 Welcome, everybody. Hello. It is wonderful to see so many of you here on a Friday afternoon to be back in person for these types of events, both our students and the surrounding University of Michigan Ann Arbor communities. I'm John Sorciari. I'm the Director of the Wiser Diplomacy Center and International Policy Center here at the Ford School, where I'm a professor and associate dean for research and policy engagement. I want to thank all of you for attending today's event, which I'll introduce very briefly before I hand it over to my colleague, Gene Wiebs-Ubriski, who is a professor at UM and also directs UM's Wiser Center for Europe and Eurasia and Copernicus Center for Polish Studies. I want to give a special welcome today to students who have come from throughout the Midwest here from UM and a number of other universities to participate from Albion College, from Kent State, Michigan State, the University of Chicago, and Wayne State. The students, I just mentioned, are participating along with their UM colleagues in a two-day Midwest symposium during which they're exploring U.S.-Russia relations and security in Eastern Europe. It's the culminating event in a program that Gene Wiebs and I have co-led here at UM for the past few years on cultivating future leaders in U.S.-Russia relations sponsored generously by the U.S.-Russia Foundation. I also want to thank and welcome some special guests who are visiting the university and who are participating in the symposium, Ambassador Mark Pekla, whom students had the benefit of learning from today at a great lunch talk. We also have Ambassador Dan Shields, who's here visiting us this semester as a visiting instructor teaching on diplomacy in Asia. We have a number of visiting Ukrainian scholars at the university this year. Two of them here in front of me will be presenting to students tomorrow, Anna Taranenko and Xenia Yurteyeva. And so we thank you all for being here. Your presence is such an important part of what makes the University of Michigan a wonderful hub to study the region and its international politics. Of course, I also want to thank our staff, the great staff of the International Policy Center and the Center for Russian-East European and Eurasian Studies at UM who have organized this event together with the Ford School as well as the surrounding symposium. This afternoon we're going to explore the diplomacy between the United States, key NATO allies and Russia around the war in Ukraine. Our panelists are going to consider key Western interests at stake, the evolution of U.S. and NATO approaches to Russia, and evident Russian aims and intentions in Ukraine and the surrounding region. We'll then look to the road ahead considering realistic goals for diplomacy in the months and years ahead, as well as how to pursue those goals most effectively. We'll leave some time for questions toward the end of today's session, and at that point we'll encourage you to raise your hands. My colleagues, Katie and Cindy, will have microphones and we'll circulate around so that everyone can hear your excellent questions. And now to welcome our outstanding panel of experts. I'll start from the furthest chair away from me, former U.S. Ambassador to Russia, John Byerly, who studied here at the University of Michigan. He was elected chairman of the U.S. Russia Foundation in October 2018. And before that role, he served as a U.S. diplomat for three decades in a career focused on the Soviet Union and Russia, as well as Central and Eastern Europe. To his right, former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Stephen Began, who many of you will know, is also here as a visiting international policymaker in residence with our Wiser Diplomacy Center and teaching a class right now on U.S. foreign policy and grand strategy. Secretary Began has more than three decades of experience in international affairs in government and in the private sector, including high level service within the State Department, the White House, and the Congress. And last but not least, closest to me, the former Polish Ambassador to Russia, Katarzyna Pelczynska-Nałęcz, and Ambassador Pelczynska-Nałęcz serves as the director of the Institute Strategies 2050, as well as having served as the first female ambassador to Poland to the Russian Federation since the establishment of Polish-Russia relations. So, wonderful array of expertise on the panel, and with that, I'll hand it over to Genevieve and get our conversation started. Thank you. Thank you, John. And welcome, everyone, to this panel. And I want to start our conversation by discussing today's events. Today marks a new milestone in the war on Ukraine. A few hours ago, put in formally but illegally a next four Ukrainian oblast or regions. After surreal 45-minute speech in which he presented Russia as a savior of the regions next, as the defender of colonized and oppressed people around the world, and as a victim of Western and especially US imperialism. Afterwards, during a Eurovision-like event on the Red Square, some political figures went as far as calling for a Russian jihad against the West. So, President Zelensky declared that Ukraine would not negotiate with Russia as long as Putin remained in power and reiterated his request for Ukraine to become a member of NATO. So neither the annexation nor Putin's inflamed rhetoric nor the highly choreographed celebration were surprising. We knew it was coming. But the escalation in the acts of war and the speed at which this is all happening is shocking. So, to begin our conversation, I'd like to ask each of you to take stock of today's events and to reflect on the last couple, two, three weeks and share your reflections on what you see as the most critical issues and challenges this new phase is bringing about. A new phase and the challenges for Ukraine, obviously, but also for European and US security. And so one question is, am I wrong? Are we not in a new phase? Is this something new that's becoming beginning or more of the same? So I'd like to reflect on this and perhaps I will start with Ambassador Byerle. Thank you and thanks to all of you for being here on a Friday afternoon. This is very impressive. I guess we have a topic that some people are interested in. I think there is a strong smell of desperation in the air in Moscow. Almost everything that we have seen this week, the rushed mobilization, the call-up of these 30,000 Russians, the hurried, attempted, I don't call it annexation, I call it attempted annexation and the show that was put on in the Kremlin today. All of that was a result of and was hastened by Ukraine's military successes. So Putin, far from dictating what is gonna happen on his terms at the time, he says he is now, I think, in a almost totally reactive mode. I think the call-up of the 30,000 soldiers, the conscripts, conscripts, 300, what'd I say? 30, no, 300,000, 300,000, I think is a case in point. If you read the intercepts of the Russian soldiers that were printed in the, or that were carried in the New York Times yesterday, actual intercepts of them talking about how hopeless things are, how ill-led they are, how they don't have any food, they don't know why they're there. And these are people who volunteered to go. The people coming now were conscripted, they will have less training, and much less of a sense of ownership of this. I mean, it reminds me of if your campfire is going out, you don't throw a bunch of wet wood on top of it. That's in essence, I think, what Putin is doing to the Russian army. And I don't think this is maybe a little too early to say it's a turning point. But it's certainly an inflection point. And Putin's speech today, I would recommend everyone here to read it. It's already been translated, and it's in the New York Times of the Post. It's absolutely chilling and hair-raising. Thank you. Well, I completely agree with John. He, Putin is desperate, and it's forcing him to do some uncharacteristic things, including improvising. He tends to be somebody who plans and had, prefers to operate in secrecy. But since the beginning of this campaign, he's been on his back foot. Since the beginning of this war, it's been going against him. And he has lost the war that he started. Whether he can afford to lose the war he's in now remains