 Welcome back to the Lowy Institute's Digital Conference, the Indo-Pacific Operating System, Power, Order and Rules for the 21st Century. I'm Ben Scott, Director of the Australia's Security and the Rules-Based Order Project here at the Lowy Institute. I'm delighted to be chairing the first panel of the conference today, which is called Competing Visions. We'll begin by polling you, the audience. Click on the poll notifications on the right-hand side of your screen to respond. This time, we have two statements and a question. You will see that you are asked whether you agree or disagree with the two following statements. One, China supports peace and international law in the Indo-Pacific. Two, India supports peace and international law in the Indo-Pacific. There's also a question. How important is ASEAN to the future regional order? In this panel, we'll take a big picture look at how countries in the region think about the Indo-Pacific. Governments are now using the Indo-Pacific concept more often in official statements and strategy documents, but they describe it differently. I'm just going to have a look at some of those poll results. I can see that in response to the ASEAN question, very high number. 84% of you think it's very important and 10% somewhat important. So very strong on ASEAN. On the India question, again, a lot of support for the proposition that India supports peace and international law in the Indo-Pacific. That's sitting now with a green, strongly agree between them at close to 90%. And on the China question, almost the inverse is true. It's close to 90% for disagreement, either strongly or just regular disagreement for that proposition. So we're set up for a big debate here. We've gathered some of the sharpest minds in the region to discuss these issues. Joining us from Washington is Alina Noor. Alina is Director of Political Security Affairs and Deputy Director of the Washington D.C. Office of the Asia Society Policy Institute and a non-resident fellow at the Lowe Institute. Also in Washington, Tanvi Madan. Tanvi is a senior fellow in the project on international order and strategy in the foreign policy program and the Director of the India Project at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. And joining us from Shanghai is Professor Wu Ximbo. He is Professor and Dean of the Institute of International Studies and Director at the Center for American Studies at Fudan University. A very warm welcome to all our panelists. And welcome again to our audience joining us from around the world. If you're watching through the conference platform, please use the platform to send your questions to the panelists. Once again, you can enter them on the right-hand side of your screen. Before we get into the discussion, I'm going to pose a question to each of our panelists. First to you, Professor Wu. Professor Wu, the post-war international order created the stable and relatively peaceful environment for China's extraordinary rise. Why would China want to change that? Okay. First, thank you for your invitation. It is true that China has benefited from the current international order in terms of its remarkable economic growth over the last several decades. However, this does not mean the international order is perfect. Actually, there are many flaws and problems with the order. First and foremost, this is a US-led and Western-centered international order. When the rules and norms were made, countries like China, India, and others were not sitting at the table. So this order is not as inclusive as it should be. And actually the rules and norms are reflecting the interests and preferences of US and its Western allies, rather than those of the developing non-Western countries. The second problem is the international order, as it is today, is a hierarchical structure. With the US standing at the top of it, followed by its allies. And China and other countries are put lower on the ladder. And especially, the US has enjoyed some exorbitant privilege in this international order as a hegemon. Now, when we call the international order as liberal order, that's not accurate. It is actually a liberal hegemonic order. US hegemon is a major feature of the current international order, which means the US not only has a privilege to make the rules, but also has a privilege to choose not to abide by the rules that it made. For example, if you take a look at the US invasion of Iraq, outside of the UN authorization, or what Donald Trump did, there is a presidency inviolating so many international rules. That's US privilege. If other countries did this, sure, they would be condemned and even punished. But when the US did it, it was taken for granted as the hegemon's privilege. The third problem is the current international order is neither effective nor sufficient in providing the public goods in both economic and security fronts. And actually, if we look at the current pandemic, I think this order seems to be far behind the demands from other developing countries. And especially in the last several years, we have seen a decline in wealth and capability on the part of the US to provide the public goods, both in economic area and in other areas. Last but not least is that China is raising its material power. So is aspiration for its national interest. However, China has found that is a pursuit of its legitimate national interest has encountered more and more constraint from the current order. For example, the current order as it is reflects separation of the Taiwan St. That means China remained a divided and separated country. So if that is a part of the status quo in the so-called Indo-Pacific region, China is not going to endorse this kind of a status quo or international order. Second national reunification is the ultimate goal of China's dream of national rejuvenation. And also, if you look around China, and basically it has been surrounded by the US troops presence, its military bases, its military allies. Every day, many US military aircraft and Navy ships, they just come around China, making China feel very insecure. So that is why China does not feel comfortable with the current international order. And also speaking broadly, international order has never been static and has been evolutionary. And as Henry Kissinger pointed out, the vitality of international order changes our balance between power and legitimacy. Today, the power balance is shifted with the power of the US and its Western allies are relatively declining while those of China, India, and other development countries are rising. So if the current order does not accommodate the shifting power balance is not sustainable. And also in terms of legitimacy, as I just said, today the US has become a major challenge to the legitimacy of the international order. From the Iraq war to Donald Trump's unilateralism, it has casted a very dark shadow on the feasibility of the current order, challenging the legitimacy of the very international order that the US has helped create. So if the current international order cannot accommodate the shifting power balance as well as the challenges to the international order, this is going to be a problem. As Professor Joseph Nye from Harvard University noted recently, the desirability as well as feasibility of the current international order have been caught into questions as never before. So that's my answer to your question. Very much, Professor Wu. I mean, I was intrigued at the number of times I saw that you joined China and India together there as countries that were both excluded perhaps in some way from the making of the international order. So this is a good point to turn to Tanvi and ask her view on that question, but also I'll pose the question