primary reason why, you know, you know, so called development, you know, could not be consolidated in Bengal. And hence, similar, you know, government kind of political homogeneity is required at both the level center as well as the state, which is BJP government at the state level, which can kind of you know, facilitate a kind of unmediated, you know, flow of so called flow of development in the state, you know, you know, where, where, where the, the irritant of regional parties can be, can be cleared out, who are, you know, touted of ineffective corruption and so forth. So, so this is the kind of, you know, double engine governments argument that the center is, you know, that the BJP is trying to posit, you know, has has a very important bearing on how we are going to perceive, you know, federalism or federal, you know, politics in India at this point of time. Now coming to, now coming to two numbers, you know, combat to the BJP's narrative of double engine is definitely about how, you know, TMC is reinforcing, you know, month of energy is reinforcing its image as the as the soul most competent torch bearer of the state because developmental as well as cultural narratives, you know, by highlighting the constant neglect. You know, of the state by the center, be it, you know, GST compensation be it COVID-19, you know, management funds on fund management funds. You know, so, so this is constantly being highlighted that the center has been perpetually neglecting the state. You know, touting BJP as you know, projecting BJP as as an alien force as an outsider is also, you know, one of the way, you know, how TMC is trying to project that the region's interest, cultural, you know, specificity, legacy is best protected with the with the with the with the regional party TMC, you know, who is much more local local in some sense and also much more cognizant of the of the of the demands of the state of the problems of the state of the uniqueness of the state. And of course, the last part is, you know, TMC is in a competitive populism, you know, regarding regarding the schemes where the TMC is claiming, you know, and has been, you know, very effectively campaigning on the ground that if the policies and the governance initiatives, the freebies, whatever we might choose to call them are much more effective, much more better, you know, a debate between between, let's say, Shastra Shathi versus Aishman Bharat. So if TMC is claiming to give you know, you provide much better version of the central schemes. So, you know, which is, which is, you know, which it claims that is, is, you know, much more much more benefiting the people than the central scheme. So this is also a narrative of computer populism, which TMC is trying to, you know, impose it to counter the BJP's claim of double engine government. Now, how do we make sense of these two, you know, narratives and and where does it clash. So, so Dengar elections of 2021 to my mind is also very important to understand that what is the fate of the trajectory of Indian federalism, you know, that India is going to witness Indian democracy is going to witness in the near future. On one hand, a very, a very different kind of a federal, you know, dimension that BJP is trying to posit, which is, which is the, the, you know, the narrative of political homogeneity, centralizing narratives that, you know, that that that actually marks the quintessential federal principle of political plurality and diversity. So, so what does it do. So it makes it, you know, it makes a situation it kind of pushes the situation where, you know, a state government ruled by the BJP can be controlled by the center amenable by the by the central leadership, and I have also seen during the, during the, you know, during the Congress hegemony during in the country's rule how puppet chief ministers were being used, and you know, and and the kind of kind of control was being, you know, you know, unleashed from the center. So BJP is narrative of a more homogeneous and a neater principle of federalism, you know, where that, you know, there will be, you know, a kind of unmediated direct narrative, so called narrative of development, where the regional parties are not there, as the irritants, which is many, you know, manifested in the BJP's election slogan, you know, because hobby, which basically, you know, brings a very different kind of a federal narrative, you know, which, which, which kind of defies the quintessential understanding of federalism, which, which is, you know, innately linked to plurality and diversity. You know, in many ways. So, and on the other hand, you know, it is also to be very closely watched that the kind of federal narrative that TMC is constantly trying to project narrative of you know, you know, specificity, who is well equipped to safeguard the idiosyncratic needs of the state, you know, in the interest of competitive federalism that, you know, send centers on sample, you know, unparalleled power can be checked. You know, if, if TMC isn't in power and it can, it can safeguard the people, you know, state's interest and provide, you know, governance, which is again manifested in the, in the, in the TMC's slogan that, you know, this needs to be watched out, you know, that, that, that which, which, which kind of, you know, you know, whether we will see on second May, you know, a kind of federal assertion, or a very unique kind of a federal, you know, of a federal narrative, you know, that, that Indian democracy will see if, you know, BJP makes