to be seen, but he has lost the war that he wanted to fight in February of this year. The so-called campaign to denazify and demilitarize Ukraine. Any hopes or any unbelievable expectation that was possible is gone. And now he finds himself in a very tight corner. It's for sure the case that he's facing some of the most severe domestic unrest that he's seen in his 20 years, 22 years in office. He's used to occasional protests from his liberal opponents, his liberal pro-western, perhaps even pro-democratic opponents at home. But he has suppressed, repressed, or even killed many of them. And that's not what worries him. What worries him is he's also facing protests and complaints from his supporters. From the extreme faction of the Russian political spectrum that is angry at Putin for not being brutal enough in the campaign in Ukraine. And that's what Putin was responding to. But it wasn't just that. Just a week and a half ago, he was in Samarkand in Uzbekistan for a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a stylized organization of mostly thuggish and undemocratic states that was by design a counterweight to NATO. And while he was there, he was openly criticized by the Prime Minister of India and who had been a stalwart supporter of Russia during this fight. And also it was clear that he was being pressured by the Chinese as he acknowledged that he was eager to answer the concerns that he had heard expressed by Xi Jinping. But even that isn't his worst problem. His worst problem is his army's losing the war in Ukraine. And that is his biggest problem. And so goes that army, so goes Putin. And he knows it, and that's why he took the steps today, Genevieve. He's desperate to try to change the trajectory and to gain some initiative in this fight. Thank you. I definitely agree that Putin is totally frustrated and he's desperate to do something to change the situation. And my understanding of his, in a certain sense, incredible speech today was that he sent three messages to three different audience. The first one was to his inner circle, that he is still a strongman, that he is still able to take the leadership, that his power cannot and should not be undermined. And this is very important because the strength, it's an important, it's a crucial factor in this Russian KGB political culture. Second message was sent to us, so the collective west, but I believe that it was more even addressed to the Europeans than to the US. And he just demonstrated his determination, his power, he escalated and simply he said, I am ready to do anything it takes to win the war. So you should really be afraid of me and think twice if you are ready to confront me. And Putin understands that European Union, although it's been really acting in a very unified way in the recent months still, European Union, these are 27 different countries and they can be divided. And there is growing war fatigue in some member states and there are also divisions within the member states. So what he tries to say is, think twice if you really want to continue this war and whether, because I am absolutely determined. And that was the second message. And the third message was to, it was global. Putin understands that there is growing gap between the US and the EU and the countries of so-called global self. So he intentionally positioned himself as someone who defends India, all countries, all nations, which have suffered due to the American imperialism. And that's propaganda or the narrative which may work in some regions. It also may work even in some sections and some member states in the EU. And of course, this is the crucial question whether this is the continuation or the turning point and new phase of the war. And in a certain sense, it's both. Russia wants to control Ukraine, Putin wants to defeat Zelensky and through Zelensky, he wants to humiliate the EU and the US. So this is the continuation. But for the Russian society, this is a completely new phase of the war. As over recent seven months, they've been explained that this is not their war. It's the special military operation which is taking place somewhere in Ukraine and they can just move on, live their normal life. And then all of a sudden, they were informed that now their sons, husbands, brothers, go to the war or drafted to the war and they will be sent to the front line without any training. And the war was this annexation of four Ukrainian regions which are not fully controlled by Putin. The war was brought to Russia and Russian people, ordinary people, suddenly became the part of the military conflict. So for them, that is a huge change. So returning to something you just said about the danger that this speech highlighted about the threat of nuclear warfare, for example, or the use of nuclear weapon on the one hand and the call for this jihad by his supporters, for example. Now we're in the seventh month of the war and we're starting to see that war fatigue. Prices, inflation is rampant and much greater in Europe than it is in North America. There's a harsh winter coming. People are told in France and Germany to buy warm clothes because, and even being warned that there might be blackout so electrical power might go out. So facing threats from the outside and also having their quality of life diminished, do you see that as really a major threat to an international consensus which so far has been quite great in support of Ukraine and against Russia? How much do you see, well, that's for the three of you. Do you think that there's a danger now that the really international community will start to really show divisions about this and that? I'll jump in, Gene, if you have the, this is definitely what Putin thinks. Putin thinks that time is on his side. He thinks that the determination of Europeans to oppose him is not for the long term and he also thinks that here in the United States, even at some point, there will be a fatigue with this. I think President Zelinsky's concerns could be the same and in part account for the very successful counteroffensive that really drove home the fact that the Ukrainians will be successful in this fight with the support that they're getting, but in any event, that's President Putin's play and as the ambassador said, he's trying to put additional pressure and raise the stakes for European populations in order to try to achieve that and the truth is nobody has a lot of time in this one, in a sense, he is right. There will be a fatigue in the West, I'm sure, at some point and also our ability to sustain the level of economic and military support for Ukraine may not be indefinite, but Putin also has some constraints on him. His economy is weakening, not as fast as many would have hoped, but his economy is weakening, his army is just sorely debilitated by their performance in Ukraine and so Putin doesn't have time either and I think in a sense, what you're seeing is a growing urgency in all parts, Ukraine, the West and Russia, as we go into the fall with this conflict. Putin is definitely good in one thing, so he knows how to integrate the West. Anytime some divisions here. And Ukraine. He's good at uniting Ukraine too. Yeah, yeah, yeah, absolutely. So anytime some divisions appear in Europe between the member states, Putin does something which immediately mobilized the West and mobilized the European Union. And I believe that what has just happened with sham referendums, with this annexation and this awful theater and crumbling today and this is just the first phase because on Monday we will see the unanimous, I believe, vote in Russian Duma and the change of Russian constitution. So, but that does not mean that there are no serious divisions, that there are no differences within the EU, but these divisions are not between the East and the West of the EU. Unfortunately, this is Hungary, the country which borders Ukraine, which is the only EU member state openly pro-Russian. All the other member states are definitely anti-Russian. They are pro-Ukrainian. The divisions are more between those who believe that Russia should be defeated and punished and between those who think that we should try to achieve peace at any cost as quickly as possible. So, and of course in Polish society there is almost total consensus that Russia should be