again to you, Tanvi, about whether the Indian view of the Indo-Pacific vision is basically the same as that of other members of the Quad, whether there are some differences there and whether it's essentially opposed to perhaps the Chinese view, where there are perhaps some points of overlap there. Thanks, Ben, and it's a real pleasure to be on this panel with Professor Wu and Lina, who have known for over a decade and a half now. You know, in some ways, if you'd asked this question 15 years ago, I think there would have been more overlap between kind of what India and China was thinking about issues in terms of the regional and particularly the global order. But that has changed and I can come back to that, but I will kind of start with the question you asked about where India's vision converges with those of other Quad partners and perhaps where it diverges as well. I think you do see an India's vision of the Indo-Pacific convergences with other Quad partners both in terms of what it wants to see and what it doesn't want to see. It, like other partners, wants to see a free, open, inclusive, secure, prosperous Indo-Pacific. It wants to see a region where a rules-based order prevails, whether that's freedom of navigation and overflight, whether that's the peaceful resolution of disputes, whether that's territorial integrity being respected as well. India also wants to see, like the others, a region where the US is not an outsider, not considered an outsider, but has a robust presence. What it doesn't want to see, again, like the others, is a unipolar region dominated by China. While officially India might not use the term China, you have heard India's foreign minister, for example, on multiple occasions, including to Australian audiences, say that India does not just want to see a multipolar world, but also a multipolar Asia. India doesn't buy the Asia for Asians line, Asia for Asians line. It does want to see the US as well as European partners play a role and think that they have interest there. And that might be considered a change over time, but nonetheless, you did hear Prime Minister Modi very early on in his administration say that when I think about, when I look out onto the Indo-Pacific, I see the western shore of the United States. You also do, the other things that India doesn't want to see are things like unilateral changes of the status quo, whether that's in the south or the east China seas, or at inter-territorial boundaries, including in Ladakh. India doesn't want to see the threat or the use of force or coercion. It doesn't want to see a lack of reciprocity in terms of economic ties. It doesn't want to see a lack of transparency in connectivity or technology, the technology domains. I think you also see India converge with the others on thinking and believing that the region, this vision of the region that I just articulated where certain things happen and certain things don't. They do see in India this vision of the region under challenge, whether that's by COVID-19 or climate change, or whether, and I think this is more stark and often not stated very obviously, or kind of directly, but implicit in what India says that India does see this rules-based order being challenged in the region, this vision of the region being challenged by China's assertive behavior. So not China's rise per se, but its actions in terms of how it's treating both India as well as other countries in the region. I think India also agrees with Quad partners that existing mechanisms, whether that is the hub and spoke alliance model or regional organizations are necessary, but insufficient mechanisms to meet the challenges in the region. And that what is really needed is deeper and broader cooperation between like-minded partners, whether Asian or European or even African, bilaterally and plurilaterally to tackle these challenges. And to ensure both and try to aim for kind of a favorable balance of power trying to achieve that as well as to try to build resilience in the region. And so working with these partners to build resilience in the region, whether in Southeast Asia, whether in South Asia, whether in the Pacific Island States or in the Indian Ocean Island States, and helping themselves as well as kind of other countries in the region detect and defend against some of these challenges they see. Very quickly, you know, when people used to ask about divergences, the first one that would always come up is geography, you know, everybody has a different definition of the Indo-Pacific. I think you hear that less these days because the countries have figured out ways to work across bureaucratic and military, you know, boundaries that they have in the systems, but there are some differences that India has. I think you do see it in terms of principles, how India interprets certain principles or the degree of commitment that India has. So for example, in the free and free and open Indo-Pacific, the way India interprets that is countries should have the freedom to make choices. Rather than thinking about it as a Democrat, you know, that countries have to be in this considered part of this vision have to be democracies, for instance. You even see this in terms of how India interprets freedom of navigation or the open for India and free and open doesn't mean open markets in the broadest sense or kind of unlimited freedom of speech, but that it would have to represent certain kind of national concerns as well. I think you see some differences in priorities as well. For India, the continental challenge is kind of a main concern, whereas most of the other Indo-Pacific countries I think do see the maritime security challenge as kind of primary, if not at least equally important. And then, you know, I think on specific issues, whether that's on Taiwan or for India, the border issue prioritization is somewhat different. I think another important divergence is partnerships who actually are like-minded. I think India would like to see and has failed to try to get Russian buy-in, for example, into this idea of the Indo-Pacific. So it sees hopes Russia will be part of the solution to the challenges in the region, whereas the US and others I think see Russia in terms of being part of the problem in the region as well. And just to kind of conclude, I think there are differences for India in terms of how the past really kind of makes it see some of these issues in practice or principles in practice. I think India is a sovereignty hawk, perhaps more so than the other countries because of its post-colonial history. And so you see this play out in terms of digital space and others and principles. And again, because of that post-colonial history and specific issues, India's partnership with Mauritius, for example, has led it to support the Mauritius's claim against Britain to the Shagos archipelago, which, you know, for the US creates certain uncertainty about the Diego Garcia base. So you do see some practical differences as well. But I think the reason you see the Quad exist is that convergence aside really does outweigh the divergence aside. And some convergences, which I used to talk about, or divergences I used to talk about a few years ago, have actually narrowed to the point that they're not really serious concerns or obstacles. Thank you so much, Tanviya. Many, many rich seams for further discussion there. Alina, if I can turn to you now, is there a meaningful difference really between the US, the Chinese, perhaps the Indian, Australian and even ASEAN views of regional order? Yeah, thanks Ben. And I'd also like to echo my thanks for having me on this panel. I'm pleased to be reminded that it's been 15 years that Tanviya and I have known each other. But to answer