considerable inroads in the state. And I would, you know, finally end with I think Dr. Sinha's, you know, reference to the Indian Express report, you know, which reflects the kind of, you know, the kind of nationalizing in a tendency of the of the of the of the Bengali Bengali electorate, which, which might, you know, which might, you know, make us make us think, you know, how the federal, you know, you know, you know, you know, culture based on, you know, based on diversity and reality is going to play out, you know, in this in this elections that that needs to be watched out very closely. And I leave it there. Thank you. Thank you very much for a very interesting sort of as you promised your topic promised contentious federalism and, and I think, you know, we've had this discussion as well before, whether we are going to look at the bigger broader picture, whether the narrative is really within the state, talking of ethno nationalism, communalism. So we've had a variety of speakers variety of takes, and I think that is what made this webinar quite enriching I think, but it's also made it quite long, longer than it was hoped for, instead of having to webinars, try to try to, I think, present quite a lot in this as I'm just going to now keep to a few sort of questions that I would like Professor, she called on the body to address because I think one of the questions that came up, particularly would be of interest to you, Professor bond about that that is from show Mojit Niyogi, who says, Do you think the rise of PJP in Bengal, along with rising popularity of their culture is main reversion for Bengal. Bengal had always been ahead of caste religion, women's empowerment. It seems now they will come back to national level. Again, the whole point of, you know, the distinctiveness and unique idea of Bengal is being played out, perhaps with reference to history, but we've had a lot of discussion that that is also changing. I wanted to say anything on that. I will very briefly respond because I think that that very concept of Bengali exceptionalism has been mentioned number of times in this evening's webinar. And it has already been responded to very adequately by both Shana, Shana, Nawaz, and Epshita Hallar, and I don't think we are witnessing a reversal. PJP is coming to a ground to a fertile ground for the development of these issues in terms of casteism and Islamophobia. Shana was has already mentioned the Vodalo culture. I mean, if we go historically, and the Vodalo culture essentially was very high caste oriented. And it was from the very beginning, taking a questionable position vis-a-vis incorporation of the Muslims into the Indian nation. I was stuck by Dr. Hallar's last observation about the conversation that someone is saying that we should have a non-Brahman chief minister instead of Banerjee Akhosh. I remembered the two very famous anthropologist and sociologist, both Ashish Nandi and Andhra Bethe had once commented that West Bengal will never have a Dalit chief minister. He can have a Banerjee replaced by Ghosh or a Rai, but will never have a Dalit chief minister. And this speaks a lot about the inherent casteism and Islamophobia, which had always there in this embedded, deeply embedded in this Vodalo culture. What I witnessed personally is the change that BJP has brought in, that it has made all these things legitimate. An educated Vodalo is no longer ashamed to say that I don't like Muslims. A few years ago, they would feel a little bit ashamed to say this openly. So what BJP has done, if there is any shift in culture, I think they have met these attitudes more politically and socially legitimate than it was because of the whole idea of Bengal renaissance and other things which kind of contested these ideas. But these ideas were always there. I mean, and we need to kind of re-examine the whole question of Bengali exceptionalism. So I'll leave it at that. That's great. I think these points again are kind of coalescing around how the social media has facilitated a lot of the openness that you're talking about, that you know how easy it is to sort of express your emotions with regard to communalism. Then just stay within that bubble of political correctness. And so there's an interesting question there about why the Love Jihad campaign didn't pick up in Bengal. I don't know if you want to quickly respond to that before I turn to Inderjit who's waiting to answer a question that was there in the previous round. Thank you Shekhar, Professor Shekhar for responding. I think I will also come back to you briefly with another question that is to Shahnawaz but I also wanted to hear a little bit from you on that. So if you did you want to respond, did you have a quick answer on Love Jihad because you know you really work on social media quite a lot. What I want to say is it's not like that there is no anise compared to the North Indian, if I can use this monolithic term called the North Indian, compared to the North Indian kind of anxiety and I would say, you know what an intolerance, this kind of intensity is absent in Bengal but that doesn't mean that there is less anxiety or there is less intolerance because there are couples interreligious with interreligious marriage, they didn't find any place to stay, these are all known stories among our friends and also in the extended social sphere. But what is very important here is that there is a culture of love marriage without both interreligious and intercast, but those did not bring any sort of cultural structural change. Like