defeated and punished while in France, Italy, it's 50-50. It's interesting because in Germany the majority believes that Russia should be defeated and punished and there is a gap between the position of the majority of population and the position of the present government, or rather even not the whole government as they have even divisions inside the government. Just one more word about economy. As economic warfare is very painful for Europe and it's much more painful for Europe than for the United States. It's the prices of oil doubled, the prices of coal tripled, the prices of gas increased five-fold. So this is really a shock for the governments and for the society, but there is no way back with the sabotage or the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2, which happened a couple of days ago. Everyone in Europe understands that there is no way that Europe will continue its dependency on Russian energy resources. So even these governments, which believes that they would like to cooperate in Europe with Russia, now they understand that there is no such a way, there is no such a chance for them to re-establish this cooperation. And that is true, that Russian economy proved to be surprisingly resilient to this unprecedented sanctions. But with the coming sanctions and the end of import of Russian oil by the end of this year, Russia will be deprived of the most important revenue and the most important source of financing of Russian budget and the war. And this will happen by December. And I believe that this is one of the reasons why Putin escalates because he believes that he should threaten the West now as in half a year it will be, even not only militarily, but also economically too late for him. I think Putin has made four fundamental miscalculations in all of this, very uncharacteristic for him. Whether they're fatal miscalculations, we'll see. And three of them are already fed accomplice. There's one that still has to solve itself. Clearly, he miscalculated the will and the capacity of the Ukrainian state and people and army to oppose him. No question about that. I think he also miscalculated the degree of political dissension in the United States. I think that he was counting based on what he had seen that there would be a fracture at some point between the Democrats and the Republicans or maybe within each of those parties and that hasn't happened at all. As someone who lives in Washington, I can tell you there is basically only one issue that is a bipartisan issue on Capitol Hill and that is Ukraine. So that's the second fundamental miscalculation. I think that he also, I'm sure that he also miscalculated the European Union's capacity to be cohesive on this. It's always been his hope that he can sort of divide and conquer, but we really have to see. And the fourth, well, I would add to that the amount of coordination between the United States and the European Union is remarkable and unprecedented and that's a feta comply that I don't think will break as well. The fourth miscalculation, and we will see how it turns out, is the one we've been talking about. Putin is convinced that he could outlast, outweight Europe that a cold winter would eventually begin to fracture the consensus against him. And again, we have seen the Europeans come together to prepare for this in a way not just buying blankets, but stockpiling, making sure that there's enough energy on tap. And I think when that hits home, if Putin is still with us at that point, that could be the last prop that gets knocked out from under him. So what do you mean if he's still with us? I mean, do you? So do you expect that it's, you know, you're thinking the long delay, long term, or you could imagine a change at the top? I mean, do you think that change will come from the top or bottom up? I think in a system like that, where there is basically no accountability to anyone and where Putin's number one main interest is a single hyphenated word, self-preservation, he has to be on his guard constantly to make sure that the people who have been supporting him up till now because he's been pretty good at what he's done, they may start to look at him in a different way. And I'm talking about the people at the top. Change will never come from the bottom in Russia. A very good friend of mine, a Russian, once said when you think about Russia and the political climate in Russia, imagine it as a big opera house. And on stage is Putin, Petr Shev, Shoigu, the inner circle around Putin. In the orchestra seats, the expensive seats are the elite and they're applauding and watching the show and going along with it, but they are also looking over their shoulders. They're looking over their shoulders into the balcony seats, the second, third, fourth balcony. And those are the people with the muddy boots. And when those people begin to clap and clapping in Russia means get off the stage when it's done rhythmically, then I think Putin and the people on stage and the elite will try to get out and preserve themselves as soon as possible. Do you want to add to this exchange? I agree with John that it will not be a bottom-up change, but the reality that we have to confront is that Putin is most likely to be overthrown by the more extreme faction in his own country. It won't be kind of the pattern that we saw in the 1990s play out at the end of Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev's tenure. This will be a two-brutus. Standing on that stage, I was thinking they're performing Julius Caesar, John, and the hand on proverbial knife could be, Shoigu could be Nikolai Petrachev. It could be any number of figures who may foretell an even worse period in relations with Russia. So we have to be mindful that that, if Putin goes, it's, well, we certainly shouldn't oppose Putin being removed from office, but if his own people get rid of him, we shouldn't assume that it means that things will get better. So in that case, in that case, what should the goals of the US and its close allies and NATO and the EU be? Is there any path forward for diplomacy or is we're beyond diplomacy at this point? Or is there a path forward, basically? What you're describing is, you know, basically Putin might disappear, but we'll get worse. Things will get worse. And things are not going very well now. So what does that mean for security, for Europe? For Ukraine, of course. We have to keep in mind that this is, this is the wars being fought on Ukrainian ground and Ukrainians are dying as we speak. Is there a way forward with diplomacy or should we, you know, hear Zelensky and think about accepting Ukraine and NATO? Should we continue the line of no, because this will make things worse? We have Finland and Sweden who asked also to become members of NATO. I think in the short term, the most important thing is to keep the pressure on, the pressure that has been put on him by the sanctions, by the Ukrainian army trained and equipped by the West. Increasingly by the international community, Modi and Xi Jinping, for example. The worst mistake we could make now would be to back off because he's making nuclear threats, because he said that these provinces are now part of Russia. None of that has any basis at all in fact. And the nuclear threat, we could talk about that separately. We have to take that very, very seriously. But I don't think that we can allow that threat to make us lose our resolve. As far as diplomacy goes, I think it's very important that we keep relations with Russia, that we don't break relations. I think it's extremely important that we're gonna have an American ambassador in Moscow, hopefully in a couple of months. I think it's important that Jake Sullivan can get on the phone and call his counterpart, Patricia, not so much to negotiate, but to deliver messages. That's how the message was delivered about the catastrophic consequences that would ensue from any Russian use of nuclear weapons. But I think we're very, very far from any kind of diplomatic solution which would mean concessions by either side. Because what I heard from both Zelensky and Putin today was very far from anything that looks like a concession. I think that diplomacy is always somehow operating. There was the war prisoners exchange. There was this grain deal between Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine. So wherever there is room for diplomacy, it's there, and it's quite effective. I agree that at the moment, there is no match this room left for diplomacy. Definitely, back channels are important, and I very much hope that messages which should be delivered were delivered to Russia, so they know what they can expect in case they escalate towards nuclear, there will be a nuclear escalation. But obviously at certain point, diplomacy will be very useful and will be necessary, but what we should remember and what we should understand that always when we start negotiations with Russia, it should be from the position of strength and not weakness. All kind of narrative about dialogue, understanding channels of communication, so on and so forth, can be very easily misunderstood by the Russians and taken as signals of weaknesses. And if Putin and the Russian regime feels that the opponent is weak, then they just escalate and this is the end of any effective negotiations and any effective diplomacy. And just one word about, if I may add to this discussion about the role of Russian society and whether the system can be overturned or Putin somehow disappear due to the bottom-up actions. I believe that at certain points some major protests in Russia are possible. But unfortunately, remembering the Belarusian experience and definitely the majority of the Belarusians were totally against Lukashenko and the protests which took place across Belarus and lasted for months and at the end of the day there was very brutal, very cruel crackdown on civil society. And that unfortunately will happen in Russia if people in Russia do the same as the Belarusian citizens did. So unfortunately this is the reason why the regime may change or the leadership may change only due to some coup d'etat or some changes in the Putin inner circle. But it is possible that once if protests start in Russia this can be used by some people from the inner circle to get rid of Putin. So I would see this as the most likely scenario for the leadership change and then of course the question arises whether leadership change in Russia will lead to regime change or it will just mean the continuation under different leadership. Just on negotiations I would say I agree completely with the importance of the potential for diplomacy and also the conditions not being anywhere close to what would be necessary for that to happen. But I'd add one other caveat is whatever diplomacy happens should be driven by the interests of Kyiv, the Ukrainian government. John mentioned the miscalculations, the underestimating of the Ukrainian nation, Ukrainian state, Ukrainian military. Those miscalculations weren't just in Moscow. There were many in the West who did the same and we certainly owe it to the Ukrainians not to do that again. Anything that happens should happen from a position of strength and it should be led by the Ukrainians. So to go back to Ambassador Bayerli's your point that what drives Putin is self-preservation. What kind of constraints can we put on Russia that could actually work in de-escalating at least? I've been asked many times how should we react to his now explicit threats to use a nuclear weapon. And my answer is that we've been preparing that for 70 years. We have a nuclear deterrent. Not at all suggesting that we should be prepared for a nuclear war that's absolute anathema but the purpose of deterrence is to keep him from doing that. The messages that I believe were sent by the United States government to Moscow were that the United States will intervene in the conflict if he uses a weapon of mass destruction and I think those are constraints on his choices. He may be desperate. He may even be crazy. But is he suicidal? Well Poles have, you know, the immediate neighbors of Russia have sometimes believed that yes, he's suicidal that he might go till the end because he refuses to step down to back down to de-escalate. And Poland has a very long border with Russia. With Ukraine has welcomed over 3 million Ukrainian refugees many of whom went back to Ukraine those who were from regions where the war is not, you know, the region of Kiev and Western Ukraine. So we have to think also about the security of immediate neighbors, the Baltic states, Poland, Romania, Moldavia. So what do you feel or what do you think is the way forward to make sure that these immediate neighbors remain safe? For the immediate neighbors like Poland and for us that's been really a strategic earthquake because three of our neighbors Belarus, Russia and Ukraine are directly involved in the military conflict and it was almost 7 million refugees who have crossed Polish borders since the beginning of this full-scale invasion. The majority of them, less than 5 million, came back to Ukraine. Some of them went further west and around 2 million and a half remained in Poland. But that is an incredible experience for Polish society as in every school, every class there are Ukrainian kids and Russian language, not Ukrainian because these are mostly people from the eastern regions of the Ukrainian people for whom the first language is Russian, not Ukrainian. So Russian language is now the next after Polish most popular and often spoken language in Poland, so it's quite a paradox of this situation but yes, it is very scary for Polish society and to increase to make us and all the countries of Central Europe feel more secure I think that three factors are crucial here. Firstly is the unity of the transatlantic alliance but also unity of the EU and European cooperation. So it's very important for us to trust not only the US but also trust our European allies that if the worst-case scenario happens and the conflict spills over to Poland or the Baltic states they will respect the article 5 and they will respect the principle all for one, one for all. That's very important but of course we have our homework to do to encourage this unity and I must say that Polish government was really very good at handling the refugee crisis and reacting properly reacting to the invasion there are some major problems in our European policy which actually feeds some divisions inside the EU and inside the European divisions in Europe which is not good. So firstly unity secondly it's strengthening the US and NATO presence in our region which is already what is already happening and third factor is to continue military but also economic aid to Ukraine as we are deeply convinced that the Ukrainians are fighting for us and in case of Poland, in case of the Baltic states this is not just a theoretical assumption but this is exactly the case if Ukraine failed Poland or the Baltic states I mean if Ukraine fails and I hope it will never happen Poland and the Baltic states will be the next so we absolutely believe that they are fighting for us and therefore the military aid and the budgetary aid which is also very important is one of the most important factors for our security. So how do you see the American response for that and what you know the path forward for Well I think I mean the constraint that we can most easily put on Putin I think is a military constraint which challenges his army I think the sanctions are the sanctions I don't think that they will bring the Russian economy to its knees anytime soon and people have an almost limitless capacity to take this on board to take one for the team so to speak but militarily I think to get very precise about this I think it's time for us to look at those weapon systems that we have been holding in reserve saying we don't want to provoke Putin, we don't want to let him escalate, well guess what he just escalated the war significantly so from the American side I would say Abrams tanks which have sort of been no go up until now, German Leopard tanks and sophisticated aircraft F-16s I think it's time to talk about that seriously it's already being talked about in Germany two of Schultz's coalition partners have already come out tougher than he is and I think when Congress gets back from the midterm elections you're going to hear a renewed call for more, a higher grade of weapon and that will have the same effect on the battlefield that those Heimars long range missiles have I think there's one last thing that's very