your question, let me make perhaps two brief points. I think, first of all, it's important to disaggregate ASEAN. I'm thrilled to know that the polling results show that there's a lot of faith and confidence in ASEAN. I'm curious to know, though, that whether those results are mainly the voting of those within ASEAN or beyond ASEAN. But I think it's important to step back and remind ourselves that there are 10 very different member states within ASEAN, all with differing perspectives, varying degrees of affinity and confidence and commitment to both the US and China, and very different foreign policy approaches in general. Having said that, though, I think it was quite an achievement that the ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific came out and this represented a consolidation of baseline of sorts of all these varying positions. I think it's also really important to focus on the term outlook because, really, if you think about it, the ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific was a response to the term of the Indo-Pacific that was promoted by the United States. And I think if we step back a little further in time, time we brought up India's post-colonial legacy, we step back in time a little and think about how we think about Southeast Asia in general. We didn't have a regional identity. That was really a colonial imposition that we've come to accept and adapt in the region. And the ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific was somewhat similar to that acceptance of something that was, I would argue, imposed from the outside. The nomenclature of an Indo-Pacific was not there prior to the Trump administration really promoting it. Of course, Japan and Australia had that vision as well, but it didn't really take off until the United States really promoted the concept. And so ASEAN in a way had no choice but to respond to it. And if you look at the ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific, you'll see that there is a recognition of both the Asian Pacific and the Indo-Pacific. And the way the Indo-Pacific is described is really a marriage of the two maritime areas of the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean regions. So I think it's really important to keep that nuance in mind. Secondly, to answer your question more directly, Ben, the short answer is no. In ASEAN, we don't really see a huge stark division between the Chinese regional order on the one hand and the US-led regional order on the other. And let me explain why. I think this binary many Southeast Asian states feel is very unhelpful, is very unconstructive. And as you and everybody on this panel, probably everyone watching this will also know that there is a great deal of agnosticism, perhaps even cynicism about this ideological split that has been drawn up between authoritarian states on the one hand and democratic states on the other. Because the reality is that there are shades of both in many countries, including in the great powers of China and the US. Professor Wu pointed out some examples of US transgressions in Iraq. But similarly, in Southeast Asia, we're concerned about the complete crashing of the 2016 PCA decision related to the South China Sea. And so in Southeast Asia, we don't really see one power or the other to be morally superior. And so ideological divide aside, I think very often people tend to compare the BRI with the free and open Indo-Pacific. And I don't think that makes for an adequate comparison because the BRI is primarily commercially and economically driven. Not wholly I recognize that there is some grand strategy behind that, that maybe was tacked on a little bit laterly after the initial economic and commercial considerations. For it, but on the other hand, sorry, I've fallen into this American acronym, acronymization of everything free and open Indo-Pacific. On the other hand is primarily strategic, primarily led by strategic considerations with almost no economic or commercial considerations tacked on it's, it's almost like an afterthought and I know from yours, the session with Kurt Campbell. The US is trying to catch up with an economic framework of sorts, but the reality is that component is very solely missing. And so there are hints and misses with both visions of a regional order as seen from Southeast Asia. Let me stop here. Thank you Elena. Professor, if I can turn back to you, you've argued quite strongly that the emphasis on liberal values, at least in rhetorical descriptions of the rules based order is a mistake. And perhaps there's some overlap with what Tanvi is telling us there. I'm not sure we can get back to that. But you've argued instead that the emphasis should be on a rules based order or an international order and even a regional order, which is functional. That's what makes it work. That's most important. In the recent meetings between Presidents Biden and Xi, they put a lot of emphasis on guardrails or at least from the American side. There's a lot more talk now about the importance of guardrails to prevent competition from veering into conflict. My question for you is how much interest is there in that concept in developing that concept in China? What would that look like? But also is that something that can be applied more to, for example, the Indo-China border dispute, which also is in danger of veering into much more alarming conflict at the moment? Good question. Well, actually, when President Biden talked to President Xi, he tried to reassure President Xi that the US has no intention to challenge China's political system. The US has no intention to gain up with its allies and partners against China, and the US has continued to uphold the One China policy. Well, if he really means what I said, that should be a very useful guardrail for China-US relations. However, if you compare the rhetoric with CDs, Biden always characterized the competition between the US and China as one between democracy and authoritarianism. And also, in the US and also in the West in general, there is a strong tendency to ideologize the competition between China and the United States. So, how can we believe that the US has no intention to challenge China's political system? Secondly, the US said it has no intention to team up with its allies and partners against China. Come on, look at the quadruples. Everything the US has been doing these days is against China, right? Let's be honest about it. What's interesting here is that, on the one hand, you have the dominant power with concern about being overtaken by the rising power. And you have countries who are lagging behind, like India, is concerned about China dominating the region. So there is a kind of marriage between the dominant power and the power behind the rising power. So that is what Tambi said when she said, you know, India does not welcome a unipolar order in Asia. Well, if this unipolar order refers to China, that is a far-fetched scenario because today there is no such thing as China dominated unipolar order in this region. It is still a kind of US dominated unipolar system. And also when she said, you know, India welcomes US and EU to participate in regional affairs for what kind of reasons. I think the major reason is that you want US and EU to join you in balancing a rising China. That is exactly the geopolitical incentive behind it. So that's the second point, as Biden mentioned. The third is about the Taiwan issue. I think in the last several years, starting from the Trump administration, Taiwan has become an important part of the US in the Pacific Scottish. That is, US should play the Taiwan card against China as a very useful strategic weapon to contain China in the Western Pacific. So if you compare