 Thanks very much, Julia. Nice to see so many people that can join this event today, even though I can't see all of you today. I can see how many of you there are. So if we just move on a few slides to the third slide. So what we're planning to run through with you today is a few slides, which we hope will take around 20 to 25 minutes and leave plenty of time for question and answers later on, which I'm sure you've got your questions ready already, so we're going to split the presentation into three main bits. The first is around our recommended path and the overarching analysis and key messages from the economy-wide point of view. Then we've got some detailed slides on surface transport followed by David on aviation and shipping. So if we go move on. So the first slide really shows our approach to the analysis and we developed three sort of exploratory scenarios which are shown on this slide in grey and these spy on one axis how far we can go on innovation and on the other how far we think we can go on behaviour change. And as the name suggests the widespread engagement scenario is one in which people and businesses are more likely to take action on behaviour change and the widespread innovation scenario is testing how far we can go on R&D and innovation and what that implies for cost reductions for many of the technologies that are being used across the economy. For example, cheap power and how that flows through into different sectors. The headwind scenario is where progress is more heavy going. We need to make more use of infrastructure and there's more use of hydrogen in buildings and transport in particular and the tailwind scenario takes an optimistic view of what could happen if we go very quickly or very well on both of these fronts. So it's really exploring the optimistic scenario and in that scenario net zero is met a bit earlier than the others. So if we go one more slide. So our balance pathway as we call it which is the main pathway that we base our recommendations on cuts across all of these other scenarios and what we do is we set we assess what actions are needed across all the sectors and take a balanced view of what can be achieved. So this is really looking at a bottom up analysis across all the individual sectors and setting out what that means for the economy as a whole. And it aims to keep open the options from the other sectors in play and crucially is what we think is feasible. We use this pathway to make our recommendations. So if we go on one. An important two important points about the balance scenario is that it's consistent with the climate science and what's happening internationally. So it keeps open though the one and one and a half degree global warming ambitions are set out in Paris. It delivers early action, which is important because that's what determines cumulative emissions and ultimately what drives climate outcomes. It results in UK emissions per person in 2035, which are consistent with with the global pathways to one and a half degrees. And it really shows clear leadership that supports raising global ambition that's needed for Paris. And that's really important for the COP presidency next year. It's also a fair contribution in the context of global emissions reduction. It sees UK taking actions earlier than required in global pathways to one and a half degrees. Okay, Owen. Next one please. Thank you. So what does this all mean and what are we actually recommending? So this chart shows the path of emissions to net zero in 2050 and the six carbon budget period is shown here as the purple bar. The headline that we've set out is that we need to cut emissions by 78% by 2035 on 1990 levels. And that basically means in effect bringing forward the previous 80% target by nearly 15 years. So it's a quite step up in ambition compared with the previous target. It's important to note that the path is front loaded. It's an inverted S shape with 60% of the reduction happening in the first 15 years from now and 40% in the next, in the following 15 years. And this, this is really important for investment because most of the investment needs to take place in the next 15 years or so. Basically, in order to keep open opportunities that we may not have, that we may need to use, that we've identified in the exploratory scenarios. And our recommendation for the UK NDC in 2030 is for a 68% reduction. And that excludes the international aviation shipping sector, which is in line with UN Convention. And we're really pleased that the government announced that it's accepted that and agreed to that target. So if we go on one. So this slide shows they really summarises the committee's key recommendations for the economy as a whole. The budget level and the 2030 NDC we've been through, just to note for in terms of the scope of emissions, we've included all greenhouse gases, including international aviation and shipping and peatland emissions. We're recommending that domestic action should be judged on on on UK actual emissions. So that's really important with credits only being used where they go beyond the budget level. We're recommending that they let the our recommendation be legislated as soon as possible to give clarity and certainty to business and individuals and to put in place measures to deliver it because we, you know, we really need to be getting on on with it. And lastly, we don't think we need to change existing budgets. Although you know that they're below the level required now because the UK NDC and the six carbon budget really supersedes those. So that's a whistle whistle stop a talk through the economy wide level when we move now to to looking at surface transport in a bit more detail. So, yeah, this thanks so in this this slide shows the balance pathway in surface transport and just to note that surface transport is the largest emitting sector currently with 22% of total emissions. With 22% of total UK greenhouse