as Ambedkar once said that a kind of instrumental inter inter intercast marriage won't bring any structural change exactly that happened in Bengal. A few examples of intercast marriage did not bring any sort of eradication or any sort of structural critique. So I think the ground is prepared as Professor Bondapad has just mentioned, so it's a kind of and I also mentioned in my small talk that actually these intolerance were dormant, and they were actually these were there as the integral emotion of the sovereign Hindu dominant culture. So if I mean BJP occupies the space, it might trigger those kind of higher and intense form of intolerance. So that is very annoying. Thank you. Thank you again. I just, I'm just very tempted to mention here that you know I worked as a campaign coordinator to, to remove all caste related adverts from Bengali newspapers, and it is still something that is there. So until that goes, you know this whole question of intercast marriage, etc. is going to stay open because you know even still now, all the Bengali newspapers still mentioned caste in all the marriage columns so that's, that's there and that's not going to go very soon I think there are deeper areas of interest to keep that going. And so I just want to quickly pick up on Leslie's question that I read out first but I want to repeat for integer that is, is communal violence guaranteed should be JP win state and implement an NRC in West Bengal. As I understand rightly that the CA can only be implemented should a state agree to it. Is that correct and secondly how much violence is to go going on in election campaign, but I think the first part probably wanted to answer integer. That's right. And quite specifically the question on the CA and whether it can be implemented. State does not agree. My understanding is that the short answer to your question is, no, the state does not need to agree to the implementation of the CA. My understanding is that the CA is a subject of the central government of India. And if the central government has legislated, then states have to follow states legislatures can pass resolutions against the CA as many states have done, but that's a political resolution so Kerala, Rajasthan, I think Delhi, I don't know what the West Bengal situation is, but these legislative assemblies can pass resolutions indicating that they do not think it's a correct decision. I don't think they can neglect or resist in the way that the term is normally understood. What the states can do, which is what Kerala has done is to take the matter to the Supreme Court under I think it's article 131 of the Constitution if there is a dispute between the center and the state or center center and states then the state can take the matter to the Supreme Court and which is what Kerala has done. What that does is to buy everyone time. And as long as the matter is in the Supreme Court of course the government cannot insist that the state implement or go ahead with the legislation. So, my understanding is that the CA can be implemented irrespective of who's heading the state government. And in that respect, I'm not sure that any it's relevant anymore whether the BJP wins the state or doesn't my understanding is sadly that communal violence is perhaps guaranteed. Because this is not a sort of not to relapse into defeatism to say oh it's all the same. Obviously if a non BJP government comes to power in West Bengal you can expect the implementation of the CA to be delayed. But I think that's all it will be it will only be delayed I don't think they can block it effectively. Yeah. I hope that answers quite well. And it kind of ties up with this whole rhetoric of double engine of the government that another question that is to ombro, if you would like to take from the plan show three who is asking, do you think that the double engine government is against the basic constitutional principles because it tries to induce a sense of homogeneity between state and central government, undermining the base basic ethos of a federal structure. Do you want to respond to that very quickly. Yeah, sure. Very, very briefly. Of course, definitely, you know, the federal principle, you know, instinctively talks about diversity and plurality, you know, in terms of, you know, a multiparty system, definitely, you know, encapsulates that idea of federalism. The entire idea of double engine government or a kind of political homogeneity underlines a kind of centralizing, you know, tendency, you know, in terms of, in terms of, you know, governance at both the levels. So definitely in some sense, it very seriously undermines the federal principle, which has been one of the more, you know, you know, one of the core aspects of the constitutional architecture of India but I'll, you know, stop short of calling it, you know, unconstitutional because, because, you know, that is, if the electorate elects similar, you know, parties and we have had that in the past as well. Same party at the center and the state. So it might not be, you know, called constitutionally, you know, invalid, but definitely, it definitely, you know, spells crisis for the spirit of federalism. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. But that really ties up very well. I have a question for Shana was, but I would ask you to just be very, very brief on this because I would ask the same question to to Professor Shekhar Balapada as well. And that relates to a question from Nilanjan Banerjee about Mufassal Hindutva. He'd asked this question before and I kind of tried to answer that it does relate demographics of the question that he did ask before relates directly to rural urban divide because Mufassal Hindutva is not something that is entirely urban. And his question was that how is it different to Bodhralok Hindutva, which I think was one of the reasons that you presented the paper, but his question then kind of extended to asking does it change the approach of the BJP to some extent in the campaigns. So what has been the strategy for addressing Mufassal Hindutva. And I just wondered whether the same kind of twist we can give to Professor Shekhar Balapada whether you know cast does play a role in this kind of strategy. So very briefly Shanu was on that. So the Mufassal Hindutva is not necessarily relying upon BJP, but RSS also. So, a number of Sakas has been doubled in the last 10 years. So it reminds me Shubhajit Bagchi is reporting of RSS Sakas, I think two years back in the Hindu. In which he says he said that there is a steady growth of RSS within within last 10 years actually under the TMC rule. So he was quoting someone who was saying that there is right now we have 50,000 daily Sakas or like we have 10,000 weekly online million meetings. We have every year 20 to 25% organizational growth. So the Mufassal Hindutva is actually very much dependent on RSS also. And why we are saying Mufassal Hindutva is because the difference of leadership it is offering. So, till now we have whatever the party is Congress TMC or CPM. So, unlike all these secular parties the BJP leadership actually right now coming from not necessarily from upper caste English educated urban middle class, or, for example, the small town, educated upper class or upper caste, but from a rural leadership, they are Dalit, they are OBC, they are not Sabarna from the category. And another thing is BJP is somehow successfully challenged the syncretic culture of Bengal. But we are witnessing from couple of, from last couple of years, like for example in my home district Malta, the Jalalpur Rothermala is very famous. You will have lot of Rothermala in which the Moira is actually Muslim, or you will have lot of Eid in which the guy who is selling tele bhaja is Hindu. This time successfully since 2019 Lok Sabha election BJP successfully campaigned among this common Hindu people don't buy your suite in the Rothermala from Muslims off. So, successfully organized the anti Muslim sentiment among the village population which were very much subscribing the syncretic value of Bengali culture which we had in since the pre conillion time. That's why I'm saying this leadership is not coming from Jadapur, not from presidency, not from coffee house, not from non non field festival, they all are coming from moffasils. So, that's why it's a, and all the more to watch all the, all the more to watch all the normal should road that dongle more. So this is how the demography itself very much moffasil kind of the emergence of moffasil politics, which we witnessed in late in the 30s or 40s we are witnessing right now. Thank you. Okay, so I because you touched on the mood to as I just wanted, Professor Shekhar want to bother if you had anything specific to say that you know yes moffasil Hindu politics will change with the kind of trends that we're seeing with cast. It's a it's a long standing trend. It was from the 1930s that the Hinduization of the Dalit and the adibasi community started Hindu mohasava started it in a very concerted and organized way in the 1930s. I went by the Varsha Bhasram Sangha who started the, the institution called Milan Monday, that was specifically to mobilize the adibasis and the lower caste people around the idea of, of a Hindu nation. At the same time, this Hindu mobilization has tried to appropriate the local deities and local Hindu customs and motor is a is a very interesting example I mean. The major question which can be asked that the motor was are an anti cast organization. It is against Brahminical domination, it is against Vedic Hinduism but how come they're accepting the Hindu ideology, but the narrative of India, Hindu ideology is being presented in a very, very different way. And this, this symbolic gesture of Modi visiting the aura Gandhi which is the most sacred kind of pilgrimage center for the motor was. This symbolic gesture in the social media. And there's always already a claim that this has given a huge national and international recognition to their identity through their own movement. And this is where the politics of recognition and politics of identity work and BJP has very carefully introduced that into into this. And if you look, but we know Ryan has just a recent book out on the Republic of Hindu where he argues that this is not typical in West Bengal but in other parts of India also BJP has been trying to, to kind of appropriate local deities and local traditions to expand its net and slightly change the narrative. And I have also seen that. I mean the show was mentioned the RSS mobilization the RSS shock house where being established right after the independence right up the after the partition. And they were kind of changing the narrative very carefully. And they were telling this people to that. Most important thing is to remember the partition and the violence and the very important fact that they had to leave their homeland and come to a form to a different part where they were, they have not been treated very well. So the partition narrative has been kind of emphasized to displace the anti-caste narrative. And