what the rhetoric we see is, how can you trust the US is serious about, you know, finding some, building some good rears for China-US competition. So in that regard, I think we are still too early to talk about this. However, down the road, there is a possibility that China and the US can work out some common denominators about how to manage their competition in this region. As South China say, in the Taiwan Strait, we have to agree upon some real lives if we really do not want to say competition leading to conflict as President Biden mentioned. I think the most important thing, in my opinion, is on the Taiwan issue. And in the last several decades, before the Trump administration, Washington largely abided by the one China framework. However, this framework has been seriously undermined by Washington during the Trump administration. Now this is a time that all these three sides on the Taiwan issue are not happy with the status quo. Taiwan under the DPP is seeking to move toward more and more independence. The US side under the inter-Pacific strategy wants to further encourage Taiwan's independence and use Taiwan as a strategic leverage against China. And Beijing at the same time is also not happy with the policy change on the part of Taipei and Washington DC and is trying to exert more pressure on both Taipei and Washington. So this is a very dangerous period of time. I don't mean that the three sides have already made up their mind that there's no choice but to go to the war. However, there is a high risk that events may gradually lead to a choice. We seem to have lost Professor Wu voluntarily. We will come back to him as soon as we can. Perhaps now I'll turn to you, Tanvi, assuming it's still working there for you. The issue of the India-China border has come up now. I'm just interested, do you view that, is that essentially a bilateral issue or is that an Indo-Pacific issue? And if it is an Indo-Pacific issue, how does that manifest? You know, Delhi has said, as Beijing has, that this is a bilateral issue for the two sides to kind of manage. In that sense, it's bilateral. But I do think in terms of how India sees it, particularly its timing, which started last year in spring, that it did seem to coincide. And we still debating the motivations for the PLA to take the steps that they did last year, given the consequences that it's had on the India-China bilateral relationship beyond just the boundary dispute. You know, it did happen to coincide with other steps that China was taking, that at least from the Indian point of view, was kind of more surrogate, whether that was, you know, ramming vessels of other South China Sea claimants, whether it was economic coercion against Australia, whether that was increasing kind of overflights across Taiwan's ADIC. So a whole range of steps that India perceived, and there were questions about whether this was something happening in Beijing that was causing it, another way it could potentially be linked, which you again here, Indian officials say, I'm presuming privately as well, because they are saying it publicly, that Beijing should stop looking at India through a US lens. And I think that's saying that that's to convey two messages. One, that sometimes there is a view expressed in Beijing, whether by officials or analysts, that somehow India-China frictions are being caused by the US. And if the US just stayed out of the region or stayed out, India-China would be fine. For India, that's not the case. India-China, I think on your previous panel, somebody mentioned Vietnam, it's the US that is late to this party. It's Japan that potentially is late to this party. India-China tensions go back to at least the 50s and not the 40s. So I think one thing India has been trying to convey is stop looking at this as US is causing problems between us, know it is your actions from Delhi's point of view. And I think second, it's trying to convey that if the US, if there is a judgment now in Beijing that India does not take independent action, that it's just getting dragged along, that's not the case. That China's choices are helping shape India's choices. And so, you know, if China actually had not done some of the things that happened last year at the border, I can tell you, I don't think the Quad, somebody who has been studying the Quad for, you know, since its first iteration, I don't think India would have gone as far as it has on the Quad, if not for the boundary crisis last year. So if the Quad is where it is, it is because of Beijing, not because of the Biden administration. I would just say kind of one more thing on guardrails as well as kind of external impositions, which is one, you know, you talked about guardrails and the India-China relationship. And this is actually quite worrisome because guardrails did exist. They existed in the form, in fact, more so than in the US-China case. In terms of these boundary agreements that had been signed by India and China between 1993 and 2012 and one in 2013 as well. And the whole point about these boundary agreements was it wasn't going to resolve the boundary crisis, but it was going to manage the boundary dispute set kind of protocols at the border, etc. It would keep the boundaries stable to let the other parts of the broader relationship continue. And what Indian officials see and have said is that they see China's having violated these agreements. And what's worrisome about it is, so in the guardrail sense is they think China is just driven through the guardrails. And so now the problem is, if you construct guardrails again, or you're trying to put them back up, there's zero trust in Delhi right now and they won't do the same thing again. So you almost have to rebuild trust before you kind of get back, you know, even to rebuilding guardrails. The other thing is, you know, and to Alina's point, I think India has a different view than perhaps a number of ASEAN countries. India was a late adopter, like the US to the Indo-Pacific concept. It was as Alina said, Japan and Australia that was really pushing it. But whatever you want to call it, India doesn't see this as an external imposition. In fact, what it did see as an external imposition was the Cold War division of Asia. Because for India, as you see when you go around Southeast Asia, Indians have been going into Southeast Asia from traversing the seas for ages. Indians have been doing that all the way up to East Asia. So as India sees it, in fact, the disruption isn't kind of what the Trump or Biden administration has proposed. The destruction was actually the Cold War period when the region was divvying up. And similarly, they don't see the Quad as an external imposition. It was something Shinzo Abe deserves credit for. It is really the true Godfather of. Thanks, Tanvi. I'd just like to stay with you on one of those issues. And just a question here is from an Indian perspective, is the reopening of US-China dialogue, which seems to have been following on from the Biden-Chi non-Summit meeting. Is that something that you see as a positive development for the restoration or reinvention of India-China guardrails? Or are they completely separate issues? And it's something that's essentially bilateral in India-China. I think for one, India sees whenever it hears about US-China engagement, it goes back to just like the Japanese had a Nixon shock in 1971. There was a Nixon shock in India too. So there's always kind of this concern about is this leading to a G2? Is this going to kind of be a spheres of influence G2 deal between the US and China? And I think you still heard some of that commentary in the amongst kind of the strategic community. As far as the government is concerned, I think they are now the US-India