gas emissions in 2019. And the pathway that we've set out here shows the 70% reduction is requiring in surface transport GHGs by 2035. So it's slightly less ambitious than the economy as a whole. And but it has a similar inverted their shape. So the next decade or so is going to be really crucial and challenging as the bulk of emissions reduction happens. Our balance pathway gets to nearly zero emissions by 2050 with with around a megaton residual left over and it goes slightly further than we had in our net zero report. So now I'll hand over to Owen who's going to take you through the key elements needed to deliver this pathway. So on the right hand side here you can see the sources of abatement that make up the emissions reduction in our balance pathway. So at the top there the sort of purple wedge represents demand reduction so that's car travel demand reducing by about 9% by 2035 and 17% by 2050. And it's also logistics improvements in HDVs and vans leading to a reduction in miles driven for these sectors as well. In addition, we assume by 2032 that fully electric zero emission vehicles make up 100% of all new car and van sales. An uptake of these vehicles produces the green and the light blue wedges in this chart leading to about 25 million battery electric cars on the road by 2035. The orange wedge here represents the sales of zero emission high heavy goods vehicles HDVs which accelerate rapidly during the 2030s up to almost 100% by the end of that decade. During this transition though it's going to be important still to improve the efficiency of remaining petrol and diesel vehicles and also to continue to use biofuels effectively and that's represented by the brown wedge. And then finally you've got the yellow wedge here which includes rail in which diesel trains are removed from all passenger services and from most freight operations by 2040 with zero emission options where possible or hybrid options were not being taken up as the existing stock is replaced. So these contributions then add up, as shown in the chart to produce the blue line representing the emissions under the balanced pathway. But our analysis also did consider various alternative emissions reduction pathways as I have described. And now I'll move on to what these trajectories look like so you see on this chart you've still got the blue line dark blue line for the balance pathway. And then you've got these various other exploratory scenarios which we considered. And one striking point about this chart is that the pathways, the trajectories of emissions reduction look quite similar between the different pathways. There's only about 10 megatons of emissions difference between them by 2035 on a per year basis. Now this similarity is down to the fact that much of the emissions reduction is driven primarily by the phase out of new petrol and diesel cars at some point in the early 2030s. And now that technology and policy commitments are suitably advanced we can be fairly confident that this is deliverable, which reduces a bit the uncertainty about our trajectories. That said, the similarity of the trajectories does somewhat mask the fact that they get there in quite different ways. So for example, the trajectories vary in factors such as the extent of technology choice or the scope for behavioral change, and varying levels of each can sort of combine to offset each other and give ostensibly similar outcomes. So for example, the widespread engagement scenario, which you can hopefully see in the sort of light green line at the bottom there. That delivers the steepest, the sort of fastest emissions reduction through high levels of public engagement and high levels of demand reduction up to about 34% against baseline by 2050. First the widespread innovation scenario actually sees demand increasing slightly and we'll talk more about this in a second. But this, this sort of higher level of demand is partly compensated by faster uptake of electric vehicles due to faster assumed technology development battery prices coming down faster etc. So there's sort of potential trade offs which maybe get us to broadly similar places but in different ways. So next I'm going to take you through some of the key assumptions underpinning our, our analysis of the surface transport sector. So we'll start with demand reduction, and that is the extent to which we can reduce our use of high carbon modes of travel. This particularly means car mileage reducing with smaller demand reduction contributions assumed from reductions in van and HGV miles through things like better logistics and consolidation etc. But the chart here shows the levels of car demand reduction that we assume. And I should note at this point, our demand reduction assumptions are all stated relative to a baseline represented by the black line in this chart in which car ownership increases in line with kind of government business as usual expectations that is in line with population and GDP growth. So what that means is potentially there may be some scope to go a bit further in some of our scenarios if it were possible to deliver reductions in car ownership on top of this, these levels of per car demand reduction. So our demand reduction scenarios are based on kind of a combination of three factors. Firstly, you've got societal and technological changes, shifts that lead to lower need to travel so things like increased homework, which we've obviously seen be quite effective in many sectors this year. We would expect some of this benefit to be maintained and things like online shopping. Potentially increases in car occupancy, particularly for commuting their scope for things like increased car sharing schemes and local initiatives such as high occupancy vehicle lanes that sort of thing. And finally you've got modal shift so our analysis considered the scope for some shorter journeys switching to cycling and walking and some longer