important for us to do in the Democratic West and that is be forthcoming and honest with our own people Putin's play is that he's going to catch us in the same lie that he caught in his special military operation but insulating his population from it we the Democratic West, the leaders of Europe the leaders of the United States need to make the tough case to their people on why this hardship is worth enduring, whatever small amount of hardship we're enduring compared to the people of Ukraine today and ensure that we remain unified in our own societies not just between our institutions or within our institutions but within our societies our elections, European elections will be opportunities for Putin to exploit he's already shown a propensity to do so certainly in both Europe and the United States and our leaders, our political leadership needs to anchor our policies in the popular support of the people Thank you, did you want to add something? Yeah, I just wanted to comment on this theoretically I agree that there should be a very clear message from the elites or from the decision makers to wider public that we have to suffer for a while in order to put in and to guarantee the sustainable peace in Europe but there is always but public opinion polls show quite it's quite significant and growing up between the decision makers position on Ukraine and Russia and Europe and the wider public and this is definitely the case in Italy this was the case in Italy this is the case in France, in Spain in Portugal but it's also the case in Slovakia the polls show that 50% of Slovakians are against are in favor of Ukraine but 50% just want peace at any cost and even if that would mean serious territorial concessions by Ukraine and in Prague just a couple of days ago there was huge demonstrations of people who demanded just gas supplies from Russia and even there were demands of leaving the EU and NATO I know that it does not necessarily reflect the position of the whole society but Euro skepticism has increased both in Slovakia and in Czech Republic so in this context polls are quite unique that with this very consensual approach to Russia, to Ukraine and to war and this growing up between the decision makers and the public it is a real problem in the democratic countries I mean in Russia Putin can totally disregard what his people think but in democratic Europe decision makers just want to be reelected that's the normal thing in democracy so it's not that easy for them just to go to the people and say you are frustrated with the suffering which you already experienced but what I would like to tell you is that you will suffer more that is not the best recipe for the victorious election unfortunately I don't disagree with you on your description of the condition if they don't do it then Vladimir Putin will so who do you want speaking to your democratic society do you want Russian propaganda, Russian disinformation or is it a moment when the democratic leaders of the west need to make those tough appearances and make the case for this we need to do it here in the United States too we have the same conditions perhaps less acute in the United States but if we are this is what Putin's calculation is Putin's calculation is that he can outlast us and it's going to take our democratic political leadership to ensure that we are insulated against his manipulations I don't think we have a choice yeah but this is why I said that Putin is really master in unifying the west because I'm not sure that like it's better to tell people you will suffer some of them will believe, some of them will just support another political party if people see the atrocities which are happening under Russian occupation when they see what Russia did in eastern Ukraine when they see this sham referendums and this terrible theater in Kremlin that is the message which really unifies the European Union European public and mobilize the west to fight against Putin and just decision makers should make sure that this pictures this information is properly delivered to the public I completely agree but that's what our leaders have to do is they have to make clear that we understand the stakes not just the hardship but why the hardship is worth making and it is for all the reasons you mentioned what he's doing has the possibility of throwing the entire continent of Europe into war and we need to stop him here on that note unless you have something to add I think it's time to open the floor to your questions we have staff people with microphones so if you can raise your hand to me and they will bring a microphone to you here we have our Ukrainian scholar at risk fellow Oksana Chabanyuk thank you I'm a scholar at risk fellow from Kharkiv Ukraine I have a very short question but I hope to receive your expertise answer what answer would you predict Ukraine will receive from NATO after today's application for instance Ukraine doesn't have the sufficient air defense weapons to close the sky and the air strikes which are against civilians in the cities are very horrible for instance the missile reaches from the border of Russia to Kharkiv only during three minutes thank you I don't think the political conditions are in place and I wouldn't advocate for Ukraine's full entry into NATO at this moment in the midst of an act of war it would be a just response but it would almost be the equivalent of Putin's annexation of the four territories and placing his new border right in the middle of the conflict zone in Zaporizhia and Donetsk-Bahansk and Hurson what I would do instead is I would treat Ukraine as a de facto NATO member in providing all forms of military assistance to them in order to help their defense and to get directly involved in this war right now is simply not something that you would be successful in fact it would very likely backfire in terms of gaining support in the West to sustain the effort against Putin I would just make sure the Ukrainians have everything they need including some of the equipment that Ambassador Byerly was mentioning to defend themselves I would add we don't need to be involved in a pretty good job with our material with our training de facto NATO member as you said as long as they keep advancing and they do seem to keep advancing I think it's off the table really Hello, I'm a student here at the Ford School of Public Policy and I had a question regarding the recent border clashes in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and Armenia and Azerbaijan how do you really think that Russia has impacted those and what do you guys see coming in the next six months a year in terms of those conflicts I know Armenia and Azerbaijan have had long-standing tension but it just seems to be getting worse especially over the past couple of years Good question Armenia and Azerbaijan remember that was a sort of settlement that was brokered by Russia and involves the stationing of Russian troops in Armenia I'm not really sure that Russia can afford to station a lot of troops there so I think what you're seeing happening there in Tajikistan with Uzbekistan and possibly elsewhere I'll get to that in a minute is what happens when there's a distraction at the top when there's a sense that there's an opening there's an opportunity to make some gains because Russia is not going to be in a position to stop it and I'll tell you what I worry about is Georgia Sakashvili is not in charge anymore but I could imagine there are discussions going on in Georgia saying it's time for us to try to take back South Ossetia to try to take back Abkhazia because the Russians will be in no position to counter it It won't be this Georgian government, I'm afraid I'd expand it out a little bit what you're seeing is a loosening of Russia's grip over these former Soviet territories Uzbekistan mentioned Tajikistan Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have a border clash as well at the same time and what's happened is Russia's attention and its influence are redirected in a different direction it's kind of like if you're Lord of the Rings fans the Eye of Soran has moved off of them and what you're seeing is not a vacuum but a vacuum being filled by China the headline for those of us who watch former Soviet politics from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting was the criticism from Prime Minister Modi and the implicit criticism from President Xi Jinping of Vladimir Putin's war but what was really noteworthy to me was the fawning statements that all five Central Asian states released after the bilateral meetings between their leaders and Xi Jinping China's grip on Central Asia is substantial and growing it's ironic because the United States two decades ago tried to establish the same kind of influence in the region and faced enormous Russian resistance there are also challenges to us because we bring normative expectations, human rights, democracy that were unwelcome by many of the Central Asian leaders but the United States has largely vacated Central Asia as a foreign policy interest but China is stepping in and at some point this will generate concern in some corners of the Kremlin as well I'll go even farther, I would say that this is the last phase of the decomposition of the Soviet Empire and Russia is losing Central Asia to China but it's also losing Azerbaijan to Turkey and the recent escalation between Azerbaijan and Armenia was definitely provoked by Azerbaijan who is stronger now and receives substantial political but not only political support from Turkey Armenia immediately asked Russia for help but Russia remained silent which was quite symptomatic and the intention of Azerbaijan is to get the corridor exterritorial or just the Azerbaijan control corridor to Nakhichevan which is Azerbaijani-exclave bordering Iran and that would split Armenia into two pieces and make it in fact the kind of cripple remaining of what Armenia used to be so it's a deadly threat to Armenia and Russian influence in this country but still Armenia remained silent and as for Georgia I would be absolutely sure that under this government they will definitely not claim neither Ossetian or Abhazia and I'm not very much in favor of this government but they are quite clever in this respect Thank you I will start making a list you and then another student on this side and then Ambassador Milovitsky There's a student in the back who has a mic They have the mics already So we'll go with you then in the back because you have your microphone Good evening to you all and thank you very much for having this talk My question is how has the level of first-hand accounts with social media changed the calculus of American diplomacy especially relating to the 2009 Russian military reorganization and the perceived military might of the Russian machine and how that's being reflected in the actual conflict on the ground at this time and what the implications are for future conflicts in the age of social media Thank you It was a terribly planned military campaign but I think most analysts believe that it was actually an intelligence campaign anyway It was planned by intelligence officials but the military was the implementor of it and it was catastrophic The collective west deserves enormous credit for the resolve it's shown from the very beginning and it was a real reversal I understand that it started in 2008 with the Russian invasion of Georgia and then in 2014 with the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea This is a demonstration as the ambassador said that the Europeans in the US could work together and that that unity has delivered an outcome I think it's reaffirmed US faith in many of our NATO allies When you look at the scorecard of Putin's accomplishments he's overturned Scandinavian neutrality he's overturned German pacifism and he's united the European Union and the United States in the great geopolitical challenge of our era Pretty extraordinary track record Can you stand up so we can see you? Hello, my name is Zaire I'm from Taiwan and I have a question about information warfare during this invasion because as we know there are many fake news and propaganda through the internet so I want to know if we have any concrete policies toward this invasion through the internet and how do you think about the situation in Taiwan? You can answer the second question So maybe I'll... informational warfare I think one of the most remarkable aspects of this war in terms of information has been a reversal of American policy with regard to intelligence We have, I think the best intelligence-gathering apparatus and people in the world but the information that comes from that apparatus and those people has been guarded like the crown jewels that changed when it became very apparent what Putin was aiming to do in Ukraine and the American government had no compunction about making this public about sharing pretty sensitive intelligence with the world and also privately talking to the Russians in a way that leaves the Russians in no doubt that we have a lot of sight sight lines into what's happening there I'll give our friend and colleague Bill Burns the current director of the CIA and my predecessor, his ambassador in Moscow a lot of credit for that because he had to overcome a lot of resistance within the CIA to do that but it was fundamentally important because it pulled the rug out from under all of Russia's efforts to put out what is fake news they really never recovered from that Information warfare is one of the most important elements of this war next to military, economic and surprisingly that wasn't absolutely obvious for us, it was obvious to these US intelligence but definitely it wasn't obvious to the European experts that this war would be won so quickly and so easily however, I think that the huge role was played here by the Ukrainians and by President Zelensky himself as he demonstrated incredible leadership and incredible charisma and ability to communicate not only with his own people but also with specific nations in Europe in the US using their cultural codes and there were lots, there were huge doubts I remember when Zelensky became president whether he's capable of running such a big country but his experience, his previous experience I think helped him very much in communicating in a very, very effective and professional way with the Europeans American citizens and of course with the Ukrainians there is lots of hope in the EU, not in Poland but in Germany and France that Europe will be able to develop some channels of communications with the Russian society and here I must say that I am very skeptical I believe that the Russians have lots of independent source of information run by anti-Putin Russians on social media, on telegram, on YouTube and this works so if someone in Russia really wants to learn what's going on everyone who is more or less skillful on the internet can get access to independent information so if the Russians trust any anti-regime information it will be information coming from the Russians and not from Europeans or from American media so that's why I think it's very difficult actually to reach out to the Russian society but if it happens it will happen thanks to the Russian citizens and not thanks to our effort The question of Taiwan comes up often and whether or not there's anything analogous in China's potential towards Taiwan would be comparable to Russia's with Ukraine I don't think there is much in that that is analogous but it is worth looking at what lessons China might be drawing from this as it thinks about its own policies towards Taiwan It was just a couple weeks before the invasion that President Putin was in Beijing with Xi Jinping celebrating what they termed a partnership without limits It sure looks like there's some limits on that partnership now First of all, China at least to my knowledge has not provided any direct military support to China to Russia, to Putin despite being obviously approached by the Russian government for that kind of support China has paid a substantial economic cost domestically as have all the rest of the economies in the world from the degree to which the invasion exacerbated already challenging economic conditions China has found itself in an uncomfortable position of straddling the inviolability of borders and the sovereignty of states with Putin's blatant intrusion into Ukraine and his invasion of his neighbor and just today the President of Russia validated in his view that a national referendum could confirm independence on territory that other countries