relationship is in a place where they are being briefed on discussions. There is Curt and others explaining what exactly the objectives are. And so there's an understanding it's about kind of putting up these guardrails, which India has no interest in seeing US-China tensions going to flare up or lead to conflict as well. So I think it's positive about that. I think one of the things that we're worried about in the India-China sense is, I think there's a little bit of an unknown because on the one hand, you would think that if this suggests that China is interested in, for instance, at least putting a lid on tensions everywhere, that's a good sign. And I think there are some who think that might be the case. There's another view, however, that there have been times when China has thought that, in fact, when China has actually reached out to India has been when US-China tensions have been high because it wants to keep India away from joining up, at least in the past, any US partnership. Whereas when you have seen China feel more comfortable about where it is with the US, India has believed there's been pressure on India. So for instance, after the Mar-a-Lago summit, you saw the Doklam crisis in terms of most recently. So I think there's a mixed view in terms of do as a non-ally of the US, so you can pressure it without any commitments coming into play. Do you actually see more pressure particularly given the buildup? So I think what India will be focused on is trying to continue the border talks, et cetera, but also at the same time ensure that preparations are in place in case there is a further increase in tensions that India can deal with its boundary. Right, right. Thank you, Tanvi. Alina, turning back to you, we heard Kurt Campbell this morning saying, if I heard him rightly, that the administration intends to really step up engagement with ASEAN next year. And we often hear, or we continually hear support for ASEAN centrality, whether that's rhetorical or not is a separate issue. Can you tell us a bit about why ASEAN centrality is so important, but more specifically, what should Washington be doing differently next year? I think it's certainly a welcome change that there have been more proclamations of support for ASEAN centrality. I mean, the baseline was pretty low over the last few years, and just the fact that there have been expressions of support from the US for ASEAN centrality has been very well received in Southeast Asia. ASEAN centrality is important for ASEAN itself because amid the constant hand wringing and angst that many Southeast Asian watches as well as citizens feel about where ASEAN is, I think there are still general consensus that ASEAN is needed for the region because it offers a collective platform for the articulation of positions from smaller countries in the region that would enable these countries to stand up to some of the larger neighbors it has. It is also an important platform for the larger powers to convene and discuss in ways that they would not otherwise be partial to. And so from both those aspects, internally within the region as well as with external powers, ASEAN I think remains still very relevant. And I think despite the current crisis in Myanmar, despite the criticisms constantly leveled at ASEAN about how it's ineffective at managing or even resolving some of the political and security crises, ASEAN has been trying and I think that's key. The fact that when you realize just how very, very different the positions are among 10 ASEAN member states, the fact that any declaration or joint statement can come out is something of an achievement itself. I mean, I didn't fully recognize this even as a Southeast Asian participating all these meetings at the Track 2 level until just very recently and I just was in complete amazement at how ASEAN does anything with such divergent positions on U.S.-China relations or anything else really. Yes. Can I ask you just to follow up then on that question of ASEAN unity, you spoke a bit about the pressures that ASEAN faces internally just to get out a joint statement is a great achievement, as you were saying. Two questions really. The first one is, are the pressures on ASEAN unity now more internal or more external? And secondarily, I already asked you what Washington should be doing differently. What do you think ASEAN leaders should be doing differently next year so they can actually make themselves more central? Yes, I realized I didn't actually answer your question about what Washington should be doing next year. I think Washington should continue doing what it's doing this year, but it should also have a more concrete economic agenda. And that's what's been missing for the last decade, if not longer. What ASEAN countries should be doing is really consolidating positions among themselves. I think what we see in Myanmar now, the little positive steps that have been made, is really a combination of really hard working diplomacy, but also leadership of certain personalities within ASEAN. And ASEAN has always operated that way, unfortunately or unfortunately, it's very personality driven. In the 60s to 80s, you have very strong leaders in ASEAN. And then countries started turning inwardly. But with a specific example of Myanmar, I think you've seen in particular Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore really pick up and really try to consolidate positions among ASEAN countries to get to where we are now. It's definitely not enough, but it's a lot further than where we were just a few months ago. And so I think if ASEAN countries continue along with this really hard work of blood, sweat and tears and focus more on some of the key political and security challenges, such as I see included in the next few months with Cambodia at the helm, I think maybe we can make some positive steps forward. I know there's a lot of skepticism about Cambodia's chairmanship, but I also believe that Cambodia really wants to avoid the buckle of 2012, for which no one will let it live down even till today. And so I think it really is trying to stay away from that sort of embarrassment for decades to come. We'll see, I suppose. Professor Wu, we were cut off there, so I'd like to just continue our discussion where we left off. I do have a lot of great audience questions coming in, I should emphasize. And I promise I will get to them, but I just have a few more of my own. Professor Wu, we were halfway through talking about the concept of guardrails. And I think if I understood you correctly, you're saying that from China's perspective, it's really too early to be making any moves in that direction because US rhetoric is one thing, but you need to see some kind of movement on the ground as well. And you were suggesting that that movement really needs to include Taiwan, which seems like a big ask, as we would say here in Australia. So my question is, is it not possible to put in place some kind of mechanisms that will reduce the likelihood of conflict erupting over Taiwan without actually making any progress on resolving that issue, as it were? Well, on the Taiwan issue, I think first and foremost, we should go back to the original framework about One China. This framework dated back to 50 years ago when President Nixon visited China. So I think this framework has enabled the stability in the Taiwan state over the last several decades until very recently when Taipei and Washington decided to undermine this framework. So when we talk about this kind of tactical arrangements as a mechanism controlling the disputes, I think from the Chinese side, it's always important to look at the strategic intention of the other side. If we think the other side has a reliable intention, we