ones to public transport. It's not going to be for every journey, but this can be driven by initiatives that support active travel and improve public public transport services. So then those three in our balanced pathway combined to reduce total demand as I said earlier by 9% by 2035 relative to baseline and 17% by 2050. The management scenario explores a world where there's greater scope for demand reduction, it's brought the aligned to the upper end of what the climate assembly recommended. By contrast, the widespread innovation scenario as I said before, actually you can see sees demand slightly above baseline, and that's due to reductions being offset by the advent of connected and autonomous vehicles, which could lead to improved road space and increased mobility particularly for younger and older age groups. So what you can see is there's quite a wide range of potential demand futures within our scenarios, but it's clear that it's a key factor within our analysis. So moving on from demand, I'll take you through some of the technological uptake trajectories that we assume. So we'll start with cars and vans. So we welcome the government's recent announcement for 2030 phase update for new petrol and diesel vehicles. But one point we really want to emphasise is that we believe the role of hybrids in new sales beyond 2030 needs to be minimal. And that's because in real world use hybrids often drive on petrol power over 50% of the time, so they're not fully sort of zero tailpipe emission vehicles. So over on the right what you can see is our assumed uptake trajectory in terms of the proportion of all sales that are fully battery electric cars and vans. Across all scenarios, what you can see is that this increases fairly quickly reaching over 90% by 2030 across all of our scenarios. So you can see as I was saying our scenarios leave little room there beyond 2030 for new sales of hybrids to play a role. And in fact by 2032 with our balance pathway, they are fully phased out and all new sales are battery electric vehicles. So what's this mean in terms of overall fleet numbers well we're, we're a balanced pathway expect about 12 and a half million battery electric cars on the road, which is around a third of the fleet by 2030, and just below 25 million by 2035. It's achievable in part because by 2030 battery electric cars in our analysis are no longer more expensive to purchase upfront than conventional vehicles. And in fact, the greater efficiency they offer means they'll deliver substantial operational cost savings through things like fuel, lower fuel costs etc. So if we enable this level of uptake, we're going to need widespread deployment of charging infrastructure so our scenario balance pathway sees about 280,000 public charge points being installed across the UK by 2030. This is an addition to private charges in people's homes and that workplaces. These public charge points will be around towns to support on street charging for about 30% of premises that don't have access to off street parking, and also for opportunity based top up charging. There will also be about 10,000 in interurban locations such as motorway service stations for rapid recharging during long journeys. We think the current level of investment and focus on charging infrastructure is about right, but this needs to continue, and we need detailed plans to ensure that we can appropriately leverage private investment. And that charge points are always available everywhere that they're needed, not just in particular locations, and that infrastructure and network capacity never become barriers to EV take up. Now on to heavier duty vehicles and for them the roadmap is perhaps a bit less certain at the moment. So up in the top right you can see three potential decarbonisation solutions for HDVs you've got two forms of electrification, and you've got hydrogen vehicles. Now our scenarios are based on some research we commissioned from Element Energy, which considers how uptake of these three technologies might vary depending on the mix of supporting infrastructure and investment that's developed and deployed. And the graph in the bottom right shows the range of different technology mixes that our scenarios generated in 2035 and you can see there's quite a variety in the balanced pathway where we allow the most cost effective technology mix to be taken up. This results in battery electric being used for many smaller trucks and mainly hydrogen for the larger ones. But a key message I'd like you to take from this chart is that the, the grey bar representing diesel sales is very small across all scenarios by this point. And this in particular shows that there are various potential pathways by which zero carbon options can become technically suitable for most HDV operations by then. So it's a question of making sure the right plans and incentives are in place to enable this to be delivered. So to this end, it's good to see funding recently announced for trials of HDV decarbonisation technologies. We would emphasise that these need to be, these need to be substantial in length and significant in scale to provide a comprehensive assessment of costs, performance and suitability of the technologies. And these findings then need to be collated and disseminated effectively to help fleet operators understand their options and understand what's suitable for their fleets. We also welcome the plan to consult on a diesel phase update. Our assessment is that this should be about 2040, but it could be brought earlier if data from the trial suggests this to be feasible. Now in parallel we'd expect to see a comprehensive plan for how to deliver freight decarbonisation. It should include consideration of the infrastructure deployment required and appropriate plans for incentives to ensure that operators can afford to make the switch. That this notwithstanding of course diesel vehicles are likely to be