that is where that is how the these groups have been gradually attracted to more articulate Hindu identity or Hinduized identity that that kind of thing. And also, you know, you know, what my finding is that on a day to day basis, not all Motuwa's kind of make a very strict emphasize a structural disjuncture between Motuwa and the Hindu identity. They also participate in the popular Hindu festivals like Durgapuja and Kalipuja, etc, etc. So there is old there as has always been an ambiguous space. And it is there, the new narrative or what if you call it Mufassil Hindutva or whatever, it isn't into that space that this new narrative is being scripted. Thank you. I think there are a few more questions that goes back to this whole Supreme Court wording cases. And I think there's there's a question from Leslie on, still on the Supreme Court likely to rule that CAA is contrary to secular constitution of India, or that careless challenge will be struck down. There's also on the wording of case being taken to Supreme Court, does it involve questioning of both validity of CA and NRC and on what basis, if there's anyone from the panel that would, you know, like to sort of quickly respond to these two, and then I have one final question for myself to Moitish and then we will just wrap that up. Is there anyone who'd like to take this because I think we have discussed this quite a lot already. I can quickly sort of just obviously I don't want to comment on the honorable Supreme Court's, you know what it's, which way it's likely to go but it's anyone's guess whether the Supreme Court is likely to go against the central government, or whether Kerala's challenge will eventually be struck down. I think most people would go with the latter that eventually the Kerala challenge will be struck down. I don't have access to the exact wording but a report from the Hindustan Times, which reported the petition going, you know, Kerala's petition, says, and I quote, the petition state that is the Kerala government's petition states that the CAA violates the right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution of India, right to life under Article 21 and freedom to practice religion under Article 25. So I think the petition is against the CAA rather than the NRC. Again, I'm quoting this from Hindustan Times, not from the original judgment. Sorry, the original petition. Thank you. I'm really going to have to wrap up the session because it's already quite long and I just have, because Moitish you've been really waiting for your turn but I don't think there was any direct question at you, except that something came to my mind about. Sorry, I was just out of respect for the other panelists and sitting through. I don't, I am not particularly waiting for it to say something. I wanted to bring out a question actually that was raised but it wasn't directed to you, but it could have some relevance to what you had said already. So the question, I think it was earlier in the chat is that, you know, about a comment from through Jocanto Mishro regarding the possibility of a post-poll alliance. There was a question that was raised and very much earlier in the chat and that kind of ties up slightly with my point on this whole unpredictability of a triangular contest that you had raised in your presentation. And that, you know, the triangular contest makes it difficult to predict anything. And so this whole point about a post-poll alliance, you know, what is it that is going to drive? I mean, is there a possibility? Or is, or something like this, some kind of a question like this can crop up because of the total uncertainty that we are facing? I mean, is there anything that we can tie up? Just very quickly, if you have to say. So, you know, two quick points. So yesterday I was giving an academic seminar on something else. And this was the Harvard of IT joint development seminar, and a political economy person who happens to be working on France and works on voting behavior. He suddenly mentioned he has written, read my recent piece in the wire and the West Bengal election. And I was a bit surprised because this was, you know, it was a more specific thing. So I was surprised. And he said it reminds him of the situation in France that there is anti-incumbency. People are unhappy with Macron. And they're worried that they don't feel that the left alliance, the socialists actually might win. And then they feel that they could be splitting the, you know, voting away that that could benefit. So therefore it's as somebody who sort of works on sort of underlying political economy forces at work, that's kind of in a way reassuring that there are certain patterns here that are kind of somewhat objective. And he said that I would say, see, this is the classic situation. If you have at this stage, what will you say that yes I'll ally with whoever and then we'll take a call on who we want to keep out you don't want to say that it's you know it's the classic it's think of a, you know, cricket or football tournament you're not going to say that okay, if there's a tie and then I want that team to lose so that then I'm going to play with that you're never going to say that he's always going to say that I'm going to win this match that's I'm going to do. So therefore, I mean I think it's perfectly fine for Mr Mishra and I'm sure if I were in his position, I would say the same thing that we are here to win the battle, but come on, you know, after the election results are out, and you have a certain position that leads to