 Nachmud Karakukulukul, who as I've mispronounced terribly, who as you might tell is a Turk and he's the founding board member of Global Relations Forum and a founding partner of Kanunum and also chairman of Koran Consulting. So Nachmud, over to you. Thank you. Actually I'm a Turk probably with an Egyptian name. Memduch is very Egyptian as I understand. It's good to be here. It's great to be in Abu Dhabi. Great to be again a guest of the World Policy Conference. So I thank the organizers, Thierry and of course Abu Dhabi for hosting us. Whenever I'm invited to speak on a Middle East panel, I feel both anxiety and intrigue. Anxiety, because my usual life during the year, I focus on issues like digital currencies, the global energy situation, so more the geo-economics part of the world or geo-technology. So Middle East, I don't have prepared remarks. I have prepared remarks for so many things, but not for this one. So that's the anxiety. Maybe that's better. Maybe that is better. That is the intrigue. The intrigue is that I know so much happens in this part of the world that when I sort of take a distance and look at the region for a full year, very unusual patterns emerge and then I'm intrigued. It induces dopamine, the expectation that I will get something interesting at the end of it. I think I'm the only one from my panel of last year and we ended last year, I was here again on the Middle East panel, saying that there is something in the air. There is something good in the air, that the tensions are receding and there is a sense of de-escalation. That proved to be, I think, reasonably accurate. This year, I mean, we did get the main tensions, quite a few of the main tensions sort of calmed down, Turkey being at the center of quite a few of them, the Turkey UAE, the Turkey Saudi, Turkey Egypt, then within the GCC, the Qatari Saudi. I mean, many of these tensions that burdened us seem to have softened at least and that was the expectation. So I think we got that right. And there is a truce in Yemen, however, tenuous. The Libya situation is, you know, again tenuous, but at least we're not in an active war situation. The Syria situation is complicated, but still it is what I make, still sort of a frozen state of affairs, not a sort of war, a real, real war. So this year, my concerns are really, looking forward, are related to the Iranian situation and to the situation in Iraq and Lebanon. But let me go back to the synopsis of this. There was something in the air. I think it was accurate, but it was incomplete, because what I didn't realize at the time is that the something good in the air was predicated on pragmatism on the side of many of these actors. It wasn't wise, long termism, but it was simple pragmatism. And what turns out to be the case after looking at this past year, I think actually it was hyperpragmatism. That is what we are facing. It is unanchored pragmatism. And that worries me, because I think that kind of pragmatism is ineffective to deal with long term issues, it corrodes institutions, and it makes us unable to deal with these long term challenges. Before I explain myself, let me just give you the punchline, because this year, more than before, I felt Thierry wants us to be precise, concise, open, get to the point. So let me get to the point. I'll tell you what the point is. I think, I mean, now we are at a stage where Middle Eastern players, including my country, including Saudi, including GCC, these countries feel empowered for different reasons. And these countries are in a hyperpragmatic state. Short termism, swift maneuvers, deals, bargains, they are the currency of the moment. It is normal for the West, but especially for Europe, to feel it's being left out of this game. But I think fast paced bargaining is not the European forte or the comparative advantage. So I think this is a phase, and we'll need the European institutions and long term structures to survive the phase that we are going through. I think that Europe should not compromise what it's good at. We'll need those norms. And it should use those structures in this phase to bring in the Middle East players to the table for long term problems. Now, that is the punchline. That is my main theme. Shall I stop there? Or you want me to couple of more minutes, briefly where I stand? Yes, we're in a phase of transitions. This is when we need foreseeability to coordinate actions when everything is changing. But instead, we get anxiety across the actors. Everybody is trying to, it's a climate of mistrust, kneejerk pragmatism is everywhere. And norms, balances, alliances that give some structure to this world are eroding before our eyes. So it's a world of night and uncertainty that we see. And I think we can see it, and I can't go into it, but I won't. The global energy markets is a very good example of that, because I think the main axes of that structure have been broken, and everybody is after self-sufficiency, which makes that whole structure very inefficient. Reaction, what can you do when all this happens? You can go for cartesian rationality. I think that's what Thierry was hinting at. I don't think it's possible. You can push someone to absorb all this, that's America not happening. You can have by insurance, you can say, I'll give you security guarantees, you give me energy stability, that is not working. You can have portfolio of countries you work with, Russia, China, US, that is happening. And finally, you can just go for incrementalism, fast maneuvering, and that, I think, is the name of the game. Let me ask you a much more specific question. Please. You have Erdogan, who's going to have an election soon, who seems very shaken by this prospect. He's balancing many, many powers. He's annoying a lot of people. NATO, America, Russia too. He's playing footsie with Russia. He's not doing sanctions. Can he keep going like this with the tanking economy? Or is he going to start another war in Northern Syria? Or with Greece? What do you think? No, I'm very simply, no, there will not. I do not think Erdogan or Turkey will start a war. I think these problems in Syria and in Greece, they are actually manageable with under this hyper pragmatism that I'm talking about. They are not, they can be contained within that framework. Erdogan has enough room for maneuver with all the actors and all the instruments he has, that we can get security on our southern border. And I don't know what it is with Greece. That's an unnecessary problem. I think these can be managed without a war. Do you think he will allow himself to lose the election? Well, it's a democratic system. It's an election. So if he loses, he loses. You know, on vera, as they say in France, we'll, we'll, we'll see next.