on the road a bit longer in this sector than for light duty vehicles. So it's important to support efficiency schemes and to set out ambitious CO2 emission standards. Biofuels will also continue to play an important transitional role, although in the longer term we continue to view biomass as better used in sectors where it can sequester carbon or where zero carbon options aren't available. So then finally from me, this chart shows shows the cost impacts of our balanced pathway. And so above the axis what we have is the total investment cost at each year which rises to 12 billion pounds per year by 2035 and this includes both public and private investment and both additional costs for purchase of vehicles and the cost of installation of charging infrastructure. And then below the axis what we have is the cost savings that results so you can see in the light blue wedge this includes substantial savings for car and van users. And this is because our assessment is that EVs will be cost saving to society so excluding taxes and duties from around 2025. But if you do include taxes and duties and from a private owners perspective, the driver could be saving around 500 pounds a year in fuel costs on top of potentially sizable maintenance savings due to fewer moving parts in electric drive trains. You've also got large fuel savings through greater efficiency and electrification of trains in the green wedge, and you've got demand reduction and efficiency improvements on the road which we discussed earlier on the slide about demand. The key message I'd like you to take from this chart is that from around 2030, the operational cost savings below the axis begin to exceed the in-year investment costs. So what that's telling us is that from this point onwards the pathway for surface transport is actually cost saving to society. And this is on top of the emissions reduction it delivers and the various other benefits such as health improvement, air quality improvements and reduced congestion. So with that I'll hand over to David who's now going to take you through the aviation and shipping scenarios within our analysis. Thanks very much, Owen. If you wouldn't mind moving on to the next slide please. Thank you. OK, so aviation first. So I'll talk you through the chart on the left here. This is emissions from domestic and aviation and international aviation on the left here. The purple line you see at the bottom there, that's the emissions in our balanced pathway for aviation. So that falls to around 23 megatons in 2050 from just under 40 before the pandemic. I'll step through them from the top of that chart. The black line is baseline emissions, so that's essentially business as usual. And what we see there is further increases in aviation demand through to 2050. That's about a 65% increase in aviation demand in a business as usual world. And a particularly big jump around 2030 there, which is airport expansion in the southeast. So that's business as usual. That's our starting point, but that's not our scenario. Our scenario then for the balance pathway has three chunks that reduce emissions below that. The first of those and the biggest of those is limiting demand increases. So in our balance pathway, we only have a 25% for other than a 65% growth in aviation demand by 2050. And we don't have that net increase in UK airport capacity. So that's relatively smooth, even with just that plus the business as usual efficiency improvement that's in the baseline. That would take us to around the level of emissions that we had before the pandemic. But we then have further aircraft efficiency improvement over and above what's in the baseline, which takes emissions down significantly from that plus a fraction of sustainable aviation fuel. So that's around 25% in this scenario. So that takes us down to 23 million tonnes. On the right hand side, we see that the overall the costs for aviation is actually cost saving in this pathway, where the reduced fuel burn because aircraft are more efficient at weighing the higher capital costs of making planes more efficient, plus the extra costs of the sustainable fuels point to make here is aviation is not achieving net zero purely within its sector here. So on top of these costs, we then also have to include the cost of greenhouse gas removals to make aviation net zero to balance out those 23 megatons. In 2050, and once you do that, there is a net cost to the aviation passengers will have to bear. We estimate that's around 55 pounds on a return flight to New York. So that's, you know, you've got some cost saving for the efficiency improvement, but then you're paying for the sustainable fuels and for the greenhouse gas removals to make aviation net zero. Okay, Owen, can you move to the next slide please? Thank you. Okay, so we then have a wide range of scenarios and you will see quite a broad range here. I'll start on the right hand chart to explain what's going on here. So this is aviation demand. As I said, the baseline is business is usual 65% growth in aviation demand. Moving down from that, we have the innovation scenario that is more like a 50% increase in aviation demand consistent with the top end of the climate. Assembly range that was considered acceptable there. And that's continued really on big technological improvements, both in aircraft efficiency, but also then on the sustainable fuels to power those aircraft. Moving downwards from that we have the headwind scenario that only has a 25% increase in demand by 2050, but it does have the net increase in airport capacity, which means it does have that jump as does the innovation scenario in the early 2030s relating to increased airport capacity. We then have the balance pathway, which gets to the same point as headwinds, but in a more in a smoother way without that net increase in capacity. And the bottom one here is both for the widespread engagement scenario and for the