might claim certainly a principle that Xi Jinping would not want to see infecting the political discourse in Taiwan the Chinese are clearly putting some distance between themselves and Russia but we need more from China now and this will be an opportunity I'm not Polly Anish but Xi Jinping is in the last few weeks of a leadership selection process which is highly predictable in China for a third term after October 16th and once he's in place he has an opportunity to help shore up the rules based order that has benefited China so much over the past three decades but if he will then that means he will also have to put pressure on Putin just as we in all other civilized nations West I have a question, my name is Carlos first year MPP student and this question is directed to the Deputy Secretary it's like a series of questions regarding the same issue the first one is should in your opinion the United States make a pre-emptive strike in Russian soil or in the Ukrainian soil to shift the tides of the war the second one is if the Russians decide to take it further and actually go with the war how much would it take Congress to declare it back and the third one is how safe is the United States soil to handle this kind of as you said nuclear possibility I would frame all those questions in the same context as the question about NATO membership that at this point the United States is going to there are going to be some limits on what the United States is going to do appropriately so including for example that we wouldn't launch a preemptive strike and I don't think we should talk a lot publicly about nuclear war either I even get uncomfortable with my own answer about our deterrence but it's the reality of the world we live in that's how we keep nuclear weapons from being used is with the tool of deterrence and that's kept the peace for 70 years thankfully there are circumstances under which I would short of a weapon of mass destruction the only circumstances where I would see us making direct strikes back is if Russia violates NATO territory President Biden has said that the United States and the NATO allies will defend every inch of territory if Poland for example was struck by a conventional attack on an arms depot or something on the border I think the United States should immediately respond on Ukrainian territory and make it a very very costly strike against Russian targets in Ukraine I'd limit it to Ukraine I wouldn't go into Russia proper but I would consider Ukraine everything up to the eastern border of the Donbass and Luhansk with Russia we shouldn't initiate this but we should be deadly serious that if any attack is launched against NATO that there will be a response and quite frankly an immediate response can you stand up please it's easier to sure can you hear me perfect I'm Kendrick I'm a law student here and this is kind of continuing on the previous point regarding the use of nuclear weapons you indicated previously that the U.S. saw that as a red line beyond which a lot of intervention perhaps a return of nuclear weapons would be necessary but in terms of the use of smaller like tactical nuclear weapons or other CBRN weapons if those were to be used by Russia in Ukraine as a means to raise to escalate the conflict without necessarily taking it fully you know globally nuclear what would be the U.S. response and how likely do you think Putin is to engage in that kind of behavior well I'll jump in I don't know if you want to jump in on this but first of all there's no military strategic case to use those weapons in Ukraine there's no concentration of forces it wouldn't be effective as a battlefield weapon depending on the type of weapon that the Russians might use it could also have reverberations for their own forces you're talking about forces that are in close combat with each other and there's no sensible military strategy that would have you use those weapons but that doesn't mean Putin wouldn't do something for a demonstration effect perhaps to further test to resolve the Europeans the message that I am crazy and I'm willing to test whether you're suicidal but in any of these cases and I believe this is the message the United States government has sent to the Kremlin that will initiate the same kind of response inside Ukraine that I just mentioned a moment ago in the event of an attack on NATO we have to be absolutely clear there will be no upside for Putin for the use of weapons of mass destruction there's a very good op-ed piece today in the Washington Post former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen and Sam Nunn about this issue and one of the solutions they also propose is it's time for the United States and China to get together and go talk to Russia and tell Putin to just knock it off one thing if this helps you sleep better at night I'm convinced that our American response to Russian use of let's say a tactical nuke in Ukraine will be conventional as someone said a strike by Americans inside of Ukraine and possibly a couple of cyber attacks that could maybe shut down the Russian banking system or blackout cities that has a demonstration effect too we have who has a microphone right now hello my name is Svetlana just one second and then we have in front here sorry go ahead good afternoon I'm very glad to see everybody and my name is Svetlana I'm from Ukraine I'm a Fulbright fellow here and I'm from Mikolayev and my question is so you mentioned that you are ready to support Ukraine and maybe not in the way that we really want this support but of course we are very grateful for those countries who support us and who help a lot my question is that what do you think in what way it is possible to persuade other countries and other leaders to help more thank you there are two ways one I've already mentioned that's just to show to to the Europeans what's really happened in Ukraine how Russia and Russian soldiers behaved on the Ukrainian territory and by this sending this message it mobilizes European public and the European public then exerts pressure on their government and actually this happened in Germany I think that Germany is the only member states in which the government was much more reluctant in terms of providing both military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine much more reluctant than the German public and there were huge demonstrations in Berlin and the pressure worked finally some military aid was delivered but then again Chancellor Schultz promised next weapons supplies but he didn't didn't deliver on this promise so again there was pressure from experts from the wider public and again it worked so this is one way and of course another way is to create like-minded coalitions and this is up to the governments like Polish governments Poland could have here a special important role to create such like-minded countries and government coalitions which would put forward some specific proposals how to how to increase and how to handle the long lasting and sustainable support to Ukraine unfortunately a Polish government is like although a Polish government was very effective with pro-Ukrainian policy and supporting the refugee Ukrainian refugees in Poland they are very anti-European and anti-German in the European policy and inside Poland that makes very difficult for Polish Prime Minister and for Polish President to go to Germany to go to France and to convince them that they should send more weapons and more money to Ukraine and it would be very difficult in Europe but between the Nordic states this could be Sweden, Finland, Denmark but it happens that all these countries are also very sensitive on the issue of the rule of law and here again Poland has quite significant problems in this sphere and that makes very difficult for the government to create this Polish Nordic-North-South coalition countries which border Belarus, Russia and Ukraine coalition which will convince other European member states to increase military and financial support to Ukraine so that would be the best strategy but for this reasons Poland unfortunately isn't able to create such coalition and since Poland is the biggest country of Central Europe the biggest country which borders Russia and Ukraine there is no other so much engaged and member states which would