the, certain to the three no more than certain to the, you know, and BJP and no parties in the position to form a government. You know, the hands will be forced right I mean so therefore at that point you won't be able to either outside support or, you know, which is likely. At that point it would even have some legitimacy, whatever way, you know, whichever way it's going to play out. So therefore I think, again, I think this is all in a way on script. Essentially, I would expect every political leader to kind of say that we are we are going to win it. But looking promising but opinion polls have been wrong too so we don't know. Thank you. Thank you that's great. So, just one very final comment and it's something that has been brewing inside me throughout this session that is brought out by many of you. I leave it open to either ombar or Indrajeet to comment on, because it's it kind of is this bigger question, you know, Bengal will become greater Bangladesh. And I just wonder, is that going to be a good thing, given Bangladesh's current achievement in the human development index, and that we are all kind of planning for sustainable development goals, which is another big thing that puts us right in the midst of this contentious federalism that we've been talking about, and takes us away from the traditional sort of quarrel of communalism and all that, which is what is the traditional campaign, but we brought the bigger picture out and in that bigger picture. I just wonder whether a narrative like this Bengal will become Bangladesh doesn't stand a chance. Just a very quick snap comment from you and then we shall end this session. I'm definitely not going to answer that in the way that you would like but but I do want to remind everyone and we have historians here of course who will testify to this. But remember that the demand for Pakistan started out in Dhaka. And we know where that went. And I don't think there will be a greater Bangladesh sort of thing, but you know if if people push majoritarian agendas too much national unity is a very fragile thing. It's built over decades of hard political negotiations, and nobody on any side should take anything for granted. And the greatest example is in our own neighborhood. That's all I'd like to say. I'm not taking the bait. Yeah, I wasn't I wasn't expecting anything more so on another snap comment from you before you finish. I completely second, you know, Dr Roy's, you know, observation. Simply, you know, add that, you know, to reality and diversity is something which is inalienable and indispensable kind of a principle for a kind of complicated, you know, diverse terrain like India. So definitely, you know, a kind of a competitive, you know, federalism where, you know, you know, kind of a constant check on the, on the, on the, on the, you know, kind of, you know, constant constant supremacy of the center. You know, we have a structurally, you know, centralized federalism. Anyway, very, very, very strong structure. And now that we have a very, very aggressive kind of a ruling, you know, ruling hegemonic political force at the national level. But definitely, where national oppositional space is thinking rapidly. So, you know, pockets of regional opposition, you know, what I call occasional spasms of resistance is definitely the only probably the saving grace for a kind of kind of diversity that that India is. Thank you. Thank you again. I can see severe is back is severe you're still there if you wanted to add anything on a final note from so as he's still there. He's probably not here but I can still see him on the panel. And of course, Salim has left and so I just want to thank the entire panel for this wonderful session that we've had and you can see from the rich speakers list that you know I tried to to bring out all different angles from here the larger picture the smaller picture, but also to establish some kind of dialogue between the traditional narrative Bengal elections and the differences that we've been talking about that that are emerging politics. That's also political in a in a much more kind of bigger Indo-Pacific sense or tying up with Bangladesh, or within the South Asian context, and the whole idea of the Sung Lap forum, which I want to conclude with is that, you know, it is inspired by Shukumari's Monday Club, which is a bit more free flowing critical analysis of things to break many stereotypes and to encourage that kind of critical thinking. That is the whole point of size and love that we have had previous sessions on. And, you know, usually these conversations spill over to drinks and meetings and teas and coffees. It has it has a much more extended life, and it's possible in this digital forum. But as I would say that you know the Monday Club is about fuzzy meanings and to deconstruct these fuzzy stories that we've had, many of which are about learning things alternatively through expressions and language so language plays quite an important role in Sung Lap forum so we always have artists, writers, and others other languages expressed and something that we briefly touched on through vernacular social media and Ipsita has also talked about, you know, taking things to the mafasal and learning from the mafasal agencies, and of course the role of the social media which is a big thing to touch on but we don't have that time. So I want to thank again and I want to end the session. So a very good evening to everybody as well. Thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you all. Bye everybody.