can sit down to work out the tactical details. So at this moment, I think we are still trying to detect the intention on the part of Washington DC. The two sides have agreed to establish some joint working groups after a Biden-Shih summit meeting. So I think this working group will discuss issues, including Taiwan, how to manage the differences. And this can also go further down to the relations between two militaries. How should they engage each other to consolidate the crisis management mechanism? Some are already in place, but not functioning very well. Some have to be newly created. So I think once the Chinese side feels that Washington really means what it says, then it creates a good atmosphere for working out the details. Now, aside from Taiwan, let me just lead a little bit on the body issue between China and India following the comment by Tambi. As a serious scholar, I studied carefully the history of the border conflict between China and India. And India has a long history of taking opportunistic and adventurous approach to this issue. First time was in the early 1950s during the Korean War. When China was preoccupied with the war on the Korean peninsula, New Delhi began to push in the border. The second time was in the early 1960s when China's Soviet bloc broke up and China was in a strategic dilemma and New Delhi began to push again. The last year was the third time when China-U.S. relations worsened after the Trump administration was politically hit by the outbreak of COVID-19 in the U.S. And this time, New Delhi pushed again. Just look at the pictures, how the Indian troops crossed the river to push the Chinese side. That's a picture who initiated the attack. Whether or not the U.S. was behind this, I don't know. But before Modi was re-elected and right after he was re-elected, in China there was an analysis that Modi, in his second term, would become more adventurous both domestically and internationally. Domestically, we saw what he did with the Muslim area in Kashmir. We saw what he did in the border dispute with China last year. After right after the border conflict, Secretary Pompeo went to New Delhi to encourage India to push further, even considering a war with China. So that is how the U.S. played a role in the border dispute between China and India last year. I'm very glad that New Delhi was rationally enough not to take the advice from Secretary Pompeo. However, I just believe that if India continued its tradition of opportunist and adventurous approach to the border issue, I think there will be no real, god-real time established between two sides. Thank you, Professor Wu. Tanvi, I have to give you an opportunity to respond if you would like to, Professor Wu. Well, you never want to ask a historian of China-India-U.S. relations about who did what. The one thing I would say is during the Korean War perhaps folks in Beijing have forgotten that India actually was very supportive of China and in fact tried to prevent the U.S. from moving against China. Having said that, I'm not going to talk about the history of it because I think, please read my book, but read others as well, including those who perhaps would be considered more focused on the nitty-gritty. I will say that the boundary crisis last year goes back, while the Galwan incident happened in June, it goes back to May of 2020. When Delhi sees, and it wasn't just Delhi, other countries have seen this as well. These days, all of us can see what has happened because of open-source data that you did see the PLA move at various points at the border. That's what made this boundary crisis different than the ones in 2013, 2014, as well as 2017, that the PLA moved at multiple locations at a time when Indian forces, especially in Ladakh, were not where they usually conduct military exercises, both countries do, because of COVID, and that the PLA took steps to change the status quo at the boundary as well as some attempts in the East as well. Now, we could probably be here for the rest of the evening or morning in your case, but I would just say that I guess people can go and see where the deployments were, where they are, and who moved what when, and would be apparent to people who do look at that, versus videos that are spliced in certain ways to convey certain messages from state-run outlets. Don't take either of the government's word for it, just go and look at the satellite imagery we have, and look at who has taken these steps at the China-India boundary since 2012. This is not the first incident, it is the fourth over the last decade or so, and this is the most serious one. I think what would be good is for the two sides to use the systems that they have and continue to talk, they are stalled, but the good part about the guardrails is that they did prevent an escalation. I will finally say and I will reiterate, this is not the US telling India to do anything. I think perhaps Beijing, that might be a misreading if that is the view in Beijing that India does what other countries tell it to. If anything you just have to ask Washington, it has problems getting India to do certain things, till of course China has facilitated that. So I would just say India makes independent judgments on these things, particularly decisions on whether or not to go to war. It's not going to do it for the US, it's not a US ally, it does it for its own national interests. Okay, thank you for that Tanvi. I'm certainly going to take that advice and now steer away from history and from the India-China border issue for now. I have a lot of good questions here coming in, but this one in particular I'm going to pose to all of you and it again points at an area of possible commonality. But I'll start with you Alina, ask for your response and then we'll go around the table. This is from Hunter who asked this question. It sounds like China, India and ASEAN would all to varying degrees like to see a multipolar regional order. How can they most effectively convince the United States traditionally wary of multipolarity to embrace such a vision? Alina. I'm intrigued how Hunter must and now goes just by Hunter. But that's a really good question and what I completely expected of Hunter. I don't know that anybody will really be able to convince Washington of anything. I think the fact that this is now this multipolarity is really now starting to evolve as a reality. It's probably the best reality check, if you will, on where we're at for Washington. And part of why we're seeing this contestation between the US and China is I think the recognition of the fact that the world is changing and the US is not the dominant sole superpower for very long. And I think that's worrying many of us in Southeast Asia. Can the US accepts not being number one across the board? It may still retain its number one position and its military superiority, but economically it may no longer be the big guy in the room anymore. And I think that's fast changing. So this rivalry that we're seeing is really a product of the world changing. And I think we in Southeast Asia recognize that very acutely. The issue for us in the region is how to manage that. As we head Huttel rather towards a new form of rivalry in the technological sphere. Thank you. Professor Wu, I think the question for you is slightly different. It's not just one of what China can do to convince the United States. We've already spoken a bit about that. But also what China can and should do to convince the region that what China in fact seeks is not a Chinese led Chinese dominated order, which is characterized by Chinese hegemony. And from our perspective, a lot of what we've been terming wolf warrior diplomacy seems to be completely counterproductive in that sense