be able to create this coalition and to strengthen these other member states to strengthen the support and the problem in Europe now is that in fact Europe is leaderless in this policy towards the war or to put it frankly Europe outsources leadership to the US and this is not the best strategy for the war which is taking place in Europe and in our neighborhood and not in your neighborhood so we have time for one more question now I'm torn I can give the voice to you Ambassador Levitsky or to two Ukrainian fellows what can I say so maybe you can be very brief both of you and then Mel can make a and then that will serve as a round up I can go over a little bit too I defer to John on that issue Thank you very much maybe somehow our questions might coincide so thank you very much I'm a part of the Ukrainian scholars program in Europe and Eurasia and following up on the topic of nuclear energy regarding the situation with this nuclear plant close to the Parisia overtaken now at this point, at this age in these circumstances even without nuclear weapons in such cases if such nuclear object is overtaken it somehow changes the energy security landscape for instance, will countries in the future somehow change their attitude even to atomic energy, nuclear energy for peaceful purposes for instance, make constructing less atomic plants because on the one hand we are all facing climate change on the planet and atomic nuclear energy is considered cleaner than oil as a supply so do you think it will affect somehow or maybe not, thank you so much Yuri, ask your question Thank you very much, ambassadors my name is Yuri Kapoorlin, I'm a state professor at Herson State University and I'm with him at the Wiser Center for Europe and Eurasia Studies so my question, if shortly I found very interesting detail in today's speech Putin he spoke not only about war against collective west but also against Anglo-Saxon and then he talked and spoke about genocides in US history so what does it mean on diplomatic level language maybe I can say more but if shortly, yeah you need a microphone just a couple of comments by the way one, one, one I just want to make a comment about international law and why resolving this issue is important for international law if Putin or the Russians gets away with this these situations around the world where bad neighbors are at each other's throats it's one that is delicate and it's one that certainly the United States doesn't want to get involved in physically itself but it's something that we have to have persistence with and I agree with what you said about Putin if he were the historian looking at US history he could well think that we'd get tired of this and that's a danger I don't think we will in this case because the administration has staked out a very strong position on this but this has to be resolved it's a much bigger issue than just Russia-Ukraine I think it's a big international issue so I just wanted to point that out for some of my sources thank you very much so you have three different questions I'll take a crack at the nuclear one there is a risk that this war will have an effect on what I see as a sort of very slow emerging international consensus that nuclear energy needs to be looked at seriously as one of our responses to climate change I think it's possible if there is a leak, if there is some sort of catastrophic event that happens and that's why I think to go back to the question of diplomacy and keeping space for diplomacy open the IAEA, as far as I know those inspectors are still in Ziparizhe and it's very important that they continue to work with both sides to make that basically a demilitarized zone I agree with Ambassador Lobitsky at the stakes here they're radical, but they are very real in the historical sweep that Putin is trying covers in his revisionist history in the period that he wants to rewrite the history for there's not a border between Russia and the United Kingdom that is in the same place it was during that period Europe has seen a shifting of borders Putin goes back to the collapse of the Russian Empire the Austrian, Hungarian Empire and even the German Empire, the Prussians there's not a border that could be secured now we have done a lot in western and central Europe central Eastern Europe over those years including the very wise decision in my view to enlarge NATO and to enlarge the European Union which overcame those borders with supranational bodies that helped cement the status quo and today as not a NATO member with this invasion just think about the meltdown that would be happening in this region that was the vortex for the two world wars that we fought in the 20th century thank goodness prudent decisions were made to strengthen the sovereignty and security of those states but parts of Europe still remain outside that and it's obvious that that's the playground in which Putin is playing, it's one other thing I want to say it's wonderful to see so many Ukrainian participants here and I don't think I've tried to hide my enormous sympathy and respect for what your country and what your people are doing but it's also with a sense of loss that I say here like the two ambassadors on either side of me we have spent much of our lives working in or with Russia and there was a day when we would have an equal number of Russian participants in this session and it really ever since I began my first undergraduate course here at the University of Michigan as a Russian major it has been part of my life for 37 years and that's all gone and John knows my mantra about Russia it said don't give in to Putin but don't give up on Russia and it seems awfully hard now to hang on to that but really we have to find a way to bring the Russian people back to not under Putin and not without a price to be paid by the authors of this brutal, terrible war but we can't give up on the Russian people either Thank you When Fukushima catastrophe happened in Japan, Germany decided to close all the nuclear power plants in Germany and together with green energy transformation it led Germany to a very high dependency on Russian energy on Russian actual natural gas supplies so at the moment it's a total top priority for everyone in Europe to just cut off this dependency of the Russian energy of the Russian fossil fuels and that's why I don't think that anyone in Europe now will think about closing nuclear power plants actually there is quite significant debate in Germany how to reverse some decisions which had been already made so maybe in the medium long term perspective we will come back to this issue but at the moment this is mostly about cutting off Russian oil and Russian natural gas Putin's pointing to the UK to the US that's the element of his propaganda there is small evil this is the EU and there is the huge evil standing behind the EU and we are actually the puppets in Europe we are the puppets of this huge evil and that is the US so that's been always his propaganda and of course he continues to present it this way to his people but also to the Europeans as he understands that he can fuel anti-American sentiments not only in Europe but also across the world and in fact I think that everyone here is aware that such sentiments exist and this is the serious problem for the US but also for the European Union and I just wanted definitely very much agree with your words about Russia it's especially important for Poland as Russia will never ever disappear it will always be where it is and it will be next to Poland so it's absolutely crucial for my country that one day there will be peaceful civilized government and that the Russian people will again be able to travel to Europe with us and we will feel safe with them and they will feel safe with us we understand after the three decades of last three decades that this will not happen overnight it takes generations for people to change to transform their mindset and still we definitely cannot give up on the Russians because they are in Europe and even though now they believe that they can somehow become a part of Pax Chinese is that something like Pax Chinese there is nothing like this and they are just Europeans we have to conclude I would like to thank our distinguished guests and to everyone here to be to having joined us