tailwind scenario that have the same demand assumption, which is actually for a 15% reduction in aviation demand compared to pre pandemic levels. So those three through then into emissions on the left hand side here we see not only demand, but then also use of sustainable fuels and and efficiency improvements to come out with with emissions. We see that headwinds, because it has a relatively low use of sustainable fuels and relatively low efficiency improvement has the highest emissions there, followed by headwinds. The really interesting story here though I think is the widespread engagement and widespread innovation scenarios, which get to about the same level of 2050 emissions, but through very different ways. So in the engagement one we have the lower demand actually lower demand that we have today, but more modest use of sustainable fuels 25% use of sustainable fuels and more modest efficiency improvements in in the innovation scenario demand is considerably higher. But we have more efficient aircraft and we have 50% sustainable fuels in that scenario. We're interesting that they get to the same level of emissions in 2050. And then the tailwind scenario, which is kind of how low can emissions go and how rapidly can we get to net zero. We combine the best of those two previous scenarios that I was talking about so we have the lower demand as in the engagement scenario, but the also the better technological improvements to aircraft efficiency as in the innovation scenario and also the same volume of sustainable fuels as in that scenario. In tailwinds that volume of fuels in the innovation scenario is enough to push out almost all fossil fuels by 2050 in tailwinds. So that gets us almost to zero absolute emissions in aviation and very little then greenhouse gas removal needed to offset that. Okay, that's a quick tour through our aviation scenarios. I'll come back to talk about policy in a minute. Owen, can you move on the side? So we'll talk about shipping scenarios now. Okay, so it's quite a different story in shipping. The chart on the left here again shows our balance pathway. And what we see here is that most of the heavy lifting in decarbonising the shipping sector is through use of sustainable fuel, zero carbon fuels, which we've assumed to be low carbon ammonia produced both in the UK and overseas. We assume that that can decarbonise almost all the shipping and with a relatively small role for for ongoing efficiency improvements over and above business as usual. On the right hand side we see the different scenarios that we have and really they get to the same endpoint and the differences is only about the timing, the balance pathway has a relatively gradual deployment of ammonia over the period 2030 to 2050. The tailwind scenario and the innovation scenario is more front loaded where most of that happens in the 2030s in terms of rollout of ammonia, both for new ships and retrofit of ammonia to existing ships. And the widespread engagement scenario has a more back end in most of that happening in the 2040s. Broadly speaking, they all get to the same endpoint. It's only a matter of how quickly they get there. Next slide please. The last thing to say on shipping scenarios is we think there's a net cost here because we think that low carbon ammonia will be more expensive than the high carbon fuels will be used today in shipping and the impact of further efficiency will be relatively small on overall costs. So there is a net cost here, but it's not huge. Finally, Owen, do you mind moving us to the recommendation side? OK, so first of all, we have recommended that international aviation and international shipping should be included formally within the scope of the sixth carbon budget and the 2050 net zero target. So far, they've been kind of allowed for formally outside the targets but allowed for in setting the level of targets for other sectors. But we think now is the right time to formally include those. That's not about the UK taking a unilateral policy approach to aviation and shipping just because it's in the targets. It's about taking responsibility for those emissions. So we still think that it's appropriate if ways can be found for international action on a multilateral basis to tackle aviation and shipping emissions in the right way. That's the right approach, but that doesn't mean we can't have them in UK targets and take responsibility for those emissions. And if necessary, if emissions are too high in aviation and shipping, reduce emissions by more in the other sectors. So that's our recommendation there. For the NDC, you'll see that the UK has now agreed to our recommendation for a 68% reduction in UK emissions by 2030, excluding emissions for international aviation and shipping. But we said as part of our recommendation that should be alongside tackling those emissions from those sectors. We recommended it on that basis because that's the convention for NDCs. Finally, on non-CO2 effects and primarily in aviation, we recommend that those are not directly included in carbon budgets through a multiplier, for example. Because the science does not support that as a robust way of estimating the contribution to climate change. Those are not equivalent to tackling CO2 emissions. You can't have a metric that treats them on an equivalent basis, but that doesn't mean that we shouldn't tackle them. We absolutely should be tackling the non-CO2 impacts of aviation, but not in a way that is at the expense of increasing CO2 emissions. So we shouldn't be taking longer routes, for example, to avoid non-CO2 impacts if that means burning more fuel and higher CO2 emissions. But we do recommend that there's a minimum goal, that there should be no additional aviation non-CO2 warming beyond 2050. And we will be monitoring aviation non-CO2 in our annual progress reports to Parliament. OK, I'll leave it there. Thank you very much. Back to you, Julia.