recently. What do you think China's messaging should be? Thank you. Well, first, for the US, I think like it or not, at the end of the day, the US has to face reality is just like it's a war in Afghanistan. After 20 years of use for this effort, it realized that it has to pull out. So I think at the end of the day, the US has to realize that this is a different world. But for China, I think the most important thing in this region is that a it should continue to pursue economic partnership with other countries and economies in the region. China's rise is first and foremost economic rise, not a military rise. So it should continue to pursue this trajectory and to share the benefits of economic growth with other regional members. Secondly, China has and should continue to support the ACR centrality in regional cooperation. In the last two decades of East Asian cooperation, China, in spite of being the largest economy in the region, we supported her hardly ACR centrality, unlike other major players in or beyond this region. So as long as we support ACR centrality, I think ACR should not be that much concerned about China's intention to become the head money. Suddenly, China should continue to explore ways of solving disputes with its regional members in a peaceful way by diplomatic means. That is very important. And that can really reassure that when China gets stronger, it's not going to abuse its power and influence. So I think that by doing that, China can reassure regional members that it is a benign player rather than an emerging hedgerman. Having said that, my concern once again is still on the Taiwan issue. This does not necessarily have much to do with Asian countries, but certainly it has a lot to do within a space. In a time when the US has defined China as an archaic strategic competitor, certainly there is a consensus in Washington that it should use Taiwan as a card against China. That is a major issue for China, for China-US relations, and also for the region as a whole. Wonderful. Thank you Professor Wu. Tanvi, would you like to take a stab at that one? You know, I think Elina said what I was going to which I think you do see some recognition of the reality of this in Washington. I think India sees that as well. If anything, India itself will talk about how this is not just about kind of a US-China competition that there are other countries that have significant heft, whether they're major powers or middle powers, operative in the region. And I think the one way that they've conveyed that to the US, and I think you hear the US talk less about primacy if you've noticed recently than, and even towards the end of the Trump administration and some administration documents than they used to in the past. But I think the other thing that the way kind of India and others in the region have tried to sell this so to speak, is that it's actually good that there are other capable and willing powers in the region, because from a domestic political point of view, it also helps answer that question about burden sharing. It's just that burden sharing is of different sorts, but nonetheless, that it's not just that it's not possible, but that the US itself or many constituencies in the US have said it's not desirable. So, you know, it's actually best to work with the region and that it is, and you will hear Indian officials say this repeatedly, that it's not just the rise of China and the reasons also kind of the rise of India, or as it says, the reemergence of both China and India. But I do think, you know, you will kind of, and I hear kind of Indian analysts talk about the importance, not just in terms of the primacy issue or the objective issue, but also in terms of as countries talk about the rules based on, I think this is true of the US, it's true of India. If they're going to talk about the rules based order, you better stick to it too. So economic coercion or, you know, taking steps to walk out of treaties, those don't help either. And so I think that's the other thing that you do hear folks say that, you know, it is not just, even though you today might consider some of Beijing's assertive steps, more kind of assertive than the others that it was incumbent. Now, you won't say they have the Indian government saying this, but I do think it's true that both India and the US have to also then stick to the rules that they say are so important. Yes. Staying on India and multi polarity. I mean, India is a big country with many interests outside the Indo-Pacific. I mean, particularly the India-Pakistan issue has dominated India and foreign policy for a long time. But also India-Russia is interesting. I mean, I would have assumed that for India there is a tension between Indo-Pacific interest and working with the Quad and the need to work with Russia in many ways. India's membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, for example. But I think if I heard you correctly, you were portraying it more as an effort to kind of harmonize those interests to persuade Russia to accept some kind of positive role in the Indo-Pacific, which is in accord with what the Quad is trying to achieve, which is quite different from what we're hearing from the US, for example. Is that right? I think, you know, one of the things that India in the past has saw, first the Soviet Union, that Russia is integral to its, you know, strategy to kind of create a favorable balance of power in Asia. And the two times that India has aligned in the past, even if not allied, were in 1962-1963 with the US. And then after 1971 with the Soviet Union, both times it was because of concerns about China. And what you did see for India, the Soviet Union was crucial in terms of both kind of what's called internal balancing, which is building Indian capabilities or, you know, helping facilitate the building them and the next tunnel balancing in terms of its own, you know, sign of Soviet tensions. In the 90s, you did see kind of Russia, India, China, you've seen it, you see to this day, I think particularly since the 2000s, whether it's the BRICS, whether it is the Russia, India, China Foreign Ministers Meeting, which met recently, whether it's the SCO, that there have been these attempts for Russia, India, China to work together on some global governance issues, etc. But you are starting to see kind of India diverge with Russia and China, a number of those issues. And I do think, you know, you asked that India would like to harmonize those, it would like to see Russia again. And to be very blunt, India would like to see another sign of Russian split. And now both China and Russia have said that's not going to happen. But in, from an Indian perspective, that would be the ideal scenario because it brings Russia back into kind of the, on the side that India wants it to, even if it doesn't, you know, have some of the other principles or buy into some of the other principles, I think from a sheer balance of power perspective, that's what India would like to see. And it's still very dependent on Russia for certain military equipment, which including military equipment that's being used at the boundary. So I think, you know, it is it is concerned about the divergences for Russia to, and when you know you have Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov saying or President Putin saying Russia-China relations have never been better. That causes concern in India for whom today China is its major strategic challenge. Thanks Tanvi. Alina, can I turn to you on the Russia issue? I mean, there are reports recent Russian naval exercise with ASEAN partners, I believe. You said earlier that you see there's no real meaningful distinction between all these different powers in Southeast Asia, external powers operating. Is that true in the case of Russia as well? Yeah, I mean, Russia has a military and political relationship with a number of ASEAN countries. And so that relationship has long been there. I don't think that most of Southeast Asia sees Russia in the same light as it does some of the other powers in the region. Russia is sort of in the background, still an important player. But I think for certain countries, Malaysia in particular, especially with what happened with the aircraft, there are some misgivings about where Russia really stands in the regional and world order. That said, as we all know, everybody, all states in Southeast Asia prefer to be friends with everyone regardless of transgressions. And so these differences are kept on the lowdown, so to speak. But there's no doubt that because of the military contracts, procurement that some Southeast Asian countries have with Russia, that relationship will still be maintained. Professor Wu, I'm going to ask you the Russia question as well. But before I do so, or perhaps at the same time, I've got two audience questions that I mustn't overlook for you. One is from Colin. He says, in view of the shortcomings in current world order, would Professor Wu agree that major powers, India and Japan, should become permanent members of the United Nations Security Council? And the second question is from Prakash, who says, if, as Professor Wu says, the whole Indo-Pacific Quad construct is an attempt to balance China, doesn't the fact that these countries feel the need to balance China indicate that its rise has not been perceived as benign? Well, first question very briefly, I think there are many other countries who are qualified to become the permanent members of the UN Security Council, not just India and Japan. We have to think about countries from Africa, countries from Latin America. So I think there should be more than just two countries. Okay. And also, this has to be based on the widest possible consensus among the UN membership. Secondly, as for the Indo-Pacific, I mean, in China, we don't really use that word because we think this concept as it is constructed has a very strong geopolitical and a strategic connotation, especially with this kind of implication for China. So from a Chinese perspective, the Indo-Pacific concept doesn't really have creating more opportunities for economic cooperation and security cooperation in this region. But rather, it works to building some US-centered security blocks against China and dividing regional countries into camps as we saw in the past. Now, again, when we think more broadly about the regional picture, this is not just Indo-Pacific. We have to think about Asia. And we have to think about the Euro-Asia continent, right? So this is not just a matter of time. You have to think about the continent. And in that context, Russia has played an important role in Asian affairs, especially in North-East Asia, Central Asia, and even to a less extent in West Asia. So we have to think about the participation of many players both from the region and from all sides of the region in regional affairs. Can we just mention that US and India want to say a break of China-Russia relations? That is a typical zero-sum perspective, a typical geopolitical perspective. That shows how the Indo-Pacific concept is built upon. That is built upon the traditional zero-sum geopolitical concept. At the end of the day, in my opinion, I think Euro-Asia continent is going to be more important and relevant in both regional prosperity and security. Why didn't you see that? If you look at the map on the east, you have China on the west side, you have the European Union. The two major economic blocks, among the three economic blocks in the world today, they are going to build in more and more connections and economic links with each other. And with the Better World Initiative, there will be more connectivity between the east and west of the Euro-Asia continent. And then after the US withdraw from Afghanistan, China is working with other countries, Iran, Russia, Pakistan included, to create a new mechanism trying to stabilize this region. So if we can make more progress in stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan after the failed US attempt in the last two decades, there will be even more opportunities for Euro-Asia continent to help create a sphere of prosperity and security. So let's not just look at the Indo-Pacific. We really need to think about Euro-Asia continent. And when we think about Euro-Asia continent, it's important that we should not think in terms of excluding some other countries, zero-sum geopolitical rivalry, but rather how we can pour all kinds of resources from within the region and from the outside to kind of build to the peace and stability in this region. China, as you mentioned from the very beginning, has benefited a lot from the current international order. Even though we are not happy with some of the problems, but first and foremost, we want to maintain the current international order while gradually improving rather than overthrowing it or creating a new one from the beginning. That's not what China is going to do. So in that sense, I think China is both a constructive player, but also a responsible effort to improve the current international order. Thank you, Professor Wu. Very interesting to hear you cite Afghanistan as a possible future test for Chinese foreign policy. That's one we'll be watching very closely. We're almost out of time, but I just want to ask one more question of Tanvi and Alina about AUKUS and the Quad before we go, which is really this, do AUKUS and the Quad you can answer collectively or separately complement the existing order? Do they support it in the region or do they undermine it? And is there a way of reconciling those two? I'll ask you first, Alina. I think to the credit of the countries involved in the Quad and AUKUS, because of the reassertion of ASEAN centrality and the fact that these countries have chosen to focus on global public goods like climate change, like the pandemic, there's little less consternation, I think, about where both these arrangements are headed. That said, we all know that there is still concern that AUKUS and the Quad, the Quad less so now, but AUKUS in particular because of recent announcement may result in an escalation of tensions and result in an arms race. And there are different gradations of how this is perceived in Southeast Asia. I think if the region keeps a watchful eye on how these developments unfold and assert their agency in a number of areas that both these arrangements are working on, that angst and anxiety can be minimized and worked on. Great, thank you. Tanvi, we're almost out of time, but do you have a short answer to that? I can say very quickly, I think it probably depends on who you ask about it. I think from India's perspective, these are supportive of the international order and exist to both contribute to the region to solving regional problems, but also to deter challenges for the challenges to the rules-based order as well. Okay, thank you. Thank you so much, all of you. Thanks to all the panelists. Also to our audience for contributing those great questions. It was a very enlightening discussion, I thought. We'll take a short break now and return at 1.15 Sydney time for a panel discussion on new rules. That panel is chaired by Herve Lemer here, Director of Research at the Lowe Institute, and he'll be joined by Richard Mord from the Asia Society Policy Institute, Beck Strudding from La Trobe University and Akiko Fukushima from the Tokyo Foundation for Research. I hope you can stay with us for that. See you in just about 15 minutes. Thank you.